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Abstract 
This work examines the ways in which the relationship between society and 
nature is problematic for social theory. The Frankfurt School’s notion of the 
dialectic of enlightenment is considered, as are the attempts by Jurgen Habermas 
to defend an ‘emancipatory’ theory of modernity against this. The marginalising 
effect Habermas’ defence of reason has had on the place of nature in his critical 
social theory is examined, as is the work of theorists such as Ulrich Beck and 
Klaus Eder. For these latter authors, unlike Habermas, the social relation to nature 
is at the centre of contemporary society, giving rise to new forms of 
modernisation and politics. 
Michel Foucault’s work on biopolitics and governmentality is examined 
against the background of his philosophical debate with Habermas on power and 
rationality. The growth of scientific ecology is shown to have both problematised 
the social relation to nature and provided the political technology for new forms 
of regulatory intervention in the management of the population and resources. 
These new forms of intervention constitute a form of ecological governmentality 
along the lines discussed by Foucault and others in relation to the human sciences.  
However, Foucault’s work is not sufficiently critical of the relationship 
between the natural sciences and power. Extending Foucault’s biopolitics to 
environmental discourse is consistent with his general approach to power, but his 
incomplete critique of political sovereignty meant that for him agency remained 
tied to an idealised notion of the autonomy of the human subject. He therefore 
made too strong a distinction between the human and natural sciences and 
between power and the capacities of non-human entities, and continued to view 
the natural sciences as separating themselves from power in a way that was not 
possible in the human sciences. 
A more general critique of epistemic sovereignty reveals that the natural 
sciences (including ecology) are subject to disciplinary and normalising practices 
similar to those of the human sciences. Foucault’s key inadequacy is that he 
linked agency to human autonomy and sovereignty. The work of Bruno Latour 
and other actor network theorists show that an unambiguous ontological 
distinction between nature, material technologies and active human subjects is 
highly problematic. In the place of a separate ‘society’ and ‘nature’, this thesis 
argues that it is preferable to see these as a single socio-nature populated by the 
hybrid products of translation networks. 
By drawing together the insights of recent governmentality studies and the 
approach of actor network theory to agency and translation, Foucault’s concept of 
biopolitics can be adapted to provide a theoretical framework for understanding 
the ecological programs of government that have emerged around the problem of 
nature in second half of the twentieth century. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction: the problem of nature 
Most contemporary Western thinking about the natural environment is 
characterised by an ecological view of nature, that is, by the belief that the 
relationship between human society and nature must, at least to some degree, be 
managed or guided by the principles and laws expounded by the science of 
ecology. The research problem that underlies this thesis is how the natural 
sciences, and ecology in particular, contribute to the governing of human conduct 
through the representations of nature they provide. The thesis is a critical 
reflection on how the representation of nature by scientific expertise acts as a 
political resource which actively constitutes the objects of government and at the 
same time provides the intellectual machinery or ‘political technology’ necessary 
for such government. 
More particularly, this thesis is about the problem of nature in contemporary 
social theory. It examines the way in which two major theoretical perspectives - a 
German tradition of critical theory drawing on the work of the Frankfurt School 
and Jurgen Habermas, and a post-structuralist tradition deriving from the work of 
French theorists Michel Foucault and Bruno Latour - engage with this problem. 
Why study these two schools of thought? Both perspectives have something 
significant to say about the relationship between society and nature, and I wanted 
to explore the implications of the different approaches for how we understand key 
concepts in political philosophy such as power and agency, and how these relate 
to contemporary concerns over the natural environment. 
The problem of nature as approached here is not primarily the problem as 
framed by the rationalist and utilitarian traditions, of how to subject nature 
through science and technology to human ends such as economic growth. Rather 
the problem is one that results from the apparent success of such economic 
development and scientific ‘domination’ of nature. The problem is most clearly 
evident in the contemporary ecological notion that the exploitation of nature in 
modern industrial society puts at risk not only human welfare but also the material 
basis of life in general. The ‘problem of nature’ should be understood subject to 
the qualification that in using this term I am referring specifically to the 
contemporary theoretical formulation of the natural environment as an issue of 
social concern and as a site of political conflict. By pointing to the theoretical 
formulation of the social relation to nature as a problem, I wish to emphasise that 
this process is an important discursive development not only within political and 
social theory, but also within key areas of the natural sciences. Thus, 
environmental risk is an issue that, in one form or another, has increasingly 
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occupied the social and biological sciences over the past four decades, and has 
been the focus for an expanding domain of policy formulation and administrative 
intervention by States, international institutions and social movements. 
This work is firmly situated within the context of those contemporary 
environmental debates and problems of ecological risk. Yet, I am not concerned 
here with the scientific details of such issues in a substantive way. Neither am I 
directly concerned with the evaluation of policies and regulatory instruments that 
might be appropriate and efficacious for the management of environmental 
problems. This is not to suggest that these tasks are unimportant, or that the 
conclusions of this thesis have no relevance to the policy and practice of 
environmental protection. 1 
The German critical theory tradition – stretching from Weber via the 
Frankfurt School to contemporary theorists of a new politics of ecological 
modernisation such as Klaus Eder and Ulrich Beck – is intimately bound up with 
the critique of the process of rationalisation. This tradition sees societal 
rationalisation as the dynamic behind modernisation and takes seriously the 
heteronomous effects of technocratic rationality on human freedom. German 
critical theory has been one of the most outspoken critics of the effect of such 
technocratic rationalisation on human autonomy. At the same time it has also 
sought to preserve the notion that there is an underlying normative content of 
reason which is essential to human freedom and social progress.  
The Frankfurt School (particularly Horkheimer and Adorno) and recent 
theorists such as Eder and Beck have taken as central in their work a close 
connection between the scientific domination of ‘external’ nature and repression 
of human ‘inner’ nature. In doing so they have anticipated from a social theory 
perspective, themes taken up in environmental discourse over the past four 
decades, and have done so with a degree of philosophical and sociological 
sophistication that has generally been lacking in the moralistic and scientistic 
efforts of much environmental dialogue. Nevertheless, this German tradition, 
including contemporary theorists such as Beck, in the end fails to break with the 
tendency to seek a ‘dialectical unification of processes of rationalisation’, and to 
privilege the abstract and general over the substantive analysis of the multiple and 
dispersed forms of practical and technical rationality which characterises the work 
of the theoretical tradition deriving from Foucault. (Dean, 1998b) 
                                                 
1  In fact, I consider these to be important matters. Environmental policy and regulation are issues 
with which I have been engaged for over 17 years of professional life - within non-government 
environmental organisations, with State environment protection agencies, and in university 
teaching. 
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The thesis is more sympathetic to work of the French theorists Foucault and 
Latour. While the work of each has a different focus – Foucault is perhaps best 
characterised a political philosopher, while Latour is a sociologist of science – 
each can contribute to the development of a more satisfactory understanding of 
the dynamics underlying contemporary ecological discourses and practices. In 
particular both authors, albeit in different ways which I consider in some detail, 
place particular importance on the relationship between expertise, scientific 
knowledge, and government. Government is not simply (or in many instances, 
even primarily) the activities of the State. Rather it is seen by both theorists as a 
series of matrices or networks of power through which authorities of all sorts 
(scientific, moral, economic, legal, technical, as well as ‘political’) attempt to 
translate their plans, calculations, schemes and interests in ways which shape the 
conduct and beliefs of others. Rose and Miller (1992 p.175) most succinctly sum 
up this perspective when they say that  
Knowledge is central to these activities of government and to the very 
formation of its objects, for government is a domain of cognition, 
calculation, experimentation and evaluation. And, we argue, government 
is intrinsically linked to the activities of expertise, whose role is not one 
of weaving an all-pervasive web of ‘social control’, but of enacting 
assorted attempts at the calculated administration of diverse aspects of 
conduct through countless, often competing, local tactics of education, 
persuasion, inducement, management, incitement, motivation and 
encouragement. 
These comments direct our attention to one of the key elements that 
distinguish this approach from the other main theoretical perspective considered 
in this thesis, the critical theory of Jurgen Habermas and the Frankfurt School. 
Both Foucault and Latour decline to understand the relationship between the 
technical and the political as an opposition (although as I argue Foucault’s 
approach has significant shortcomings). The technical is not something that 
interferes with or frustrates the realisation of the potential for human freedom, but 
rather is fundamental to the constitution of agency. Hence, the problem of nature 
is examined here within a specific theoretical framework. That framework draws 
on both the work of Foucault (and those scholars who have developed his work on 
political philosophy and especially ‘governmentality’ over the past 15 years) 2 and 
                                                 
2 I am referring to the works of Nikolas Rose and Peter Miller in particular, but also important 
work by Barry Hindess, Mitchell Dean, Paul Patton, Joseph Rose, Graham Burchell, and Colin 
Gordon, among others. For the major contributions see Barry et al. (1996); Burchell et al. 
(1991); Dean (1994); Gane and Johnson (1993); Gordon (1991); Hindess (1996); Miller 
(1987); Moss (1998); Patton (1994); Rose (1999); Rose and Miller (1992); Rouse (1987). 
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the work of Bruno Latour and those associated with what is known as actor 
network theory.3 
Environmental issues and conflicts have generated a substantial literature in 
political science (especially the policy studies area), philosophy (particularly in 
ethics), sociology (social movement theory), law, economics, and geography. 
Environmental conflicts make problematic the modes of conduct with which we 
relate to the natural environment. What is at issue then, are the ways in which 
specific social activities or technical practices affecting the natural environment 
are turned into problems and challenged, giving rise to conflicts over how such 
problems should be dealt with.4 Taking up the sort of analysis explored by 
Foucault, the problem of the social relation to nature can be understood as 
involving four different dimensions of ‘government’, each of which shapes the 
ways in which we relate to and interact with the natural environment. These four 
dimensions of government are forms of knowledge, relations of power, technical 
rationalities, and practices of identity formation. Thus, as James Tully has 
expressed it 
Our ‘relation to nature’ in any organised form of practice, such as, say, 
forestry, is a complex experience that conjoins four dimensions: (1) a 
field of knowledge (including concepts, theories, economic, scientific, 
and political disciplines, practical know-how and so on, often at odds 
with each other), (2) ways of governing the individuals and groups 
involved in this activity (employing techniques, rules, procedures, 
relations of power, and so forth), (3) the practical rationalities in 
accordance with which human aptitudes are exercised on nature through 
various technologies, and (4) the practices of self-formation available in 
our cultures by which individuals make themselves over as ethical agents 
in relation to nature. (Tully, 1997 p.6) 
Employing this general approach the thesis shows how Foucault’s notion of 
biopower can be adapted to the understanding of environmental government. 
Biopower is that aspect of modern power, according to Foucault, which is 
simultaneously focused on disciplining of the body of the individual and 
managing the population through the regulation of its biological processes. 
Following from this, I advance three central propositions in this thesis. First, the 
concern with environmental problems and ecological risk which has emerged to 
prominence in the past four decades can be seen as a development of what 
                                                 
3 I include in this Latour’s early work with Woolgar (Woolgar and Latour, 1979) and the work of 
Callon and Law. See Callon (1986); Callon and Latour (1981); Latour (1983); (1987); (1991); 
(1993); Law (1986); (1991b); (1994). 
4 Sometimes of course, the conflict is over whether or not there is a problem – this was 
particularly evident in the earlier stages of the debates on both ozone depletion and global 
warming. 
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Foucault called ‘the regulatory biopolitics of the population’. Second, this 
relatively recent articulation of biopolitics gives rise to new techniques for 
managing the environment and the population, which are dependent on the 
institutionalisation of new areas of scientific expertise, which is itself based on a 
bio-economic understanding of global systems ecology. Third, this aspect of 
contemporary biopolitics is expressed as a distinctive mode of governmental 
rationality that I describe as ecological governmentality.  
As I have noted, examination of the work of the German scholars mentioned 
above reveals a concern with the processes of social rationalisation that locates 
the problem of nature as a consequence of modernisation. Discussion of how the 
problem of nature relates to the wider concerns of a critical social theory leads 
into the major debate between Habermas and Foucault on power and rationality. 
While Foucault’s view of power is superior to that of Habermas and critical 
theory, there is nevertheless a significant gap in his work as it applies to the 
natural sciences. Indeed, it is argued that while the extension of Foucault’s notion 
of biopolitics to environmental discourse and the natural sciences generally is in 
many respects consistent with his theoretical approach, he appears reluctant to do 
this in the way he did with the human sciences. 
Foucault was unwilling to consistently extend his genealogical approach to 
power and knowledge from the human to the natural sciences. The thesis 
concludes that this is because, despite his critique of the traditional view of 
political sovereignty (in which power is seen as a ‘possession’ centralised in the 
State and largely equivalent with domination), Foucault does not take the critique 
of sovereignty far enough. He retains a view of agency that is tied to human 
autonomy, and which in some key respects idealises political sovereignty as the 
absence of domination or even disciplinary power. He also appears to accept a 
fairly conventional view of the natural sciences, affording them a special 
epistemological status in which scientific knowledge is somehow able to detach 
itself from the relations of power that he sees as inextricably tied the knowledge 
and practices of the human science. In order to carry the critique of political 
sovereignty further a more thorough critique of epistemic sovereignty is needed in 
which all forms of scientific representation are subjected the same sorts of 
rigorous examination given by Foucault to the human sciences. 
A major finding of the thesis is that the problems of sovereignty which have 
prevented Foucault and subsequent governmentality studies from consistently 
applying the insights of this approach to the natural sciences can be overcome by 
drawing on the work of Latour and actor network theory. Actor network theory is 
broadly consistent with the approach developed by Foucault and has been 
influential in providing some of the key concepts employed in governmentality 
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studies. 5 However, its most significant advantage is that it is able to deal with the 
problem of agency in a more satisfactory and less anthropocentric manner than 
does Foucault. This is achieved by rejecting any rigid ontological and 
epistemological distinctions between subject/object and human/non-human, and 
by showing that agency is not exclusively a property of the human subject. Rather 
agency is a characteristic of networks composed of hybrid actants (rather than 
actors). Actants are entities made up of a ‘socio-nature’ that collect together and 
translate a diverse assemblage of capacities, powers, resources, technologies and 
practices in the complex and multiple ways suggested by governmentality studies. 
By recognising the centrality of material technologies (such as inscription 
devices) in the scientific representation and mobilisation of ‘nature’, the actor 
network approach permits genealogical analysis of the social relation to nature in 
a way that more fully accounts for the complex inter-relationship between the 
social and the technical. Power is not only the human capacity to act and shape 
the conduct of other humans, but is a feature of any capacity to act, no matter 
what the source of that action. Agency then is a property of a network, elements 
of which will be non-human and may have a significant enough capacity to 
initiate or direct action as to qualify as an ‘agent’. 
The approach explored in this thesis is intended to contribute to two important 
tasks in political philosophy and social theory. The first is to develop the 
substantial insights of Foucault’s work on biopolitics and governmentality (and 
subsequent studies on governmentality by others) and apply these to the analysis 
of environmental politics and the role of the ecological sciences in the emergence 
of new forms of governmental rationality. Until the recent publication of an edited 
collection (Darier, 1999a) there had been no major attempt to bring Foucault’s 
work to bear on environmental concerns. However, as I have argued in my 
contribution to the Darier collection and elsewhere, 6 the biopolitical management 
of the population is only possible if at the same time the natural environment on 
which the population depends is itself subject to scientific and political 
thematisation and problematisation. The second task is to open up a more robust 
and focused dialogue between the substantial and important bodies of political 
theory – particularly governmentality studies and actor network theory – that I 
have drawn upon in this thesis. As I have shown each ‘school of thought’ is aware 
of the other and each acknowledges the influence of the other on its own 
approach, but this is something that tends to occur in the background.7 In the 
governmentality writings, this is no doubt a reflection of the biases in Foucault’s 
                                                 
5 In particular the work of Nikolas Rose and Peter Miller. See Chapter 8 of this thesis. 
6 See Rutherford (1993), (1994a), (1997a), (1999b). 
7 Law (1994) and Kusch (1991) provide what are probably the most serious attempt to engage the 
two schools of thought. 
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work against the natural sciences. Similarly, as actor network theory developed 
out of the sociology of science and science studies, it has primarily been 
interested in those areas – the natural sciences and material technologies – 
neglected by Foucault (and those most influenced by his work). 
Structure of the thesis 
The remainder of the thesis, following this brief introduction, is divided into 
two main parts. Chapters 2, 3 and 4 deal with the problem of nature in what can 
be broadly described as the German critical theory tradition. Chapter 2 by way of 
background considers the counter current to the Enlightenment view of 
modernisation and progress which is evident in Weber and the Frankfurt School’s 
appropriation of him and Nietzsche. This view, most evident in Horkheimer and 
Adorno’s book Dialectic of Enlightenment, argues that the same processes of 
societal rationalisation which were responsible for progress through the 
domination of nature also reify and distort human inner nature. Horkheimer and 
Adorno therefore rejected the Enlightenment’s philosophical separation of 
subjectivity and nature, and argued instead for emancipation of both natures from 
the violence of ‘identity thinking’ through an aesthetic reconciliation between the 
two natures. This is a move that draws on Nietzsche’s critique of morality and 
science, and which is attacked by Habermas as ‘reducing’ truth to power and 
undermining the possibility of rational social critique, a charge he also makes 
against Foucault’s work. 
Chapter 3 examines Habermas’ attempt to develop critical social theory in a 
direction that would overcome the Frankfurt School’s ‘one dimensional’ view of 
rationality. The focus of the chapter is on how in his reconstruction of critical 
theory, Habermas deals with the problem of the relationship between ‘inner’ and 
‘outer’ nature as presented in Horkheimer and Adorno’s critique of instrumental 
reason. This involves a detailed consideration of his early work in which the 
natural history of the human species is seen as giving rise to a series of knowledge 
constitutive interests. The chapter then goes on to examine the recasting of the 
problem of nature in his later theory of communicative reason with its shift to 
linguistic philosophy and systems theory. Both theoretical approaches, but 
particularly the latter, are only able to overcome the problem of nature by 
maintaining a radical separation between subjectivity and nature, and arguing the 
only ‘theoretically fruitful’ attitude to nature is a strategic, instrumental one. 
Some key criticisms of Habermas’ work are reviewed, focusing in particular on 
the anthropocentric character of his rigid separation of nature and society, and his 
dismissal of ecological movements as marginal and anti-modernist. 
The critique of Habermas is developed further in Chapter 4 where the 
contemporary work of the theorists Ulrich Beck and Klaus Eder is examined in 
some detail. Unlike Habermas, both authors see the problem of nature as central 
  
 
15
 
to contemporary social relations and the direction of further modernisation, and 
regard ecological problems as providing the basis for new social divisions and 
conflicts. Particular attention is given to the ways in which these authors argue 
that the problem of nature in contemporary technological society is taken up by 
ecological movements. Contrary to Habermas, for these theorists such movements 
are not anti-modernist or irrational reactions to the complexity of social 
rationalisation, but represent alternative, critical views of the course of 
modernisation. Instead of being marginal, such movements can be seen as 
significantly influencing the future direction of modernisation in technological 
society. 
Chapter 5 sets the ground for the transition to the second part of the thesis, by 
introducing discussion of Foucault’s work, and more importantly by examining 
the core differences between Habermas and Foucault over the nature of power and 
rationality. This is important as Habermas’ criticisms of Horkheimer and Adorno 
parallel those he directs at Foucault and other ‘post-structuralist’ theorists. My 
argument in the second part of the thesis – that a more useful theoretical 
framework for understanding ecological issues is found in Foucault’s concepts of 
biopolitics and governmentality – is in part developed through this critique of the 
shortcomings of Habermas’ view of power and its relationship to the natural 
sciences. However, despite the differences, some common intellectual concerns 
between the critical theory tradition and Foucault are evident, and these are 
briefly considered in this chapter. 
The second main part of the thesis consists of Chapters 6, 7 and 8, which deal 
with the problem of nature as it arises in bodies of work influenced by two French 
theorists of power, Foucault and Latour. Chapter 6 examines Foucault’s work on 
biopolitics and governmentality in detail. The intersection of what Foucault calls 
the emergence of the ‘population-riches’ problem and beginnings of the 
environmental discourse are explored. It is argued that the extension of the notion 
of biopolitics to the ecological relations of populations to their environment is 
consistent with Foucault’s approach. This is demonstrated with a discussion of the 
emergence of modes of governmental rationality that problematise and discipline 
the social relation to the natural environment. Particular emphasis is placed on the 
role of scientific expertise in this process, and the emergence of ecology as a 
regulatory science, with functions not unlike those evident in the application of 
biology to the human sciences. 
Chapter 7 commences with a discussion of Foucault’s view of the relationship 
between power and the natural sciences. It is shown that Foucault was far more 
ambiguous about this than he was with the ‘dubious’ human sciences. In fact, 
Foucault regarded the natural sciences as having attained a degree of 
‘formalisation’ and ‘objectivity’ that allowed them to free themselves from power 
in a way he regarded as impossible for the human sciences. The chapter identifies 
the source of this approach in an underlying conception of subjectivity, evident in 
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his later works, which identifies agency and power with an idealised view of 
human autonomy. It is argued that his critique of political sovereignty needs to be 
carried further, to more thoroughly scrutinise the relationship between power, 
domination and agency. It is also argued that this needs to be broadened to a 
critique of epistemic sovereignty in general, so that the same sort of critical, 
genealogical questions as are put to the human sciences are also asked of the 
natural sciences. 
Chapter 8 discusses the work of Bruno Latour and Michel Callon, and what is 
known as actor network theory, and considers the intellectual affinities of this 
with Foucault and some of the more recent work on governmentality. Following 
the criticisms of Foucault’s approach to agency and the natural sciences in the 
previous chapter, it is suggested that actor network theory can provide a way of 
overcoming these shortcomings. Of particular importance is the use of what 
Callon terms the principle of generalised symmetry. This is the methodological 
cornerstone of actor network theory, and requires that irrespective of whether 
human or non-human phenomena are studied, the same analytical framework 
should be used. In line with actor network theory’s socio-technical approach, this 
principle cautions against the assumption that agency is necessarily a human 
characteristic. In making representational distinctions between ‘subject’ and 
‘object’ problematic, this approach is able to follow through on the need identified 
in the previous chapter to extend Foucault’s critique of political sovereignty to 
that of a critique of epistemic sovereignty and all modes of scientific 
representation. In doing so it thereby focuses attention on agency as an effect of 
socio-technical networks rather than as an inherent property of the human subject. 
Chapter 9 is the conclusion, and consists of two broad sections. The first 
reviews the key themes and findings of the thesis, while the second briefly 
considers some of the theoretical implications of these findings for political 
philosophy and social theory, and the ways in which these disciplines deal with 
the analysis of contemporary ecological problems. 
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Chapter 2 
Background: the negative dialectic of progress 
Introduction 
This chapter examines some key social theorists who have been concerned in 
varying ways with understanding modernity and who have questioned the 
consequences of the rationalisation of society associated with modernisation. In 
particular I focus on the Frankfurt School theorists Horkheimer and Adorno and 
their diagnosis of the ‘dialectic of Enlightenment’, although in doing so I also 
briefly discuss the influence of Weber, Nietzsche and Lukacs. 
Modern Western political thought has portrayed human history as the struggle 
to establish and maintain the material security of existence through the control of 
nature. This discourse underlies a multitude of human endeavours - from battles to 
subdue disease through medicine and public sanitation, to the drive for 
development and industrialisation, to the rise of contemporary programs to deal 
with the unintended contamination of the global environment by the unwanted by-
products and effects associated with the success of that same techno-industrial 
development.  
At their core, these notions presuppose biological embodiment as a 
fundamental feature of human being. This claim, obvious in itself, has formed the 
starting point for a broad range of problems in political philosophy and social 
theory, from Hobbes, through Marx, Nietzsche and evident in contemporary 
discourse about global ecological crisis. This concern with survival reflects an 
understanding of human beings as simultaneously possessing a dual nature – a 
species-being and a cultural-being. The tension between culture and nature is 
manifested in numerous ways. It is crucial to the development of concepts of what 
it is to be a person. What makes humans different from other living things, on this 
account, is not any special relationship with the divine or mystical, but human 
self-consciousness, our cultural, language dependent differentiation from the 
merely biological. Additionally, and this is frequently taken as the distinguishing 
characteristic of modern societies, some peoples have developed a capacity to, 
and propensity for, the systematic scientific investigation of the world and the 
technological manipulation of the human biophysical environment. This interplay 
of culture and nature thus leads to those characteristics which define the modern 
human subject - self-reflective agents pursuing a fundamental drive for self-
preservation through the rational manipulation of the non-human nature to 
enhance the security and welfare of human beings. It is this relationship between 
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society and our environment that in recent decades has given rise to increased 
consideration to the problems of ecological crisis.  
Weber: the ‘iron cage’ of societal rationalisation 
The work of Max Weber was centrally concerned with the processes of 
modernisation, which he interpreted as involving the progressive rationalisation of 
society. Rationalisation for Weber signified the spread of scientific specialisation 
and technical differentiation peculiar to Western culture. (Smart, 1983 p.123)8 His 
theory of rationalisation distinguished three aspects of rationality - purposive, 
formal and discursive. Purposive rationality is that involved in the selection of the 
most efficient means to achieve specific objectives and is directed towards an 
instrumental manipulation of outcomes. It is particularly related to increasing the 
efficiency of administrative and economic actions. Formal rationality, for Weber, 
referred to a broader or more generalised systematisation aimed at imposing 
coherence and order on the disorderly complexity of human experience, thought 
and social actions. Weber identified this form of rationality with developments 
such as the formalisation and ‘universalisation’ of law and the spread of 
bureaucratic organisation within modern society, that is, with the means and 
procedures for enhancing institutional calculability and control. Discursive 
rationality for Weber related to notions of practical reason in a more traditional 
Kantian sense, in that it involves adoption of coherent criteria for the substantive 
evaluation of the actions of individuals. Weber saw this as related to the adoption 
of the desacralized attitudes of modern science with its objectivity, freedom from 
illusion and value neutrality. (Wellmer, 1985 p.40-1) 
The growth of rationalisation and the rise of capitalism Weber attributed to 
the development of Protestantism and its creation of a culture oriented towards the 
mastery, through work and science, of the social and natural environment. (Smart, 
1983 p.123; Turner, 1987 p.223-4) The Weberian attitude exhibits a certain 
ambiguity towards rationalisation. Smart argues that the rationalisation process is 
not understood by Weber as representing either the ‘progress of reason’ or 
enlightenment. The focus of rationalisation is on the refinement of efficient means 
of social organisation. Efficiency here is in terms of the realisation of particular 
outcomes or objectives, so that increasing efficiency of administration and control 
does not signal a move toward moral progress. This instrumental rationality of 
efficient ends cannot provide the criteria for choosing between different values or 
                                                 
8 There are of course a variety of interpretations of Weber’s work. In this Chapter I do not attempt 
to deal with the debates in the literature on how Weber should be read, but rather I present what 
could be described as ‘the critical theory account’. A detailed consideration of Weber is beyond 
the scope of this current thesis. My concern is to present Weber (by way of background) as 
Horkheimer and Adorno read him for their work. 
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goals. Thus Weber rejected the ‘naive optimism in which science ... has been 
celebrated as the way to happiness.’ (Smart, 1983) 
The increase in societal rationalisation leads, through the dominance of 
instrumental rationality and bureaucratic modes of administration, to an 
undermining of the possibilities for autonomous individuality idealised by 
Enlightenment thinking. Weber saw rationalisation as producing a paradox that 
has become a central problem in critical social theory: that the rationalisation 
process implies simultaneously both emancipation and reification or domination. 
Wellmer (1985 p.41) argues that this paradox results from the conflation of 
the descriptive-analytic features of Weber’s characterisation of modernity with a 
particular Enlightenment derived normative connotation. At the analytic level, 
rationalisation refers to an ‘internal systemic logic’ that tends towards increasing 
formalisation and bureaucratisation of knowledge and social action, leading to the 
conclusion that the modern individual must inevitably be bound by an ‘iron cage’ 
of instrumental reason and bureaucratic domination. (Smart, 1983 p.125) 
However, Weber’s view of rationalisation is unable to escape from the normative 
implications of a ‘more emphatic and comprehensive idea of reason’ arising from 
the European intellectual tradition, in which ‘being rational signifies a basic 
condition of human beings qua human beings.’ (Wellmer, 1985 p.41-2) Weber is 
unable to disengage his descriptive sociology from this broader normative 
assumption precisely because the rationalisation process is also a process of 
enlightenment. The achievements of modern science and law, bound as they are to 
the disenchantment of the world, represent the necessary conditions for modern 
individual autonomy in the Western intellectual tradition. Disenchantment for 
Weber represents the move from traditional authority, epitomised by religious 
thinking, to a modern rational worldview, characterised by the differentiation of 
knowledge into the domains of empirical fact and non-empirical value 
judgements. Disenchantment then is the process of overcoming the illusion of 
traditional societies that there can be any transcendental source of meaning and 
validity in the natural or supernatural world, that is, outside of the ‘sphere of 
symbolically mediated human praxis.’ (Wellmer, 1985 p.42) Not only is 
disenchantment a necessary functional precondition for the development of 
modern societies, in terms of facilitating instrumental rationality (in legal, 
scientific and administrative action), it also is central to the emergence of the 
modern idea of rationality (ie as reason in the comprehensive sense). This 
broader, normative notion of rationality is, for Weber as it is for critical theorists 
such as Habermas, a fundamental cognitive achievement that more than anything 
else defines the modern consciousness, inasmuch as it signifies the emergence of 
‘man’ as the sole source of intersubjective meaning and validity. (Wellmer, 1985 
p.42-3) 
Two key concepts raised by Weber’s theory of societal rationalisation, and 
taken up later by later critical social theorists, should be noted at this point. The 
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first is the notion of differentiation of value spheres, which is central to 
Habermas’ work. This notion plays a central part in Habermas’ defence of the 
inherent emancipatory potential of reason against what he sees as the theoretical 
confusion of the earlier Frankfurt School theorists, especially Horkheimer and 
Adorno, and ‘conservatives’ such as Nietzsche and Foucault. Habermas’ defence 
of reason proceeds via an elaboration of the theory of the differentiation of value 
spheres and the proper relationship between different modes of rationality, and 
aims to overcome what he sees as the unnecessarily ‘pessimistic’ attitude towards 
modernity and rationalisation adopted by Weber and the early Frankfurt School. 
Horkheimer and Adorno saw the differentiation accompanying rationalisation as 
responsible for the rupture in modern Western thought between subjectivity and 
nature. Their notion of the ‘dialectic of enlightenment’ in which the progress of 
enlightenment and instrumental rationality undermines reason in the 
comprehensive, emancipatory sense thus replays Weber’s paradoxical attitude 
towards rationalisation. 
The second important idea is that of disenchantment. Habermas’ approach to 
critical theory is particularly reliant on the concept of enlightenment as a process 
of disenchantment, as the cognitive overcoming of illusion and metaphysics. This 
is crucial to his defence of what he characterises as the ‘unfinished’ project of 
modernity, in that he values science and formal legal-political institutions as 
positive achievements of modernity, achievements that are founded on the forms 
of rationality made possible by the cognitive functions of disenchantment. The 
result of this is to render all claims as to the validity of knowledge and moral-
practical action susceptible to ‘intersubjective redemption’ through rational 
argumentation. Habermas, although critical of the dangers of societal 
rationalisation for the possibilities of emancipation, is thus concerned not to 
accept the ‘pessimistic’ conclusions of Weber, and Horkheimer and Adorno, 
regarding the role of reason as such. This view of the rational-critical attitude as 
implicit to modernity plays a central role in Habermas’ formulation of the relation 
between nature and humanity (which I will consider further below). It is also 
central to his critique of the earlier Frankfurt School theorists’ view of the 
inevitable complicity of ‘reason’ in the reifying separation of subjectivity and 
nature. 
The Frankfurt School: the Dialectic of Enlightenment 
Weber’s sociology understood the process of rationalisation as directed 
towards the administration and mastery of the social and natural environment, and 
saw this as providing the conditions for the emergence of capitalism in Europe. 
Unlike Marx, Weber did not believe that the ‘reification’ produced by modern 
society would disappear if the ‘irrational’ market relations of capitalism were 
replaced by ‘rational’ socialism. Indeed, he saw socialism as likely to lead to an 
even greater growth in bureaucratisation and regulation of society. In this sense 
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Weber, rather than Marx, could be said to provide an important intellectual 
impetus to the Frankfurt School’s notion of a ‘totally administered society’, but 
also, through this, to the concept of ‘industrialism’ which has been influential in 
both New Left and Green thinking. 9 By adapting from Weber the notion of a 
‘negative dialectic’ of modernity, the Frankfurt School theorists (especially 
Horkheimer, Adorno and Marcuse) rejected the Marxist belief in emancipation as 
the immanent or logical consequence of the development of contradictions within 
the mode of production. Instead critical theorists pointed to the link between the 
ascendancy of an instrumental, scientific rationalism that increasingly expressed 
itself in a technological manipulation of nature, and the expansion of the social 
relations of the capitalist market. (Dallmayr, 1991 p.74-5) Of particular 
importance in this regard is the strong link developed by critical theory between 
the domination of nature and social domination. Two closely interrelated features 
emerge from the work of Horkheimer and Adorno in particular and are important 
for my purposes here. First, their further, explicit development of Weber’s 
negative dialectic of progress, and second, their focus on the role of rational 
thought and science (aimed at the mastery of nature) in producing a radical split 
between subjectivity and nature in modern society. 
Horkheimer and Adorno recognised in Weber’s idea of formal and 
instrumental rationality an accurate depiction of the dominant features of modern 
industrialised society. While rejecting the ‘objectivism’ of the Marxist belief in 
the immanent and inevitable progress of social development towards a rational 
and just society, they nonetheless sought to preserve the possibility that such a 
‘liberated’ society could come about. Thus, in the place of a historical continuity 
between capitalism and the classless, emancipated society, Horkheimer and 
Adorno posed the need for a radical break with ‘the continuum of progress’. As 
Wellmer indicates, their critical theory makes two key claims about the process of 
societal rationalisation: 
First, they claim that the realisation of the demands of reason has become 
historically possible, given the technological development of modern 
industrial societies - if only individuals would grasp this possibility; and 
secondly they claim that the logic of development of modern societies - of 
the rationalisation process in Weber’s sense - points in the opposite 
direction and tends to lead to the establishment of a closed system of 
instrumental reason, of reification and repression. (Wellmer, 1985 p.46) 
                                                 
9  Industrialism is seen by many New Left and Green critics as a particular mode of economic-
technological organisation common to both capitalism and state socialism which is understood 
as ‘resting upon the ideologies of growth and technological optimism’ and which aimed at the 
technological domination of both nature and society. See Eckersley (1992) and Marcuse 
(1968). 
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Weber identified the source of the rationalisation process as the rise of 
Protestantism and the consequent (unintentional) creation of an ascetic culture 
conducive to the development of markets, intellectual inquiry and world mastery 
through science.10 Horkheimer and Adorno located the ultimate source of 
rationalisation as belonging to the very nature of conceptual thinking itself. 
(Alford, 1985b p.16) In their work they explored the increasing separation of 
humanity and nature, and related this to the ascendancy of formalised and 
instrumentalised reason in which the natural world, through science, came to be 
understood in terms of the operation of quantitative, universal laws. Nature came 
to be understood as disenchanted pure substance, ‘mere matter’, capable of 
manipulation and control in the interests of human self-preservation. Critical 
theory’s approach to rationalisation thus rests on a series of closely interconnected 
arguments about the nature of rational thought and its relationship to nature. 
Horkheimer, in his earlier writings had already rejected the Marxist-
Lukacsian ‘objectivism’ that saw progress as linked to the idea of universal 
history. Horkheimer nevertheless maintained a belief in progress as a real 
historical possibility, where the concept of progress was understood primarily as 
the material improvement of living standards through the development of the 
productive capacity of society. Progress therefore was something to be pursued as 
a practical task, and he rejected what he saw as Marxism’s attempt to invoke an 
‘objective calculus of suffering and improvement’ which sought, through the 
notion of ‘absolute progress’, to justify past and present suffering as a historically 
necessary or ‘unavoidable cost’ of progress. (Grumley, 1989 p.160) Adorno, 
under the influence of Walter Benjamin and Nietzsche, was even more suspicious 
of the idea of progress. History was not the bearer of an immanent reality, indeed 
the notion of progress served an ideological function of covering up and 
reconciling the ‘disasters’ of capitalist development. See (Grumley, 1989 p.169; 
Held, 1980 p.208-9) 
Progress for Horkheimer and Adorno then, much as for Weber, could be 
understood as the unceasing refinement and rational extension of the technical and 
economic capacities of modern society, but it did not represent in any necessary 
way either progress towards a morally superior state of existence nor the progress 
of humanity towards ‘Reason’. (Wellmer, 1991 p.60) This critique of progress 
was further developed, as a collaborative effort in their work Dialectic of 
Enlightenment, (Adorno and Horkheimer, 1986) into a more radical critique of 
instrumental reason. While this work was originally written during the latter part 
of World War Two and first published in 1947 in German, it appears not to have 
                                                 
10 Turner argues that Weber saw more ancient cultural roots for Western rationality pre-dating the 
rise of industrial capitalism, and claims that in fact ‘Weber appears to be committed to the idea 
that rationalisation is a long term teleological and irreversible process in Western culture.’ 
(Turner, 1987 p.234) 
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had a significant impact until much later. Jay, in his history of the Frankfurt 
School, notes that only through wide circulation as a ‘pirated’ edition in Germany 
during the 1960s (where it ‘became an underground classic’) and its subsequent 
‘official’ republication in 1970 did the book become influential. (Jay, 1973 p.255) 
11 
The Dialectic of Enlightenment, and Horkheimer’s (1985) The Eclipse of 
Reason, reflected the further distancing of critical theory from the tradition of 
orthodox Marxism, while at the same time confirming the continuing influence of 
Weber and Nietzsche. (Held, 1980; Jay, 1973) Central to the move away from the 
Marxist heritage was the abandonment of class struggle as the effective principle 
of history, and its substitution by a broader, more all-encompassing conflict 
between humanity and nature. The notion of Enlightenment in these works was no 
longer understood simply as a cultural expression of the rise of capitalism, but as 
the fundamental feature of Western thought and society in general. Tied to this 
was the implicit critique of Marx as standing firmly within the Enlightenment 
tradition, and the more explicit rejection of Marxism’s central emphasis on labour 
as the mode of self-realisation of the human species. This emphasis on humanity 
as an economic animal, according to Horkheimer and Adorno, resulted in 
Marxism’s ‘reification of nature as a field for human exploitation’ which 
continued a process that predated capitalism and appeared likely to persist, even 
intensify, beyond capitalism. (Jay, 1973 p.256-8) In this respect, critical theory 
echoes Weber’s tendency to see rationalisation as a long-term process inherent in 
Western culture, transcending the specific historical development of capitalism. 
(Turner, 1987 p.234) Thus the radical critique in Dialectic of Enlightenment is 
directed at the Enlightenment tradition and Western thought itself, that is, at the 
process of disenchantment described by Weber. 
Weber has often been read as expressing resignation towards the rationalising 
processes of modernity. (Jay, 1973 p.259; Smart, 1983 p.125) Smart argues that 
while Weber identifies domination with the spread of rational discipline necessary 
for modern bureaucratic modes of authority, his notion of charismatic authority, 
through its capacity to disrupt the routinisation of everyday life, also retains a 
metaphysical function. This ‘constitutes the sole locus of a possible, if temporary, 
freedom for the individual from processes of social determination in general, and 
rationalisation in particular’, even though this too is likely to succumb to 
routinisation. (Smart, 1983 p.130) The work of the Frankfurt School displays a 
similar ambivalence. As with Weber, it is unwilling, indeed persistently unable, to 
break from an emphatic, positive notion of Reason. At the same time, a pessimism 
                                                 
11 The influence of Frankfurt School (especially Eric Fromm and Herbert Marcuse) on New Left 
was significant, and via this there was an indirect influence on the left of the Green movement, 
particularly in Germany but also in the USA. See Betz (1991) and Jamison and Eyerman 
(1994). 
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and lack of clarity about the means of achieving a break with the dominance of 
instrumental rationality and ‘identity thinking’ prevail. It is this tension that 
critics, such as Habermas, see as forming the basis of a fundamental aporia in the 
notion of dialectic of enlightenment. However, before considering these 
criticisms, it is necessary to consider in more detail the Frankfurt School’s 
critique of instrumental reason and the relationship of this to the perceived split 
between the modern subject and nature. 
The critique of instrumental reason 
Horkheimer and Adorno saw the radical separation between subjectivity and 
nature as the hallmark of modern society. This separation Horkheimer identified 
with the rise of scientific thinking, and related to the growth of pervasive forms of 
political domination. The Renaissance, through science, introduced a new view of 
the natural world as an object to be manipulated and mastered for human 
purposes. This new, objectifying attitude to nature was paralleled by the notion, 
most clearly manifested by Machiavelli, that human beings too were objects of 
domination and control.12 According to Horkheimer, Hobbes and later 
Enlightenment theorists further carried this objectification of nature into the 
objectification of subjectivity in political theory. (Jay, 1973 p.257)13 Thus, 
Horkheimer made two claims, first that the separation of ‘man’ from nature is 
undialectical, a artificial dichotomy, and second that having ‘split’ subject from 
object, Enlightenment mechanistic thinking then further reduced the subject to an 
object of instrumental calculation. 
Against this separation, Horkheimer argued following Lukacs, that nature is 
in fact a social category, that is, something conditioned by social practices. Hence 
not only is nature dependent on human activity in that it is transformed by social 
practices, but also in the way human concepts of what nature is are themselves 
subject to change, and are therefore dependent on particular symbolic mediations 
and cultural significances. (Grumley, 1989 p.156; Jay, 1973 p.257) However, 
Horkheimer’s use of the concept of nature retained a recognition (as did Marx’s 
1848 Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts (Marx, 1974 p.93-216)) of the 
biological limits on human activity. Thus nature is not only socially constituted 
but also provides the ‘permanent arena and irreducible pre-condition of human 
activity.’ In other words, nature as a prediscursive thing-in-itself presents itself 
‘both as potentiality and limit on the social meanings historically ascribed to it.’ 
                                                 
12 Foucault suggests that this move to a concern with the disposition of things was not so much 
attributable to Machiavelli as to his ‘police science’ critics. See (Foucault, 1991c). This is 
discussed further in Chapter 5 of the current thesis. 
13 As discussed in Chapter 8, Bruno Latour credits Hobbes, along with Boyle, as being 
instrumental in the formulation and articulation of ‘the modern constitution’ which divides 
nature from society. 
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(Grumley, 1989 p.156) In holding to this notion of a prediscursive nature 
Horkheimer illustrated the complexity of this approach, for he insisted on the 
dialectical interconnectedness of humans and nature while at the same time 
rejecting an identity between these (ie between object and subject, nondiscursive 
thing and discursive concept). This, of course, presents difficulties for any 
explanation of how the alienation of humans from nature is to be overcome, for 
central to the critical theory of Horkheimer and Adorno (and Marcuse) is the idea 
of reconciliation with nature. 
Adorno also attempted to utilise a notion of historicised nature, particularly in 
building on the Lukacsian idea of a socially constructed ‘second nature’.14 Adorno 
regarded both the concepts of nature and history as cognitive tools to be used in 
the critique of the present, that is, he insisted on emphasising the dialectical 
interrelationship and mutual determining of each as a means of destabilising any 
attempt to assign either concept an ontological primacy. The task for Adorno was 
thus as much to attack the myth of a ‘constant nature’, as it is to overcome the 
myth of ‘progress’. (Buck-Morss, 1977 p.49) Not only are nature and history 
mutually determining, but each element of this dialectical doublet also express a 
dual character. On the one hand nature refers to embodied history, ‘the material 
products of men’s labour as well as their own corporeal bodies’, while on the 
other hand nature is ‘pre-given being’ standing outside of history, reason and 
human mastery. (Buck-Morss, 1977 p.54) This division is reflected in Adorno’s 
use of the idea of ‘first’ and ‘second nature’. First nature corresponds with the 
sensuous, biological world, including the human body and those ‘human instincts 
and passions repressed and displaced by civilisation’. (Benhabib, 1986 p.166) 
Second nature refers to the reification of the historically produced social world in 
which socially constituted conventions and practices are perceived as ‘natural’, 
ahistorical givens. The consequence of this is that the status quo is fetishised. Just 
as first nature is mythified in traditional societies, in modernity second nature 
becomes myth. (Buck-Morss, 1977 p.55-6; Held, 1980 p.167-9) Adorno’s method 
of critique was therefore to use ‘nature’ and ‘history’ as 
cognitive concepts which demythify reality by means of reciprocal 
critique. In other words, the concept of ‘nature’ exposes the non-identity 
between the concept of historical progress and actual historical reality by 
drawing attention to the material nature violated in the name of historical 
‘progress’. Similarly, the concept of ‘history’ unmasks the ideology 
which views existing social arrangements as ‘natural’, essential or true by 
invoking their historical production. (Grumley, 1989 p.166) 
                                                 
14 Susan Buck-Morss points out that the concept of ‘second nature’ comes from Hegel, although 
she also notes that Horkheimer claims the term dates from Democritus. See Buck-Morss (1977) 
p.55 & footnote 94 p.228) 
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The denial of the interdependence of the subject and nature is traced in 
Dialectic of Enlightenment to the spread of instrumental reason. The notion of 
instrumental reason as used by Horkheimer and Adorno, drew on their earlier 
critique of progress and a reinterpretation of Weber’s concept of rationalisation in 
which the processes of societal and cultural rationalisation (which Weber sought 
to differentiate) are merged into one.15 (Benhabib, 1986 p.162-3; Grumley, 1989 
p.170) In Horkheimer and Adorno’s formulation, social rationalisation involved 
the extension of the apparatus of administrative and political domination into all 
areas of social life through the bureaucratisation of institutions such as the 
economy, the military, education and the ‘culture industry’. Such rationalisation is 
effected through the application of the procedures and techniques developed by 
science and technology that derive their efficiency from the capacity to fragment 
and formalise their objects in ways that enhance the controllability for specific 
purposes. Thus the very processes of rationalisation (societal and cultural) that 
Enlightenment saw as emancipatory, for Horkheimer and Adorno expressed a 
relentless logic of domination, not only in shaping institutional practices, but also 
in distorting the idea of Reason itself. The notion of a comprehensive, substantive 
Reason is usurped by a narrow, bureaucratic-technical instrumental rationality. 
Thus, the dialectic of Enlightenment is between these two forms of reason, 
substantive or universal Reason, and reason as the rational manipulation of the 
particular.  
At the same time, the dialectic also concerns the way in which Enlightenment 
itself reverts to myth. (Held, 1980 p.150-1) Horkheimer and Adorno saw myth 
and Enlightenment as grounded in the same basic human need: self-preservation, 
and it is this that connects nature and history. Science is a tool employed by the 
human species for its self-preservation, for through the application of scientific 
reason humans seek to control nature. This is also the function of myth. While 
science objectifies nature and distances itself from its object, myth functions by 
the ‘projection of the subjective onto nature’; both nevertheless seek to control 
and understand nature. (Held, 1980 p.155)16 Therefore, while myth and 
enlightenment are different, there is also a functional continuity between them. 
                                                 
15 For Weber, societal rationalisation referred both to institutional differentiation between the 
economic and political spheres, and to the increasing formalisation of rationality within 
economic, political and legal institutions. Cultural rationalisation referred to the 
‘systematisation of worldviews’ and the consequent decline in the power of myth. See 
Benhabib, (1986) p.379-80, footnote 19. 
16 This is one of the problems with certain green perspectives, which seek the ‘re-subjectify’ 
nature, for example Mathews (1991) and Naess (1986). For critical discussion of this see 
Bennett (1987); Luke (1988); Rutherford (1997c). 
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Thus Horkheimer and Adorno claimed that the unknown in nature (including 
environmental uncertainty)17, is feared as a threat to self-preservation: 
Man imagines himself free from fear when there is no longer anything 
unknown. This determines the course of demthyologising ... 
Enlightenment is mythic fear turned radical ... Nothing at all may remain 
outside, because the mere idea of outsideness is the very source of fear. 
(Adorno and Horkheimer, 1986) 
At its very heart enlightenment, through science, thus aims at emancipation of 
the human subject from the risks and uncertainty of its natural environment, but it 
is a freedom sought through the domination of nature. It must be remembered 
however that nature is not totally separate from humanity; history and nature exist 
in a dialectical relation to each other. The control and mastery of ‘first nature’ by 
the subject simultaneously constitutes ‘second nature’. The mastery of nature 
therefore also involves processes that suppress and distort the spontaneous, 
prediscursive instinctive drives of human beings. Horkheimer and Adorno see this 
drive for self-preservation and the objectification of external nature as at the same 
time a process of suppression of the self’s own inner nature. Indeed, the modern 
unitary subject, the Cartesian cogito, is the product of this bifurcation of self and 
nature. It is the price paid for the triumph of reason, but reason as ‘mythic fear 
turned radical’, which becomes a systematising, totalising ‘instrumental 
rationality’ that dominates not only external (first) nature, but also social relations 
(second nature) and the inner, instinctive nature of the self. (Held, 1980 p.152-6; 
Wellmer, 1991 p.59-61) 
Following Nietzsche18, and conflating Weber’s differentiation of institutional 
and cultural rationalisation, Frankfurt School critical theory understands the 
totalising, systematising force of reason as inherent in the character of conceptual 
thinking and language. Thus, in Wellmer’s words, in Dialectic of Enlightenment 
At the heart of discursive thought we thus discovered an element of 
violence, a subjugation of reality, a defence mechanism, a procedure for 
excluding and controlling, a prearrangement of phenomena for the 
purpose of controlling and manipulating them, and an implicit system of 
delusion. This objectifying, systematising and instrumentalising reason 
                                                 
17 This is the problem of risk – see Chapter 4 for a discussion of the way this dealt with as a 
central theme in the work of Beck. See Beck (1992b). 
18 Here I am referring to Nietzsche’s perspectivism, which at the considerable risk of 
oversimplification, can said to ‘assert four distinguishable claims: (1) no accurate 
representation of the world as it is in itself is possible; (2) there is nothing to which our theories 
stand in the required correspondence relation to enable us to say that they are true or false; (3) 
no method of understanding our world – sciences, logic, or moral theory – enjoys a privileged 
status; (4) human needs always help to ‘constitute’ the world for us.’ (Magnus and Higgins, 
1996 p.4) 
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has found its classical expression in the natural sciences; but as Foucault 
has shown, the human sciences can also be viewed in the same 
categories.19 (Wellmer, 1991 p.60) 
Horkheimer and Adorno explicitly acknowledged the influence of Nietzsche 
in their formulation of the dialectic of enlightenment. Their discussion of the way 
in which rational thought serves a basic need to control nature reflects Nietzsche’s 
view that the striving to master nature is a universal feature of reason, that is, 
knowledge is fundamentally a tool of power. Nietzsche makes a clear connection 
between self-preservation and knowledge as the object and purpose of the ‘will to 
power’. The drive for self-preservation is thus the ‘motive’ behind the 
development of knowledge. According to Nietzsche, ‘the desire for knowledge 
depends upon the measure to which the will to power grows in a species: a species 
grasps a certain amount of reality in order to become master of it, in order to press 
it into service’ in the interest of self-preservation. (Held, 1980 p.156-7) Our desire 
to know the world, not just as formalised scientific knowledge, but also in 
everyday judgements about how the world is or what is ‘true’, involves a process 
of abstraction and simplification that according to Nietzsche, is ‘directed not at 
knowledge but at taking possession of things’. (Gemes, 1992 p.54) Nietzsche thus 
not only rejected the notion of unconditional truth, he also links particular ideas of 
what is ‘true’ to the pragmatic or instrumental exercise of power in the interests of 
self-preservation. Horkheimer and Adorno’s characterisation of conceptual or 
‘identity’ thought as that which imposes homogeneity and suppresses otherness is 
therefore clearly dependent on Nietzsche.20 
Unlike Nietzsche’s uncompromising critique of reason, or indeed Weber’s 
ultimately fatalistic view of rationalisation, Horkheimer and Adorno attempt to 
retain the possibilities of both a reconciliation with nature and a comprehensive 
notion of emancipatory Reason. The critique of reason in Dialectic of 
Enlightenment is still, as Buck-Morss notes, a critique ‘for the sake of the 
Enlightenment and the rationality which it promised.’ Horkheimer and Adorno’s 
work should thus be read as a ‘critical negation’ of the rationalist view of 
historical progress which preserves as its aim the realisation of human 
emancipation. (Buck-Morss, 1977 p.61) At its core, Horkheimer and Adorno’s 
critique is a critique of instrumental reason precisely for the sake of re-
establishing this form of ‘subjective reason’ as a subordinate component of a 
comprehensive, ‘objective reason’. The pessimism of Dialectic of Enlightenment 
to a large degree reflected Horkheimer and Adorno’s assessment of the realities of 
the modern totally administered society and the recent experiences of fascism and 
Stalinism. It also served, however, as a ‘negative construct’ intended to unmask 
                                                 
19 See Bennett (1987) for a discussion of this issue in terms of Foucault's work. 
20 Heidegger is also an important figure in this mode of critique. See Benhabib (1984) p.106-11. 
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the totalitarian currents of instrumental reason and Enlightenment thinking that 
threatened to destroy Reason and enlightenment in the broader, emancipatory 
sense. (See Grumley, 1989 p.175-7; Held, 1980 p.156-7; Leiss, 1975 p.175-7; 
Wellmer, 1991 p.60-63) 
Central to this critique of instrumental reason was the notion of reconciliation 
between the subject and nature, between inner and outer nature. Reconciliation is 
seen as essential for emancipation because the history of the mastery of nature is 
at the same time the history of the domination of humanity. Such domination will 
continue unless humanity develops a critical understanding of the paradoxical 
character of human reason, that is, of the ‘naturalness’ of the drive for self-
preservation and domination which at the same time is a trend that alienates 
humanity from nature. The Dialectic of Enlightenment links the growth of 
scientific knowledge and social progress with a retreat from the ‘unreflective 
naturalism’ characteristic of modern disenchantment.21 However, Horkheimer and 
Adorno do not believe that the process can be reversed through any sort of 
simplistic ‘return to nature’ or through the invention of new nature mythologies 
which equate Reason with nature. To do so would be to ignore the historical 
realities of Enlightenment and technological progress that have brought the 
modern subject into existence.22 (Dallmayr, 1991 p.76-7; Jay, 1973 p.270-2)  
Moreover, the total identification of nature and subject, understood as complete 
reconciliation would be a regression to yet another form of ‘identity thinking’ that 
reduced subject to object, rather than a dialectical mediation of the interrelated 
though non-identical. Reconciliation must be based not on assimilation of the 
differences between humanity and the rest of nature, but through the ‘reflective 
opposition between them.’23(Jay, 1973 p.267) 
Consistent with the view of nature as a social category, reconciliation, 
particularly as developed by Adorno’s appropriation of Benjamin’s idea of 
‘mimesis’, is not intended to imply the possibility of unmediated access to nature. 
                                                 
21 ‘Unreflective naturalism’ is also characteristic of much of contemporary environmental 
thinking. See Bennett (1987). 
22 Wellmer makes the point that Horkheimer and Adorno saw the decline of individuality in late 
industrial society as a ‘regressive development’ despite the fact that they also saw the modern 
cogito or unified self ‘not in terms of the autonomous subject which was destroyed by Freud, 
but - rather more in the manner of Foucault - as the correlate or product of the 'discourse of 
modernity', namely as a disciplined and disciplining form of organisation of humans as social 
beings. It is violence that stands at the origin of this unified self, and not an act of autonomous 
self-positing.’ Wellmer explains this apparent contradiction by suggesting that Horkheimer and 
Adorno saw the modern ‘constellation of norms of rationality’ as a kind of ‘nodal point - like 
bourgeois society for Marx - through which it is necessary to pass, but which is destined to be 
sublated in a self-transcendence of reason.’ (Wellmer, 1991 p.62-3) 
23 See Luke, (1988) and Rutherford (1993) for critiques of the deep ecology attempt at such an 
assimilation of the differences between humanity and nature. 
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Rather it recognises that history and culture necessarily mediate the relationship 
of humans to nature, and that any so-called ‘direct’ access to nature would in fact 
be a fetishisation of nature. (Alford, 1985b p.158) Nevertheless, the notion of 
mimetic reconciliation reflects the problem of characterising conceptual thinking 
as directed at control and self-preservation. If the systematising, disciplining 
character of language and rational thought always reifies and does violence to 
nature and the subject, then it becomes improbable that any form of discursive 
reason would be capable of breaking this circle. Indeed, Horkheimer and Adorno, 
faced with the conclusion that all forms of linguistic and mathematical-scientific 
expression are dominated by instrumental rationality, sought refuge for 
emancipatory thought in a prediscursive, aesthetic ideal. In particular, the problem 
is that formal rationality (‘identity thought’) becomes ‘philosophical imperialism’ 
in which truth is defined by the triumph of the universal and abstract over the 
particular and the real, resulting in Enlightenment transforming itself into myth. 
The only way to resist this is through the ‘radical self-reflection of thought’ to 
make thought aware of its ‘complicity with power’ and to stimulate the 
‘recollection of nature in the rational subject’. (Dallmayr, 1991 p.81) 
Benhabib describes Adorno’s notion of mimetic reconciliation as the ability 
of the subject to ‘forget oneself’ in the face of otherness, through ‘aesthetic 
experience’ of the ‘naturally beautiful’. This idea of the ‘naturally beautiful’, as 
an allegory for reconciliation in Adorno’s work does not represent an essentialist 
category but the antithesis of modern society inasmuch as that society appears in a 
fixed instrumental relation to nature. Mimesis is therefore the suggestion of the 
possibility of a non-static mediation between nature and humans, rather than the 
final realisation of some mystical condition beyond history. Benhabib sums this 
up succinctly: 
The utopia of a non-sacrificial non-identity of the subject is intimated in 
that non-compulsory relation to otherness which forces the subject to 
forget him- or her-self and to catch a glimpse of the moment of 
reconciliation. What distinguishes this appeal to the aesthetic, it must be 
emphasised, from a romantic theory of flight into nature is precisely the 
ambivalence of the concept of nature. Nature, for Adorno, signifies not a 
given entity, state, or medium, but ‘otherness’, the ‘otherness’ of society, 
civilisation, and reason. The semantic content of this otherness changes 
historically, and must be recreated again and again. (Benhabib, 1986 
p.211-2) 
Despite this, the characterisation by the Frankfurt School of all discursive 
thought as linked to instrumental reason is seen by many critics, most notably 
Habermas, as leading to serious theoretical problems for critical theory. In 
particular these critics argue that such a move undermines the notion an 
emancipatory moment to reason and deprives the project of rational critique of a 
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valid foundation. (See Habermas, 1982a p.13-30; Ingram, 1987 p.67-74 and 
p.213-23; Wellmer, 1985 p.46-51) 
Habermas’ critique of the Dialectic of Enlightenment 
Habermas’ intellectual project can be understood as a response to the 
pessimism of Dialectic of Enlightenment and as an attempt to redeem the positive 
emancipatory potential of the Enlightenment tradition that, on his account, 
remains as an unrealised practical task of the ‘project of modernity’. (Bernstein, 
1985 p.31) Habermas’ philosophical criticism of Horkheimer and Adorno takes 
on greater significance because the theoretical impasses he claims to find in 
Dialectic of Enlightenment he also sees as repeated in the post-structuralist 
revival of Nietzsche, especially in the works of Foucault, Deleuze, Derrida and 
Lyotard. (Habermas, 1982a p.13) He sees what he regards as a clear continuity of 
error in the works of Nietzsche, Adorno and Horkheimer and what he describes as 
the ‘anti-modernism’ of the post-structuralist conservatism. (Habermas, 1981b 
p.13; Ingram, 1987 p.75) This perspective is also reflected in his analysis of the 
nature of new social movements. (Habermas, 1981c) 
Adorno and Horkheimer had argued, said Habermas, that the separation of the 
cultural spheres (science, morality and art), and the loss of reason in religion and 
metaphysics had lead to the regression of reason in general into a ‘purposive 
rationality at the service of a self-preservation gone wild. In cultural modernity 
substantive reason is stripped of its validity claims and is assimilated to sheer 
power.’ (Habermas, 1982a p.18) Habermas however rejects this as a one 
dimensional, ‘flattened out’ view of modernity and reason, arguing instead that 
there remains within each of the value spheres elements of rationality which are 
not subsumed totally within purposive rationality. He cites such elements as those 
within the sciences that transcend the production of instrumental knowledge; the 
universalistic bases of law and morality embodied in the modern democratic and 
constitutional state; and the emancipatory power of aesthetic experience. 
(Habermas, 1982a p.18) Habermas differentiates rationality and action into 
various spheres or types, placing particular importance on the distinction between 
the communicative and instrumental forms. As a result of this differentiation of 
reason, he claims that the universalistic claims of ‘bourgeois ideals’ in the realms 
of morality and law represent, despite the distortions of modern capitalist society, 
‘an irreversible collective learning process’. This is categorically distinguishable 
from both the technical-developmental logic of the sciences and technology, and 
from the formal and bureaucratic rationalisation of social institutions. (Habermas, 
1982a p.18) Thus contrary to Adorno and Horkheimer, Habermas maintains a 
strong belief in the potential for a democratic and emancipatory rational 
organisation of society, a potential that is contained in his category of 
communicative rationality, which for him is a fundamental feature of the modern 
‘species-being’ of humanity. 
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Adorno and Horkheimer claimed that myth and enlightenment inevitably 
reverted into each other, that ‘power and knowledge are synonymous’ (Adorno 
and Horkheimer, 1986; Ingram, 1987 p.65) Habermas however argues that 
‘demythologisation’ is necessary to distinguish between culture and nature, 
between the objects of human manipulation and acting and speaking agents. 
Enlightenment results in the ‘desocialisation of nature and ... the denaturalisation 
of the social’ leading to a decentred worldview. (Habermas, 1982a p.19) 
According to Habermas this decentred understanding makes possible the critique 
of ideology, a form of critique which seeks to ‘demonstrate that the validity of a 
theory ... has not freed itself sufficiently from the context of its genesis ... (and 
that) hidden behind ... this theory is an inadmissible fusion of power and validity.’ 
(Habermas, 1982a p.20) Hence, ideology critique carries forward the process of 
enlightenment by revealing categorical errors that arise from the conflation of 
professed validity claims (that is, veracity or truthfulness) with concealed power 
claims. Ideology critique becomes reflexive by carrying out its project on its own 
theories. Adorno and Horkheimer however, claims Habermas, carry critique to a 
second level of reflexivity in which the very method of ideology critique itself is 
brought into question through the totalised critique of all thought as expressive of 
power claims. With this Adorno and Horkheimer had abandoned hope in the 
Marxist critique of ideology and the possibility of critical social science. Their 
critique becomes a totalised attack on Reason as the very basis of critical analysis. 
For Habermas, in the Dialectic of Enlightenment,  
purposive-rationality, which had become total, eliminates the difference 
between that which claims validity and that which only serves the 
interests of self-preservation. By doing so instrumental reason breaks 
down the barrier between truth and power and thereby annihilates the 
fundamental differentiation which the modern decentred understanding of 
the world thought it had gained definitively by overcoming myth. Reason, 
once instrumentalised, has become assimilated to power and has thereby 
given up its critical power. (Habermas, 1982a) 
These criticisms of Adorno and Horkheimer are precisely those that 
Habermas directs against Foucault’s theory of power/knowledge. It should be 
noted here that in concentrating attention on those elements in Dialectic of 
Enlightenment that draw on Nietzsche, Habermas brings clearly into focus the key 
theoretical differences between himself and Foucault. I shall discuss the 
philosophical debate between Habermas and Foucault on power in more detail in 
Chapter 5. 
Habermas identifies two fundamental areas in which Adorno and Horkheimer 
agree with Nietzsche. First, each regarded thought as the mechanism through 
which external nature is objectified and constituted as a resource for 
manipulation. Thought is also for both associated with the repressive 
internalisation of instincts and ‘natural drives’, that is, with the creation of ‘inner 
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nature’ or subjectivity. These modes of domination of internal and external nature 
result in the ‘institutional domination of men over men’. (Habermas, 1982a p.24) 
Second, Adorno and Horkheimer’s critique of instrumental reason parallels 
Nietzsche’s critique of morality and scientific knowledge, in that for each behind 
the ideals of universal morality, objectivity and truth, there lies the concealed 
drive for self-preservation and domination, that is, the will to power. A 
consequence of this, argues Habermas, is that for Nietzsche the will to power 
destroys the possibility of any ‘claim to intersubjective validity’, as all judgement 
is in the last resort based on aesthetic preference or ‘the judgement of taste’. For 
Habermas this also destroys the possibility of critique, for without the foundations 
of objectivity and universality attributed by modernist philosophy to truth and 
validity claims, critique loses its meaning and reduces to no more than 
‘difference’. (Habermas, 1982a p.25-6) 
In order for Nietzsche to show why it is wrong to accept the domination of 
life by science and morality, says Habermas, he must have resort to some criterion 
on which to base such a value judgement. Habermas argues that Nietzsche’s 
theory of power seeks to dissolve this problem by denying that value judgements 
are validity claims but ‘mere expressions of claims to power’. (Habermas, 1982a 
p.27) Horkheimer and Adorno find themselves confronted with this same problem 
in that if they wish to retain their commitment to the practice of critique as an 
‘ultimate unmasking’, they must also retain ‘at least one standard for their 
explanation of the corruption of all reasonable standards.’ (Habermas, 1982a 
p.28) It is Adorno and Horkheimer’s inability to do this that deprives their critique 
of direction, according to Habermas. In fact, says Habermas, they simply abandon 
the desire to overcome this aporia, not only leaving the contradiction unresolved, 
but intensifying it. As a consequence Adorno and Horkheimer were unable 
theoretically to avoid the negativity and pessimism of Dialectic of Enlightenment. 
Habermas’ method of avoiding this ‘abyss’ is to execute an abstract categorical 
differentiation within reason and thought, and by asserting the negative powers of 
reason are the result of an inappropriate dominance of instrumental or technical 
rationality over communicative rationality. 
Nietzsche’s theory of power, argues Habermas, is thus confronted with the 
problem that ‘critique surrenders the world ... to the irreconcilable struggle 
between powers.’ (Habermas, 1982a p.28) This, says Habermas, is also the path 
adopted by the post-structuralists such a Deleuze and Foucault. Although 
Foucault’s concept of power allows for differentiation between specific discursive 
formations, it still however denies any basis for universal or transcontextual 
judgement of validity claims. It also fails, according to Habermas, to offer a 
solution to the aporia of a critique that denies the validity of its own premises. 
(Habermas, 1982a p.29) 
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Conclusion 
The themes outlined in this chapter provide the background against which the 
arguments of subsequent chapters will be developed. The notion of a negative 
dialectic of progress is a concern that, in one form or another, influences the work 
of the major theorists examined in this thesis. The main elements of this negative 
dialectic include, first, the assertion that the key to the development of modern 
society, and consequently to development of the modern subject, is to be found in 
the processes of societal rationalisation. Second, these processes of 
rationalisation, while they have made possible substantial social and economic 
progress (through legal-political institutions and the power of science), have also 
come to be seen as having a darker side in which reason and knowledge have 
increasingly become forces of domination, discipline and control.  
The way in which these themes are dealt with by social theory defines in a 
significant sense what Habermas has called the ‘philosophical discourse on 
modernity’. The themes covered in this chapter are essential to understanding 
much of the social theoretical debate, over the last 30 years, and in particular the 
philosophical discourse on power and subjectivity. Such a background is therefore 
an indispensable starting point for a consideration of these issues in general and in 
particular the disputes between critical theorists such as Habermas and theorists 
such as Foucault. 
Against this background, the chapters that follow consider the relevance of 
these general social theoretical debates to the analysis of contemporary discourse 
about ecological or environmental crisis. In this context, the current chapter has 
pointed to what I described in Chapter 1 as the problem of nature in social theory. 
It is against the background of the theoretical debates outlined in this chapter that 
I now turn in the next two chapters to a detailed consideration of Habermas’ 
critical social theory, and the recent work of Ulrich Beck and Klaus Eder. 
Following this I examine the work of Foucault and consider how it may be used to 
understand ecological problems. 
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Chapter 3 
The problem of nature in Habermas 
 
Introduction 
In the work of Horkheimer and Adorno the relationship between humanity 
and nature is considered central to social theory, and it is this particular focus that 
marks the later work of the Frankfurt School. The problem of the dialectical 
relationship between ‘inner’ and ‘outer’ nature, is as we have seen in the previous 
chapter, cast in a way that problematises the belief that technological and 
scientific progress is necessary to the realisation of the goals of human 
emancipation and moral progress. In calling into question this assumption, 
Horkheimer and Adorno’s work anticipates themes common to the widespread 
concern with environmental problems and ecological crisis that emerged in the 
post-World War Two period in the industrialised Western societies.24 The 
Frankfurt School and the broader discourse on the environment25 therefore have in 
common a focus on what I described in the introduction to this thesis as the 
problem of nature. 
This and the next chapter consider the problem of nature as dealt with by 
some contemporary critical theorists. I have not attempted a comprehensive 
survey of the vast literature on social theory. Rather I present an examination of 
selected theoretical approaches that can be considered as either central to the 
                                                 
24 This is not to claim that Horkheimer and Adorno's work directly inspired concern for such 
ecological problems or the development of Green political theory. Eckersley comments that 
while Frankfurt School Critical Theory takes up themes of fundamental significance to Green 
theory, such as the critique of industrialism, technology and bureaucratic state administration, it 
nonetheless failed to have as strong an impact on Green thought as such common concerns may 
lead us to expect. Eckersley (1992) attributes this lack of greater influence by the Frankfurt 
School largely to the direction imposed by Habermas’ work on the development of Critical 
Theory since the 1960s (see p.97-99). It should however be noted that other Frankfurt School 
theorists, especially Marcuse, were influential on the New Left in the 1960-70s. There is little 
doubt that through this connection their ideas did have an impact on Green political theory, 
particularly its anti-bureaucratic tendencies. Eckersley, (1992) p.10-11, mentions this. Betz 
(1991) gives a detailed account of the influence of the New Left on the development of the 
Green movement in Germany. See especially Chapters 1-3 of that work. 
25 Here I am referring to the widespread growth of concern for the environment beginning in the 
1960s and reflected in such works as Carson (1962); Commoner (1971); Ehlrich (1968); Hardin 
(1968); Meadows et al. (1972) 
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framing of the debate (Habermas) or as significant recent attempts to develop a 
more satisfactory social theoretical framework for analysis of ecological problems 
(Eder, Beck).26 This present chapter further considers the way in which Habermas 
deals with the problem of nature as it arises from Horkheimer and Adorno’s 
treatment of the ‘dialectic of enlightenment’. In doing so I consider some of the 
key elements of Habermas’ development of critical theory and some criticisms of 
this. In particular I examine his notions of ‘system’ and ‘life-world’, and his 
insistence that an objectifying  and instrumental attitude to nature is an 
unavoidable cost that must be borne if we are to preserve and extend what he 
regards as the ‘cognitive gains’ of the ‘unfinished project of modernity’. 
(Habermas, 1982b p.238-250) The following chapter goes on to consider some 
recent theoretical works that give ecological problems a greater sociological 
significance in advanced industrial society than does Habermas’ consideration of 
these as conflicts. 
The problem of nature in Habermas 
As outlined in Chapter 2, Horkheimer and Adorno’s analysis in the end is 
largely pessimistic about overcoming the historical impasse produced by 
modernisation. In part this reflects a continued acceptance that a relatively high 
level of material production, and therefore technological and economic progress, 
as a necessary precondition for a free and humane society. However, in 
Horkheimer and Adorno’s view, social domination is an inevitable consequence 
of the domination of nature by science and technology. The only possible solution 
to this lay in reconciliation with nature. The difficulty of this approach 27 is that 
the domination of external nature required the control of inner nature, which is 
achieved in the human subject only through imitating the rigidity and 
despiritualisation of disenchanted nature within the self. According to this view, 
the domination of external nature is therefore achieved only by distorting and 
undermining the instinctual psychological structures that would provide the 
subjective conditions for the realisation of an emancipated society. (Alford, 1985b 
p.11; Whitebook, 1979 p.41) Thus after Dialectic of Enlightenment critical theory 
faced the dilemma of explaining how reconciliation with nature could occur while 
at the same time avoiding a significant undermining the productive capacity of 
modern industrialised society.28 This latter question is a key focus in the 
                                                 
26 I have, for example, made only passing references to the work of Marcuse. 
27 Apart from how such reconciliation was itself socially possible (as distinct from a private 
intuitive or expressive reconciliation). 
28 Marcuse, despite being critical of advanced science and technology, regarded them as essential 
to the liberation of the instinctual nature of human beings. Advanced technology, and 
particularly automation, offered the possibility of the freeing humanity from engaging in 
necessary labour - and thus being able to enter into an instinctive, expressive reconciliation 
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environmental debate between ‘romantic’ or deep ecologists and the utilitarianism 
implied by the notions of ecological modernisation and ‘sustainable 
development’.29 
Habermas declines to accept the notion of reconciliation with nature, 
regarding it as regression into metaphysics. (Habermas, 1982a) Instead he 
challenges the central argument of Dialectic of Enlightenment as expressing a 
narrow ‘monistic’ notion of Reason as domination. While admitting the close 
interrelationship between the domination of internal and external nature, 
Habermas argues that these do not operate according to a single logic. He adopts a 
differentiated concept of reason in which instrumental rationality as the logic of 
domination of external nature necessarily ‘aims at reification’, while in the logic 
of communicative rationality, which governs inner nature, reification is not the 
aim but only a ‘possible pathological outcome’. For Habermas the reification of 
external nature is necessary for the formulation of the objective technical rules 
that allow science and technology to manipulate the natural world. By contrast, in 
the development of inner or subjective nature, it is not a question of the creation 
of formal rules of technical control, but rather one of the internalisation of 
intersubjective norms. In other words, normative processes are aimed not at 
reification but at ‘autonomy, individuation and socialisation’, and as such they 
follow the logic of communicative rationality. (Whitebook, 1979 p.43)  
By virtue of this differentiation of value spheres and their corresponding 
modes of rationality, 30 Habermas unlike Horkheimer and Adorno is able to 
maintain that the rationalisation of society is not inimical to moral progress and 
emancipation. On the contrary, the basis for the development of a society 
grounded in a free and democratic consensus is embodied in his notion of the 
‘ideal speech situation’.31 The rational evolution of each aspect of the human self-
                                                                                                                                     
with nature. For a discussion of Marcuse's attitude to science, see Alford (1985b) especially 
Chapter 4. 
29 This distinction (which has been drawn by Klaus Eder among others) is discussed in Chapter 3 
of the current thesis. See also Rutherford (1999a). 
30 Parsons’ comments that ‘following Weber - and ultimately Kant - Habermas characterises 
modernity as the differentiation of three spheres of 'value': science, morality and art. These 
three spheres allow for the production of different forms of knowledge: scientific-technical, 
moral-practical, and aesthetic-practical.’ (p.218) For a discussion of Habermas’ reliance on 
Kant and Marx in his account of the relationship between human knowledge and nature, see 
Parsons (1992) p.218-230. See also Bernstein (1985) p.24. For a more sympathetic but 
nevertheless critical review of Habermas’ use of Kantian notions in this context. See McCarthy 
(1978) p.110-125. 
31 As McCarthy points out, for Habermas ‘the goal of critical theory – a form of life free from 
unnecessary domination in all its forms – is inherent in the notion of truth’ and as truth, 
according to Habermas, is fundamental to communication, truth is therefore ‘anticipated in 
every act of communication.’ (McCarthy, 1978 p.7). West explains that for Habermas truth, 
freedom and justice ‘are to be understood in terms of consensus theories of theoretical (factual 
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formative process (labour, communication and power), is immanent albeit in a 
distorted form, in the legal and political institutions and humanist values of 
modernity. Thus, moral progress is possible despite the over-importance of the 
technical/instrumental mode of rationality. Rather than terminating in the dialectic 
of enlightenment’s conflation of power and reason, modernity needs to be pushed 
to completion, that is, social norms must be made fully rational, but in accordance 
with the appropriate mode of rationality - moral-practical reason. (Habermas, 
1982b p.240) 32 
Habermas’ treatment of the problem of nature must be understood within the 
context of his concern to rescue a rational basis for universal normative standards 
against the ‘totalised critique’ of instrumental reason advanced, following in the 
footsteps of Nietzsche and Weber, by Horkheimer and Adorno. (Habermas, 1982a 
p.19-23) The rejection of this form of critique is central to his project, which aims 
to maintain the critical role of social theory. In the hands of Horkheimer and 
Adorno critical theory looses its earlier aspiration of developing a critical social 
science directed towards fulfilling an explanatory-diagnostic role in furthering the 
task of human emancipation from domination and repression. In the Frankfurt 
School’s formulation of the dialectic of enlightenment the emancipatory power of 
social science, itself an instance of ‘identity thinking’, is ensnared in the critique 
of instrumental reason. It cannot guarantee a solution to problems of 
rationalisation or modernity for it is part of the very mode of conceptual thought 
responsible for these problems.33  
Habermas however seeks to ground his emancipatory critical theory through 
the reflexive use of social science. His re-formulation of critical theory is thus 
directed towards ‘a non-positivist approach’ to theory in the social sciences, rather 
than following Adorno’s negative dialectics, which Habermas characterises as ‘a 
renunciation of the social sciences’. (Habermas, 1981a p.10) While positivism 
denies the link between knowledge and interests (value), and therefore attempts to 
deny any rational warrant to moral-practical thought, Horkheimer and Adorno’s 
totalising critique of instrumental reason likewise undermines practical reason by 
                                                                                                                                     
or scientific) and moral or practical truth (rightness). But a consensus is not valid if it is the 
result of inadequate information or external pressure or compulsion. … Discourse is to be 
measured against an ‘ideal speech situation’, which is free from relations of power or 
domination, and which is undogmatically committed to the consideration of all available 
evidence and even alternative conceptual schemes.’ An ideal speech situation is not possible 
when ideology or power systematically distorts the rational force of ‘the better argument’. A 
key task of critical theory is therefore to expose any such deviation from the ideal speech 
situation. (West, 1996 p.75-6) I argue in Chapter 5 that Habermas’ view of the possibility of 
power free communication is based on an inadequate conception of power. 
32 See also Parsons (1992) p.218-9; Wellmer, (1985) p.50-2. 
33 Foucault makes a similar point about the complicity of the human sciences in modern forms of 
power. See for example Foucault (1980b) p.273-89. 
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assimilating value judgements to power. (Habermas, 1978 p.303; Habermas, 
1982a p.22-3) Habermas’ concern in this respect is to avoid the relativism (or 
perspectivalism) which he regards as inherent in Weber and the Frankfurt 
School’s presentation of the processes of rationalisation. Instead he develops a 
theory of modernity that acknowledges the ‘dialectic of social rationalisation’ 
(‘the main theme of the dialectic of enlightenment’). He also employs a theory of 
communicative rationality (or ‘universal pragmatics’) that ‘possesses the 
analytical selectivity’ needed to understand reification as a pathological 
phenomena arising from the deformed or partial realisation of the rational 
potential of modernity.  
Habermas’ theoretical development of critical theory therefore has been 
directed toward maintaining what he regards as this emancipatory potential of 
modernity. While this, in his view, has required the rejection of Horkheimer and 
Adorno’s monistic notion of reason, it has also lead to his reconceptualisation of 
the idea of nature in accordance with this perspective. His treatment of nature has 
varied as his ideas have developed, and this can broadly be grouped into two 
phases, the first corresponding with his earlier formulation of the theory of 
cognitive interests, the second with his development of a universal pragmatics. In 
the first phase he relates different types of knowledge constitutive interests to the 
natural history of the human species, while in the later period he views problems 
of nature and ecology as expressions of the conflicts that arise at the interface of 
‘system’ and ‘life-world’. I shall consider in turn each phase of his work. 
Nature and cognitive interests 
Habermas’ view of the relation between nature and society retains the 
Frankfurt School’s understanding of nature as at the same time both the product of 
human history and the ground for that history. (Habermas, 1978) 34 His theory of 
cognitive interests appeals to a fundamental dialectical relationship between the 
human subject and nature.35 He postulates a collective interest in utilising the 
forces of nature for the purpose of the reproduction and self-preservation of 
human society, and in doing so suggests a basic dependence on nature and at the 
same time, through knowledge, a separation from it.36 This interest in self-
                                                 
34 See also McCarthy (1978) p.113; Parsons (1992) p.222-5; Whitebook (1979) p.48. 
35 In Habermas (1978) - see Chapter 2 and Appendix - Habermas understands the subject as 
simultaneously possessing a human species-being and social-being, along the lines evident in 
Marx. See Marx (1974). 
36 ‘Orientation toward technical control, toward mutual understanding in the conduct of life, and 
toward emancipation from seemingly 'natural' constraint establish the specific viewpoints from 
which we can apprehend reality ... By becoming aware of the impossibility of getting beyond 
these transcendental limits, a part of nature acquires, through us, autonomy in nature. ... the 
mind can become aware of its natural basis reflexively.’ (Habermas, 1978 p.311). 
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preservation is embedded in the natural history of the human species and gives 
rise to particular ‘knowledge-constitutive interests’. The most significant point 
about this claim is that knowledge is not separate from the wants and needs of 
human beings, as traditional epistemology would have it, but is based in ‘the 
metalogical necessity of interests that we neither prescribe nor represent, but with 
which we must instead come to terms.’ (Habermas, 1978 p.312 - original 
emphasis) Thus Habermas emphasises that what is taken as factual knowledge (or 
‘objective knowledge’) reflects the success or failure of collective actions, lying 
behind which is the interest in self-preservation giving rise to the interlocking of 
knowledge and interests from the ‘life-world’. His view of knowledge therefore 
exhibits the characteristics of philosophical pragmatism. 
Following from his differentiation of reason and ‘value spheres’ as an 
antidote to the Frankfurt School’s totalising notion of reason, Habermas posits 
three types of knowledge-constitutive interests: the technical, the practical and the 
emancipatory. (Habermas, 1978 p.308-310) According to this schema the 
technical interest is that which governs human relations with nature, where the 
interest is an instrumental interest in control and exploitability, of pragmatic 
utility in securing the satisfaction of needs and wants brought forth in the natural 
history of the human species. This natural history lies behind and is inseparable 
from social and cultural processes. It gives rise to taken-for-granted (‘natural’ and 
‘instinctual’) needs and motivations, but at the same time these are also 
historically and socially shaped so that they transcend ‘mere self-preservation’. 
That is, even the apparently natural interest in self-preservation is expressed 
through the social system as the means of securing a ‘historical existence’ against 
nature.37  
The idea that interests are constitutive of knowledge means that humans can 
only experience the world (‘reality’) as conditioned through these interests, and 
additionally that knowledge would not be possible unless interests existed. This 
means that interests have a cognitive function of constituting what it is possible to 
have knowledge of, that is, they create ‘fundamental object domains’. (Habermas, 
1978 p.369) 38 Interests therefore structure the possible viewpoints from which the 
human species can apprehend reality. Habermas further argues that knowledge-
constitutive interests ‘take form in the medium of work, language and power’, that 
                                                 
37 ‘the human interests that have emerged in man's natural history … derives both from nature and 
from the cultural break with nature. ... What may appear as naked survival is always in its roots 
a historical phenomenon. For it is subject to the criterion of what a society intends for itself as 
the good life.’ (Habermas, 1978 p.312-3)  
38 There is a similarity between this and the notion of ‘problematisation’ evident in the work of 
Foucault and others on governmental rationality, and in the work of Latour and other actor-
network theorists. Both are discussed in detail in subsequent chapters. 
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is, each of these media shape interests in distinct ways and corresponds to the 
different types of knowledge.39  
Habermas reconstructs Marx’s differentiation of nature into three moments - 
nature-in-itself, subjective nature and objective nature. Nature-in-itself is 
conceived, following the early Marx, (Marx, 1974 p.329-30) 40 as that which 
exists prior to the cultural world, as the basis of the natural evolution of the 
human species in a biological sense. In addition to this naturalistic sense of extra-
human nature, Habermas also understands nature-in-itself as an epistemological 
necessity, which presupposes nature as existing of itself, independently of human 
history and experience41. This is nevertheless ‘an abstraction’, for nature must 
always be encountered within the context of the socio-historical ‘self-formative 
process’ of the human species. (Habermas, 1978 p.34)  
In its anthropological aspects, Habermas further divides nature analytically 
into ‘the subjective nature of man and the objective nature of his environment.’ 
‘Subjective bodily nature’ consists not only of the characteristics ‘of an organism 
dependent on its environment (sensuous receptivity, need, emotionality, 
vulnerability)’ but also the ‘adaptive modes of behaviour and active expressions 
of life of an ‘active natural being.’ Central to the human self-formative process is 
social labour, which is both a ‘natural’ process through which humans exchange 
materials with their environment and at the same time a ‘transcendental’ act 
through which the conditions for the constitution of objective knowledge of 
external nature are brought into being. (Habermas, 1978 p.26-8) In the labour 
process subjective nature is mediated with external environmental nature. 
Habermas argues that humans are thus able to gain ‘access to nature’ only through 
the ‘historical dimension disclosed by the labour processes’, that is, through 
purposive-material interaction with the natural world. (Habermas, 1978 p.34) 
                                                 
39 The three ‘categories of possible knowledge’ are: that which ‘expands our power of technical 
control’ (instrumental); that which ‘makes possible the orientation of action within common 
traditions’ (practical); and that which ‘free consciousness from its dependence on hypostatised 
powers’, ie social and psychic constraints (emancipatory). These types of knowledge ‘originate 
in the interest structure of a species that is linked in its roots to definite means of social 
organisation: work, language, and power. The human species secures its existence in systems of 
social labour and self-assertion through violence, through tradition-bound social life in ordinary 
language communication, and with the aid of ego identities that at every level of individuation 
reconsolidate the consciousness of the individual in relation to the norms of the group.’ 
(Habermas, 1978 p.313) 
40 There is clearly an attempt to combine Marx and Kant in Habermas’ account of nature, for 
example see (Habermas, 1978 p.25-6, 35). For a detailed consideration of this aspect see 
(Parsons, 1992). 
41 This serves a similar function to Kant's thing-in-itself, as something which cannot be known as 
such but which is postulated as lying behind the appearances confronted by the senses. See 
Habermas (1982b) p.241-3; McCarthy (1978) p.110-25; Parsons (1992) p.221-6; Whitebook 
(1979) p.48-9.  
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Hence objective nature is not identical to nature-in-itself but is constituted ‘only 
in being mediated by the subjective nature of man through processes of social 
labour’. (Habermas, 1978 p.28) 42  
Habermas suggests that objective nature is not simply a creation of the 
subject, but the synthetic product of the subject’s activity in attempting to 
transform, control and utilise external nature (nature-in-itself). According to Marx 
there is both a unity of humans and nature, and a struggle between the two, which 
exists in the process of material production (social labour), and through which 
both nature and the labouring subject are transformed. (Marx, 1976 p.283) 43 
Following this approach, Habermas argues that the unity or synthesis between the 
subject and nature is only brought about by the activity of the subject, and is 
therefore necessarily something forced on to nature by the subject. Objective 
nature however does not exist in isolation from nature-in-itself. While the activity 
of the subject constitutes objective nature, it does not do so at will but encounters 
resistance: there exists an ‘independence and externality’ to nature that resists the 
subject. As a consequence, the unity of humans with nature ‘cannot eradicate the 
autonomy of nature and the remainder of complete otherness that is lodged in its 
facticity’, regardless of the scientific-technical power brought to bear. (Habermas, 
1978 p.33) It is important to understand that in talking of objective (or objectified) 
nature, Habermas is referring to the constitution of nature as an object of 
instrumental action or scientific knowledge, that is, as an object of experience. 
(Habermas, 1978 p.323 - translator's note 23) Objectified nature then, consists of 
‘possible objects of experience’ and as such shares both the independence and 
externality of nature and the ‘produced objectivity’ of a Lebenspraxis (world-
constituting life activity or social practice). (Habermas, 1978 p.27-28)  
Habermas claims his use of the concept nature-in-itself is an ‘ironic’ reuse of 
Kant’s thing-in-itself. He thus points to the pragmatic necessity of recognising the 
contingency and resistance of an independent reality which we are forced to 
construe as existing along the lines of nature-in-itself, even though this nature can 
only be scientifically known to us ‘as objectivated.’ (Habermas, 1982b p.242) 
Habermas’ twofold characterisation of natural objects as possessing the qualities 
of both being-in-itself and humanly produced objectivity is captured in his 
assertion that reality can only be known ‘in the perspective of possible technical 
control.’ (Habermas, 1978 p.130) What he is saying is that reality or nature is both 
disclosed and constituted. It is constituted to the extent that the meaning of 
statements we make about nature and the properties we assign to nature, ‘must be 
understood in relation to the structure of instrumental action.’ Nature is disclosed 
                                                 
42 Habermas takes labour to include science and technology. Both are ‘work’ in the Habermasian 
sense. 
43 For a discussion of the problem of nature and ecology in Marx see Grundmann (1991a) and 
(1991b). 
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inasmuch that statements about nature must have a pragmatic utility, that is, they 
must accommodate the resistance of nature to ‘false interpretations’. The facticity 
ascribed to nature in statements must be construed as existing independently of 
human action, as nature-in-itself. McCarthy argues that this approach allows 
Habermas to avoid some of the difficulties of interpreting nature-in-itself as 
strictly a Kantian thing-in-itself, for under Habermas’ re-formulation, nature-in-
itself is no longer completely unknowable. Nature-in-itself is knowable to the 
degree to which it can be subjected to instrumental action or technical 
manipulation; that is, it is knowable ‘subject to the conditions of possible 
objectivity’, to the degree to which nature is objectified. (McCarthy, 1978 p.117)  
Habermas clearly understands subjective nature as including the fundamental 
social life-structures, work and interaction. Here again there is a paradox, for if 
nature can be known in the context of instrumental action then it follows that 
‘subjective bodily nature’, inasmuch as it is known through instrumental means, 
must also be understood as part of objectified nature.44 However, this same 
subjective bodily nature would (in a consistently materialist ontology) need to 
exist prior to constituted objectivity. The dilemma is then, that ‘either subjective 
bodily nature is not a prior condition of possibility of cognition, or it is and we 
cannot know it.’ (McCarthy, 1978 p.119) Habermas attempts to overcome this 
problem by differentiating the conditions under which human knowledge of 
objective and subjective nature is achieved. Thus while objective nature is 
constituted in the context of instrumental action, subjective nature can only be 
understood, according to Habermas, within the media of the ‘reproduction of 
social life’ (work or social labour) and the ‘cultural conditions’ in which it takes 
place (interaction). Unlike objective nature, subjective nature cannot be 
understood within the same objectifying framework as biological reproduction 
and preservation of the species. Work and interaction are elements of a self-
formative process that includes ‘learning and arriving at mutual understanding.’ 
(Habermas, 1978 p.196) Subjective nature is therefore to be understood as bound 
to these structures of social action (work and interaction) and the knowledge 
constitutive interests that lie behind them. These are to be understood not as the 
product of an objectifying process but of a reflexive or hermeneutic task, which 
reflects on the conditions of objectivity: 
In an epistemological context, then, subjective nature refers neither to an 
unknowable nature-in-itself nor to an objectively constituted nature. It 
refers to structures of human life that are grasped reflectively in an 
attempt to elucidate the nature, conditions, and limitations of human 
knowledge. (McCarthy, 1978 p.120) 
                                                 
44 There is some similarity here with Foucault’s approach to the human body. See Butler (1989). 
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One of the tasks of Habermas’ cognitive interest theory is to overcome what 
he sees as Marx’s epistemological conflation of symbolic interaction and labour. 
(Habermas, 1978) He attempts to do this by arguing that these separate domains 
of action are based on different categories of knowledge that obey different logics 
or rules of formation. (Habermas, 1978, Appendix; Habermas, 1982b) Labour, as 
Parsons notes, is nevertheless defined by Habermas ‘in terms of dual character: 
as both a category of human existence and an epistemological category.’ (Parsons, 
1992 p.222) 45 Nature and labour therefore come together in a specific way in 
Habermas - through science and technology. For him science and technology are 
highly rationalised expressions of social labour. Indeed, Habermas makes a direct 
link between the ‘old’ techniques of labour (techne) characteristic of artisan 
production in the past and modern technology. He argues that the 
function of the knowledge of modern science must therefore be 
understood in connection with the system of social labour: it extends and 
rationalises our power of technical control over the objects or - what 
comes to the same thing - objectified processes of nature and society. 
(Habermas, 1976 p.334) 
Science and technology are therefore modern expressions of the same 
cognitive interest as is labour, that is, the instrumental or technical interest in the 
effective manipulation and control of nature and the social organisation of labour 
necessary for this. Whereas Horkheimer and Adorno understood science and 
technology as expressions of the objectifying tendency characteristic of all 
conceptual reason, Habermas insists on a differentiation. The problem of nature 
(insomuch as there is a problem) therefore does not arise from the ‘new function 
of science as a technological force’, but rather from a failure to separate ‘practical 
and technical power’. The difficulty is precisely that the different value spheres 
and cognitive interests are not adequately distinguished, resulting in ‘the process 
of scientification’ transgressing the proper limits of technical rationality and 
intruding into areas of moral-practical reason, that is, politics. (Habermas, 1976 
p.331-4) 46 
One of the main strengths of Habermas’ interpretation of science is his 
insistence that knowledge of nature cannot be separated from human interests and 
their historical production. Thus contrary to the ahistorical orientation of 
                                                 
45 See Habermas (1978) p.28-35. It is not within the scope of this thesis to consider in detail the 
bases from which Habermas draws his theory in this regard. For discussion and criticism of 
Habermas’ attempt to synthesise Kant and Marx see Parsons (1992) p.218-30; McCarthy 
(1978) p.110-25; Whitebook (1979) p.41-69. 
46 This is an issue that is also taken up by Beck. See in particular (Beck, 1994 ) where he in effect 
argues for a politicisation of decisions about technology - he asserts that the acceptability of 
technological risks is a moral-practical one rather than a technical one. Beck’s work is 
discussed in Chapter 4 of this thesis. 
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positivism and the totalising tendency of Horkheimer and Adorno, Habermas 
attempts a historically based account of the relation between knowledge and 
nature. However, his own tendency to seek a universal grounding for reason 
undermines this. This is particularly the case with his argument that the technical 
cognitive interest is a product of the natural history of the human species, and that 
‘our’ technology as an expression of this must be conceived as a project of ‘the 
human species as a whole.’ (Habermas, 1971 p.87) Such a homogenous view of 
‘natural history’ and social evolution is as totalising in its own way as the 
‘monistic’ notion of reason put forward in Horkheimer and Adorno’s Dialectic of 
Enlightenment. The desire to secure a universal foundation, or more precisely, 
universal criteria for assessing validity claims, is evident in key aspects of his 
cognitive interest theory, and later in his theory of communicative action. 
Habermas argues cognitive interests give rise to a universal or ‘quasi-
transcendental’ perspective, in that they are directed at satisfying universal 
interests of the human species in self-preservation. These interests are however 
historical in that they have evolved in the ‘natural history of the species’, but take 
on an almost transcendental character in the way in which they provide a 
universal and necessary horizon within which knowledge of the natural and social 
world is possible. (Habermas, 1974 p.8, 21) As Alford comments, this ‘seems to 
mean that each interest sets the conditions under which the possible objects of 
experience can be known, but interests do not constitute the objects themselves.’ 
(Alford, 1985b p.80) Thus while on the one hand Habermas appears to want to 
assert that knowledge is only possible within a historical context, he also seeks to 
retain the notion of ‘objective’ knowledge of the natural world. This is very much 
tied to his rejection of the Frankfurt School’s version of the critique of 
instrumental reason. In emphasising the differentiation of reason, Habermas wants 
to retain the claim of the pragmatic-technical usefulness of natural science while 
at the same time quarantining politics and ethics from the objectifying logic of 
those sciences. Unlike the natural sciences, the human sciences express the 
cognitive interest in the development of intersubjective understanding that allows 
agreement on moral-practical issues as a necessary means for orienting social 
actions. The human sciences, in Habermas’ view, are fundamentally linked to 
political and moral discourse, and involve interpretation and criticism directed 
towards hermeneutic understanding of social interaction. Science and technology, 
as forms of labour, are directed towards the technical mastery of external nature in 
the interest of self-preservation of the species, while the human sciences are 
directed towards understanding subjective nature and the realisation of human 
emancipation and autonomy. (Habermas, 1971 p.87-93) Habermas thus asserts, 
contrary to Horkheimer and Adorno, that the mastery of external nature need not 
lead to the subjugation of ‘inner nature’, that is, there need be no necessary link 
between an advanced science and technology and social domination. 
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Having made this separation between the natural and the social, Habermas 
reinstates the notion of ‘objective’ or decontextualised knowledge of nature, for 
while the cognitive interest in technical control of nature is the product of history, 
it is the nevertheless the product of a common natural history of the entire 
species. This suggests that while the technical interest in the control of nature is 
the result of an evolutionary history, the species share a common interest in self-
preservation through mastery of nature. The ‘transcendental ego’ is naturalised in 
the biological notion of species, and through this step Habermas attempts to 
rescue the notion of the objectivity of the natural sciences, contrary to Horkheimer 
and Adorno’s assimilation of knowledge to power. 
As noted earlier, Habermas argues that we are forced to ‘construe nature as 
something existing in itself, though it is scientifically accessible to us only as 
objectivated.’ He also claims that nature, as ‘a contingently existing reality 
independent of us’ resists ‘false interpretations’. (Habermas, 1982b p.242) It must 
be asked, however, what is it that ‘resists’? It cannot be said that it is nature-in-
itself for as Habermas insists, this cannot be known other than as objectified. The 
‘independence’ of nature is therefore the resistance offered by objectified nature, 
not external nature-in-itself, to which we have no access. It must be remembered 
that objective nature in Habermas’ account is constituted through the process of 
social labour, which includes scientific theorising. (Habermas, 1978 p.34) The 
consequence of this is that what guarantees the objectivity of scientific knowledge 
of nature is not the realities of nature-in-itself but the activity of objectification. In 
other words, the independence and externality of nature, which Habermas says we 
must construe as an ‘epistemological postulate’, cannot act as a measure of the 
objectivity of technical-scientific knowledge. Instead objectivity is the ‘produced 
objectivity’ of social practices. (Habermas, 1978 p.27-36) 47 In this circumstance 
Habermas’ attempt to draw a rigid division between instrumental and practical 
knowledge, between the natural and the human sciences must be questioned.48 
                                                 
47 This is not that far from the approach taken by actor-network accounts of how science 
‘constructs’ nature. Actor network theory is discussed in Chapter 8 of this thesis. See also 
Latour (1987 ). 
48 Habermas does of course acknowledge that theory formation in the natural sciences is subject to 
hermeneutic influences, as pointed to by 'post-empiricist' philosophy of science such as Popper, 
Kuhn, Lakatos, Feyerabend et al, [see (Habermas, 1984 p.107-11)] inasmuch as data and facts 
cannot be described independently of theoretical languages and paradigms within which 
observation statements are formulated and interpreted as meaningful. So, while the natural 
sciences cannot be interest free or 'objective' in a positivist sense, they nevertheless do not obey 
the same logic involved in communication. The natural sciences still obey an instrumental-
objectifying logic directed at manipulation and control of nature (expressed in labour) while the 
human sciences are thoroughly communicative or ‘doubly hermeneutic’ [see (Habermas, 1984 
p.110)] in that they are governed by a logic or practical interest in the reproduction of 
intersubjective, mutual understanding that orientates social action. See Rouse, (1987), Chapter 
6 for a detailed discussion and critique of Habermas’ under-estimation of the hermeneutic 
character of natural scientific knowledge. I will return to a more extensive discussion of this 
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Communicative action 
Habermas’ project, even in his early works aims to develop a systematic 
theory of social rationalisation in a way that will explicate the ‘pathology of 
modernity from the viewpoint of the realisation - the deformed realisation - of 
reason in history.’ (Habermas, 1981a p.6-7) Habermas’ Knowledge and Human 
Interests is an attempt to develop such a theory of rationality capable of giving a 
rational basis for universal normative standards in the struggle for emancipation. 
In this work Habermas derives an emancipatory interest from self-reflection on 
the technical and practical cognitive interests. (Habermas, 1978, Appendix p.314-
5, and Postscript p.370-6) Here Habermas’ thrust is primarily epistemological in 
that he is concerned with the ways in which critical self-reflection on the 
connection between knowledge and interests can be grounded on an emancipatory 
critical theory of society. For a variety of reasons Habermas came to see the 
approach adopted in Knowledge and Human Interests as suffering from 
shortcomings. (Habermas, 1978, Postscript) 49 Principal among these was the 
failure of his cognitive interest theory to sufficiently extricate itself from the 
epistemological orientation of the ‘philosophy of the subject’. Habermas argues 
that in such a philosophical orientation the focus remains on the way in which 
autonomous subjects relate to the objects in the world rather than on how subjects 
are constituted and formed in social interactions based on communication. 
(Habermas, 1985) 50 
While Habermas moved away from use of ‘quasi-transcendental’ cognitive 
interests he nonetheless retained some of the key distinctions embodied in his 
earlier theory. The earlier distinction between technical interests and 
                                                                                                                                     
argument in Chapter 6 of this thesis where I criticise Foucault for his tendency to assign a more 
'objective' character to the natural sciences than he does to the human science, and thus separate 
science from the critique of power. See also Latour’s criticism of Foucault (in Crawford, 1993) 
on similar grounds – this is discussed in Chapter 8 below.  
49  See Bernstein (1985) p.11-25 for an elaboration of these shortcomings. 
50 Chapter 11 of that work in particular deals with these issues. Here Habermas claims that 
‘Rationality refers in the first instance to the disposition of speaking and acting subjects to 
acquire and use fallible knowledge. As long as the basic concepts of the philosophy of 
consciousness lead us to understand knowledge exclusively as knowledge of something in the 
objective world, rationality is assessed by how the isolated subject orients himself to 
representational and propositional contents. Subject-centred reason finds its criteria in standards 
of truth and success that govern the relationships of knowing and purposively acting subjects to 
the world of possible objects or states of affairs. By contrast, as soon as we conceive of 
knowledge as communicatively mediated, rationality is assessed in terms of the capacity of 
responsible participants in interaction to orient themselves to validity claims geared to 
intersubjective recognition.’ (p.314). From this it is clear why Habermas would consider his 
cognitive interest theory fails to overcome the perspective of the philosophy of the subject - in 
Knowledge and Human Interests the focus is still firmly on the relationship between knowledge 
and purposive-instrumental reason. 
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practical/emancipatory interests is reformulated in its most systematic fashion in 
Theory of Communicative Action. (Habermas, 1984; Habermas, 1987) In 
particular, this later work retains a fundamental categorical distinction between 
purposive-rational action and symbolic or communicative action. Whereas his 
cognitive interest theory attempts to ground a universal emancipatory interest in 
the natural history of the human species, his theory of communicative action (or 
universal pragmatics) seeks a universal foundation for emancipatory critique in 
the structure of the human speech act and communication in general. There is 
therefore a ‘linguistic turn’ from natural history to language as the means of 
grounding the rejection of various ‘forms of relativism’ and ‘irrationalism in 
general’ that he sees as appearing ‘under the sign of a dubious revival of 
Nietzsche’. (Habermas, 1981a p.12) 51 Thus Habermas now bases his theoretical 
perspective on the notion of communicative action as a uniquely human form of 
social action based in language and in his formulation, directed intrinsically 
towards mutual understanding and consensus. However this new grounding for 
emancipatory critique remains, as with his earlier theory, dependent on the 
‘natural’ characteristics of the human species, in this case language.  
Habermas’ theory of communicative action provides a perspective in which 
the ‘cognitive-instrumental mastery of an objectivated nature (and society)’ is 
understood as a process that derives from the separation of instrumental reason 
from a ‘suppressed’ practical reason, that is, in its separation from the 
‘communicative structures of the life-world’. For Habermas the notion of 
communicative reason retains the comprehensive or emphatic concept of reason 
(that Horkheimer and Adorno’s idea of instrumental reason undermines) by 
postulating a rational potential inherent in speech acts which he regards as 
possessing a discursive logic aimed at achieving a non-coercive, rational 
consensus among participants. In Habermas’ later work the communicative 
potential of reason becomes the effective principle behind the processes of social 
modernisation, albeit a potential that is ‘simultaneously developed and distorted’ 
by modernity. (Habermas, 1987 p.315) While in one sense Habermas’ notion of 
communicative reason has a ‘purely procedural character’ (and thus retains a 
‘quasi-transcendental’ element), it is also understood by him as implicit to actual 
social processes as these assume and necessitate mutual understanding and 
consensus among social actors. Indeed, Habermas argues that the communicative 
potential of reason derives from the everyday life-world with its taken for granted 
cultural context providing the basis for processes of mutual understanding. The 
rationalisation of the modern life-world, through the differentiation of spheres of 
social action and the division of labour, is an inevitable (and positive) element of 
modernisation. However this process, according to Habermas, is distorted by the 
                                                 
51 Habermas is no doubt referring here not only to Horkheimer and Adorno, but also to Heidegger, 
Foucault, Derrida et al. See Habermas (1985) for elaboration of his critique of these theorists. 
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‘unfettered imperatives of (the) economic and administrative’ system, which 
embodies a functional logic that suppresses questions of practical reason. 
(Habermas, 1987 p.315-6) Thus the ‘natural’ life-world in which communicative 
reason originates is ‘uncoupled’ from the economic and administrative system of 
modern society. The functional or purposive logic of this system then comes to 
dominate and distort the communicative-practical processes of society. It is in this 
context that Habermas talks of the need to complete the ‘unfinished project’ of 
modernity, that is, he argues that the full potential of communicative reason can 
only be realised by re-establishing the proper relations between moral-practical 
decisions and strategic-purposive ones within the economic and administrative 
system. 
System and lifeworld 
In Theory of Communicative Action, Habermas’ response to what he regards 
as the ‘dead end’ into which the Frankfurt School had taken critical social theory, 
as well as to his own earlier inadequate attempts to overcome these, is twofold. 
The first, as discussed above, is to further develop his earlier critique of 
Horkheimer and Adorno’s one dimensional notion of reason through the use of a 
linguistically based concept of communicative action linked to the notion, derived 
from phenomenology and interpretative sociology, of the lifeworld. The second is 
an attempt, developed in detail in volume two of Theory of Communicative 
Action, to integrate this hermeneutic-phenomenological concept of the lifeworld 
with the approach of systems theory derived from Talcott Parsons. (Habermas, 
1987) An important feature of this reorientation is the shift of focus from the 
differentiation of action spheres (instrumental, practical, emancipatory) to an 
emphasis on the analysis of two distinct modes of action coordination. With this 
change Habermas now gives a central role to communicative reason (at the 
expense of cognitive interests) as providing both the ‘internal logic’ and 
coordinating mechanism for the rational reproduction of the symbolic content of 
the lifeworld. The material reproduction of society is now conceived as being 
coordinated through the ‘system media’ of money and power within the social 
‘sub-systems’ of the economy and the administrative state. (Habermas, 1987 
p.250-77; Smith, 1993 p.107)  
In the tradition of interpretative sociology (ie Schutz, Luckman) the notion of 
the lifeworld refers to the pre-given stock (or horizon) of background knowledge 
and values that individuals draw on as interpretative resources for the orientation 
of action in social contexts. Habermas is critical of the ‘individualising’ and 
‘culturalistic’ implications of this approach and instead argues that rather than 
viewing action from the perspective of the individual actor it is necessary to 
understand the existence of the lifeworld in collective terms. (McCarthy, 1984 
p.xxiv-xxvi) In doing this, Habermas insists that the institutional order of society 
must be considered an important structural element of the lifeworld. The argument 
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here is that the existence and reproduction of this institutional order (which 
includes institutional production of norms) is essential to a stable lifeworld. The 
existence of an institutional, norm producing, order is therefore vital in 
‘coordinating, even constituting’ the everyday contexts within which social actors 
pursue their activities. (Baxter, 1987 p.46-7) 52  
Habermas argues that modernisation is the result of a process of social 
differentiation and rationalisation that occurs on two levels simultaneously. He 
combines hermeneutic and systems perspectives to view society simultaneously as 
both as a lifeworld and a self-regulating system. In the former, solidarity or social 
integration is based on the cultural coordination of the action orientations of 
individuals through communicatively negotiated normative agreement and 
legitimation. In the latter, functional integration is brought about via the 
coordination of the action consequences in a way that contributes to the 
maintenance of the institutional order or social system. (Habermas, 1987 p.117) 
Habermas claims that social integration manifests itself as the symbolic 
reproduction of the lifeworld, and is dependent on processes of socialisation and 
cultural tradition. On the other hand, functional integration, according to 
Habermas, is ‘equivalent to a material reproduction of the lifeworld that is 
conceived as system maintenance’. Such functional integration or systemic 
‘interdependency’, while requiring the social integration based on the symbolic 
reproduction of the lifeworld through communicative reason, goes beyond the 
‘communicative intermeshing of action orientations’, that is, ‘the system’ has a 
degree of structural autonomy. By introducing this systems approach Habermas 
thus emphasises that system integration is not the intended result of mutual 
cooperation but must be understood as the unintentional expression of latent 
systemic tendencies or functions. He argues that this systemic coordination of 
actions is not comprehensible from a social actor’s ‘intuitive knowledge of 
lifeworld contexts’. Rather ‘survival imperatives require a junctional integration 
of the lifeworld, which reaches right through the symbolic structures of the 
lifeworld and therefore cannot be grasped without further ado from the 
perspective of participants.’ (Habermas, 1987 p.232-3) These survival imperatives 
are those of the human species. The material reproduction of society requires 
                                                 
52 Habermas identifies three structural components of the lifeworld - culture, personality, and 
society [or what Baxter and McCarthy call ‘the institutional order’; see Baxter (1987) p.47 and 
McCarthy (1984) p.xxiv. Habermas explains that ‘By culture I mean the stock of knowledge 
upon which participants in communication draw in order to provide themselves with 
interpretations that will allow them to reach understanding ... By society I mean the legitimate 
orders through which participants in communication regulate their membership in social 
groups, and thereby secure solidarity. Under personality I understand the competences that 
make subjects capable of speech and action, and thus enable them to participate in processes of 
reaching understanding, and thereby assert their own identity.’ [Baxter (1987) p.47-8 quoted 
from the German 1981 Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns, Band 2: Zur Kritik der 
funktionalistischen Vernunft p.204-5]. 
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system (functional) integration, and in this sense social reproduction is 
‘fundamentally dependent upon the appropriation of natural resources’ needed to 
maintain the material conditions of biological life. (Honneth, 1991 p.290-1) 
It is against this methodological orientation that Habermas develops his view 
of modernisation as a two-level process of rationalisation. At the first ‘level’, he 
sees what he calls the uncoupling of the system from the lifeworld, in which the 
means of functional integration (the sub-systems of economy and state) become 
increasingly autonomous from those elements of the lifeworld responsible for 
social integration. In other words, the institutional order is increasingly 
differentiated from culture. At the second level Habermas sees a process of 
growing differentiation and rationalisation within both the lifeworld and system 
themselves. (Habermas, 1987 p.153-4) 53 Rationalisation of the lifeworld occurs 
through the growth of modern society’s reliance on ‘discursive will formation’ in 
which the values or normative statements that legitimate social practices become 
dependent on formal, ‘rational’ procedures for their justification rather than the 
authoritative invocation of cultural tradition.54 At the same time the means of 
material reproduction of society become more complex, requiring a greater degree 
of division and coordination of social labour. This process is driven by the 
increasing complexity (and productive capacity) of economic exchange in 
industrialised society and necessitates a corresponding expansion of the 
administrative capacity and organisational power of the state directed toward the 
purposive-rational efficiency of economic exchange and administrative actions. 
(Habermas, 1987 p.153-197) 55  
These processes of rationalisation however pull in two directions. On the one 
hand they increase the potential for communicative rationality, while at the same 
time the rationalisation and autonomisation of the mechanisms of functional 
integration of the system tends to free (‘uncouple’) instrumental activity from the 
normative restraints traditionally imposed by the cultural lifeworld. Thus against 
the potential of modernisation to realise the communicative rationalisation of the 
lifeworld, there is the tendency (realised in advanced industrial society) for the 
functional elements of the institutional order (‘the system’) to replace normative 
communication as the means of coordinating social actions. From the perspective 
                                                 
53  See also McCarthy (1984) p.xxviii; Baxter (1987) p.70-1. 
54 Indeed, Habermas claims that even the reproduction of cultural tradition ‘becomes more 
strongly dependent upon the capacity for critique and innovation’. It thus embodies a much 
greater possibility of arriving through rational argumentation at mutual agreement on claims to 
truth and normative validity which is reflected in the institutionalisation of scientific research, 
modern legal practices and democratic political representation. Habermas translated by Baxter 
(1987) p.49, from Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns II 1981, p.219-20. See also 
Habermas (1984) p.70-1. 
55 See also McCarthy (1984) p.xviii-xxiv). 
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of the sub-systems of the economy and the state, this gives rise to the situation in 
which the ‘steering media’ of money and power develop into ‘formally organised 
domains of action’. (Habermas, 1987 p.307) Rather than being embedded in the 
appropriate lifeworld domain of communicative action, according to Habermas 
these steering media represent a form of strategic action that not only uncouples 
itself from the lifeworld, but also develops an ‘irresistible inner dynamic’ that 
leads to the ‘colonisation of the lifeworld’. (Habermas, 1987 p.331 - emphasis in 
original) In particular, Habermas points to the way in which such ‘norm free’ 
strategic action parallels in the social world the methods employed for dealing 
with ‘scientifically objectivated nature’. Indeed, he argues that strategic or 
purposive-instrumental action is freed of ‘normative restrictions to the extent that 
it becomes linked to flows of information from the scientific system.’ (Habermas, 
1987 p.196)  
Nature in communicative action theory 
In his earlier cognitive interest theory, while locating the generalised interests 
of the human species in its natural history, Habermas nevertheless was concerned 
to separate the social from non-human nature. As we have seen, he does this by 
arguing that there are different types of cognitive interests, and that these reflect a 
fundamental divergence between the different realms of human activity, that is, 
between social labour and symbolic interaction. He also claims that these different 
cognitive interests constitute distinct ‘object domains’ which each obey different 
logics. (Habermas, 1978 p.369) These differences are in turn reflected in the 
character of the methods of knowledge production, that is, between the 
objectifying methods of the natural sciences and the hermeneutic methods of the 
human sciences. In adopting this approach Habermas rejects Horkheimer and 
Adorno’s call for reconciliation with nature, which he sees as regression into a 
religious or metaphysical worldview that undermines the positive achievements of 
modern scientific knowledge and politics. Nature, Habermas insists, can only 
usefully be known as an object of control. (Habermas, 1982a; Habermas, 1982b)  
Habermas’ attitude towards nature has not only been the subject of a 
debate between Habermas and members of the Frankfurt School, 56 but has also 
drawn criticism from a range of writers more directly concerned with ecological 
problems. 57 Their key criticism is that Habermas’ theoretical differentiation of 
                                                 
56 This was an important issue of debate between Habermas and Marcuse, in which Habermas 
(1971, p.85-6) attacked Marcuse's notion of a ‘new science’. See Alford (1985b) for a detailed 
study of these differences. 
57 In this respect the main works are Leiss (1975), DiNorcia (1974) Alford (1985a; 1985b), 
Whitebook (1979), Ottmann (1982), Eckersley (1990; 1992), Parsons (1992). See McCarthy’s 
comments (1978 p.112-125), and the response to much of the substance of these criticisms by 
Habermas (1982b) especially Section III - Reason and Nature: reconciliation at the cost of re-
enchantment', p.238-250. 
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cognitive interests (and the corresponding differentiation of spheres of rationality) 
is drawn with such rigidity that it denies the possibility of knowledge of, or 
relations with, nature except insofar as this is mediated by an objectifying interest 
in technical control. Habermas’ approach to nature is considered by most of these 
critics as being too narrowly conceived to be capable of adequately dealing with 
the ecological and ethical issues posed by the environmental problems facing 
contemporary society. In particular, Habermas’ theory is attacked for being 
‘thoroughly anthropocentric’ (Whitebook, 1979 p.52) in that it appears to exclude 
the possibility of communicative interaction with nature, that is, it constructs the 
distinction between technical and practical interests too rigidly. Ottmann, for 
example, suggests that given the severity of modern ecological problems it may 
be necessary to recognise that the human species has an interest in nature beyond 
mere technical control. Indeed, a normative relationship to nature should be 
considered an integral part of the human practical interest in ‘the good life’. 
(Ottmann, 1982 p.89-92)  Eckersley (1992) mounts a similar argument. 58  
Habermas generally rejects these criticisms on the grounds that nature cannot 
enter into the sorts of relations of mutual understanding and recognition that takes 
place between subjects, and which he regards as characteristic of relations 
founded on communicative reason. (Habermas, 1978 p.33) In other words, nature 
is incapable of entering into discursive or dialogical relations as a ‘partner in 
communication’ as are humans.59 He questions how any attitude other than the 
‘objectivating attitude of the natural-scientific experimenting observer’ can be 
‘theoretically fruitful’ in the sense of leading to a pragmatically successful 
manipulation of natural resources required for the material reproduction of 
society. He also rejects the idea that a ‘naturalistic ethic’ could be ‘adequately 
grounded’ today without recourse to religious or metaphysical outlooks that 
would undermine the ‘level of learning attained in the modern ie scientific 
understanding of the world.’ (Habermas, 1982b p.242-3, 248) This is the crux of 
Habermas’ defence - that useful knowledge of nature is only available through the 
objectifying medium of social labour (particularly science and technology), and 
that a ‘nature’ ethic would undermine the cognitive achievements that flow from 
the disenchantment and rationalisation of society brought about by modernity. 
Thus the real issue for Habermas’ in his debate with these critics is the question of 
under what conditions can we know nature and which of these ways of knowing 
                                                 
58 See p.112-4. 
59 While this is challenged on largely ethical grounds by the critics discussed here, Bruno Latour 
argues against this assertion on somewhat different sociological, or more accurately, ‘actor-
network’ grounds. Latour questions whether the ‘modernity’ that Habermas seeks to defend has 
ever really existed, that is, whether the separation of the human and non-human assumed by 
Habermas is ontologically possible. (Latour, 1993 p.60-1) I argue that Latour and actor-
network theory provides some useful elements for a (largely sympathetic) critique of Foucault - 
see Chapter 8 of this thesis. 
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nature are useful to human beings in a pragmatic sense? As we have seen, his 
response to this is an emphatic insistence that functionally useful knowledge of 
nature can only be acquired through the objectifying, ‘decentred attitude’ of 
modern science. (Habermas, 1982b p.248) 60 The intricacies of this debate, and 
especially the philosophical response of Green theorists, are outside of the scope 
of the present discussion.61 
However it is clear that the development of the theory of communicative 
action does little to alter Habermas’ basic conceptualisation of the relation 
between nature and society. If anything the move to the ‘paradigm of linguistic 
philosophy’ (Habermas, 1987 p.390) strengthens his emphasis on the 
intersubjective relations by privileging social over material reproduction. In 
another sense however, the move to systems theory makes the relation to nature 
less problematic. This arises out of Habermas’ criticism of Weber’s and the 
Frankfurt School’s notion of reification (or the absolutising of purposive-
instrumental rationality in the interests of human self-preservation) as being 
bound to the philosophy of the subject. (Habermas, 1987 p.399) Habermas claims 
that the ‘problem of reification’ should be understood not so much as the 
reification of consciousness as the result of an ‘unleashed functionalist reason of 
system maintenance’ which overrides and distorts the fundamental 
communicative processes of ‘sociation’ responsible for the symbolic structuring 
of the lifeworld. (Habermas, 1987 p.392) He argues that the maintenance of 
society is not simply dependent on technical mastery of external nature or on the 
strategic relations between social groups. It also requires the coordination of 
societal activities through communicative action, which can only be brought about 
in accordance with the ‘conditions of rationality’ inherent in this. By introducing 
                                                 
60 From an epistemological perspective Habermas denies that it is possible to have direct, 
unmediated access to nature-in-itself at the level of rationally reconstructive knowledge (ie as 
theoretical knowledge). However, he does concede that some form of ‘private access’ to nature-
in-itself ‘guided by a pre-understanding of the lifeworld specific to humans’ may be possible. 
But he insists that such a ‘performative attitude to external nature’ can only allow humans to 
enter into communicative relations with nature via ‘aesthetic experience and feelings analogous 
to morality’. (Habermas, 1982b p.242-4) Nevertheless, this is still not a genuinely 
communicative relation in the sense of a linguistically shared intersubjectivity. This would 
depend on the possibility of argumentatively challenging validity claims between linguistically 
competent subjects (ie ‘the comprehensibility of the symbolic expression, the truth of the 
propositional content, the truthfulness of the intentional expression, and the rightness of the 
speech act with respect to existing norms and values.’ [Habermas quoted in Bernstein (1985, 
p.19-20).] The extent to which a non-instrumental relation with nature is possible is in any case 
limited by the specifically human pre-understandings of the lifeworld, which relies on human 
communicative action. A similar line of argument is followed by Habermas with regard to 
ethical theory where he maintains that ethics must be based on a discursive ‘norm-conformative 
attitude’ in which ‘the principle egalitarian relation of reciprocity built into communicative 
action ... cannot be carried over into relations between humans and nature.’ (Habermas, 1982b 
p.248) 
61 See Eckersley (1990) for a summary of the key arguments in the Green critique. 
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this ‘communications-theoretic turn’ (Habermas, 1987 p.392) as the keystone of 
his later social theory, Habermas seeks to provide a universal and fundamental 
grounding for emancipatory critique that the philosophy of the subject is unable to 
defend from the reifying effects of social rationalisation. He thus claims to revive 
the comprehensive notion of Reason that the Frankfurt School and Weber have 
difficulty maintaining due to their dependence on the philosophy of the subject.  
Habermas sees self-preservation, which the Dialectic of Enlightenment 
identified as ultimately lying behind the triumph of instrumental rationality, as 
underpinned by the logic of communicative action. The notion of self-
preservation in the hands of Habermas changes from ‘mere’ self-maintenance to 
incorporate the broader concept of social reproduction which he regards as 
dependent on communicative reason, through which the ‘utopian perspective’ of 
emancipation is ‘built into the linguistic mechanism of the reproduction of the 
species.’ (Habermas, 1987 p.398 - emphasis added)  Thus while in his cognitive 
interest theory the emancipatory interest is ‘derived’ from the natural history of 
the human species, with communicative action theory emancipatory reason is 
located as a quality intrinsic to the evolution of the species as language users. 
Furthermore, the processes of self-preservation bound by communicative 
rationality are also dependent on the ‘functional interconnection’ following from 
the consequences of the activities of individuals and groups in society. In other 
words, the social imperatives of self-preservation require mechanisms for both 
social and functional integration, and these are constitutive of the modern subject. 
62  
In the shift to communicative action theory, social theory is thus no longer 
tied to the view of the ‘subject that represents objects and toils against them’. 
(Habermas, 1987 p.390) Instead Habermas uses this shift to locate the 
instrumental as a moment of a more comprehensive rationality, thereby assigning 
instrumental action to its ‘proper’, that is, subordinate place. In doing this 
Habermas diminishes the importance of social labour, and therefore science and 
technology, as problems in social theory. For Horkheimer and Adorno these are 
problematic because they are the most powerful means for the rational domination 
and suppression of nature. In shifting the focus of his social theory to the norms of 
communicative interaction between social actors and away from the critique of 
                                                 
62 Habermas claims here that ‘A subjectivity that is characterised by communicative reason resists 
the denaturing of the self for the sake of self-preservation. Unlike instrumental reason, 
communicative reason cannot be subsumed without resistance under a blind self-preservation. 
It refers neither to a subject that preserves itself in relating to objects via representation and 
action, nor to a self-maintaining system that demarcates itself from an environment, but to a 
symbolically structured lifeworld that is constituted in the interpretive accomplishments of its 
members and only reproduced through communication. Thus communicative reason does not 
simply encounter ready-made subjects and systems; rather it takes part in structuring what is to 
be preserved.’ (Habermas, 1987 p.398) 
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instrumental rationality, Habermas does not substantially move away from his 
earlier view of the need to adopt an objectifying attitude towards external nature.  
Indeed, as Hayim suggests, in arguing for the foundational role of 
communicative reason in structuring society, Habermas does not reduce the 
importance of instrumental rationality for the economic reproduction of society. 
Rather he emphasises its ‘unproblematic nature ... which appears as a self-
maintaining system tied to self-preservation’ in which the natural environment is 
rigidly separated out from the symbolic structure of social life. (Hayim, 1992 
p.190) In approaching science and technology as a value-neutral, instrumental 
activity Habermas continues to stress the practical utility of science in fulfilling 
the needs of material reproduction (system integration). This has the effect of 
perpetuating his earlier characterisation of science as part of a human self-
formative process, which expresses in a decontextualised, abstract manner 
generalised human interests. As a consequence science is rendered as a 
‘technically automatic and normatively unproblematic’ species enterprise. 
(Hayim, 1992 p.194-5)  
Honneth, who is in many aspects sympathetic to Habermas claims that 
Habermas nonetheless adopts a ‘technocracy thesis’, in which the notion of 
communicative action simultaneously fulfils two contradictory functions. On the 
one hand communicative action is understood as something that stands outside the 
relations of social labour and domination, and thus provides the basis for a critical 
social theory. At the same time his theory conceptualises the relations of social 
labour and domination in a fundamental sense as the product of communicative 
action. (Honneth, 1991 p.247-8) The technocracy thesis posits the ‘irresistible 
autonomisation of technology’ so that the evolution of social rationality occurs 
largely as a means of providing technical solutions to the problems of social 
reproduction. Habermas, according to Honneth, accepts science and technology 
are dominant in advanced industrial society, while at the same time wishing to 
cast this as a disturbance or pathology of the evolutionary development of the 
human species. (Honneth, 1991 p.265) This is the theoretical motivation behind 
Habermas’ separation of communicative and technical-purposive action, and 
which underpins his diagnosis of a one-sided or distorted rationalisation of 
society. However, in moving away from an emphasis on spheres of social action 
(labour and symbolic communication) in favour of types of action coordination 
(system and lifeworld), Habermas’ theory of society can be said to rely on Smith 
(1993 p.197) describes as two key theoretical fictions – ‘norm-free organisation 
of action’, and ‘power-free paths of communication.’ 63  
                                                 
63 See also Baxter (1987) p.66-80 and Honneth (1991) p.248-250, 264-266, for discussion of these 
problems. Habermas’ dispute with Foucault on the nature of power revolved around precisely 
these questions. This is discussed in Chapter 5 of this thesis. 
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The effect of these moves is apparent in Habermas’ treatment of the politics 
of ecological problems and Green movements. Here his separation of system and 
lifeworld leads to the argument that ecological movements are not concerned with 
conflicts arising over the material reproduction of society as are the modernist 
movements organised around distributive issues (eg the labour and socialist 
movements). Habermas characterises ecological issues as primarily concerned 
with ‘the grammar of forms of life’. He regards these as problems that arise within 
the lifeworld (‘in areas of cultural reproduction, social integration, and 
socialisation’) provoked by the ‘reification of communicative spheres of action’ 
brought about by the intrusion of the functional, system steering media of money 
and power. (Habermas, 1981c p.33; Habermas, 1987 p.391-396) Habermas 
suggests that ecological conflicts and environmental movements should be 
understood as particularistic expressions of resistance to the pressures towards the 
colonisation of the lifeworld, that is, these movements ‘seek to stem or block the 
formal, organised spheres of action in favour of communicative structures’. He 
identifies the critique of economic growth and the ‘self-destructive consequences 
of the growth in (social) complexity’ as key unifying themes in the new social 
movements. (Habermas, 1987 p.34-5) 
While Habermas identifies ecological movements as particularistic reactions 
to specific, tangible environmental problems, he argues that these specific 
responses are dependent on the existence of an already highly rationalised 
lifeworld. Furthermore and somewhat inconsistently, he suggests that ecological 
problems are ‘largely abstract and require technical and economic solutions that 
must, in turn, be planned globally and implemented by administrative means.’ 
(Habermas, 1987 p.35) Here Habermas also identifies ecological issues as 
expressions of resistance to the problems generated by the ‘overcomplexity’ of the 
system of functional integration. In this context, ecological problems arise as 
systemic abstractions ‘forced upon the lifeworld’ which can only be properly dealt 
with within the already highly rationalised modern lifeworld through 
communicative action. At the same time however, these systemic ‘abstractions’ 
supersede or cut across the complex boundaries between the different modes of 
action coordination in advanced industrial societies. In Habermas’ words, 
ecological conflicts and problems therefore ‘arise at the seam between system and 
lifeworld’. The implication of this approach is that ecological problems reflect an 
inevitable tension between communicatively derived cultural norms specifying 
the acceptable limits to the human appropriation of the natural environment 64 and 
the functionally defined systemic imperatives of the material reproduction of 
society. 
                                                 
64 Habermas describes these as ‘criteria of livability’ and ‘the limits to the deprivation of sensual-
aesthetic background needs’. (Habermas, 1987 p.35) 
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Conclusion 
Habermas’ analysis of nature can be read in several ways, and indeed as we 
have seen, his approach has changed over time. However, central to his analysis is 
an attempt to separate human from non-human nature. This is not because he 
adopts a simple realist view of an external ‘objective’ nature – he clearly does not 
– but rather because he sees this as necessary if the notion of emancipatory reason 
(and critique) is to be rescued from an ‘Nietzschean’ assimilation with power. By 
making a categorical distinction between communicative and instrumental 
rationality, Habermas argues that while treating nature as an object of 
manipulation and control is necessary to human survival and progress, to do the 
same to human beings themselves is to undermine the goal of such progress - 
human autonomy.  
Central to Habermas’ criticisms of Horkheimer and Adorno is the view that 
power relations between human beings (that is, relations of control and 
domination) are a pathological outcome resulting from the ‘colonisation’ and 
distortion of social relations by technical or instrumental rationality, and not by 
reason in general. As I shall discuss in Chapter 4, this leads to an idealised view 
of human subjectivity based on communicative competence and a notion of 
human emancipation that is premised on power free relations of communication. 
Habermas is thus forced, by his desire to preserve the ideal of autonomous 
rational human subject, to rigidly separate the relations between humans from the 
relations of humans to nature. Such a move is, of course, very much a ‘modernist’ 
one. 
A consequence of regarding contemporary ecological problems as 
‘skirmishes’ at the interface between system and lifeworld is to cast these as 
peripheral side effects of the rationalisation of society and the historical progress 
of emancipation. Given his insistence that nature must be dealt with in an 
objectifying, instrumental manner, Habermas therefore takes a particularly 
pessimistic view of the ‘emancipatory’ potential of ecological politics and new 
social movements. In contrast to Habermas’ approach, other contemporary 
German social theorists see ecological problems and movements concerned with 
environmental issues as expressions of the emerging social dynamics of late 
modernity and as central to political debate. In the next chapter I consider the 
approach adopted by some of these social theorists to the problem of nature and 
ecological risk. 
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Chapter 4 
The problem of nature in Eder and Beck 
Introduction 
In contrast to Habermas, other contemporary German theorists treat the 
problem of nature as central to social theory. In this respect, these authors can be 
regarded as reinstating the early Frankfurt School concern with the problem of the 
relationship between nature and society. This chapter considers in some detail the 
work of major contemporary social theorists Klaus Eder and Ulrich Beck, and 
somewhat more briefly that of Niklas Luhmann. All come from the German 
tradition of social theory in which Habermas has played such an important role. 
These writers can be regarded as falling within the broad tradition of critical 
social theory, inasmuch as they argue in their own ways for a critical defence of 
‘modernity’, while at the same time seeking to develop a more relevant critique of 
the contemporary expression of that modernity. In this context each can be 
understood as engaging in an implicit critical debate with Habermas 65specifically 
on the issue of the way in which his later work does not adequately deal with the 
challenge posed to modernity by contemporary ecological problems. 
(1) Eder: nature as a new field of social conflict 
As I have indicated, Habermas tends to see ecological conflicts, and the social 
movements concerned with these, as reactions to inherent tensions between the 
communicative production of cultural norms in the lifeworld and the material 
reproduction of society by the social system. Eder on the other hand seeks to 
understand such conflicts as both reflecting a new phase in the evolution of 
modern society, and following Touraine, as an important form of collective action 
responsible for the historical production of society. 66 Eder sees the problem of 
                                                 
65 The debate with Habermas is also quite explicit and direct at times. In commenting on the 
criticisms of Habermas (by Eder and others) on the question of 'new social movements', 
Strydom suggests that ‘To the extent that they remain within Habermas' framework, they 
constitute an immanent critique of his position.’ See Strydom (1990, p.156-164) and also the 
comments by Scott Lash and Brian Wynne to this effect in their introduction to Beck (1992b). 
Luhmann’s position is somewhat different, in that he is very much concerned to develop 
systems theory. Nevertheless, in Theory of Communicative Action, Habermas explicitly seeks 
to bring together systems theory and hermeneutics, and debates between Habermas and system 
theorists including Luhmann have occurred.  
66 For an elaboration of Eder's use of Touraine in this regard see Eder (1993) p.107-118. 
[Originally published as Eder (1982) p.5-20]. 
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nature, and the associated awareness of the worldwide ecological crisis, as the 
central factor shaping contemporary discourse on modernity. According to Eder, 
ecological crisis leads to the experience of a ‘deep ambivalence’ towards the ideas 
of rationalisation and progress, in which rationalisation is increasingly seen as a 
socially and environmentally negative process. He argues that notions of progress 
and rationalisation become increasingly distinct from each other as the problem of 
nature undermines the modern assumption of the separation of nature and culture. 
One effect of this is a heightened sensitivity to what Eder regards as a basic 
ambiguity towards the supposed rationality of modern Western culture, forcing a 
re-evaluation of the ‘normative assumptions of modernity’, and a questioning of 
progress as the inevitable product of modernity. (Eder, 1990a p.67; Eder, 1990b 
p.40-2) The notion of a negative dialectic of progress, discussed in Chapter 2 of 
this thesis, is clearly evident here. In particular new types of conflicts arise around 
the problematisation of the social relation to nature. These call into question the 
‘old’ idea, expressed by the bourgeois and labour movements, of progress through 
technological development and the mastery of nature. However, unlike Habermas, 
Eder argues that these new conflicts should be seen as disputes about the type of 
modernisation and development that modern society should pursue, rather than an 
expression of a neo-romantic anti-modernism. (Eder, 1990b p.40, 21; Eder, 1993 
p.103-112)  
The problematisation of nature and progress is related to fundamental changes 
in social structure brought about by a global process of modernisation and 
rationalisation involving an intensification of the exploitation of both labour and 
nature. 67 For Eder, this is not simply the product of capitalist development, but 
rather, capitalist development is only one element of a much broader social 
process of modernisation. 68 He sees this process as tied to significant changes in 
the class structure of advanced Western societies, in which the growth of new 
middle class groups, associated with the service sector, are becoming a key 
element of ‘the emerging post-industrial society.’ (Eder, 1990b p.22, 37-41) 69 
The emergence of these post-industrial class conflicts challenges the prevailing 
model of social development (what Eder calls industrialism) common to both 
                                                 
67 See Yoxen (1981) p.66-122 for a similar argument in relation to the growth of molecular 
biology. Yoxen’s analysis draws on both Marxist and Foucauldian concepts. 
68 Here Eder shares a view common to both Weber and Horkheimer and Adorno in Dialectic of 
Enlightenment. Turner suggests that Weber's immediate analysis of the role of Protestantism in 
the rise of capitalism is complemented by long-term view that understands Western rationality 
(and the processes of rationalisation) as pre-dating capitalism, that is, as involving a ‘long-term 
teleological and irreversible process in Western culture.’ See Turner (1987) p.222-41, 
especially p.234. 
69 A more detailed treatment is given in Eder (1993). There is a significant literature on the 
notions of the ‘new class’ and its relation to post-industrial society. For discussion of this in 
relation to the rise of environmentalism and Green movements, see Betz (1991) and Eckersley 
(1989). 
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capitalist and socialist societies. According to Eder, the main features of this new 
type of society are social conflicts ‘centred around the problem of the exploitation 
of nature’, and the central role played by social and cultural movements in 
‘determining the direction of further “modernisation”.’ (Eder, 1990b p.22)  
Eder’s approach gives rise to a range of criticisms of Habermas’ treatment of 
the problem of nature and his use of the system / lifeworld dichotomy in 
connection with this. These criticism are important for they suggest how 
Habermas’ tendency to marginalise environmental issues can be overcome 
without abandoning the insights of a ‘macro’ or social systems approach to 
ecological problems. In particular, Eder criticises what he describes as 
modernism’s dominant cultural model of nature, which attempts to ignore the 
impact of both cultural tradition and external nature on the context of thinking and 
acting, leading to ethnocentrism and anthropocentricism. (Eder, 1990b p.26-27) 
Marx’s notion of the human relation to nature is firmly within this modernist 
model, conceiving nature as a mere object of human activity. As a consequence, 
the Marxist heritage ‘naturalises’ the social relation to nature, and in doing so 
posits a notion of rationality involving ‘a close relationship between progress and 
the rationality built into the development of the forces of production.’ (Eder, 
1990a p.68-9) Eder therefore argues that Marx’s productivist notion of rationality 
defends the cultural model of nature responsible for the environmental crisis now 
faced by the modern world. Much like Horkheimer and Adorno, Eder sees the 
progress associated with the subjugation of nature as simultaneously representing 
a regress in social relations with nature. Thus the legacy of Marx and Weber, 
resting on this particular notion of rationality as inherent in modernity, has 
become ‘equivalent to self-destruction’ in that it aggravates this crisis in the 
relation between society and nature. (Eder, 1990a p.69; Eder, 1990b p.23, 36) 
Eder also argues that Habermas’ critique of Marx is ‘insufficient’ because 
Habermas  
substitutes the social relations of men among themselves for the basic 
relation of man to nature. This solution to the Marxian problem of nature 
separates two spheres of human action and thus overlooks the internal 
connections between both spheres of action. The problem of nature forces 
us to give up the idea that nature is subject to instrumental and culture to 
communicative action. (Eder, 1990a p.81 footnote 5) 
Not only does Eder locate the social relation to nature as central to social 
theory, as did Horkheimer and Adorno, he also argues that rather than excluding 
nature from the realm of moral consideration (as does Habermas) it is possible 
conceive of a practical reason ‘compatible with a re-enchanted nature.’ Such a 
alternative form of rationality, says Eder, is in fact found in the new discourses on 
nature expressed by the ecological counter-culture movements. (Eder, 1990a p.68) 
Indeed, Eder’s analysis of the character, and social function, of ecological 
movements represents a crucial difference with Habermas. 
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Habermas’ characterisation of new social movements draws a distinction 
between those that tend to be universalistic and emancipatory (the women’s 
movement and possibly anti-racist civil rights movements), and those that are 
particularistic and defensive (all others, including the ecology movement). 70 
While he distinguishes within the ‘resistance movements’ between those that seek 
to defend ‘traditional and social property’ and those representing a ‘new conflict 
potential’ based on ‘new forms of cooperation and community’, he nevertheless 
regards all of these as reactions to the intrusion into the lifeworld of the forces of 
money and power originating in the sub-systems of functional integration (the 
economy and state administration). However, defenders of Habermas claim that, 
in itself, this need not mean that movements such as the ecology movement 
cannot contribute to the redressing of what he considers to be the pathologies and 
distortions of one-sided, ‘unbalanced’ capitalist modernisation. White for 
instance, argues that Habermas implies an ideal of ‘balanced’ development that is 
consistent with his notion of the unrealised potential of modernity. Seen in this 
context, says White, Habermas’ analysis need not marginalise new social 
movements and ecological politics as an ‘unending border conflict’ at the 
interface of system and lifeworld. (White, 1988 p.136-143) White suggests 
Habermas’ theory in fact positions new social movements ‘as the best hope for a 
more ‘balanced’ institutionalisation of the potential of modernity’. (White, 1988 
p.126-7)   
Such an interpretation however has its difficulties. As White concedes, 
Habermas has not produced any detailed work dealing with the function and 
significance of such social movements, (White, 1988 p.139) and what he has 
written tends not to strengthen White’s interpretation. 71 Most commentators see 
Habermas as adopting a pessimistic view regarding the emancipatory potential of 
new social movements. 72 Indeed Habermas appears to regard any potential 
rationality as subverted and obscured by the failure of both of ‘anti-modern’ and 
post-modern ‘conservatism’ to distinguish between the different developmental 
logics of lifeworld and system. (Habermas, 1981c p.36-7) 
 
                                                 
70 Habermas distinguishes the feminist movement from other new social movements on the 
grounds that the ‘struggle against patriarchal oppression’ involves the potential realisation of an 
emancipatory program based in the ‘acknowledged universalist foundations of morality and 
legality (which) lends feminism the impetus of an offensive movement, whereas all other 
movements are more defensive in character. The movements of resistance and retreat seek to 
stem or block the formal, organised spheres of action in favour of communicative structures: 
they do not seek to conquer new territory.’ (Habermas, 1981c p.34) 
71 See in particular Habermas (1981c) p.36-7. 
72 See for example Strydom (1990) p.156-164 and Cohen (1985) p.710-11.  
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Environmental movements as cultural models 
Eder’s approach to modernity and the role of social movements rejects the 
distinction that is pre-supposed in Habermas (and Weber), between traditionalism 
and modernity, and which is expressed in Habermas’ view of new social 
movements as at least potentially and often actually, anti-modernist. Instead Eder 
identifies two competing cultural traditions or models of the relation to nature that 
contribute to European modernity. (Eder, 1990b p.28-37) These two competing 
traditions, or contradictory discourses, Eder labels the justice perspective and the 
purity perspective.73 The justice perspective represents the dominant cultural 
model of nature in Western society, and is expressed in the instrumentalist-
utilitarian tradition. The purity perspective embodies a non-utilitarian attitude to 
nature, which rejects the reduction of nature to an object of theoretical reason. 
(Eder, 1990b p.31) Eder argues that the ‘cultural code’ specific to modern 
Western society consists of both of these contradictory discourses, so that 
modernity, including the social relation to nature, must be understood as the 
history of the inter-relationship between these two cultural models or discourses. 
The counter tradition represented by the purity perspective is therefore not so 
much irrational as the expression of a different rationality seeking to define an 
alternative modernity. This is a significant theoretical move, which is congruent 
with the actor network critique of modernist epistemology by theorists Bruno 
Latour and Michel Callon, and which I discuss in Chapter 8 of this thesis. 
These two competing notions of nature Eder typifies by a set of conceptual 
oppositions which contrast different ways of apprehending nature (rationality vs 
romanticism), of thematising the temporality of the relation of nature to culture 
(evolution vs equilibrium), and conceptions of practical reason (utilitarian vs 
                                                 
73 Eder (1996) provides an explanation of this distinction between the purity and justice 
perspectives. The notion of purity is derived from the work of Mary Douglas (1966, 1975). In 
Eder’s usage, the purity perspective “codes the difference between nature and culture in a way 
that is evident in the values attributed to the notion of purity: they are health (referring to bodily 
and psychic integrity), empathy and life or the complimentary notions of sickness, suffering 
and death.” These types of values are not susceptible to utilitarian calculation, but are “holistic 
values” and as such are “indivisible goods”. In the justice perspective, the instrumentalist 
tradition seeks to provide a rational legitimation of the social relation to nature. In this 
perspective, the cultural perception of nature “remains on the level of validity claims”. Its 
mobilises the relation to nature in terms of “the equal treatment of all beings as the premise of 
human moral action, a premise characteristic of the utilitarian ethics” similar to those of Peter 
Singer. Eder suggests that this perspective seeks to distribute in a rational way the costs of the 
use of nature in production, without removing “man from his moral pedestal”. It seeks to 
provide justice through minimising the costs to nature with the effect that the “relation of man 
to nature becomes one of a private compensation for the economically instituted use of nature.” 
(p.207-8) 
  
 
64
 
communicative reason). (Eder, 1990a p.67) 74 Eder claims that two different but 
equally modern cultural attitudes or models are expressed in this ‘double code’. 
He argues that the rationalist and romanticist perspectives relate to ‘two 
differentiated spheres of value: the cognitive and the aesthetic.’ Thus in the 
cognitive-rational attitude to nature notions of efficiency are highly valued. In 
scientific terms nature is something that is capable of being apprehended through 
the theoretical reconstruction of sensory experience. In contrast to this, the 
aesthetic-romantic attitude is based in a non-objectifying, expressive or intuitive 
experience of nature, which Eder sees as best typified in modern art. (Eder, 1990a 
p.74)  
The different ways in which the temporal relation between nature and society 
is conceptualised is another element of the double code of modernity. This 
relationship can be cast as either a linear, progressive evolution or as a cyclical 
equilibrium. In the evolutionary perspective nature is understood as an object 
shaped by societal forces that lead inexorably to the domination of nature, 
whereas the notion of an equilibrium between society and nature is characteristic 
of romantic thinking in which nature is held to posses an intrinsic value. However, 
Eder points out that the notion of equilibrium in this context still ‘presupposes an 
interactive relationship between society and nature’. In other words, inasmuch as 
the notion of equilibrium presupposes the cultural form that a society bestows on 
its natural environment, it cannot avoid the ‘one-way relationship’ characteristic 
of evolution in society’s mastery of nature. Even where the evolution and 
equilibrium concepts are combined to understand society and nature as evolving 
together, such co-evolution is still ‘a process mediated by culture.’ (Eder, 1990a 
p.74-5) Eder’s third ‘double code’ refers to two competing interpretations or 
underlying assumptions, regarding morality or practical reason as applied to 
nature. Utilitarian reason, as the dominant ‘economic ideology’ of advanced 
Western society, can be understood as strategic or substantive rationality in the 
Weberian sense, which is aimed at ‘calculating the effects of the use of nature 
upon nature’. This perspective tends to emphasise human rational self-interest in 
isolation from ‘social and cultural restraints’. In contrast to this, the 
communicative perspective on practical reason emphasises an interactive, 
dialogical view of human nature. Attitudes based on this perspective are likely to 
‘treat nature as a symbolic good and to restrict the uses of nature to what can be 
justified on moral grounds.’ (Eder, 1990a p.75; Eder, 1990b p.34-6) 
Habermas tends to focus on those aspects of new social movements that 
reflect the purity perspective. Eder instead argues that both models of nature (each 
employing different forms of moral reason) are expressed in contemporary 
                                                 
74 Eder (1990a) links these two attitudes to nature to differences in the Greek and Jewish cultural 
traditions - see especially p.70-4. This argument is developed in much greater detail in Eder 
(1996). 
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ecological movements and thus there is within such movements a much greater 
potential for ambivalence than recognised by Habermas. Hence while ecology 
movements often draw on the romantic, counter-cultural tradition, they also 
employ the utilitarian perspective with its focus on efficiency. Indeed, as Eder 
correctly suggests, contemporary ecological thinking can also be considered ‘the 
most advanced version of the dominant utilitarian mind, a radicalisation of 
modern economic ideology.’ (Eder, 1990a p.75)75 Habermas recognises ecological 
problems as attacks on the ‘organic foundations of the life-world’ originating at 
the level of functional integration, while regarding ecological movements as 
manifestations of resistance to the effects of this within the cultural realm of the 
lifeworld. His view of ecological movements as ‘unrealistic’ and essentially anti-
modern is reinforced by his argument that dealing with environmental problems 
requires global technical-economic planning and administration. (Habermas, 
1981c p.35-7) As discussed previously, although Habermas does not elaborate on 
these questions. Nevertheless he suggests that while ecological movements are 
reactions to the ‘colonisation’ of the lifeworld by system steering media, at root 
environmental concerns must primarily be dealt with as problems of system 
integration concerned with the material reproduction of society. Hence he claims 
that the anti-modernism of new social movements stems from a failure to 
distinguish between the positive potential of modernity that lies in the 
rationalisation of the lifeworld and the increasing complexity of the social system. 
(Habermas, 1981c p.37) This interpretation is consistent with his arguments 
against the possibility of adopting a genuinely moral-practical (as distinct from 
aesthetic-expressive) attitude to nature on the grounds that useful knowledge of 
nature must be tied to the objectifying stance of the natural sciences. (Habermas, 
1982b p.238-250) 
Eder rejects what he sees as Habermas’ ‘false idealisation’ of the separation 
between lifeworld and system. While recognising the validity of Habermas’ 
concern for relating the ‘two logics of social life’ (ie lifeworld and system), he 
argues that practical reasoning can never be separated from the context of social 
systemic factors (power and money) which it serves to reproduce. (Eder, 1988 
p.937-940) However, Habermas’ analytical separation of system and lifeworld, 
with its surrender of nature to the systemic realm of functional reason, 
underestimates the interpenetration of morality and technology in shaping 
                                                 
75 Eder notes here that the ‘utilitarian justification of the relationship between man and nature, (is) 
an idea that links Bentham to modern environmental economists and has spread - paradoxically 
- with our greater awareness of the environmental crisis.’ This is an issue I will touch on in 
Chapter 6 of this thesis, where I discuss Foucault's notion of biopolitics and the emergence of 
contemporary discourses and practices which problematise the environment in terms of bio-
economic models of ecology. Here it is worth noting that several environmental historians have 
also pointed to the connection between utilitarian concepts and ideas of nature. See for instance 
Bramwell (1989) and Worster (1987a). 
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society.76 What is more, it obscures the fact that Western culture is the product of 
the interaction of competing models of practical reason, of the two ‘indissolubly 
tied’ notions of progress and modernity. (Eder, 1990a p.76) 
The ecological crisis thus brings into question the core assumptions of the 
received view of modernity, particularly the idea of progress through 
technological development and the exploitation of nature. Overcoming the 
separation of nature and culture has become an urgent problem for modern society 
because the ecological crisis now threatens the material reproduction of society. 
Eder argues that theorising on modernisation has traditionally focused on the 
political and economic reproduction of society, but now the focus has shifted to 
include problems of ecological reproduction. Thus Eder argues the problem of 
nature is not primarily a technical problem of functionally integrating the material 
needs of modern social system with its natural environment. It is a cultural 
problem in that it questions the moral dimension of the notion of progress, which 
has begun to threaten the conditions of life in general. (Eder, 1990b p.40-2) Eder 
argues that the relation between society and nature is symbolically mediated, and 
that this requires us to  
reconstruct the theoretical idea of forces of production as a cultural 
category, as a specifically defined cultural form for appropriating nature 
... we can extend our notion of a social relation to nature and see the basic 
forms of social life from production to consumption as being determined 
by specific cultural definitions of that relation to nature. (Eder, 1990a 
p.69) 
This approach accomplishes what Habermas’ approach to new social 
movements has difficulty in doing. Problems of material reproduction at the 
system level can now be linked with the actions of ecological movements in a way 
that understands this as more than the ‘overlap’ of communicatively derived 
cultural norms and the functionally defined imperatives of the system 
maintenance. Eder’s approach thus allows a more sophisticated understanding of 
the ways in which discourse on ecological problems contributes to the historical 
production of contemporary society.  
Habermas draws an overly restrictive and simple contrast between 
emancipatory social movements (bourgeois, labour and socialist etc) concerned 
with material reproduction and problems of distribution, and new social 
movements concerned with the ‘revitalisation’ of the possibilities for expression 
and communication within the lifeworld. Eder on the other hand sees nature as a 
field of collective action within which ecological movements engage in defining 
                                                 
76 This is a theme discussed in my examination of the work of theorists such as Nikolas Rose and 
Bruno Latour in later chapters. 
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the future direction of social development and modernisation. This changes the 
logic of social conflict by mobilising the way in which nature is symbolised as a 
‘new cultural model’ for organising social action. (Eder, 1990b p.36-8) Thus 
according to Eder it is necessary to distinguish within contemporary 
environmentalism between social and cultural movements.77 Social movements in 
this approach are understood as the carriers of notions of social progress. Within 
the ecological movements this is expressed in the concern to establish a more 
rational social relationship to the natural environment. This concern is essentially 
a utilitarian one that carries forward, in a new form, the notion of the material 
rationality characteristic of the ‘old’ social movements. It seeks to ‘optimise the 
relation to nature, to establish a cybernetic state of nature in society.’ (Eder, 
1990b p.39) 78  
Environmentalism as a social movement in Eder’s sense then, is concerned 
with what Weale (1992) calls a new politics of ecological modernisation, that is, 
with a more rational and efficient management of the natural and social 
environment. 79 According to Weale, the ideology of ecological modernisation is 
characterised by the reconceptualisation of the relationship between economy and 
environment. In particular, it is argued that avoiding the costs of environmental 
protection in the present does not eliminate these costs, but merely transfers these 
to future generations. Further, it is argued that environmental protection should 
not be seen as an economic burden but a source of future economic value both in 
terms of its capacity to contribute to economic growth in an increasingly 
technological society and as a source of comparative advantage in a global 
market. (Weale, 1992 p.75-9) 
Cultural movements do not share this vision of rationalising the management 
of nature. Rather these seek to establish a social relation with nature based on a 
moral-practical rationality that questions ‘not only the social relations of 
production, domination and consumption, but also the symbolic forms serving as 
the medium of these social relations.’ (Eder, 1990a p.74; see also Eder, 1990b 
p.39) It is in this sense that Eder talks of the counter-cultural aspects of the 
ecology movements. Such cultural movements have accompanied social 
movements throughout the course of societal modernisation, and as such they are 
‘inextricably tied’ to contemporary ecological movements, although always in 
potential opposition to the social movements. The ambivalent character of 
                                                 
77 It is perhaps necessary to say that elements of both can co-exist within ecological movements. 
78 See also Eder (1990a, p.74; 1993, p.115-8). This is discussed further in Chapter 6 of the current 
thesis. Worster (1987a) provides a comprehensive historical account of the utilitarian or bio-
economic aspects of modern ecological thought. 
79 It is easy to see the appeal to utilitarian values in this. The appeal to notions of inter-
generational equity is a clear example of Eder's justice perspective. I discuss the notion of 
ecological modernisation further in Rutherford (1999a). See also Christoff (1996). 
  
 
68
 
contemporary environmentalism is therefore a product of the tension between 
these two types of movements. Such a distinction is very important for 
understanding the contradictory character within environmentalism between 
modernising, science-driven discourses and romantic, re-enchanting discourses. 
These rival discourses co-exist and co-influence the political and cultural idioms 
within which social relations with nature as thematised and expressed. 80 
(2) Beck: ecological risk & reflexive modernisation 
Whereas Eder is critical of Habermas’ ‘false idealisation’ of a ‘pure systemic 
world in social life’ separate from the cultural processes of the lifeworld, (Eder, 
1988 p.938) the approach taken by Ulrich Beck sees ecological crisis as the 
structurally determined, systemic product of the modernisation process. For Beck 
this process is one in which, by the late twentieth century, the expansion of 
science and technology has produced a range of historically unprecedented global, 
life threatening hazards and risks. Habermas argues that the ‘uncoupling’ of the 
functional requirements of system integration, which are directed to the material 
reproduction of society, from role of the cultural lifeworld in social integration, is 
both the result of the increasing complexity and rationalisation of modern society. 
He also this as necessary for the coordination of different types of social action 
within such society. (Habermas, 1987 p.153-5, 183-5) Beck, however, claims that 
this sort of differentiation reaches a point where the ‘latent side effects’ it 
produces start to break-down the bases of both the material reproduction of 
society and the separation of the social ‘subsystems of economy, politics, culture’ 
etc from nature. (Beck, 1992b p.81) As is Eder, Beck too is critical of the tradition 
in Western thought that sees an antithesis between nature and society, arguing that 
nature is utilised and ‘circulates’ within the social system including its cultural 
‘sub-systems’. (Beck, 1992b p.80-2)  
Beck nevertheless can be said to argue from within the broad perspectives of a 
critical social theory concerned with modernisation and processes of societal 
                                                 
80 Melucci (1989) suggests a similar contrast between ‘technocracy’ and ‘naturalism’. However he 
goes on to argue that ‘in highly developed societies the systems of control are being 
restructured to integrate the alleged 'naturalness' of needs in support of new models of 
conformity promoted, for example, by advertising campaigns based on the mythology of a 
'pure' body and a 'natural' and 'healthy' environment. This trend can be resisted only by keeping 
open the tension between 'natural' needs and the constraints of social existence. That in turn 
requires the recognition that the 'nature' ... within us ... which expresses itself as a site of deeply 
felt needs ... is in reality inseparable from the rules and rituals of social life.’ (p.121). However, 
it should be noted that while in one sense the romantic or naturalist counter-cultural movements 
embrace an expressive, intuitive attitude to nature, these intuitive norms, as Melucci (and 
Habermas) implies, are derived from the symbolic resources of social life (the lifeworld) and in 
contemporary Western society this includes science as a powerful source of 'cosmology'. This 
point is recognised by recent works written from an ecocentric perspective - see in particular 
Mathews (1991, p.48-50); Fox (1990, p.252-3); Eckersley (1992 p.114-6). 
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rationalisation. However, unlike Habermas, he is more inclined to see the ‘dark 
dimension’ of these processes, and in particular the role performed by science and 
knowledge in producing the negative and self-destructive side of progress. He 
does however share with Habermas a view of modernity as a collective learning 
process possessing an emancipatory potential realisable through the expansion of 
the public sphere. As Scott Lash and Brian Wynne suggest in their introduction to 
Beck’s Risk Society, the theory of reflexive modernisation developed by Beck can 
be viewed as an immanent critique of Habermas. It seeks to take into account the 
centrality of ecological problems for contemporary social theory, and does so in a 
way that ‘can potentially provide the foundation for the rejection and recasting of 
Habermas’ notion of modernisation as (an) Enlightenment project.’ Both Beck 
and Eder thus share an appreciation of the existence of a negative dialectic of 
progress, which has more in common with Horkheimer and Adorno than with 
Habermas. 
As with Eder, Beck understands the processes of global modernisation as 
producing a new type of society, based on quite different social conflicts to those 
of the earlier period of ‘primary industrialisation’ – that is, up to the 1970s. (Beck, 
1992b p.20, 22) In common with Eder, it is this new ecological field of conflict 
that Beck sees as fundamental to the analysis of contemporary society. This new 
phase of modernity is seen by Beck in terms of a systemically induced shift from 
problems of wealth distribution to those of risk distribution. According to this 
analysis, classical industrial society is primarily organised around addressing 
problems of material scarcity. Industrial society, through technological 
productivity and the establishment of welfare state mechanisms, has to a 
significant degree provided the capacity to meet real material needs. 81  
However, the development of the same productive capacity that enables this, 
at the very time gives rise to a whole new category of unintended and unforeseen 
risks and hazards. According to Beck, in late modernity industrial societies are 
less concerned with how to overcome scarcity than with how to limit and 
distribute the effects of these systematically produced ‘latent side effects’. This 
means that Weber’s notion of rationalisation, as strategic or purposive rationality, 
no longer adequately characterises the current phase of the modernisation process, 
for along with the expanding productive capacity of science and technology has 
come the ‘incalculability of their consequences.’ Thus the unintended, destructive 
consequences of technological development become ‘a dominant force in history 
and society’, to the extent that the benefits of science and technology in utilising 
the resources of nature begin to be overshadowed by the costs of political and 
                                                 
81 Note that Beck specifically identifies this as the situation in the advanced industrial states of the 
West. The logic of wealth production and distribution, ie meeting ‘obvious material need’, 
remains central to societal modernisation in the less industrialised countries of the ‘Third 
World’. See Beck (1992b) p.20. 
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economic management of the risks generated by technology. (Beck, 1992b p.19-
22) 
The potential for ‘self-endangerment’, rather than self-preservation, is 
therefore a fundamental feature of this new phase of modern society which Beck 
calls risk society. In late modernity ecological and technological risks are of a 
completely different character to natural disasters or the risks and hazards of 
wealth production in the era of primary industrialisation. These new ecological 
‘mega-risks’ 82 
induce systematic and often irreversible harm, generally remain invisible, 
are based on causal interpretations, and thus initially only exist in terms 
of the (scientific or anti-scientific) knowledge about them. They can thus 
be changed, magnified, dramatised or minimised within knowledge, and 
to that extent they are particularly open to social definition and 
construction. Hence the mass media and the scientific and legal 
professions in charge of defining risk become key social and political 
positions. (Beck, 1992b p.22-3 – original emphasis) 
Habermas claims that ecological problems are system-generated abstractions 
‘forced upon the life-world’, which require system-based scientific, administrative 
and economic solutions. Despite this, protest and resistance to environmental 
problems is often a localised response to the ‘tangible destruction’ of the 
environment, to the everyday experience of ‘developments that visibly attack the 
organic foundations of the life-world’ such as poor urban planning, destruction of 
the countryside and the health affects of pollution. (Habermas, 1981c p.35-6) The 
problem with this is that Habermas fails to explain how these ‘abstract’, 
generalised system-level problems are connected to the everyday perception of 
‘specific’ problems in the lifeworld. His earlier treatment of nature in terms of 
cognitive interest theory in fact would appear to offer some help in this regard. It 
will be recalled that there Habermas characterised external (or objectified) nature 
as consisting of ‘possible objects of experience’ which share both a certain 
independence and externality, and the ‘produced objectivity’ of a ‘world-
                                                 
82 The risks Beck refers to are ‘above all radioactivity, which completely evades human perceptive 
abilities, but also toxins and pollutants in the air, the water and foodstuffs, together with their 
accompanying short- and long-term effects on plants animals and people.’ (Beck, 1992b p.22) 
Elsewhere these are defined as including nuclear power, (and) many types of chemical and bio-
technological production as well as the continuing and threatening ecological destruction.’ 
These are described as ‘nuclear, chemical, genetic and ecological mega hazards.’ (Beck, 1992a 
p.101-2). I generalise these various manifestations of technological risk as ecological risks. 
Such a generalisation while useful for the sake of brevity, is also consistent with Beck's own 
inclinations. This is attested to by his use terms such as ‘ecological enlightenment’ and 
‘ecological democracy’ in his calls for the strengthening of the public sphere and the creation of 
a ‘public science’, which he sees as a necessary political corrective to the potentially self-
destructive production of ‘mega-risks’. See Beck (1992a) p.118-9. 
  
 
71
 
constituting’ social practice, or ‘Lebenspraxis’. (Habermas, 1978 p.25-42) 83 
However, in moving away from his earlier notion of universalised species-
interests and towards a concern for systems of action co-ordination, Habermas 
also neglects any further elaboration of the thesis of a strong mediation between 
‘nature’ and social production of scientific-technical knowledge contained in his 
earlier work. 
Scientific expertise and the production of risks 
Beck places the mediation between nature and science at the centre of his 
theory of modernisation. He demonstrates that what constitutes a risk, and the 
way in which the consequent hazards are distributed, are discursively defined. The 
sorts of global ecological hazards Beck is concerned with, such as depletion of the 
stratospheric ozone layer and radiation contamination, are generally not visible or 
perceptible in any unmediated way to the every-day experience of the lifeworld. 
These sorts of ecological risks and hazards only come into existence through the 
objectifying medium of expert judgement. They are not things of simple 
experience but in a very strong sense ‘require the ‘sensory organs’ of science - 
theories, experiments, measuring instruments - in order to become visible or 
interpretable as hazards at all.’ (Beck, 1992b p.27) Unlike the problems of earlier 
industrial society which involved material scarcity, those of late modernity cannot 
be overcome by further development of the means of production and 
redistributive social welfare. Previously exposure to risk was primarily 
determined by class, whereas in late modernity risk is ‘somehow universal and 
unspecific’ and no longer produces the sort of social solidarities associated with 
class positions. ‘Risk positions’, argues Beck, are constitutive of new 
dependencies in which the victims of technologically produced hazards are 
rendered ‘incompetent in matters of their own affliction’ as increasingly the power 
of judgement and definition is reserved by expert, ‘external knowledge 
producers’. Thus on Beck’s analysis, both the substantive and theoretical 
production of risks are structurally linked through the knowledge dependent 
dynamic of modernisation, in which material conditions of life and the production 
of knowledge are fastened tightly together. 
Beck characterises risk society as involving the loss of ‘cognitive sovereignty’ 
by the individual when it comes to ecological hazards. Thus unlike ‘losses in 
income and the like’, exposure to ecological threats involves ‘loss of sovereignty 
over assessing the dangers, to which one is directly subjected. The whole 
bureaucracy of knowledge opens up, with its long corridors, waiting benches, 
responsible, semi-responsible, and incomprehensible shoulder-shruggers and 
                                                 
83 See also my discussion of this in the section 'Nature and cognitive interests' in Chapter 3 of this 
thesis. 
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poseurs ... (that regulate) ... how one gets access to knowledge, (and) how it 
should be done’. (Beck, 1992b p.53-5) This view, while undoubtedly pointing to 
the way in which technocratic expertise is not politically accountable to citizens, 
also suggests that the lack of such cognitive sovereignty and political 
accountability seriously undermines the democratic role of the citizen in risk 
society. I turn to a detailed consideration of the issue of sovereignty and related 
issues in Chapters 7 to 9. 
For Beck the production of risk is not simply a question of the factual-
methodological substance of knowledge; rather defining hazards involves both 
scientific-theoretical elements and moral-practical ones. 84 The moral component 
arises from the statistical character of risk assessments. Risk determinations 
combine mathematical probabilities of hazard with calculations of social interests. 
Decisions dealing with risks thus not only deal with statements of probability but 
are ‘at the same time also decisions defining who is afflicted, the extent and type 
of hazard, the elements of the threat, the population concerned, delayed effects, 
measures to be taken, those responsible, and claims for compensation.’ (Beck, 
1992b p.54) The moral dimensions of risk determination are generally hidden by a 
technocratic dynamic that reduces risks to questions of scientific and technical 
manageability. Nevertheless, suggests Beck, risk society exaggerates the gap 
between scientific and social rationality, while at the same time bringing into 
focus the dependence between the two.85 
While arguing that the social role of science and technology is central to the 
development of risk society, Beck is highly critical of the way in which critics of 
technocracy and ecological problems themselves tend to argue from a scientistic 
position. He is thus critical of calls for a new ethical approach to science precisely 
because this ignores the influence of the ‘logic of technocracy’, that is, the 
‘autonomisation of technological development and its interconnections with 
economic interests.’ (Beck, 1992a p.106) 86 Science is fundamental to the 
production of technological risks while at the same time scientific expertise is 
                                                 
84 Beck claims that the experience of risks ‘presume a normative horizon of lost security ... Behind 
all the objectifications, ... the question of acceptance arises and with it anew the old question: 
how do we wish to live?’ That is, the issue is not simply the definition of the probability of 
hazard, but also definition of degrees of acceptability and the social distribution of risk. See 
Beck (1992b) p.27-30. 
85 ‘The scientific concern with risks of industrial development in fact relies on social expectations 
and value judgement, just as the social discussion and perception of risks depends on scientific 
arguments. Risk research follows ... in the footsteps of 'technophobia' which it was called up to 
restrain, and from which, moreover, it has received an undreamed-of material support in recent 
years.’ Beck (1992b) p.30. 
86 Calls for an ‘ethical renewal of the sciences’, and towards nature in general, are common to 
much Green political thinking. For a discussion of this see Eckersley (1992), especially Chapter 
5. 
  
 
73
 
given ‘binding authority’ ahead of law and politics, to define risks and specify 
how they are to be managed. Thus while there is a monopolisation by scientists 
and engineers in diagnosing hazards, the authority of science is constantly 
undermined and called into question by its failure to contain or control these 
ecological hazards.87 In fact Beck’s thesis is stronger than this, arguing that the 
development of theoretical knowledge in the sciences systematically multiplies 
analyses of risks while undermining the ‘original claims’ that scientific 
management of risk is capable of providing physical security from hazard. (Beck, 
1992a p.106-7) 
At the same time Beck warns that the debate about ecological risk is largely 
conducted in natural scientific terms, in which the problems are seen to be 
chemical, biological, technological etc in origin. The debate thus tends to present 
human beings ‘only as organic material’, turning into a ‘discussion of nature 
without people’. His argument is that the critique of industry and technology 
remains fundamentally locked into a naturalistic and technocratic perspective 
characterised by a ‘loss of social thinking’. This perspective, Beck suggests, is 
held by the political environment movements (in contrast to alternative life-style 
movements) as well as by governments. 88  It is a perspective that renders modern 
society in terms of the technical domination of nature while obscuring ‘the social, 
                                                 
87 See Yearley (1992) for a discussion of the way in which this creates particular problems for 
environmental movements when they seek to use science to legitimate their political objectives. 
88 Beck's reference to the ‘political’ environment movement suggests the distinction made by Eder 
between the social utilitarian elements of the ecology movement (ie those based on the justice 
perspective), and the cultural, ‘alternative lifestyle’ element based on the purity perspective. 
However, even these cultural movements, such as ‘deep ecology’ emphasise ethical concern for 
the intrinsic moral value of non-human life, but this is still very much based on a scientific 
ontology which is taken as the source of its ‘ecocentrism’ (non-anthropocentricism), that is, 
such cultural movements employ cultural values derived from a highly scientised lifeworld. The 
appeal to science as the source of moral and epistemic authority is evident in the recent works 
of ecocentric theorists such as Eckersley, Fox and Mathews. Ecocentric theory is critical of 
what it sees as the instrumental, objectifying attitude toward nature adopted by the technocratic 
dominant political culture, linking this to an anthropocentric worldview. However these writers 
attempt to overcome this not by rejecting science per se, but by calling for a ‘new science’ that 
is guided by an ecocentric interest in maintaining the integrity and health of the ecological 
system. (Eckersley, 1992 p.114-6) Fox makes a distinction between the instrumental and 
cosmological functions of science, suggesting that modern science provides a cosmology that 
‘has had profound non-anthropological implications’, enabling green theory to understand ‘our 
place in the larger scheme of things’. (Fox, 1990 p.252-3) Mathews, following Naess, argues 
for a Spinozan monism as the basis for her theory of the ‘ecological self’ in which science, 
stripped of ‘mechanistic assumptions, is a superlative tool for investigating the nature of the 
physical world.’ While science cannot be taken as the sole basis of knowledge and truth, it 
nevertheless is indispensable to a new ecological worldview. Thus Mathews argues that in 
Western cultures environmentalism cannot posses legitimacy and credibility without ‘the 
sanction of science’. (Mathews, 1991 p.48-50). 
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cultural and political risks of modernisation’. 89 In this respect Beck’s work can be 
said to share with the Frankfurt School, Eder, and to a degree Habermas 
(particularly his earlier work), an understanding of nature as historicised. An 
important consequence of this view of nature as conditioned and symbolically 
mediated by social practices, is the critique of the fetishising of both ‘progress’ 
and ‘nature’,90 and of the political function of scientific knowledge. 
In light of advanced industrial society’s systematic production of ecological 
‘mega-hazards’ which threaten the natural foundations of life, Beck argues that 
the reappraisal of the relationship between society and nature has become a key 
task for social theory. In particular he claims that it is no longer possible to cling 
to the nineteenth century notion of an antithesis between nature and society, 
which understands nature and society as outside of each other. (Beck, 1992b p.80) 
At the end of the twentieth century nature must be understood as an historical 
product, thoroughly integrated into and affected by the global system of industrial 
production. Such a ‘societalisation’ of nature also means the ‘societalisation of 
the destruction and threats to nature’. Under Beck’s approach, environmental 
problems serve as the ‘conceptual arrangement’ in which the damage done to 
nature through its social appropriation is re-employed as a resource in new types 
of social and political conflict. 91 The consequence of this is that ‘in advanced 
modernity, society with all its subsystems of the economy, politics, culture and 
the family can no longer be understood as autonomous of nature.’ (Beck, 1992b 
p.81) At the same time, Beck rejects the naive realism and scientism so evident in 
much of the debate about protecting the natural environment. He is direct in his 
characterisation of nature as a ‘highly synthetic product’, in that nowhere today is 
‘nature’ untouched by human intervention. Similarly, science does not deal with 
nature in a purely ‘objective’ manner, but within institutional contexts serving a 
‘generalised social claim to the mastery of nature.’ According to Beck therefore,  
what is treated there as ‘nature’ is the internal ‘second nature’ brought 
into the cultural process, and thus burdened and overburdened with not 
                                                 
89 Beck comments that: ‘it is as if there had never been people such as a certain Max Weber, who 
apparently wasted his time showing that without including structures of social power and 
distribution, bureaucracies, prevailing norms and rationalities, such a debate is either 
meaningless or absurd, and probably both.’ He further pointedly comments, ‘... this absence 
seems to strike no one, not even sociologists themselves.’ (Beck, 1992b p.24-5)  
90 See Buck-Morss (1977) p.49-56 and Chapter 2 of this thesis for discussion of this aspect of 
Horkheimer and Adorno's work. 
91 Thus Beck states ‘That means that 'modernisation risks' are the conceptual arrangement, the 
categorical setting, in which injuries to and destruction of nature, as immanent in civilisation, 
are seized upon socially. In this scenario of conflict, decisions are made as to the validity and 
urgency of risks, and the way they will be repressed or dealt with is decided. Modernisation 
risks are the scientised 'second morality' in which negotiations are conducted on the injuries of 
the industrially exhausted ex-nature in a socially 'legitimate' way.’ (Beck, 1992b p.81) 
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very ‘natural’ system functions and meanings. ... In other words, because 
it is a nature circulating and utilised within the system, nature has become 
political, even at the objective hands of objective scientists. (Beck, 1992b 
p.81-2) 
Beck’s analysis of the relationship between nature and society with its 
emphasis on the system and its sub-systems of action coordination, is clearly 
influenced by the Habermasian framework. Similarly, Beck’s treatment of nature 
has much in common with Habermas’ earlier view of objective nature, in which 
nature is seen as that which is constituted as an object of human instrumental 
action and the scientific knowledge that serves this. (Habermas, 1978) 92 In 
particular, Beck’s analysis points to the systematic production of risks in late 
modernity as originating in a narrowly economic, ‘techno-scientific rationality’ 
which he explicitly identifies in Habermasian terms as ‘a type of productivity-
raising knowledge interest.’93 Yet Beck’s work also enriches Habermas’ analysis. 
by demonstrating the ways in which ecological problems, arising from what 
appears in Habermas as the largely technical problems of the material 
reproduction of society, interconnect with economic and political subsystems as 
well as the cultural subsystems Habermas designates as belonging to the 
lifeworld. 
Much criticism of Habermas relates to the perceived rigidity or abstractness 
of his notions of system and lifeworld, and the distinction between his different 
categories of rationality. 94 Beck argues that nature cannot be considered 
autonomous from society and its subsystems (economy, politics, culture and the 
family). Also, as has been indicated above, ‘nature’ for Beck is societalised 
nature, which is reproduced and utilised within the social system. In this regard, 
Beck can be interpreted as joining the criticism of Habermas’ overly rigid, or in 
Eder’s words, ‘false idealisation’, of the separation of system from lifeworld. In 
any case, it is clear that Beck wants to show the multiple interconnections 
between system and lifeworld, 95 and that in doing this he is far more critical of 
                                                 
92 See my discussion in that section of Chapter 2 of the current thesis headed 'Nature and cognitive 
interests'. 
93 ‘This once again clarifies how a type of productivity-raising knowledge interest (to put it in 
Habermas’ terms) prevails historically in scientifically directed technological development, an 
interest which is related to the logic of wealth production and remains embedded in it.’ (Beck, 
1992b p.60-1) 
94 See for example Giddens (1982) p.82-116; Baxter (1987) p.39-86; Eder (1988) p.931-944; 
Hayim (1992) p.187-209; Eckersley (1992) p.97-117; Ottmann (1982) p.79-97; Whitebook 
(1979) p.41-69; Strydom (1990) p.156-164; Alford (1985b) p.139-177. 
95 While it is beyond the scope of the present work to give a detailed account of all aspects of the 
relationship of Beck's theory of reflexive modernisation and Habermas’ work, it should be 
noted that Beck's work is concerned to explicate the ‘distributional logic of modernisation 
risks’ and the impact this has on the various aspects of social structure in advanced industrial 
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the sciences than is Habermas. For example, Beck argues that the origin of the 
critique of modern science and technology ‘lies not in the ‘irrationality’ of the 
critics, but in the failure of techno-scientific rationality in the face of growing 
risks and threats from civilisation.’ (Beck, 1992b p.59) Such a comment can be 
interpreted as an implicit criticism of Habermas’ approach to the ecological 
movements.  
In his limited treatment of environmental problems, Habermas’ inclination is 
to characterise ecological movements as part of a wider ‘neo-conservatism’ that 
rejects modernity’s ‘reasonable content and its possibilities for the future’. 
(Habermas, 1981b p.13-4; Habermas, 1981c p.33-7; Habermas, 1982b p.245-50) I 
have suggested that the basis for this stand can be found in Habermas’ claim that 
in modernity the differentiation of value spheres requires the application of 
instrumental rather than practical reason to human relations with nature.96 He 
conceptualises system and lifeworld as distinct domains of action coordination in 
which ecological problems are primarily matters of material reproduction.97 In 
contrast to this view of ecological movements as essentially anti-modern, Beck 
understands them as the result of a growing awareness of the risks produced by 
the latest phase of modernity. This awareness Beck attributes both to the 
increasing scientisation of risk, and the expanding commerce in risks. (Beck, 
1992b p.56) The scientisation of risk undermines a strict separation of system 
from lifeworld inasmuch as risk is experienced in an already highly scientised 
lifeworld, that is, the perception of modern ecological hazards depends on ‘a 
theoretical and hence a scientised consciousness, even in the everyday 
                                                                                                                                     
society, that is, its impact on social class, work, gender, individual biography, etc. In doing this 
Beck 'fleshes out' the connection between 'lifeworld and system' in a way that Habermas only 
does at a far more abstract level. Thus Beck comments, ‘Everything which appears separated in 
the perspective of systems theory, becomes an integral component of the individual biography: 
family and wage labour, education and employment, administration and the transportation 
system, consumption, pedagogy, and so on. Subsystem boundaries apply to subsystems, not to 
people in institutionally dependent individual situations. Or, expressing it in Habermasian 
terms, individual situations lie across the distinction between system and lifeworld. The 
subsystem boundaries pass through individual situations which are, so to speak, the 
biographical side of that which is separated by system boundaries. Considered in this way, we 
are concerned with the individualised institutional situations, whose connections and fractures 
(neglected on the level of the system) continually produce frictions, disharmonies and 
contradictions within and among individual biographies.’ (Beck, 1992b p.136-7) 
96 Habermas claims that there is a ‘basic philosophical question’ of how a non-objectivising 
attitude to nature could be ‘adequately grounded today without recourse to the substantial 
reason of religious or metaphysical world-views, how it could be grounded at the level of 
learning attained in the modern understanding of the world.’ (Habermas, 1982b p.248) 
97 Habermas distinguishes problems of material reproduction from the ecological movement's 
‘new politics’ concern with the ‘grammar of forms of life’, that is, the question of ‘how to 
defend or reinstate endangered life styles, or how to put reformed life styles into practice.’ 
(Habermas, 1981c p.33).  
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consciousness of risks.’ (Beck, 1992b p.28) Because Beck sees the substantive 
production of risks as closely tied to the development of expert scientific 
knowledge, he is able to focus on the link between risk production and its 
‘cognitive agents’. These cognitive agents comprise not only the those experts 
who produce scientific knowledge and its technological applications, but also 
those ‘counter-experts’ of the ecological movements etc, responsible for 
producing critiques of environmental degradation and technology.  
Advanced industrial society thus displays a ‘system immanent’ capacity to 
endanger the ecological conditions of its own existence while at the same time 
producing a self-referential, or reflexive, ‘questioning of itself through the 
multiplication and the economic exploitation of hazards.’ (Beck, 1992b p.56-7) In 
this perspective, ecological movements can be seen not so much as opposed to 
modernity as an important force for ecological modernisation.98 In Beck’s view, 
the influence of such movements derives in large measure from the existence of 
systemic contradictions arising from the industrial production and political 
administration of risks, which become an object of public concern through the 
‘needling activities’ of ecology and citizens groups. In this way, according to 
Beck, the counter experts of the ecological movements, in conjunction with mass 
media, have taken the thematic initiative and placed the question of ‘the threat to 
life’ on the social agenda. (Beck, 1992a p.115-6) 99 
What is particularly interesting in Beck’s analysis is the way in which it 
connects the concerns of ecological movements, primarily understood by 
Habermas as the cultural expression of alternative ‘lifestyles’, with the broader 
issues of global political economy, and the relationship between scientific 
knowledge and power, in risk society. In so doing Beck provides a more 
substantive consideration than does Habermas of the way in which what I have 
referred to as the problem of nature gives rise to systemic (or functional) 
pressures for ecological modernisation. 100 While this line of argument is not 
logically incompatible with Habermas’ systems approach, it is unnecessarily 
marginalised by his tendency to see ecological politics as largely isolated to 
cultural-aesthetic questions. This a view, which as I have argued, is clearly the 
                                                 
98 This is not a term used by Beck, although he does talk of ‘ecological enlightenment’. See Beck, 
(1995a). Beck speaks of ‘reflexive modernisation’. 
99 The role of the media is important in Beck's argument: ‘the evening news ultimately exceeds 
even the fantasies of countercultural dissent; daily newspaper reading becomes an exercise in 
technology critique.’ (p.116) Beck stresses the dependence of such critique on the existence of 
certain social conditions which prevail ‘in only a few countries’ (ie the West) such as 
parliamentary democracy, material affluence and an independent press, ie it is a product of 
liberal democracy. 
100 Eder makes a similar point in his discussion of ecological thinking as ‘a radicalisation of 
modern economic ideology.’ See Eder (1990a) p.75. 
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result of his attempts to isolate the critique of instrumental reason so as to save an 
emancipatory role for reason. 
As I have indicated earlier in this section, Beck argues that ecological risks 
are characteristic of a new phase of modernisation which brings into being quite 
different forms of social differentiation and conflict to those of the earlier period 
of primary industrialisation. The conflicts that arise in relation to the ecological 
risks of modernisation, while not in themselves conflicts of wealth distribution, 
nevertheless are closely connected to the economic subsystem and to problems of 
material reproduction. The emergence of ecological risks and conflicts challenge 
key notions of industrial society such as ‘progress’, ‘scientific rationality’ and 
‘economic growth’. Beck suggests therefore, as does Eder, that ecological 
conflicts ‘take on the character of doctrinal struggles within civilisation over the 
proper road for modernity’. (Beck, 1992b p.40) This is contrary to Habermas’ 
view of these movements as conservative and anti-modern per se. 101 Hence 
debates that question industrial society’s exploitation of nature raise more than the 
moral worth of nature, they also question the monopoly of autonomised and 
concealed social change exercised by science and technology under the rhetoric of 
progress. 
This new ecological field of conflict creates new configurations of power 
relations in the global economy in which, at least for the advanced industrial 
nations, the elimination of scarcity increasingly tends to be replaced by the 
elimination of risk as the rationale of the social system. There is thus a major 
difference between the sorts of social antagonisms generated by wealth 
production and those created by hazard production. The older antagonisms 
between labour and capital, created by problems of scarcity and wealth 
distribution, are undermined by the material success of industrialism. At the same 
time the systemic technological production of hazards creates new antagonisms, 
in which the ‘destruction of nature and destruction of markets coincide’: 
‘Threats to nature’ are not only that; pointing them out also threatens 
property, capital, jobs, trade union power, the economic foundation of 
whole sectors and regions, and the structure of nation states and global 
markets. ... (W)ealth production produced antagonisms between capital 
and labour, while the systematic chemical, nuclear and genetic threats 
bring about polarisation between capital and capital - and thus between 
labour and labour - cutting across the social order. (Beck, 1992a p.110-
11) 102 
                                                 
101 See also Eder, (1990b) p.40, 21 and (1993) p.103-112. 
102 Beck notes here that one of the consequences of this is that labour and labour power are no 
longer simply understood as sources of wealth production but also as social forces of ‘threat 
and destruction’. (p.113) This is reflected in the general critique of industrialism apparent in 
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The distribution and effect of risk does not fall equally. Some sectors of the 
global economy and some regions suffer more than others from the destruction of 
nature. Thus toxic accidents and pollution can transform particular commercial 
interests into economic wastelands. 103 Events such as the Chernobyl nuclear 
reactor accident and the Exxon Valdez oil spill are clear examples of such 
ecological catastrophes, but more insidious processes, such as loss of fishing 
grounds through ocean pollution or loss of agricultural and silvicultural 
productivity through acid rain etc are also significant. Ecologically damaged 
regions come into existence which transverse the borders of nation states and the 
established ‘lines of conflict’ within societies. Global ecological problems, 
especially those such as greenhouse gas induced climate change, have the 
potential to undermine the economic basis of entire regions and states, leading to 
waves of ‘eco-refugees and climatic asylum-seekers’. While global hazards cut 
across traditional social class positions, they nevertheless still impact most on the 
poorest within these newly defined ecological zones of conflict. (Beck, 1992a 
p.110-11) At the same time however, technologically induced risks may also 
represent market opportunities, both in terms of such things as pollution control 
technology and expanded demand for professional expertise in the areas of 
ecological management and environmental assessment and administration. 104 
Beck argues that the new social antagonisms of risk society are expressed in a 
complex set of ‘tensions between business and the elimination of risks, and 
between the consumption and the production of risk definitions’ giving rise to 
‘definitional struggles over the scale, degree and urgency of risks.’ (Beck, 1992b 
p.46) On one level hazards are the creation of what appears as an autonomous 
process resulting from a strictly instrumental use of technology in the production 
of commodities. However, these hazards are defined and evaluated not at the level 
of the private firm, but socially through a matrix of ‘quasi-governmental power 
                                                                                                                                     
much Green social analysis. For example see Bahro (1986) p.12-13, 45-8 and Porritt (1894) 
p.77-82. 
103 Beck suggests that with such catastrophes ‘ ... 'blank spots' on the map arise again in the most 
advanced stage of civilisation. ... suddenly discovered toxic waste dumps, transform housing 
estates into toxic waste estates and turn farmland into wasteland.’ (Beck, 1992b p.39) 
104 The direct cost of complying with the United States' pollution control regulations alone has 
beenestimated to be in excess of US$100 billion per year. (Jasanoff, 1992 p.195) While this is a 
cost to some sectors of the economy, the supply of equipment and expertise by other sectors 
represents significant new market opportunities. For example, the US market for the 
commercial treatment, storage and disposal of hazardous waste was valued at $3,000 million in 
1997; in the same year environmental remediation and associated consulting cost $8,000 
million. (HazNews, 1998 p.1) The European Commission explicitly recognises this: ‘the future 
competitiveness of Community industry on world markets will depend heavily upon its ability 
to offer goods and services causing no pollution and achieving standards at least as high as its 
competitors. ... Technological innovation allied with a commitment to high supply standards 
can open up new opportunities, by developing new markets and putting to work the 
technologies of the future.’ (Commission of the European Communities, 1986 p.3)  
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positions’ encompassing the debate among scientific experts, in juridical 
interpretation, and in the mass media. The transformation of the unintended 
consequences of private economic activities into socially defined risks and 
hazards is the result of ‘scientific battles’ fought out by ‘intellectual strategies in 
intellectual milieux’ over the heads as it were, of the class positions of the 
protagonists of the earlier industrial society. In this way the production and 
distribution of knowledge is central to the functioning of risk society. (Beck, 
1992a p.112-114) 105 
Sub-politics: decline of the state as a political centre 
However, this definition of risks, while the result of deliberate decisions (and 
therefore social in character), is not political in the sense of being defined by 
decisions taken in formal political institutions. The political system of industrial 
society is premised on a differentiation of parliamentary politics from the ‘non-
politics’ of the techno-economic pursuit of interests, which is expressed in private 
investment decisions and scientific research agendas, and it is primarily in this 
context that the decisions which produce ecological risks are made. It is in this 
sense that Beck speaks of social change as the autonomised, latent side effect of 
scientific and technological decisions in which social change is independent of the 
intentions of the formal political institutions. (Beck, 1992b p.183-4) 106 This 
process is not a distortion of modernity but rather the result of the success of 
rationalisation and progress, and occurs in part, through the equation of social and 
economic progress, assumed by modern Western culture. Risk society is thus 
shaped by two contradictory processes - the institutionalisation of representative 
democracy and the legitimation of the supposed intrinsic value of progress in 
scientific and technical knowledge - which leads to far-reaching social changes 
‘under the cloak of normality’. The effect of this is to give scientific and 
economic development in late modernity the status of a ‘sub-politics’ which is not 
subject to institutionalised political authorisation and legitimation. Nevertheless 
these constantly produce and magnify the risks which increasingly become the 
object of public discourse and over which government is called to act upon. 107  
                                                 
105 ‘The social and economic importance of knowledge grows ... and with it the power over the 
media to structure knowledge (science and research) and disseminate it (mass media). The risk 
society is in this sense also the science, media and information society.’ (Beck, 1992b p.46). 
106 While social decisions create ecological risks and hazards, what people do intentionally is 
‘something quite different: they assert themselves in the market, use the rules of profit-making, 
carry forth scientific and technical inquiry, and in so doing they turn over the conditions of 
everyday life.’ (p.184) 
107 ‘Political institutions become the administrators of a development they neither have planned 
for nor are able to structure, but must nevertheless somehow justify.’ (Beck, 1992b p.186-7) 
See also Beck (1992a) p.114-5. 
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According to Beck this results in a fundamental transformation of the 
character of politics in risk society, leading to three key developments. These are 
first, the cultural consensus over the link between scientific-economic 
development and progress begins to breakdown. Second the scientifically 
generated awareness of ecological and technological risks gives rise to demands 
for political control and accountability of processes that lie largely outside the 
public sphere. Third, the breakdown of the notion of a political centre that is 
capable of controlling the processes of scientific-economic development. 
Alongside these there occurs (paradoxically) a simultaneous extension of the 
monitoring activity by the state (and mass media and citizen groups) into ever 
more intimate levels of plant management. These phenomena are manifestations 
of a new phase of modernity Beck labels ‘reflexive modernisation’ in which 
industrial society is forced to confront the effects of threats created by its own 
technological ‘success’.108 
The ‘sub-politics’ status of scientific-economic development undermines the 
hitherto unquestioned belief in the inherent link between technological and social 
progress. The consensus that technical progress is equivalent to social progress 
Beck sees as based in the post-World War Two boom period, which in the 
Western industrialised states involved an interlinking of the economic, technical 
and social agendas of reconstruction. This consensus relied on the then obvious 
fact that increases in productive capacity would lead to an improved material 
standard of living. One aspect of this was to ensure that any adverse effects were 
regarded as the social consequences of otherwise beneficial technological 
development, which could be dealt with in isolation (and retrospectively) through 
the political intervention of the welfare state, without interfering with the basic 
non-political dynamics of technological development. 109 The post-war growth of 
                                                 
108 Beck defines reflexive modernisation in the following terms: By ‘virtue of its inherent 
dynamism, modern society is undercutting its formations of class, stratum, occupation, sex 
roles, nuclear family, plant, business sectors and also of course the prerequisites and 
continuing forms of natural techno-economic progress. This new stage, in which progress can 
turn into self-destruction, in which one kind of modernisation undercuts and changes another, 
is what I call the stage of reflexive modernisation. … Reflexive modernisation … is supposed 
to mean that a change of industrial society which occurs surreptitiously and unplanned in the 
wake of normal, autonomised modernisation and with an unchanged, intact political and 
economic order implies the following: a radicalisation of modernity, which breaks up the 
premises and contours of industrial society and opens paths to another modernity. …This 
concept does not imply (as the adjective ‘reflexive’ might suggest) reflection, but (first) self-
confrontation. … Let us call the autonomous, undesired and unseen, transition from industrial 
to risk society reflexivity (to differentiate it from and contrast it with reflection). The ‘reflexive 
modernisation’ means self-confrontation with the effects of risk society that cannot be dealt 
with and assimilated in the system of industrial society – as measured by the latter’s 
institutionalised standards.’ (Beck, 1994  p.2-6) 
109 In this situation ‘technological development itself remains undisputed, is closed to (public) 
decision-making and follows its own inherent objective logic.’ Beck also points to the role of 
the consensus between organised labour and capital as ‘industrial bargaining parties’ in 
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risk-intensive large-scale technologies with their systemic production of global 
ecological, nuclear and technological hazards and the ‘incalculability’ of their 
consequences, leads increasingly to the situation where these ‘enter into a direct 
mutual relationship to collective lifeworlds, outside the industrial arena’. (Beck, 
1992b p.203) 
This new, knowledge-dependent experience of risks, combined with the 
success of the welfare state and formal democratic participation in the West leads 
to a new political culture that demands public participation in decision-making in 
areas previously outside the political system. In this regard social movements 
such as those concerned with ecology can be understood not as the response to 
some form of pathological distortion of the communicative and democratic 
potential of the modern welfare state, but rather as the product of its success. 
(Beck, 1992b p.185) This new political culture arises from the systemically 
induced decentralisation of politics brought about by the multiplication of centres 
of social and cultural sub-politics, which have the effect of disempowering the 
traditional notion of politics with its assumptions of the sovereignty of the state, 
parliament and the executive. 110 These centres of sub-politics, which Beck 
characterises as including new social movements and citizen action groups, as 
well as the mass media and the judiciary, thus broaden the ‘opportunities for 
extra-parliamentary monitoring with and against the system.’ (Beck, 1992b p.194 
- emphasis added) It is important to note that while this process opens up avenues 
for resistance to scientific-economic development, it is still a process of 
modernisation which at the same time both decentres and channels the scope of 
formal political action. It also creates new opportunities for surveillance and 
intervention through the modernisation of the scientific-economic system. (Beck, 
1992b p.200) 
Beck’s thesis is thus that the increased production and distribution of new 
types of risk simultaneously drive the ‘self-politicisation’ of modernity, in which 
                                                                                                                                     
economic growth and increasing productivity. The objects of dispute between these parties 
were those of wealth distribution, which was always approached from a ‘common opposition 
to 'hatred of technology', 'Luddism', or 'critique of civilisation'.’ (Beck, 1992b p.202) 
110 Beck suggests that ‘the more successfully political rights were fought for, pushed through and 
concretely realised in this century, the more emphatically the primacy of the political system 
was called into question, and the more fictitious became the simultaneously claimed 
concentration of decision-making at the top of the political and parliamentary system. ... Both 
the formulation of ... program(s) and the decision-making process, as well as the enforcing of 
those decisions, must rather be understood as a process of collective action. ... This implies, 
however, that the official decision-making authority of political institutions is necessarily 
decentralised. The political-administrative system then can no longer be the only or the central 
locus of political events. In tandem with the democratisation, networks of agreement and 
participation, negotiation, reinterpretation and possible resistance come into being across the 
formal horizontal and vertical structure of authorisations and jurisdictions.’ (Beck, 1992b 
p.191-2) 
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‘the concept, place and media of politics’ are altered fundamentally from those 
that which prevailed in the earlier phase of industrial society. (Beck, 1992b p.183) 
The implications of this for understanding the relation between the problem of 
nature, ecological movements, and modernisation is quite different from those that 
can be drawn from Habermas’ treatment of these issues. He assumes ecological 
problems are largely a side effect of the material reproduction of society and are 
amenable to technical solution through improved science and technology and 
more efficient administration. Beck’s analysis on the other hand points both to an 
integral link between the production of scientific knowledge per se and ecological 
hazards, and to a diminution of the capacity of the political-administrative system 
to control the production of these hazards. While Habermas sees ecological 
movements as an anti-modern reaction to the complexity of the social system, 
Beck emphasis is on such movements not only as a product of the latest phase of 
modernity but also as a force for further modernisation. Equally important is 
Beck’s view that reflexive modernisation undermines the notion of the relative 
autonomy of the political-administrative system from the economic system, and of 
both of these from social and cultural spheres. Habermas’ approach suggests that 
the weakening of the formal institutions of parliamentary democracy and welfare 
state, along with the rise of new social movements should be seen as elements of 
what he calls the ‘new obscurity’. In contrast to this, Beck argues that the 
processes of modernisation are already bypassing the modernity Habermas seeks 
to ‘complete’. 
(3) Luhmann: ecological communication & functional 
differentiation 
The theme of the lack of a political ‘centre’ to contemporary Western society, 
evident in Beck’s work, also plays a key role in the work of Niklas Luhmann.111 
However, whereas Beck suggests that this leads to a reflexive modernity with the 
potential to reinvent politics through the ‘self-criticism of risk society’, (Beck, 
1992b p.183-236; Beck, 1994 p.51-55) Luhmann is far more pessimistic about the 
possibility of a rational coordination of societal responses to ecological problems. 
Contrary to the approach of Beck and Eder, he argues that the various social 
subsystems are largely functionally autonomous. (Sciulli, 1994 p.44)  
As with Beck, Luhmann does not situate ecological problems in nature, but 
within society. More specifically, he is concerned with developing a systems-
theoretical understanding of the manner in which social systems become aware of, 
and communicate, the differences between themselves and their environment. 
Luhmann’s work is discussed only briefly here. While his work does touch on the 
                                                 
111 A version of the following section of this Chapter previously appeared in Rutherford (1999a) 
p.106-109. 
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issues raised in this and previous chapters, his approach offer little of the insights 
available from Eder, Beck or indeed Habermas. Nevertheless, Luhmann’s work, 
and in particular his book Ecological Communication, (Luhmann, 1989) 
represents a significant attempt to consider ecological issues within the context of 
contemporary systems theory. As I argue in Chapter 6, systems theory has been 
influential in ecological thinking over the past fifty years, and this influence does 
spill over into attempts at linking social theory to environmental concerns. 
The distinction between system and environment is one of two key concepts 
in Luhmann’s system theory. Here the concept of environment is understood at a 
very general level to refer to the context in which the ‘operationally closed’, self-
referential, functional subsystems of society (the scientific, legal, political and 
economic systems, etc) operate as self-reproducing entities. Luhmann defines 
these functional subsystems as autopoietic,112 to indicate ‘that the system is the 
product of its own activity (work), and not simply self-sufficient activity as such’. 
(Sciulli, 1994 p.14) The autopoietic nature of functional subsystems is therefore 
determined, not by external environmental influences, but by the intrinsic primary 
goal of all such self-reproducing systems – ‘the continuation of autopoeisis 
without any concern for the environment’. (Luhmann, 1989 p.14 - emphasis 
added)  A second pivotal concept for Luhmann’s theory is the substitution of 
‘communication’ for ‘action’ as the most basic operation of functional systems, in 
which communication becomes the medium through which self-referentiality is 
produced and sustained. Communication is the process whereby social systems 
constitute themselves by observing themselves. Hence, the environment for 
Luhmann is ‘anything which social communication can refer to.’ (Miller, 1994 
p.104) 
When Luhmann does specifically address problems of ecology, his concern is 
to examine how modern societal subsystems react to these types of problems and 
to explain why ‘society’ has difficulty in perceiving and managing them 
appropriately. (Luhmann, 1989 p.33-5) His approach to these questions is shaped 
by a view of modern society as an assemblage of highly differentiated functional 
subsystems that lack of any central mechanism to control these subsystems, other 
than the uncoordinated reactions or autopoietic adjustments (‘resonance’) of each 
to the interference of the others. (Sciulli, 1994 p.47) This is so because each of the 
subsystems is directed to performing a relatively limited social function; for 
example, the subsystem of economy is narrowly concerned with prices and 
payments, rather than with the broader environment. 
Luhmann argues that subsystems operate with a set of binary codes, which 
specify the ways in which reality becomes the subject of communication. Codes 
specify values and counter-values (in law: legal/illegal, in science: true/false) and 
                                                 
112 This is a concept taken from the work of Maturana and Varela in theoretical biology. 
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operate so as to exclude other possible ways of ordering reality. (Luhmann, 1989 
p.44-5) Subsystems react to their environments (which include the other 
subsystems) only in the terms set out by these binary codes. It is only through 
these codes that systems are able to self-referentially differentiate themselves 
from their environment. Because the functional subsystems likewise can only 
discern and respond to environmental disturbances in terms of their own internal 
codes and meanings, the possibility of resonance between different subsystems is 
restricted to what can be communicated across subsystems as meaningful. Thus, 
‘each system has a different access to itself than to its environment which it can 
only construct internally.’ (Luhmann, 1994 p14) 
Several significant consequences flow from Luhmann’s approach. First, talk 
of exposure to ecological risks is possible only where there is resonance, or 
reaction, by a social subsystem to events in its environment, including the other 
subsystems. Given that systems can respond only in accordance with their own 
particular structures or codes, ecological risks can be perceived by society only as 
exclusively internal phenomena. Physical and biological ‘objective facts’ have no 
social effect (resonance) unless they are the subjects of communication. Luhmann 
thus argues that society cannot communicate directly with its environment, but 
instead can ‘only communicate about its environment’ within itself. (Luhmann, 
1989 p.28-31)  The key question that results from this, is how does society 
structure the way it deals with environmental information? Here Luhmann points 
to an apparently insoluble paradox. Modern society, as a highly differentiated set 
of functional subsystems, structures communication about itself through binary 
codes, so that resonance between society and its environment is always directed 
through one of the functional subsystems and their associated programs (scientific 
theories, legal rules, etc). The differentiation of society is a result of its increasing 
complexity; yet the mechanisms for dealing with this complexity (functional 
subsystems, coding, etc) operate by reducing information, that is, by 
simplification. (Luhmann, 1989 p.18-9) 
Here Luhmann is of course pointing to the reductive character of modern 
expert knowledge systems. He rejects those (such as Husserl) who criticise 
modernity on the basis of its tendency towards a one-dimensional 
‘technicalisation (that) forgets the ‘lifeworld’.’ (Luhmann, 1994 p.17) Such 
technicalisation is a fundamental characteristic of modern science, and in a move 
similar to that adopted by Habermas, Luhmann dismisses the critique of science 
and technology on this basis as a futile exercise. (Habermas, 1982b; Luhmann, 
1994 p.18) In much the same way as Beck, Luhmann also rejects attempts to base 
solutions to ecological problems on some new form of environmental ethics. 
(Beck, 1992a; Luhmann, 1989 p.xvii) Neither is a solution to be found in science, 
for, as a function subsystem, it cannot provide ‘meaningful’ solutions that would 
be recognised within other subsystems (politics, law etc). Paradoxically, the 
functional complexity of modern society relies on the ability of science (and other 
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subsystems) to reduce the epistemic complexity of the world through codification. 
Science and technology thus construct simplifications that are then 
‘experimentally’ reinserted into the world as a ‘simplification that works’, but 
only within its own subsystem domain. (Luhmann, 1994 p.18) Why these should 
‘work’ is of course a significant problem in itself. The way in which scientific 
simplifications are translated from the laboratory into the broader society is a key 
issue that shall I return to in Chapter 8, where I consider the work of Latour and 
actor network theory. 
Eder’s criticism of Habermas’ rigid separation of system and life-world 
applies with even greater force to Luhmann’s systems theory. Similarly, the 
aspect of Beck’s work which make it both potentially theoretically interesting and 
useful - the elaboration of the connections between science and politics - is 
systematically discounted by Luhmann. As a result of this, Luhmann appears to 
effectively reject the ability of politics to offer any solution to ecological 
problems. Luhmann carries Habermas’ relegation of ecological problems to the 
status of skirmishes at the interface between system and life-world even further. 
Indeed, it is possible to argue that for Luhmann ecological problems amount to 
little more than system-generated ‘noise’, which is incapable of providing a 
meaningful basis for coordinated action across subsystems and across an 
increasingly complex environment. Beck (1994) is highly critical of Luhmann’s 
argument regarding the self-referentiality of functional subsystems. He suggests 
that the autonomy of subsystems in Luhmann’s systems theory elevates the notion 
of self-referentiality ‘to the level of virtual autism’. (p.24-5) 
Conclusion 
In contrast to the limited scope for ecological ‘communication’ between the 
political and scientific subsystems afforded by Luhmann’s work, both Eder and 
Beck suggest that the processes of late modernity systematically multiply the 
interactions between science, technology and politics. Both of these writers 
suggest that the focus of politics has moved away from the formal political-
administrative institutions of the state as the centre of political action and power. 
Each in his different way points to an understanding of politics that acknowledges 
the central role of the capacity to define and structure social actions through the 
‘definition making power’ of expert knowledge and a range of sub-politics that 
operate beyond the formal institutional structures of the political system. Such a 
perspective of ‘government’ beyond the state is of course a central theme in the 
work of Michel Foucault. Foucault’s view of modern power as ‘biopolitics’ and 
his notion of governmentality are considered in detail the following chapters, 
where I argue that such an approach is capable of providing significant theoretical 
insights into the contemporary problematisation of the natural environment. 
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Chapter 5 
Foucault and critical theory: the debate on power 
Introduction 
Previous chapters have sought to examine the links in contemporary social 
theory between notions of societal rationalisation and modernisation, and 
relationship of these to the problem of nature. The current chapter introduces 
discussion of the work of Michel Foucault, in particular the pivotal debate 
between Foucault and Habermas on power and rationality. Following an initial 
examination of this important theoretical dispute, I consider, in a somewhat more 
general sense, Foucault’s relationship to the broad tradition of critical thinking 
that extends from Weber to Habermas, and which characterises modernity in 
terms of processes of societal rationalisation. The aim of the current chapter is to 
provide the theoretical setting for a detailed consideration, in subsequent chapters, 
of Foucault’s notions of biopolitics and governmentality, and of whether these 
provide the basis for reconceptualising the contemporary ecological 
problematisation of nature in terms of such biopolitics. 
Foucault: modern power and rationality 
It can be argued that like both the Frankfurt School and Weber, Foucault’s 
work also demonstrated a general concern with the processes of rationalisation in 
society. (Grumley, 1989 p.183-227; Rabinow, 1984a p.13) However, unlike this 
German social theory, Foucault’s work did not start with the threat posed by 
instrumental rationality to the freedom and autonomy of the human subject. 
Rather he was concerned with demonstrating how such technical rationalisation 
and other objectifying processes produced the human subject in its modern form. 
Thus from the outset Foucault’s project is not concerned with realising the 
Enlightenment ideal of the emancipation of the subject,113 but rather with 
explaining how the application of rationality in particular historical relations of 
power and knowledge gave rise to the modern subject. His task was not the 
realisation or completion of the ‘project of modernity’ but understanding the 
facticity, or more accurately, the genealogy, of modernity itself. (Foucault, 1984b 
p.38-50; Foucault, 1991c p.102-4) 
                                                 
113 I qualify this statement in later Chapters of this thesis, especially Chapter 7, where I argue that 
Foucault fails to make as complete a break with the ideals of the autonomy of the subject as is 
sometimes suggested. 
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Like Habermas, Foucault was also deeply occupied with the question of 
‘communicative action’. Habermas’ concern is to articulate a largely trans-
contextual, and in some respects transcendental, theory of communicative reason, 
whereas Foucault’s approach can be seen as concerned with analysing 
communicative, or more accurately, discursive practices as inseparably linked to 
relations of power. Thus while both share a concern with the question of language 
and the conditions under which discourse occurs, they approached the problem 
from different ontological assumptions. For Habermas the operation of power is 
linked to the domination of instrumental or technical rationality over practical 
reason. It is associated with the distortive effect of ideology in concealing the 
ways in which human autonomy can assert itself. Foucault, on the other hand, 
regarded power as the matrix in which social relations and social practices 
become possible and function. Power is thus ‘coextensive and continuous with 
life...(and)...is linked with a production of truth.’ (Foucault, 1982 p.214) Unlike 
the ideologiekritik of critical social theory, which sees power as mystifying and 
distortive of truth, Foucault’s understanding of power focused on the capacity of 
power to effectively define ‘regimes of truth’, that is, as productive of ‘truth’ as 
opposed to ‘falsity’. (Gordon, 1980a p.237; Hoy, 1986 p.123-147) 
As a consequence of these differences, Foucault’s work may be characterised 
by a series of closely interconnected concerns – understanding the historical 
constitution of the subject, the problem of the relationship between power and 
knowledge, and rationalities of government. In his essay ‘The Subject and 
Power’, Foucault outlined three modes of objectification through which human 
beings are constituted as subjects. The first of these was the objectifying of human 
being through making it the object of various types of formalised, scientific 
knowledge. Second, the objectifying of human being through ‘dividing practices’ 
whereby the subject is divided within itself and from others. Third, the processes 
by which human beings ‘turn themselves’ into subjects. (Foucault, 1982 p.208) 
These objectifying processes, in one form or another, lie at the core of Foucault’s 
extensive work.  
Foucault understood the disciplines of the human sciences as discursive 
practices that define, in a more or less systematic manner, the objects within their 
domain. Foucault argued that these scientific discourses, (covering the same 
domains of ‘life, labour and language’ singled out by Habermas) 114 underwent 
abrupt changes in the way statements were formulated and accepted as true, 
contrary to a progressivist view of the growth of knowledge. His analysis of these 
discourses indicates they displayed a certain internal coherence and autonomy 
                                                 
114 In The Order of Things Foucault examines the emergence of the what he calls the ‘modern 
episteme’, linking this to the birth of the human sciences, through a detailed examination 
which juxtaposes the analysis of grammar, natural history and economic thought in the 
Classical and Modern periods. (Foucault, 1970) 
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while being firmly embedded in historically specific disciplinary practices and 
institutional contexts. (Rabinow, 1984a p.8-9) In treating ‘discursive formations’ 
in this way, Foucault argued that the knowledges produced by the human sciences 
cannot be regarded as true in a universal sense, but must be seen as socially 
contingent and in some respects closer to ‘ideology’ than ‘fact’ in a realist sense. 
115 
In works such as Discipline and Punish and Madness and Civilisation, 
Foucault dealt with the varied processes, particularly the expansion of the human 
sciences, by which modern society progressively classified, controlled and 
confined parts of the social world. Of particular interest to Foucault were the ways 
in which the human body became the object of both these scientific discourse and 
‘dividing practices’, ie practices of social objectification and categorisation. 
Through a combination of the classificatory power of scientific discourse and 
exclusory social practices, such as confinement, the social and personal identity of 
the subject is structured. 
The last of these modes of objectification identified by Foucault can be 
described, following Rabinow (1984b), as ‘subjectification’. In the other two 
modes of objectification, the subject is treated primarily as a docile body that is 
defined, divided and confined by externally operating disciplinary and discursive 
forces. (Foucault, 1979b p.135-169) Subjectification by contrast is essentially a 
self-formative process, involving the active participation of the subject in its own 
constitution, through a process of self-understanding that is frequently ‘mediated 
by an external authority figure, be he confessor or psychoanalyst’. (Rabinow, 
1984b p.11) Foucault’s notion of subjectification thus breaks with the traditional 
subject-object ontology in that subjectivity is no longer privileged as the centre of 
human autonomy. Technologies of power (the techniques of administration, 
definition and control of the subject) both result from an active process of 
subjectification of the self by the self, as well as from processes of objectification 
of the self by others. This is significant because it means abandoning of the notion 
that power distorts or represses an underlying, essential human subjectivity. It 
indicates, in other words, that these objectifying and subjectifying processes do 
not distort the ‘true’ nature of human beings, but in fact create the truth of the 
subject. (Foucault, 1979b p.194) 
Foucault’s work examined the historical emergence, since the seventeenth 
century, of what he referred to as disciplinary practices or technologies of power. 
This, he argued, was a modern form of power differing substantially from the 
earlier sovereign power of the monarch. Sovereign power dealt with its subjects in 
a singular and relatively uniform fashion. The everyday life of individuals was not 
                                                 
115 Foucault was nevertheless highly critical of the notion of ideology particularly as used in 
Marxist theory. See Foucault (1980d) p.117-9 and Barrett (1991) p.123-156. 
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tightly regulated by the sovereign, and the assertion of power when it occurred 
involved intervention, often in the form of violent spectacle, in order to 
symbolically demonstrate that power. Disciplinary power on the other hand 
represented a new technique, a new type of power:  
This form of power applies itself to immediate everyday life which 
categorises the individual, marks him by his own individuality, attaches 
him to his own identity, imposes a law of truth on him which he must 
recognise and which others have to recognise in him. It is a form of power 
which makes individuals subjects. (Foucault, 1982 p.211-212) 
Foucault identified three key elements to this new disciplinary power - 
hierarchical observation, normalising judgement and the examination. 
Hierarchical observation established a connection between visibility and power in 
such a way that the ‘apparatus of surveillance’ produces the effect of power, and 
through which the subjects of power are rendered ‘visible’ as the target of power. 
The power of these hierarchical modes of observation is inherent to the apparatus 
of continuous surveillance and the control of the spatial distribution of the bodies 
of subjects. Foucault saw this sort of normalising judgement as an ‘extra- or infra-
legal penalty’ brought to bear over non-conforming behaviours, through which the 
separation of normal from abnormal or deviant behaviour can be effected. The 
effectiveness of this form of power does not come primarily from ‘repression’, but 
rather through ‘gratification’ and reward for the adoption of ‘normal’ modes of 
being and doing. Disciplinary power both specifies the range of key behaviours 
that go towards constituting the individual and directs attention towards the 
implementation of normalised (and normalising) behaviour. The other element of 
modern power, the examination, brings together surveillance and judgement in 
what Foucault referred to as the ‘normalising gaze’, a technique or practice 
through which individuals are classified so as to constitute a population, against 
the norms of which they are judged and regulated. (Foucault, 1979b p.189-90) 
Central to Foucault’s concept of the examination is the creation of the individual 
as a ‘case’ about which information is recorded and statistically incorporated into 
data archives that are then used in programs of management for both the 
individual and the larger population. Foucault made the point that this represented 
the beginning of the ‘sciences of man’, and in the process increasingly brought 
ordinary, everyday human existence into the descriptive domain of the formalised 
discourses of the human sciences. 
This modern form of power also refined the Christian practice of confession, 
and incorporated it into that older technique of subjectification described by 
Foucault as pastoral power. Characteristic of the Christian pastoral was its use of 
individualisation aimed at spiritual salvation. Pastoral power sets up a situation of 
constant self-examination, of opening up the individual’s inner-most being to the 
scrutiny of conscience and through this the self-conscious submission to the will 
and direction of a superior being (mediated through the confessor). This was not a 
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matter of self-examination as a means to self-mastery in the interests of the polity 
as understood by the Greeks, but a question of overcoming illusions within the 
self, of a constant examination of one’s own conscience and thoughts in order to 
realise the pure Christian self. (Foucault, 1981c p.236-40) Thus according to 
Foucault, the pastoral technique becomes a constitutive element in the formation 
of the subject, by establishing a ‘link between total obedience, knowledge of 
oneself, and confession to someone else’. (Foucault, 1981c p.239) For Foucault, 
the modern state came to adopt a new, non-ecclesiastical form of this pastoral 
power, a ‘matrix of individualisation’ in which spiritual salvation was 
increasingly replaced by a civil salvation of physical well-being and social 
security. With this appropriation of the techniques of pastoral power came an 
expansion of the social field, resulting in a new configuration of individualising 
power that focused on the development of knowledge of human beings on two 
levels: ‘one, globalising and quantitative, concerning the population; the other, 
analytical, concerning the individual.’ (Foucault, 1982 p.215) 
In considering the specific nature of power, Foucault pointed out that power is 
more than simply a relationship between agents. Relationships of communication 
and relationships involving the technical capacities of bodies and instruments to 
manipulate things, are not in themselves relations of power, although they may, 
and often do, interact in a concerted way with relations of power so as to 
constitute blocks of interaction that Foucault described as ‘disciplines’. (Foucault, 
1982 p.217-219) Foucault’s view of power was strongly relational. Power 
relations are fundamentally constituted in social interaction; they are not to be 
understood as ‘superstructural’ or ideological. Power is not synonymous with 
‘force’, ‘violence’ or ‘capacity’, all of which act directly upon bodies and 
things.116 The defining feature of a relationship of power says Foucault, is that it is 
a network of relationships, a ‘mode of action’: 
which does not act directly and immediately on others ... It is a total 
structure of actions brought to bear upon possible actions ... (It is) a way 
of acting upon an acting subject or acting subjects by virtue of their acting 
or being capable of acting. (Foucault, 1982 p.219-220)  
In this approach subjects must therefore be free to act, and are able to do so as 
long as the field of possibilities for action remains open. The relationship between 
subjects, said Foucault, is a dynamic tension, an ‘agonism’. Furthermore, the 
configuration of relations of power within any particular social context is a 
historical product, and as such, specific relations of power are neither necessary 
nor immutable, but rather open to transformation and change. Foucault’s concept 
                                                 
116 In Chapter 7 I discuss the distinction Foucault made between ‘power’ and ‘capacity’ and 
criticise this as adopting an unnecessarily ‘positivist’ attitude towards the natural sciences 
which is not consistent with his approach to the human science. 
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of power therefore consisted of far more than the negative power of domination 
and repression. (Foucault, 1980e p.98)  
Foucault did of course concede that power relations often result in relations of 
domination and methods of subjugation, ‘even violent means of material 
intervention’. (Foucault, 1980e p.96) Nevertheless, rather than conceiving of 
relations of power as primarily repressive, he sought to understand the productive 
modes of subjection as central to the formation of modern subjects and the 
knowledge of them as embodied in the human sciences. He was therefore 
concerned with the mechanisms of objectification and subjectification outlined 
earlier this section. In these processes there can be recognised a ‘positive’ or 
productive aspect of power relations that produces and transforms knowledge, 
truth, discourse, and emotion. (Foucault, 1980d p.119) 117 Individuals (and groups) 
are not merely the docile objects on which power operates, but also the result of 
complex networks of social relations through which power is exercised and 
articulated. Foucault’s genealogical approach to the constitution of power, 
knowledge/discourse and subjectivity is thoroughly historical and social while 
seeking to dispense with notion of the subject as founded on some 
transcendentally given quality. 118 Foucault thus shared with Habermas a desire 
not to rely on the philosophy of the subject or consciousness in understanding the 
modern individual. As with Habermas, he too made use of a concept of 
differentiated rationality, but again, rather than invoking a ‘categorical’ division 
of rationality, 119 Foucault’s approach was a functional one in which the 
significant forms of rationality were historically specific strategies, technologies 
and programs of power. According to Colin Gordon, these three general forms of 
rationality served as a means of 
conceiving relations of power in terms of the differential and 
differentiated interaction between distinct orders of historical events. In 
order to understand these concepts, it is necessary to keep in mind a basic 
distinction between three such general orders of events: that of certain 
forms of explicit, rational, reflected discourse; that of non-discursive 
social and institutional practices; and that of certain effects produced 
within the social field. (Gordon, 1980a p.246)  
                                                 
117 Foucault asserts that ‘One of the prime effects of power (is) that certain bodies, certain 
gestures, certain discourses, certain desires, come to be identified and constituted as 
individuals.’ See also Foucault (1982) p.220-223. For discussion on this see Patton (1989) 
p.260-276 and Krips (1990) p.170-182. 
118 For possibly the clearest statement of the social nature of Foucault's notion of power see his 
essay ‘The Subject and Power’ (Foucault, 1980d). 
119 I refer here to Habermas’ Kantian differentiation of rationality into instrumental, practical and 
critical categories. 
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Foucault was not suggesting that disciplinary power constituted a regime of 
total domination. Rather it provided a tool for identifying the disjuncture between 
the orders of discourse, practice and effects, and focused attention on the 
significance such discrepancies might have for the development of specific 
historical formations of power/knowledge. In effect said Foucault, there existed a 
dynamic, reciprocal relationship between power and ‘strategies of struggle’, in 
which there was always thus ‘a perpetual linking and a perpetual reversal.’ 
(Foucault, 1980d p.226) 120 Programs and technologies of power in Foucault's 
work relate to the formation and reproduction of subjects and relations of power, 
whereas strategy was the ‘instrumentalisation’ of the reality created by these 
programs and technologies. (Gordon, 1980a p.250-251) Understood in this way 
strategy signifies a non-discursive, ‘anonymous’ rationality in that while these 
involve struggle or ‘agonism’ between subjects, there is no sovereign subject or 
centre that can be said to consciously program or orchestrate the playing out of 
this dynamic. Foucault thus argued that all power relations imply, at least 
potentially, a ‘strategy of struggle’, and that a ‘strategy proper to power relations 
(exists) insofar as they constitute modes of action upon possible action, the action 
of others.’ (Gordon, 1980a p.225) Thus a strategy of power is the interplay of 
programs and technologies of power, along with the ‘historical decipherment’ of 
the potential for employment of the effects of these same programs and 
technologies of power. (Foucault, 1982 p.225-6; Gordon, 1980a p.246-258) 
The argument that power operates through anonymous, ‘centre-less’ strategies 
has much in common with the approaches of theorists discussed in other chapters. 
In particular it recalls the work of Ulrich Beck, who points to the ‘autonomised’ 
direction of social development by the interaction of technological and market 
forces. Similarly, it resonates with the work of Bruno Latour and his colleagues, 
who I discuss in later chapters, when they argue that agency should be understood 
as a network-like property of the interaction of human actions and the capacities 
of material technologies. In all of these bodies of work there can be found 
attempts to account for the three ‘general orders of events’ referred to by Gordon 
(ie explicit, rational discourses; non-discursive institutional practices; and the 
effects these produce within the ‘social field’). It could be claimed that Habermas’ 
work also attempts to come to grips with these issues, but as I have argued the 
abstractness of his theory defeats this.  
                                                 
120 In this work (ie 1980d) Foucault adds that ‘The consequence of this instability is the ability to 
decipher the same events and the same transformations either from inside the history of 
struggle or from the standpoint of the power relationships. The interpretations which result will 
not consist of the same elements of meaning or the same links or the same types of 
intelligibility, although they refer to the same historical fabric and each of the two analyses 
must have reference to the other.’ 
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In the next section I consider Habermas’ dispute with Foucault on the nature 
of power. Habermas’ deficient view of power contributes substantially to his 
overall inability to appreciate both the degree to which the problem of nature 
reflects fundamental issues of the reproduction of the social system, and the 
importance of ecological movements and discourses in shaping responses to these 
issues. 
Foucault and Habermas: the debate on power 
At the end of Chapter 2, I dealt with Habermas’ response to Horkheimer and 
Adorno’s treatment of the ‘dialectic of enlightenment’. Habermas argues that 
Horkheimer and Adorno’s critique of instrumental reason parallels Nietzsche’s 
critique of morality and scientific knowledge, in that both ultimately understand 
morality and truth as expressions of the drive for self-preservation and 
domination. This reduction of knowledge and morality to the Nietzschean will to 
power, in Habermas’ view, undermines the basis for objective or universal claims 
to intersubjective validity, and therefore the basis of meaningful critique itself.121 I 
indicated that this criticism of Horkheimer and Adorno also highlights the key 
theoretical differences between Habermas and Foucault. It is now necessary to 
turn to a more specific consideration of the differences between Habermas and 
Foucault, and to what I consider as the most significant deficiency of Habermas’ 
critical theory - his overly abstract and limited understanding of power. In 
considering the ‘debate’ between Habermas and Foucault on this point, 122 I argue 
that Foucault’s approach to the relationship between power and knowledge is far 
more satisfactory than Habermas’. The usefulness of Foucault’s theoretical 
approach, with specific reference to problem of nature and biopolitics, is a theme 
that is then taken up more detail in Chapter 6 of this thesis. 
Habermas’ critique of Foucault is most systematically developed in two 
essays published in The Philosophical Discourse on Modernity. (Habermas, 1985 
p.238-265, 266-293) Here, following the line of attack deployed against 
Nietzsche, Horkheimer and Adorno in other essays in this collection, he criticises 
Foucault on three methodological grounds: ‘presentism’, relativism and ‘crypto-
normativism’, which he sees as leading to a lack of political commitment and 
conservatism. (Habermas, 1985 p.276; Isenberg, 1991 p.301) By presentism 
Habermas designates a methodological failure in Foucault’s approach that, while 
seeking to ‘eliminate the hermeneutic problematic’ through adoption of a strictly 
external, ‘structural’ standpoint for analysis of power relations, fails to achieve 
‘objectivity’. Instead, argues Habermas, Foucault cannot escape the inevitable 
hermeneutic pre-understandings that lies behind all historical analysis. By 
                                                 
121 See Chapter 2 of current thesis and Habermas (1982a). 
122  Others of course largely carry on this ‘debate’. 
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refusing to confront this, claims Habermas, Foucault cannot admit that he 
described the emergence of modern domination in terms of ‘the very biopolitics’ 
he seeks to explain, thus producing histories that are ‘narcissistically oriented’ 
toward the use of the study of the past ‘for the needs of the present’. (Habermas, 
1985 p.277-8) Of course, far from seeing this as a criticism, Foucault in fact 
explicitly saw it as one of the tasks of his work. 123 
Habermas’ second charge is that Foucault’s historiography falls into 
relativism. Foucault defined truth as internal to the discourses that produce it, with 
the result that, in Habermas’ view, ‘the meaning of validity claims consists in the 
power effects they have.’ (Habermas, 1985 p.279) Historical analysis therefore 
can only reveal a functional ‘self-maintenance’ of discursive practices. As a 
consequence of this concealed self-referentiality, Foucault’s attempts to create a 
counter-knowledge to the human sciences, which would give voice to subjugated 
local forms of knowledge, is self-defeating for the reason that ‘every 
counterpower’ is itself an expression of power. Hence argues Habermas, the 
overthrowing of existing hierarchies of knowledge by subjugated ones merely 
establishes a new hierarchy that cannot lay claim to a validity or truth content that 
would ‘transcend local argument’. (Habermas, 1985 p.281) As Janicaud indicates, 
in this second prong of his attack on Foucault’s relativism, Habermas shifts his 
criticism from the empirical to the transcendental by attempting to ‘unmask a 
second-degree relativism which is the inverse of self-justification (ie his first 
criticism): a self-reference which is self-defeating.’ (Janicaud, 1992 p.288) 
The third of Habermas’ criticisms is that of ‘crypto-normativism’. Here he 
claims that Foucault suffered from the same problem of which he accuses the 
human sciences. Thus he argued that while Foucault’s genealogy sought to 
bracket itself off from value judgement and adopt a purely descriptive attitude, 
Foucault nevertheless clearly adopted particular normative positions but refuses to 
engage in any serious theoretical discussion as to their justification. Instead 
Foucault appeared to present engagement in terms of strategic resistance and the 
mobilisation of local counterpower. Habermas argues that despite Foucault’s 
refusal to engage in the ‘counter-discourse’ within modernity, he surreptitiously 
locates the justification for resistance in a vitalistic ‘Lebensphilosophie’ based in 
‘the body’s experience of itself’ as subjected to disciplinary force of biopower, a 
position that he nevertheless rejected in his writings. (Habermas, 1985 p.285) 
Habermas’ three criticisms are in fact the same charge expressed from the various 
standpoints of signification, truth and value. (Janicaud, 1992 p.291) All three 
criticisms focus on the alleged inability of Foucault’s theory in providing a secure, 
                                                 
123 Thus in discussing his work on psychiatric hospitals, Foucault insists ‘My work was 
undertaken only as a function of those conflicts. The problem and the stake there was the 
possibility of a discourse which would be both true and strategically effective, the possibility 
of a historical truth which could have a political effect.’ (Foucault, 1980c p.64) 
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universalisable grounding for claims to truth and validity which Habermas’ 
regards as fundamental to the possibility of critique.  
Habermas sees these methodological problems as deriving for a ‘systematic 
ambiguity’ running through Foucault’s notion of power. He argues that Foucault’s 
genealogy served both an empirical function of analysing the historical formation 
of technologies of power, and a metatheoretical role that sought to explain the 
transcendental conditions under which any scientific knowledge is possible. 
(Habermas, 1985 p.274) Habermas sees these two tasks as separate and 
irreconcilable, claiming that Foucault’s unacknowledged reliance on a 
transcendental and ‘unsociological’ Nietzschean notion of power underpins the 
‘empirical shortcomings’ of his work. Habermas is perhaps correct to point to the 
metaphysical-transcendental element of Foucault’s concept of power, inasmuch as 
it is based on the notion of a will to truth, although Foucault’s position on this is 
ambiguous. Foucault argued that the form of power he was concerned with is a 
modern development that arises at a particular historical juncture. He also insisted 
that his studies ‘always analyse quite precise and localised phenomena: for 
example, the formation of disciplinary systems in eighteenth-century Europe.’ 
(Foucault, 1991b p.167) However, having established that the form of disciplinary 
power he is concerned with has a historical genesis, he did often tend to speak of 
it as a ‘modality of intervention’, that is, as a generalised type of political 
technology, as a ‘diagram’ or ‘schema’, as ‘panopticism’.124 However, Habermas’ 
criticism is somewhat weakened by his own reliance on equally metaphysical 
assumptions about the ontological primacy of communicative reason, which he 
(similar to Foucault) identifies as the product of a particular set of historical 
conditions (modernity) but which once in existence take on a universal, ‘quasi’ 
transcendental function. 
As I have indicated, the crux of Habermas’ criticism is the charge that 
Foucault’s theory of power undermines the possibility of an emancipatory critique 
of power. The source of the problem is that he sees Foucault’s use of power as 
‘reversing’ the relationship between truth and power, so that truth becomes 
dependent on power. (Habermas, 1985 p.274) This is problematic for Habermas’ 
theory precisely because he remains bound to a traditional view of power as 
domination, as repressive, a view enunciated not only in Habermas’ own works, 
but also spelt out in detail by critics such as Taylor and Fraser. 125 Habermas 
criticises Foucault for failing to differentiate between the will to power and the 
will to knowledge. (Janicaud, 1992 p.290, 300) Of course, Habermas does not 
entertain the notion of completely disinterested knowledge. However, even 
                                                 
124 For a useful discussion of the ‘ambiguous’ use of the idea of biopower by Foucault, see 
Donnelly (1992) p.199-203. See also Barret-Kriegal (1992). 
125 For discussion of this see Fraser (1989); Connolly (1985); Taylor (1984), (1985); Patton 
(1989), (1994); Bove, (1988). 
  
 
97
 
though human interests shape knowledge, these are the generalised interests of the 
species. Although he moved away form the use of the notion of cognitive interests 
per se because of its link to the philosophy of the subject, even at the time of 
Knowledge and Human Interests he tied the interest in emancipation from power 
to the production and acquisition of knowledge. (Habermas, 1978 p.286-7) 
Already at that point, Habermas understood emancipation as predicated on the 
communicative logic inherent in human language, which by its very nature 
‘expresses unequivocally the intention of universal and unconstrained consensus.’ 
(Habermas, 1978 p.314) This view is preserved in the shift to the theory of 
communicative action. Indeed his criticism of Foucault’s treatment of truth as the 
product of power is that it makes power ‘subjectless’ and therefore no longer 
bound to ‘the competencies of acting and judging subjects’ that enable the 
formation of a rational consensus between subjects which is central to his own 
theory. (Habermas, 1985 p.274)  
In another commentary on Foucault Habermas argues that power subverts the 
‘normative standards of the analytic of the true’. (Habermas, 1989 p.178-9) This 
is not to suggest that Habermas necessarily believes that power can be fully 
overcome at the level of the individual. Indeed his attempt to incorporate systems 
theory in his Theory of Communicative Action is based in part on a recognition of 
the heteronomous forces within the economic and administrative ‘subsystems’ of 
the society that condition social actors. Nevertheless he retains the philosophical 
commitment of his Frankfurt School predecessors to the ideal of the person as an 
autonomous agent. 126 As Hindess (1996) indicates, for this sort of critical theory 
the ‘impact of power is identified in terms of a difference between the real and the 
postulated ideal.’ Thus for Habermas power is posited primarily as a largely 
abstract counterfactual to the ideal of a power-less, autonomous, rational process 
of intersubjective consensus formation, rather than in the more empirical sense 
adopted by Foucault in which its role is to describe the ‘effects of identifiable 
conditions and processes’.  
The difference between these two approaches to power is linked to 
differences in the way the notion of reason is understood. Hoy has characterised 
this succinctly in the following terms: ‘Whereas Foucault is ... interested in the 
historicity of reason, Habermas is interested in the theory of reason.’ (Hoy, 1994) 
Despite Habermas’ critique of Horkheimer and Adorno’s ‘one dimensional’ view 
of reason, his own differentiation of reason remains largely ahistorical and 
abstracted from specific social contexts. In conjunction with his commitment to a 
universalised communicative rationality, this leads him to see theories or social 
                                                 
126 Without also retaining what Foucault saw as their refusal of the Enlightenment ‘blackmail’ 
implicit to Habermas’ critique of Horkheimer and Adorno, (and Foucault); that is, the view 
that ‘operates as though a rational critique of rationality were impossible.’ (Foucault, 1983 
p.201; 1984b p.44-5) 
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forces that challenge his particular conception of reason as a challenge to 
rationality per se, as well as to ‘modernity’ as the generalised bearer (at least 
potentially) of the evolution of reason and hence human autonomy. As indicated 
in Chapter 3, this results in Habermas interpreting many new social movements, 
and particularly ecological movements, as essentially anti-modernist and therefore 
potentially irrational. A similar move is apparent in his characterisation of the 
early Frankfurt School and French theorists such as Foucault as anti-modernist 
and ‘neo-conservative’. In this instance, Habermas sees Foucault’s work as an 
attack on the resources of modernity. In effect, Habermas regards Foucault’s (and 
Horkheimer and Adorno’s) understanding of truth and knowledge as determined 
by power relations as representing a ‘repudiation of enunciative discourse 
altogether’. (Margolis, 1993 p.46)  
However, as Margolis has argued, Habermas’ project lacks the degree of 
grounding and universality it claims for itself. Habermas admits that the 
rationality of argumentation (‘the unforced force of the better argument’) is an 
‘idealisation’, something that ‘discourse participants always have to suppose’. 
(Habermas, 1985 p.130) He in fact conflates empirical and transcendental 
(metatheoretical) arguments as to the character of communicative reason, the very 
criticism he levels at Foucault’s use of power. First, he claims that it is implicit to 
everyday social processes, that is, the communicative potential of reason derives 
from actual cultural processes for achieving mutual understanding within the life-
world. At the same time he claims that communicative reason has a ‘purely 
procedural character’ and as such is ‘quasi-transcendental’. (Habermas, 1987 
p.314-6) Thus communicative action is a cultural achievement in the evolution of 
society and simultaneously an ontological condition necessary for any form of 
social existence. However, in terms of empirical adequacy, Habermas fails to 
provide any evidence as to when such ‘uncoerced consensus’ actually occurs, in 
contrast to Foucault’s provision of considerable historical detail in support of his 
claims about the emergence of modern forms of discipline. Indeed Habermas also 
fails to explain how it would even be possible to know whether any instance of 
consensus escapes the more subtle forms of coercion and deception present in 
social interactions. (Margolis, 1993 p.49)  
Introducing this ‘systematic ambiguity’ at the heart of his own critical theory 
does not help Habermas avoid explaining how discursive inquiry can posses a 
universal validity while at the same time being ‘inseparable from whatever 
unreason ... lies embedded in the practices of actual life.’ (Margolis, 1993 p.49-
50) The consensus of Habermas’ ideal speech situation, even if posed in its 
weakest form as an ideal to be striven for, assumes a neutrality and transparency 
in discourse that is not simply utopian but also seriously flawed sociologically. 
Apart from the mere assertion that there are ‘unavoidable communication 
presuppositions of augmentative discourse’ (Habermas, 1985 p.130) Habermas is 
unable to provide any compelling justification for accepting that communicative 
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reason is capable of providing a secure grounding for universal (or even 
potentially universalisable) truth or normative standards. As Margolis insists, 
there ‘is no reason in the world why “the unforced force of the better argument” is 
anything more than a purely local appraisal.’ (Margolis, 1993 p.50-1) Thus 
Habermas’ criticisms of Foucault regarding the lack of empirical adequacy and 
the conflation of empirical and metatheoretical tasks are equally applicable to his 
own arguments. It appears that Habermas’ own theory is as guilty of being 
‘narcissistically oriented’ as is Foucault’s. This does not necessarily strengthen 
Foucault’s position, but does weaken the grounds upon which Habermas can 
claim a theoretical superiority for his own. 
Habermas’ mischaracterisation of Foucault’s notion of power represents a 
more substantial problem for his critique. In this context, Kelly has argued that a 
central issue in the dispute between the two theorists has been Habermas’ 
misunderstanding of the relationship between juridical and disciplinary power in 
Foucault’s writings.127 Kelly suggests this is the result of Habermas’ tendency, in 
The Philosophical Discourse on Modernity, to base his criticisms on a one-sided 
reading of Foucault’s notion of power in Discipline and Punish. (Kelly, 1994b 
p.366-7) From this Habermas extracts a view of Foucault’s project as describing 
the ‘victory of regulatory reason’ which is seen as a process of continuous and 
generalised augmentation of discipline and domination in modernity. (Habermas, 
1985 p.245) Here Habermas’ reading of Foucault closely follows that of Honneth. 
(Honneth, 1991) Both interpret Foucault as suggesting power in modern society 
operates on the model of the total institution, that is, as a totalising and all 
pervasive repressive discipline. Neither demonstrates a broad awareness of 
Foucault’s discussions of power beyond his main books, and even this awareness 
goes little beyond Discipline and Punish, and occasionally the first volume of 
History of Sexuality. 128 Not only is this reading of Foucault deficient, as a 
comparison with the general discussion of his notion of power in the first section 
                                                 
127‘Juridical’ power refers to the sovereign view of power discussed earlier in this chapter, in 
which power is traditionally understood as the possession of a centralised political authority 
(such as the State) or social class, the ‘exercise’ of which is conceived in terms of prohibition 
or repression. 
128 In particular, neither author substantially engages Foucault's more specific comments on the 
nature of power contained in numerous articles and interviews, nor his work on governmental 
rationalities and liberalism. Habermas refers approvingly to Honneth's work on Foucault in 
The Philosophical Discourse on Modernity (Habermas, 1985 p.255, 268) and generally follows 
a similar approach, although with much less detail or rigour. Honneth's work (the parts on 
Foucault) was submitted as a dissertation in 1983 and first published in German in 1985, the 
same year as the German edition of Habermas’ The Philosophical Discourse on Modernity, 
although Habermas was clearly familiar with this in preparing his own work. Both Honneth 
and Habermas cite some passages from interviews in the Power/Knowledge collection, but 
neither appears familiar with important works of Foucault such as 'The Subject and Power' 
(1982), his lectures delivered at the College du France between 1970 and 1984, nor his 
'Governmentality' essay, which first appeared in English in 1979. 
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of this chapter would indicate, but both Honneth and Habermas also attribute to 
Foucault a view of societal rationalisation as an all-embracing phenomenon. 
However, to employ Hoy’s (1994) characterisation referred to earlier in this 
chapter, Foucault is not concerned with a theory of rationality that discerns the 
general principles of Reason, but rather with the history of particular rationalities. 
Thus Foucault’s genealogies emphasise the ‘local and contingent aspects’ of 
specific rationalisation processes ‘without assuming any necessary coherence 
overall’ as do both the early Frankfurt School and Habermas. Of course, as 
Hindess emphasises, the significance of this difference between Foucault and the 
Frankfurt tradition, while real should not be overstated. (Hindess, 1996) The 
move from the universal to the singular in Foucault involves shifting the focus of 
the Kantian critique rather than an abandonment of it, as I argue in Chapter 7.  
Kelly’s analysis demonstrates that Habermas’ reading of Foucault fails to 
understand the local and contingent character of the power relations described by 
Foucault. Hence Habermas (1985) wrongly attributes to Foucault the view that the 
disciplinary power (ie panopticism) ‘found in modern punishment is characteristic 
for the structure of societal modernisation as a whole.’ (p.288-9 - emphasis 
added) Not only did Foucault explicitly deny that modern society is a disciplinary 
society ‘in all its aspects’, 129 his analysis of panopticism in Discipline and Punish 
did not, as Habermas appears to suggest, claim that modern discipline was 
dispersed into society in general from the prison. (Foucault, 1979b p.138, 224; 
Kelly, 1994b p.366-371) Kelly also argues that by construing Foucault’s notion of 
disciplinary power in largely traditional terms, Habermas fails to appreciate the 
distinction between it and juridical power. Contrary to the inference drawn by 
Habermas’ commentary in The Philosophical Discourse on Modernity, Foucault 
did not argue that juridical modes of power are no longer important. The claim 
was rather that the preoccupation of political theory (on both the Right and the 
Left) with a ‘juridical schematism’ that unfailingly characterises the nature of 
power as repressive and negative had stood in the way of critical-empirical 
investigation of the actual operation of power in historically specific contexts. 
(Foucault, 1980d p.115-6, 118-127) Thus Foucault argued that it is necessary to 
understand modern power in terms that encompass not only the legal-juridical 
functions of the State, but also those myriad ‘micro-level’ practices and 
techniques that ‘necessarily extend beyond the limits of the State’. (Foucault, 
1980d p.122) He did not claim that the State is unimportant, or that juridical 
power has disappeared, 130 but rather that the State can only operate by virtue of 
                                                 
129 See particularly Foucault's rebuttal of the charge that he fails to distinguish between democratic 
and totalitarian regimes, in Foucault (1991b) p.166-70. 
130 Habermas argues that ‘As soon as Foucault takes up the threads of the biopolitical 
establishment of disciplinary power, he lets drop the threads of the legal organisation of the 
exercise of power and the legitimation of the order of domination.’ (Habermas, 1985 p.290) 
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already existing relations of positive disciplinary power at the micro-level of 
society. Power then for Foucault is not reducible to these negative and prohibitive 
juridical-administrative functions of the State; in fact he argued that this 
disciplinary biopower had come to be necessary to the continued existence and 
operation of these juridical functions. (Foucault, 1980d p.122) 131 As Kelly 
suggests then, while the disciplinary and juridical modes of power frequently 
conflict and compete, they are also correlative. (Kelly, 1994b p.375-6) In the next 
chapter I discuss Foucault's notions of biopolitics and governmentality in detail. 
Foucault’s relationship to the German critical tradition 
Before doing this I first turn to a more general consideration of Foucault’s 
work in relation to the largely German tradition of critical thought on 
modernisation discussed briefly in earlier chapters. This is useful because 
Habermas’ attacks on Foucault may suggest a greater degree of difference 
between the two than is perhaps warranted. This is a question I shall return to in 
Chapters 7 and 8 in my discussion of Foucault’s incomplete break with the 
notions of human sovereignty and autonomy so cherished by both the Frankfurt 
School and Habermas (and one might add, Nietzsche). Perhaps of equal 
importance, however, it is important to recognise that despite the differences 
between the two on the question of power, both arguably share common 
intellectual roots in what are branches of a European critical tradition. 
The significance of Nietzsche’s influence on Foucault has been widely 
discussed. 132 In several interviews Foucault pointed to the significance of 
Nietzsche for his own thinking, describing his reading of Nietzsche as providing 
‘a point of rupture’ and a ‘revelation’ in his intellectual development. (Foucault, 
1983 p.198-9; 1988c p.13) Foucault indicates that his motivation for drawing on 
elements of Nietzsche’s work was a concern with ‘the possibility of elaborating a 
history of rationality’ (and of knowledge) that is not based on the ‘founding act of 
the rationalist subject’. He notes that the leading French historian of science, 
Georges Canguilhem, who was influential in his early studies, also shared an 
interest in Nietzsche and was ‘thoroughly receptive’ to the own to write such a 
history of knowledge and reason. 133 Foucault identifies two camps in post-World 
                                                                                                                                     
Habermas’ comments here clearly reveal his lack of familiarity with Foucault’s work on 
governmentality, security and liberalism. 
131 Elsewhere Foucault characterised this as the ‘governmentalisation of the State’. Foucault, 
(1991c) p.103. 
132 See from example Dreyfus and Rabinow (1982) p.104-117; Lash (1984) p.1-17; Habermas 
(1985) p.238-265; Deleuze (1988). Foucault gave his most detailed consideration of Nietzsche 
in a 1971 essay published as Foucault (1984a) - see p.79-100. 
133 Canguilhem, whose main area of expertise was the history of biology and medicine, was one of 
Foucault's examiners for his second attempt for the agregation de philosophe at the Ecole 
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War Two French philosophy - a philosophy of the subject expressed in 
phenomenology, and a philosophy of ‘the concept’, of knowledge and rationality, 
represented by Bachelard’s and Canguilhem’s history of science. He locates his 
own concerns as firmly aligned with those of the second camp’s ‘historical 
critique of reason’.134 Significantly, Foucault noted that in Germany the ‘Frankfurt 
School and Lukacs, by way of Feuerbach, Marx, Nietzsche, and Max Weber’ 
represented this line of critique. (Gutting, 1989 p.9-12) 135 Hence while rejecting 
many of the Statist assumptions of power inherited from Marxism, Foucault 
nevertheless saw his own project as having much in common with the tradition of 
social critique.136 
Three key elements of Nietzsche’s philosophy in particular were important to 
Foucault’s project of doing a history of ‘the concept’. First, Nietzsche relied on 
the notion of becoming in his understanding of the world, and as a consequence he 
argued that knowledge of the world is always perspectival. As the world (‘being’) 
is in a constant state of flux, a positivist conception of ‘objective’ or ‘true’ 
knowledge is rejected. What we ‘know’ is not reality (‘being’) but appearances 
that acquire a veneer of solidity in the history of cultural practices, through the 
imposition on the world of interpretations which have proven themselves useful. 
137 A second consequence of the dependence of knowledge on historical-cultural 
                                                                                                                                     
Normale Superieure in 1951. (In his unsuccessful 1950 attempt at the agregration, one of 
Foucault's papers was on the theme of ‘man's position in nature’). Canguilhem later became 
Foucault's 'supervisor' when he submitted Folie et deraison Historie de la folie a l'age classique 
(Madness and Civilisation) as his principal thesis for the doctorat es lettres in 1961, and 
reported in very approving terms on the topic and quality of the thesis. Foucault's 
‘complimentary thesis’ was a translation and discussion of Kant's essay Anthropology from a 
Pragmatic Point of View. The conclusion of the complimentary thesis ends its discussion of 
Kant with a reference to Nietzsche's philosophy as ‘finally putting an end to questions about 
man.’ Thus while Foucault's 1971 article systematically appropriates Nietzschean themes, 
already in 1961 it is evident that Foucault had come to see Nietzsche as a resource in his 
attempt to come to grips with the 'history of reason'. For above bibliographic details see Macey 
(1994) p.45, 88-90, 103-6 and Bernauer (1988) p.120, 161. 
134 See Foucault’s (1991d) discussion  of the influence of Canguilhem and Nietzsche on his work. 
135 Gutting is here quoting from Foucault’s essay 'La vie: l'experience et la science', in Revue de 
metaphysique et de morale 70 (1985), an earlier version of which appeared as the introduction 
to the English translation of Canguilhem's 1978, On the Normal and the Pathological. See also 
Foucault (1983). 
136 See Foucault (1991a) for Foucault’s criticism of the Frankfurt School, and Foucault (1991d) 
for comments on Althusser. 
137 Nietzsche argues that the world, as that which is in a ‘state of becoming’ cannot ‘in a strict 
sense be 'comprehended' or 'known'; only in so far as the 'comprehending' and 'knowing' 
intellect discovers a crude ready-made world put together out of nothing but appearances, but 
appearances which, to the extent to which they are the kind that have preserved life, have 
become firm - only to this extent is there anything like 'knowledge', ie a measuring of earlier 
and later errors by one another.’ Nietzsche, Will to Power, section 520, quoted in Turner, 
(1984) p.242. 
  
 
103
 
practices is that language plays a powerful role in moulding the ways in which it 
is possible to think about the world. In other words, language functions as the 
medium through which experience is systematised, in which order and ‘stability’ 
are imposed on a world of constant ‘becoming’. 138 The third significant element 
of Nietzsche’s epistemology is that he regards interests as a necessary condition 
of knowledge. On the one hand his perspectivalism insists that knowledge is 
relative to such things as time, location, culture and language, and as such cannot 
be isolated from the context and relations of its constitution. However, he also 
understands knowledge (and subjectivity) as more generally serving the interest of 
the human species in securing the means for the preservation of its own life. Thus 
Nietzsche argues 
Consciousness does not really belong to man’s individual existence but 
rather to his social or herd nature ... We simply lack any organ for 
knowledge, for ‘truth’: we ‘know’ (or believe or imagine) just as much as 
may be useful in the interests of the human herd, the species. (Turner, 
1984 p.242) 139 
This suggests a view in which knowledge serves a functional role in the 
evolutionary development or natural history of the human species, which while 
ultimately based in the biological attributes, is also linked to the ‘necessary 
features’ of social communication. (Turner, 1984 p.242-3) 140 The similarity of 
this view to Habermas’ notion of a human technical interest in the mastery of 
nature and a practical interest in communication is readily apparent, 141 as is the 
similarity to Horkheimer and Adorno’s radicalisation of the link between ‘identity 
thinking’, instrumental reason and the domination of nature. In Foucault’s case, 
                                                 
138 Nietzsche thus argues that the structure of language is in fact what is responsible for notions of 
causality and subjectivity: ‘Where there exists a language affinity it is quite impossible, thanks 
to the common philosophy of grammar - I mean thanks to unconscious domination and 
directing by similar grammatical functions - to avoid everything being prepared in advance for 
a similar evolution and succession of philosophical systems; just as the road seems to be barred 
to certain other possibilities of world interpretation.’ Nietzsche (1989), section 20 p.50; also 
Turner (1984) p.242. 
139  Nietzsche, The Gay Science, section 354, quoted in Turner (1984) p.242. 
140 Warren points out that ‘the conditions of possibility’ for knowledge are in part seen by 
Nietzsche as ‘interests relating to human agency’, that is, as involving interests in ‘the material, 
social and cultural worlds as means to and conditions of power organised as subjectivity.’ 
Knowledge cannot be extricated from the interest the self has in increasing its ‘feeling of 
power’ or will to power. See Warren (1988) p.90-2. 
141 Warren points to Habermas’ treatment of interests (as a positive condition of knowledge) as ‘a 
contemporary equivalent’ of Nietzsche's approach, ‘notwithstanding Habermas' own 
interpretation of Nietzsche.’ (Warren, 1988 p.269 footnote 35). Warren argues that Habermas’ 
interpretation of Nietzsche's theory of power ‘misses the mark’ due to over-reliance on works 
such as Untimely Considerations and The Gay Science in which Nietzsche's views on truth and 
knowledge were not fully developed. See Warren (1988) p.270 footnote 46. 
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the influence of Nietzsche can clearly be seen in his insistence that the idea of a 
necessary correlation between the order of discourse and the order of things is a 
metaphysical assumption of Western philosophy. (Foucault, 1970; 1981d)  
Similarly some parallels and overlap between the concern of Weber and 
Foucault can be discerned.142 Indeed, Dreyfus and Rabinow suggest that Foucault 
inherited from Weber ‘a concern with rationalisation and objectification as the 
essential trend ... and most important problem’ of modern society. (Dreyfus and 
Rabinow, 1982 p.166) 143 Smart sees some areas of common concern, such as 
rationalisation, power and discipline, but also points to important differences 
between the two. Thus while Weber’s notion of rationalisation took the form of a 
global, all-encompassing process, Foucault’s work was concerned with rationality 
in much more specific and relative sense, and is developed in a way that denied 
any ‘absolute form of rationality against which specific forms might be compared 
or evaluated.’ In contrast to the ‘monolithic dimensions’ of Weber’s thesis, 
Foucault explicitly rejected understanding rationalisation in terms of any 
totalising notion of modern society or culture. As a consequence Foucault’s 
analysis, according to Smart, held open the possibility of resistance whereas 
Weber succumbed to the fatalistic vision of the ‘iron cage’ of bureaucratic 
domination and instrumental reason. (Smart, 1983 p.126) 144 
A further area of commonality between Weber and Foucault is that both were 
also concerned with forms of domination and discipline. However, Weber tended 
to conceptualise power in terms that emphasised the importance of the state and 
the intentionality of subjects, and which saw power in a juridical sense as negative 
and prohibitive. (O'Neill, 1987 p.54-5; Smart, 1983 p.126 p.129) By contrast, 
Foucault treated power as a far more positive and relational phenomenon, which 
not only constrains individuals but also is productive of different modes of 
subjectivity and the social relations possible in any particular historical milieu. 
(Foucault, 1982 p.219-20) Nevertheless, both placed emphasis on an 
understanding of rationalisation as the disciplining of the body, the origins of 
                                                 
142 Some attempts to deal with this connection include Turner (1984) p.157-176, 226-251; (1987) 
p.222-241; Gordon (1987) p.293-316; Smart (1983) p.123-137; Lash (1987) p.355-377; 
O’Neill (1987) p.43-60; Hindess (1987) p.137-153; Clegg (1994); Owen (1994). 
143 As indicated above, Foucault clearly locates his work within the same broad problem as 
Weber, but is quite insistent that French philosophical thought ‘knew absolutely nothing - or 
only vaguely, only very indirectly - about the current of Weberian thought.’ See Foucault 
(1983) p.200. 
144 Gordon however argues that ‘Weber is as innocent as Foucault of the so-called Weberianism 
that adopts a uniform, monolithic conception of historical phenomena of rationalisation.’ See 
Gordon (1987) p.293-4. Turner suggests that while Smart's characterisation of Weber is 
justified, it is important to note that Weber did argue against postulating ‘general laws of social 
development’, and to that extent Weber's work ‘lacked internal consistency’. See Turner 
(1987) p.232-3. 
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which are traced to the institutional practices of the monastery and army in 
medieval Europe. 145 The rational disciplining of the body was characterised by 
Weber as a process in which the ‘natural rhythm’ of human beings as biological 
organisms was brought into ‘line with the demands of the work procedure, (and 
were) attuned to a new rhythm through the functional specialisation of muscles 
and through the creation of an optimal economy of physical effort.’ (Smart, 1983 
p.130-1) 146 Such comments bear a striking resemblance to Foucault’s description 
of what he terms biopower or the ‘anatomo-politics of the human body’. This new 
form of power which began to emerge in the seventeenth century, is ‘centred on 
the body as a machine’, and involves the disciplining of the body through ‘the 
optimisation of its capacities’ so as to produce a ‘parallel increase of its 
usefulness and its docility, its integration into systems of efficient and economic 
controls.’ As with Weber then, Foucault saw this new form of discipline as 
indispensable to the development of capitalism, which required the ‘controlled 
insertion of bodies into the machinery of production and the adjustment of the 
phenomena of population to economic processes.’ (Foucault, 1990 p. 139-41)147 
Gordon has suggested a further link in Foucault’s later work on 
governmentality and neo-liberalism with a growing interest in the significance of 
Weber’s influence on recent intellectual history. (Gordon, 1986 p.79; Gordon, 
1987 p.295-6) In particular Foucault credited Weber with providing a counter-
focus to Marxism. In doing so he directed the attention of social theory to the 
problem of the ‘irrational rationality of capitalist society’, that is, to the historical 
understanding of the present in terms of processes of rationalisation which are 
‘multiple, specific and potentially discordant.’148 In particular, Foucault pointed to 
                                                 
145 Turner argues that while Weber's main focus is on the changes in knowledge and 
consciousness brought about by rationalisation and the development of capitalism, this 
perspective also incorporates a ‘general process whereby the body ceases to be a feature of 
religious culture and is incorporated via medicalisation into a topic within scientific discourse’, 
that is, there is a shift to ‘regulation of the body and of populations.’ (Turner, 1987 p.224-6) 
See also Smart (1983) p.129-31; Miller (1987) p.5-9. 
146 See Weber (1968) p.1156. 
147 I discuss the aspect of Foucault's work in relation to the development of modern ecological 
discourse in Chapter 6. See O’Neill (1987) for a discussion of the rise of industrial discipline 
and its treatment in the work of Weber, Foucault and Marx. O'Neill argues that industrial 
discipline tends to ‘naturalise bureaucratic controls which are embedded in the social 
organisation or power structure of the firm’, and that the ‘bureaucracies of state and economy’ 
seek to depoliticise their power by subordinating this within ‘the neutral image of disciplined 
technology and expertise.’ (p.55-7). See also Turner (1984) especially Chapters 7 & 10 and 
(1987). For a Foucauldian examination of the bureaucratic regulation of industrial bargaining 
under US labour law, see Moore 1993 p.165-189. 
148 Dews argues that Foucault's characterisation of power as productive of objects and rituals of 
truth is ‘acceptable’ when understood within the Weberian tradition's focus on the historical 
specificity of the transition from traditional to modern society. Thus Dews claims that 
Foucault's account of power describes ‘the productivity and efficiency of those purposive-
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a common Weberian heritage in both the Frankfurt School and the neo-liberalism 
of the Ordoliberalen or Freiburg School (Gordon, 1986 p.79-81) 149 which, while 
politically opposed, nevertheless also share an emphasis on anti-naturalism, the 
historical contingency of social forms and a specific concern with the problems of 
the ethical conduct of life in modern Western society.150 
Nietzsche and Weber have likewise also been key theoretical influences on 
Frankfurt School critical theory. Horkheimer and Adorno explicitly acknowledge 
their debt to Nietzsche in their treatment of the ‘dialectic of enlightenment’, 
claiming it was he who first recognised the existence of a nihilistic ‘anti-life 
force’ inherent within enlightenment. 151 Their discussion of the domination of 
nature as a universal feature of ‘identity thinking’ and instrumental reason draws 
heavily on Nietzsche’s theme that knowledge operates as a tool of the ‘will to 
power’, in which the drive to predict and master nature serves the interests of self-
preservation. (Held, 1980 p.156-7) Similarly, key aspects of Weber’s concept of 
societal rationalisation were appropriated by Horkheimer and Adorno in their 
analyses of the domination of reason by instrumental rationality and the rise of a 
bureaucratised, ‘totally administered society.’ (Held, 1980 p.65-68)  
Habermas too bases central elements of his understanding of societal 
rationalisation and modernisation on a critical reading of Weber, arguing that 
Weber’s analysis fails to appreciate the ‘selectivity’, or differentiation, exhibited 
in the processes of rationalisation. According to Habermas, Weber cannot 
adequately explain the way in which under conditions of capitalist modernisation, 
instrumental rationality ‘surges beyond the bounds’ of the material reproduction 
of economy and state, distorting the communicative reason necessary to the 
‘symbolic reproduction of the life-world.’ Hence, he argues that it is possible to 
overcome Weberian pessimism (the ‘iron cage’) once critical theory understands 
that the ‘colonisation’ of life-world by instrumental reason is a pathological 
distortion of the rationalisation process rather than its inevitable outcome. For 
Habermas, the progressive potential of modernity can be realised provided critical 
                                                                                                                                     
rational forms of organisation which Weber detected in modern bureaucracies and in the 
capitalist organisation of the labour process. Similarly, Foucault's repeated denial's that power 
can be considered as a possession of groups or individuals becomes comprehensible in the 
light of Weber's account of the transition from 'charismatic' and 'traditional' to 'legal-rational' 
forms of domination.’ (Dews, 1987 p.150-52) 
149 Here Gordon draws on then unpublished recordings and transcripts of Foucault's lectures on 
the history of liberalism and neo-liberalism delivered in March-April 1979. See also Gordon 
(1987)  p.314-5. 
150 Thus, according to Gordon, Foucault points in his 1979 lectures to a ‘double destiny of 
Weberianism in Germany’ which ‘ends with the street battles of 1968 in which the last 
disciples of the Frankfurt School confront the police of a government inspired by the teachings 
of the Freiburg School.’ (Gordon, 1986 p.80) 
151 For a review of the influence of Nietzsche on critical theory, see Putz (1981) p.103-114. 
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theory appreciates the different analytical approaches appropriate to action within 
the separate social environments of system and life-world. 152 The significance of 
Nietzsche in Habermas’ reconstruction of critical theory is less positive yet 
arguably still central. In Nietzsche lies the main intellectual impetus behind both 
the Frankfurt School and Foucault’s descent into what Habermas regards as the 
conservative dead-end of the ‘dialectic of enlightenment’. By ‘conflating’ 
knowledge with power, Nietzsche provides what Habermas sees as ‘the real 
challenge for the discourse on modernity’. (Habermas, 1985 p.74) 153 On this point 
rest most of the substantial theoretical differences between Habermas and 
Foucault discussed in the first part of this chapter.154 
Since Foucault’s death there have been a number of attempts to come to grips 
not only with the differences between Habermas and Foucault, but also their 
commonalties. 155 Similarities have also been drawn between the work of the early 
Frankfurt School and Foucault. Honneth for example, points to several key 
features of critique common to Adorno and Foucault, although emphasising the 
divergent philosophical grounds on which these are based. According to Honneth, 
both Adorno and Foucault understand modernity as a process of technical or 
instrumental rationalisation that, under the cloak of moral emancipation and 
progress, violently disciplines a ‘pre-rational’ dimension of the human body to 
produce the ‘modern, forcefully unified individual’. (Honneth, 1986 p.53-4) Each 
finds the root of modernity in the intellectual and political changes initiated by the 
European Enlightenment; each works on the view that knowledge assures 
domination behind the ‘generalisation of theoretical and moral validity claims’ 
and the growth of legal and constitutional structures. In this view, both Adorno 
and Foucault understand instrumental rationality as expressing a tendency towards 
the totalitarian control of social life. Modernity, in other words, is characterised 
by the regulative capacity to ‘intervene like total institutions in the life context of 
every single individual in order to make him a conforming member of society 
through discipline and control, manipulation and drilling’. This is a view I have 
argued is not accurate as far as Foucault is concerned. However, in agreement 
                                                 
152 The first requires a systems theory while the latter demands a hermeneutic or ‘action-theoretic’ 
approach. See Habermas (1981a) p.5-31; (1984) Chapter II, and (1987) Chapter VIII, 
especially p.303-331. 
153 For Habermas’ critique of Nietzsche, see Habermas (1985). For a concise and critical 
consideration of the significance of Nietzsche in work of Foucault and other post-structuralist 
writers such as Derrida, Lyotard and Lacan, see Dews (1987). 
154 The connection between knowledge and power is central to the examination of contemporary 
ecological discourse and programs of environmental regulation discussed in Chapter 6 of this 
thesis. 
155 Some significant examples of this include Kelly (1994); Miller (1987); Honneth (1991); Dews 
(1987); Habermas (1985). See also, for example McCarthy (1990) p.437-469; Richters (1988) 
p.611-643. 
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with Habermas, Honneth sees Foucault as succumbing to a totalising critique 
similar to that which deprives Adorno and Horkheimer of a rational basis for their 
own arguments for a critical social theory. He points to the quite different 
conceptions of subjectivity that lead to these similarities, while claiming that 
Foucault’s social theory in the end is a ‘version of the Dialectic of Enlightenment 
reduced to systems theory.’ (Honneth, 1986 p.56-58) 156 
McCarthy has also drawn out some of the broad affinities, as well as 
differences, between Foucault and the Frankfurt School, including Habermas. For 
my purposes, some of these similarities are particularly significant. McCarthy 
argues that both Foucault and the Frankfurt School assert the ‘primacy of the 
practical over the theoretical’ by treating knowledge production as social practice, 
and requiring that epistemic practices be understood within their broader practical 
context. Foucault concludes from this the impossibility of knowledge or truth (at 
least in the human sciences) that is outside of relations of power and hence 
capable of grounding a theory of the social totality. This is in contrast to the 
Frankfurt School, which did not give up the attempt to find some form of 
universalising truth-function for reason in the realisation of social emancipation. 
(McCarthy, 1990 p.441-2) 157 Following from this Foucault sees a pervasive 
complicity of human science expertise in modern forms of domination and 
discipline. McCarthy argues that the Frankfurt School theorists, and in particular 
Habermas, while critical of the role played by the social sciences and social 
scientific expertise in societal rationalisation, nevertheless still sought to 
distinguish between different forms of social inquiry in a way that did not regard 
them all as extensions of an instrumental rationality directed towards ‘ever more 
effective forms of domination.’ (McCarthy, 1990 p.439-40, 442) 158 Despite the 
differences between the two approaches to social theory, a key feature of each is 
the use of ‘functional accounts of how and why purportedly rational practices 
came to be taken for granted’. Such accounts are central to critique inasmuch as 
they problematise and destabilise the apparently natural and necessary character 
                                                 
156 Elsewhere Honneth argues the usefulness of Habermas’ differentiation of spheres of social 
action (symbolic and material) in undermined by the move in Theory of Communicative 
Action to a systems theory approach dominated by a technocratically conceived understanding 
of two fundamentally different modes of action-coordination. Thus Honneth claims, despite 
criticism of Horkheimer and Adorno, Habermas fails to extricate his own theoretical project 
from the technocratic diagnosis of modernity laid out in Dialectic of Enlightenment. See 
Honneth (1991); Smith (1993). 
157 I argue in the Chapter 7 of the current thesis that Foucault makes a dubious distinction between 
the human and natural sciences when he suggests that the latter has been able to detach itself 
from the social contexts of power in which it originated. 
158 McCarthy is not suggesting that Foucault lacked a notion of social critique. See McCarthy's 
(1990) discussion of this (p.451-2). As I discuss in Chapter 7, the basis on which Foucault 
could argue that any form of scientific knowledge is not implicated in power raises significant 
theoretical questions.  
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of social and epistemic practices by demonstrating how these are in fact the 
product of ‘contingent relations of force and an arbitrary closing off of 
alternatives’. (McCarthy, 1990 p.439-40) 
However much these common concerns with the role of rationalisation as a 
fundamental characteristic of modernity provide Habermas and Foucault with a 
similar object of inquiry, there remain significant differences between the two. A 
detailed exploration of these differences is an important philosophical task that is 
both beyond the scope of this current work and is undertaken elsewhere by 
others.159 Here, my focus has been on the differences between the two as it is most 
directly relevant to the problem of nature. 
Conclusion 
The debate between Foucault and Habermas on rationality and power, and 
their relation to knowledge, is the key area of disagreement between the two. It is 
in any case the point on which I have focused as this debate leads directly into 
Foucault’s notions of biopower and governmentality. It is these concepts which I 
argue provide a particularly useful antidote to Habermas’ unsatisfactory 
theoretical approach to understanding ecological problems in particular, and more 
generally to his adherence to what Smith (1993, p.107) has described as the 
‘theoretical fictions’ of norm-free organisation of action and power-free paths of 
communication. Appreciation of the reciprocal relation between juridical power 
and biopower, discussed in the early part of this chapter, is indispensable to any 
analysis of the regulatory biopolitics of the population, and particularly for 
understanding the growth of ecological regulation with its dependence on 
scientific knowledge. 
Habermas’ system-lifeworld scheme, despite hints of potential usefulness (ie 
its focus on questions of social reproduction), obscures the need for historical-
empirical investigation by its very generality and abstractness. His formulation 
leads to a rigid separation of power and discourse, a problem directly linked to a 
juridical schematism in his understanding of power. He arbitrarily restricts the 
domain of power to the social ‘system’ (administration and economy), 
recognising the operation of power within the ‘lifeworld’ only as a pathological 
state resulting from ‘colonisation’ by the system. This is a theoretical 
consequence of his conceptualisation of the lifeworld as the power-free realm of 
communicative action, which he sees as furnishing the ontological and 
transcendental preconditions for all sociality and rationality. By persisting with 
the theoretical fiction of power free discourse, Habermas falls into an empty 
                                                 
159 See in particular Miller (1987), Honneth (1991), Hindess (1996).  
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proceduralism and fails in his self appointed task of establishing the possibility of 
a universal grounding for validity and truth claims. 
In the next chapter I turn specifically to a consideration of Foucault's work on 
biopolitics and governmentality. In particular I consider the potential of these 
concepts to provide a useful theoretical framework from which to understand the 
development of scientific ecology as an important element of contemporary 
attempts to regulate the behaviour of the human population. 
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Chapter 6 
Biopolitics, governmentality and scientific 
expertise 
Introduction 
This chapter considers in more detail aspects of Foucault’s work on 
biopolitics and government.160 It starts by tracing the development of the theme of 
disciplinary power through to biopolitics in Foucault's work and his shift from a 
focus on the individual and the ‘micro-physics of power’, to a more global 
concern with the management of populations. The link between the development 
of this notion of biopolitics and the work on governmental rationality is explored. 
The chapter considers the work of authors such as Nikolas Rose and Peter Miller, 
who tie governmentality to an analysis of the role of expertise in advanced liberal 
societies. This discussion prepares the way for a critical consideration in Chapters 
7 and 8 of Foucault’s treatment of the natural sciences, and subsequently, an 
evaluation of the notions of ecological modernisation and risk society in the final 
chapter. 
Discipline and biopolitics 
The previous chapter argued that Habermas’ criticisms of Foucault failed to 
adequately appreciate the interrelationship between juridical power and 
disciplinary power. That chapter concluded with the suggestion that an 
understanding of this is indispensable to an analysis of the biopolitics of 
populations and the growth in ecological regulation. It is now necessary to trace 
the connection between discipline and biopolitics as a precursor to examining 
Foucault’s notion of governmental rationality (or governmentality). 
In Discipline and Punish, Foucault examined in detail the emergence of a new 
form of power, a disciplinary ‘technology’ that directly acts upon the body of the 
individual. Disciplinary power does not completely displace other forms of 
power, but instead ‘invests’ these with a new capacity to penetrate the most 
minute, everyday activities of individuals. This disciplinary power has the effect 
of producing docile bodies ‘that may be subjected, used, transformed and 
improved.’ (Foucault, 1979b p.136) The emergence of disciplinary power, 
according to Foucault, was directly related to the growth of capitalism in Europe: 
                                                 
160 A version of this chapter has previously appeared as Rutherford (1999b) 
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it is largely as a force of production that the body is invested with 
relations of power and domination; but, on the other hand, its constitution 
as labour power is possible only if it is caught up in a system of 
subjection ... the body becomes a useful force only if it is both a 
productive body and a subjected body. (Foucault, 1979b p.25-6) 
The development of capitalism, the economic modernisation of Europe, was 
reciprocally tied to the emergence of disciplinary power. Indeed Foucault 
suggested that the spread of these new disciplinary techniques preceded the 
growth of capitalism. The investing of social relations with these new ‘micro’ 
relations of power while not a cause of capitalist modernisation were very much 
‘the prerequisite for its success’. (Foucault, 1990 p.140-1; Rabinow, 1984b p.18) 
161 
The focus of Discipline and Punish was on understanding disciplinary 
technologies as based on a form of power that operates in the ‘minute, capillary 
relations of domination’ that form the ongoing substratum for the institutions and 
structures of the state. (Gordon, 1980a p.255) This ‘microphysics of power’ 
suggested that the actual operation of power relations could only be grasped 
through analysis of the disciplinary techniques that produced docile bodies within 
specific institutional contexts, such as the prison, the school or the workplace. A 
key criticism that arose regarding Foucault’s work of this period was that 
emphasis on such local relations of power ignored the ‘macro’ issue of the 
relationships between particular institutions (‘society’) and the state. Foucault’s 
work on governmental rationality provided a direct and important response to this 
type of criticism.162 By 1976 Foucault had turned his attention to a consideration 
of the connection between the operation of power at the micro level of the 
individual within particular institutional situations, and the problem of the 
regulation at a global or macro level of entire populations by the state. (Foucault, 
1990) 163 
The context in which Foucault developed this connection was his description 
of the emergence, in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, of a new form of 
political power concerned with the ‘task of administering life’ (Foucault, 1990 
p.139). This modern form of power, which he called biopower, focused on the 
fostering of life and the care of populations. He described biopower as developing 
                                                 
161 This argument is not dissimilar to that of Weber. 
162 Gordon notes that Foucault introduced his governmentality lectures at the College du France as 
being, in part, an answer to this criticism. See Gordon (1991) p.4. 
163 See also Dean (1994) p.175-6 and Gordon (1991) p.4-5. This is also a key issue addressed by 
actor network theory, which I discuss in detail in Chapter 8. For a particularly insightful and 
useful discussion of the relationship between micro-relations of power and macro-social 
structure, see Callon and Latour (1981). 
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in two distinct yet related forms. The first of these, constituting ‘an anatomo-
politics of the human body’, focuses on disciplining the body of the individual to 
increase its utility and manageability through its ‘integration into systems of 
efficient and economic controls’. This element of biopower is generally 
equivalent to the notion of disciplinary power developed by Foucault in Discipline 
and Punish. The second, and more recent form of biopower, focuses on the 
supervision of what Foucault called ‘the species body’, that is, ‘the body imbued 
with the mechanics of life and serving as the basis of the biological processes’. 
Management of the species body occurs through a range of ‘interventions and 
regulatory controls’ Foucault characterised as ‘a biopolitics of the population.’ 
(Foucault, 1990 p.139) 
Foucault identified a range of empirical investigations, particularly in 
demography and geography, which were closely connected to the rise of these 
regulatory interventions. In general he argued that the social sciences developed 
to meet particular demands of the administration of human populations, resources 
and the economic relations between them. (Foucault, 1980b p.171-2; 1991c p.93) 
In these developments, population emerged as an economic and political problem 
in which the central concern is the proper balance between population growth and 
available resources. (Foucault, 1990 p.25) While Foucault does not do so 
explicitly, it is worth noting that in this process, not only does the idea of a 
measurable and manageable population come into existence, so also does the 
notion of the environment as the sum of the physical resources on which the 
population depends. According to Foucault, in the eighteenth century population 
and environment come to be seen as constituting ‘perfect living interrelation’, 
with the task of the state involving the supervision of the ‘living interrelations 
between those two types of living beings’ (population and environment). 
(Foucault, 1988b p.160) 164 The elaboration of this ‘population-riches problem’ 
occurred within a network of new types of knowledge and techniques of 
government, having as their primary concern programs for the statistical 
description and the efficient management and disposition of all elements of the 
population and its resources. (Foucault, 1991c p.93; 1981a p.238; 1988b p.104) 
Through this problematisation of the population, the term economy came in 
the eighteenth century to signify an entirely new reality and a field of 
governmental intervention. (Foucault, 1991c p.92) Foucault suggested that 
population constituted a new realm of intervention in three respects. First, the 
emergence of the population as a distinct and measurable reality was connected to 
an understanding that ‘population has specific economic effects: statistics, by 
                                                 
164 Here Foucault is referring to the work of police theorists, particularly von Justi, who 
appropriated to political-administrative thought the new demographic knowledge. Here, as 
elsewhere, Foucault appears to refer to the ‘environment’ as the totality of natural resources 
and physical living conditions of human populations. 
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making it possible to quantify these specific phenomena of population, also shows 
that this specificity is irreducible to the dimension of the family.’ These specific 
phenomena included such things as ‘epidemics, endemic levels of mortality, 
ascending spirals of labour and wealth’ etc. Second, in the 18th century the 
welfare of the population, that is, improving living conditions, health, longevity, 
increasing wealth, etc, increasingly came to be regarded as an ultimate end of 
government. In the process, the idea of the population itself as the subject of 
needs and interests came to the fore. Population thus became ‘an object in the 
hands of government’, acted upon and manipulated through a range of new 
governmental programs and techniques aimed at managing those demographic 
factors relevant to welfare and security. Third, population became the focus for 
political economy, the ‘new science of government’ which was inextricably 
related to ‘a knowledge of all the processes related to population in its larger 
sense: ... what we now call the economy.’ Thus government at this time 
increasingly came to be based on a model of the ‘continuous and multiple 
relations between population, territory and wealth’. This required new modes of 
intervention in the domains of population and economy, and was aimed at 
protecting and enhancing the interests of the population, and through this the 
state. (Foucault, 1991c p.99-101) 
As noted above, Foucault regarded biopower as ‘indispensable’ to the 
development of capitalism. He pointed to the parallel growth of the institutions of 
state power alongside the techniques of biopower (both disciplinary anatomo-
politics and biopolitics) within the economy and population. It is through the 
operation of biopower ‘at every level of the social body’, across a diverse range of 
social locations (including schools, clinics, the family, the military and 
administration) that the modern capitalist economy became possible and was 
sustained. The techniques of biopower also played a pivotal role in processes of 
social segregation and hierarchisation. These not only guaranteed that the political 
relations of domination and hegemony of the modern state were efficiently 
perpetuated, but also ensured a congruence between the ‘accumulation of men to 
that of capital, the joining of the growth of human groups to the expansion of 
productive forces.’ (Foucault, 1990 p.140-1)  
Foucault identified several other key factors as arising from the formation of 
this new domain of political action focused on human beings as living entities. 
One was what he described as the eighteenth century ‘rupture’ in the way in 
which scientific discourse dealt with the ‘twofold problematic of life and man’. 
By this Foucault meant the emergence of the modern view of human beings, 
which was based on a new view of the relationship between history and life. 
Human life was seen as having a ‘dual position’ that is simultaneously ‘outside 
history, in its biological environment, and inside human historicity, penetrated by 
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the latter’s techniques of knowledge and power.’ 165 (Foucault, 1990 p.143) This 
dual problematic itself can be understood, in large part, as arising from the 
fundamental shift that occurred towards the end of the eighteenth century, in the 
way in which life in general was conceptualised. The transformation was 
associated, according to Foucault’s account, with a general discontinuity between 
the ‘classical’ and the ‘modern’ era, and in particular with the development of 
modern biology. Unlike classical natural history, modern biology saw life as 
dependent for its existence on the way in which organisms are functionally linked 
to their external surroundings, that is on the way in which they exchange 
resources with their environment. The classical view of a timeless continuity of 
nature was replaced by a concept of life in which species were understood as 
discontinuous entities shaped by the evolutionary influence of environment, and 
therefore ‘tied to the time in which these forces and their effects exist.’ (Gutting, 
1989 p.192) 166 
Another key outcome of the growth of modern biopower was the increasing 
importance of what Foucault described as the ‘action of the norm’, at the expense 
of sovereign power and the law. (Foucault, 1990 p.144) There are several key 
elements to this argument. As outlined in Chapter 5, there was a decline in the 
absolute power of the sovereign over his subjects, and a shift to reliance on a 
series of expert knowledges that endowed the subject with a multiplicity of 
properties denoting such things as sexuality, criminality, states of physical, mental 
and moral health etc. In concert with this, there developed a series of specific 
disciplinary technologies that operated corporeally to train the body, increasing its 
economic utility and political docility. (Foucault, 1979b p.128-44) The experts 
involved in the production of these new discourses also acted as the technicians 
and ‘normative judges’ responsible for the application of such disciplinary and 
corrective programs. Affecting such detailed, individualised supervision was 
beyond the blunt, prohibitive capacities of the judicial system. Rather Foucault 
argued that what had come into existence was a subtle, individualising mode of 
power that was able to ‘take charge of life’ and distribute the living, biological 
subject as efficiently as possible within the social and economic field. Such a task 
required ‘continuous regulatory and corrective mechanisms’ with the power to 
‘quantify, measure, appraise and hierachise’ so as to effect a distribution about the 
norm. (Foucault, 1990 p.144) 
                                                 
165 I argue in Chapter 7 that while Foucault's treatment of power takes the significant step of 
identifying this ‘dual position’, it also unfortunately tends to perpetuates this in some respects 
by failing to rigorously subject the biological environment itself to scrutiny. The ‘biological 
environment’ is itself an historical product and not a mere ‘substrate of life’ that lies outside the 
relations of power, especially those of the natural sciences which Foucault tended to neglect. 
166 See Foucault (1970) p.125-62, 263-79, and (1979a) p.125-30. 
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As I emphasised in the previous chapter, Foucault did not see biopower as 
replacing juridical power but rather saw it functioning in conjunction with it, so 
that the law increasingly tended to function as a norm rather than as a rigid 
prohibition. The legal system was more and more ‘incorporated into a continuum 
of apparatuses (medical, administrative, and so on) whose functions are for the 
most part regulatory’. (Foucault, 1990 p.144) It was this displacement of 
sovereign power and the incorporation of the juridical as a correlative to the 
effectivity of the norm that distinguished biopower. (Hewitt, 1983 p.69) It was the 
conjunction of the modern biological understanding of ‘life’ and the proliferation 
of medical and social scientific knowledge as normalising disciplines that brought 
forth a qualitatively different and distinctively modern biopolitics. For Foucault, 
the rise of biopower, from the eighteenth century onwards, represented quite 
literally the ‘entry of life into history’. (Foucault, 1990 p.141) In saying this 
Foucault was not denying that the age-old problem of the biological struggle for 
existence, as manifested in the threat of famine and epidemic, could exert a 
political effect on history. Such influences were clearly not new. Rather he was 
arguing that with economic development and increased productivity during the 
eighteenth century it became possible to gain some control over the threat of death 
at this basic biological-demographic level. 
Foucault’s comments on why this occurred were in most regards quite in line 
with traditional accounts of modernisation. He argued that increases in 
agricultural productivity and availability of resources in eighteenth century 
Europe encouraged rapid demographic growth and accompanied greater security 
from starvation and disease. Essential to this was the development of new areas of 
knowledge, particularly in biology, agriculture, and public health. (Foucault, 
1980b p.168-72; Foucault, 1990 p.142) It is against the background of these 
transformations that Foucault identified the emergence of the discourses on 
population and security. He was able to claim that life entered history precisely 
because these new technical and normative disciplines provided a relative control 
over the actual conditions of life. In doing so they took upon themselves 
responsibility for the control and modification of ‘the life processes’. In the 
modern West, knowledge of the biological conditions of life and their relationship 
to individual and collective welfare thus came to be reflected upon as political 
concerns, and no longer as ‘an inaccessible substrate’ that only emerged 
periodically against the randomness of fate and death. (Foucault, 1990 p.142) 
Political power was no longer primarily sovereign power exercised over legal 
subjects (over whom the ultimate authority was death) but was concerned with the 
management of living beings and their relations with all the factors that shaped 
security and welfare. The influence biopower exercised over living beings was 
necessarily ‘applied at the level of life itself’, and in so operating, biopower 
simultaneously gained influence over the individual both politically and as a 
biological entity. The corporeal nature of the body of the subject was brought 
directly into the explicit calculations of power and was thereby transformed into a 
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subjected body. The body (individually and collectively) became both the raw 
material of power and at the same time that which produces and transforms itself 
as a living being. (Foucault, 1990 p.142-3; Hewitt, 1983 p.69) 
Foucault explicitly discounted the suggestion that biopower resulted in the 
total integration of all aspects of life into the techniques that administer it, 167 
indeed, he asserted that life ‘constantly escapes them’. (Foucault, 1990 p.143) 168 
Nevertheless, with the increasing penetration of biopower’s normalising reach 
into new areas of life activity, and hence the emergence of life as a political 
object, a new conception of rights developed. However, according to Foucault, 
this was a form of rights radically different from the traditional right of 
sovereignty and was incomprehensible from within the framework of the classical 
juridical system. It was in fact a notion of ‘rights’ that, while couched in the 
traditional terminology of rights and law, was ‘turned back’ against that 
traditional system. Thus the politicisation of life, directed as it was at the 
satisfaction of essentially biological needs (including the psychological) gave rise 
to a recognisably modern interpretation of rights. Foucault described this as ‘the 
“right” to life, to one’s body, to health, to happiness, to the satisfaction of needs, 
and beyond all the oppressions or “alienations”, the “right” to discover what one 
is and all that one can be’. (Foucault, 1990 p.145) It is within this context that the 
‘right to life’ of the modern subject came into being and within which its actions 
must be understood. 
Biopolitics and ecological risk 
Some of Foucault’s remarks suggest continuity between this modern right to 
life and the contemporary concern about risks to the environment. He claimed that 
the ‘biological risks’ confronting the human species now ‘are perhaps greater and 
certainly more serious, than before the birth of microbiology.’ (Foucault, 1990 
p.143) He further suggested that the economic and social conditions that from the 
eighteenth century allowed the West a measure of relief from the struggle against 
famine etc do not necessarily apply ‘outside the Western world’. He then went on 
to link the notion of modernity directly to biopower and the conditions under 
which it emerged. 
But what might be called a society’s ‘threshold of modernity’ has been 
reached when the life of the species is wagered on its own political 
strategies. For millennia, man remained what he was for Aristotle: a 
living animal with the additional capacity for a political existence; 
                                                 
167 This is an argument mounted against Foucault by Habermas and Honneth. See Chapter 5 of the 
current thesis. 
168 See also Butler (1989) on this. 
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modern man is an animal whose politics places his existence as a living 
being in question. (Foucault, 1990 p.143 - emphasis added) 169 
These comments suggest that Foucault’s work on biopolitics is capable of 
addressing the notion of ecological risk and the problem of the social relation to 
nature, which have emerged as central problems for contemporary social theory. 
As discussed in Chapter 4, Ulrich Beck and Klaus Eder both regard ecological 
threats as the systemic result of global processes of modernisation and 
rationalisation, which have created new ecological fields of conflict within 
contemporary society. Foucault's understanding of modernity as involving the 
emergence of biology as an object of political calculation and control indicates 
that the sorts of biological concerns he dealt with are not fundamentally dissimilar 
from those more specifically ecological ones focused on by Beck and Eder. 
Beck for example draws a clear link between the success of economic growth 
and the consolidation of welfare state mechanisms in providing an unprecedented 
level of security for life. The development of such productive capacities is, at the 
same time, seen as creating an entirely new class of technologically induced risks 
which have the potential for the ecological ‘self-endangerment’ of human society 
and life in general. This is tied to what Beck describes as the sub-politics of risk 
society, in which power operates largely outside the formal institutions of 
government, resulting in a breakdown of the notion of a political centre capable of 
controlling the processes of scientific-economic development. At the same time, 
and despite this lack of a political centre, there has been a proliferation in 
knowledge-based programs of risk creation, monitoring and intervention in the 
most detailed levels of industrial management, by both state and non-state actors. 
170 Beck’s work suggests that these processes are a defining feature of late 
modernity and are quite different from the traditional distributional conflicts 
characteristic of the era of primary industrialisation, which he places as coming to 
a close by the early 1970s. (Beck, 1992b p.20-22)  
There is a clear similarity in this line of argument with the distinction 
Foucault drew between the ‘old’ environmental risks such as famine, and those 
‘modern’ ones that result when the life of the human species is wagered ‘on its 
own political strategies’. However, Foucault’s account of the emergence of 
biopower in the eighteenth century casts doubt on Beck’s insistence that the ‘risk 
society’ is a fundamentally new type of society or even a very recent 
development. It may be that the sorts of social processes Beck focuses on, 
particularly the relationship between technical capacity, expert knowledge and the 
distribution of risks (and power) are not so much a fundamentally new 
                                                 
169 Foucault’s use of the term ‘modernity’ in other works is somewhat different. See Foucault, 
(1991e). 
170 See the discussion of Beck and Eder in Chapter 4 of this thesis. 
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phenomenon but simply a recent articulation of the biopolitics Foucault described 
in another context. I give further consideration to the relationship between 
Foucault and the work of Beck and Eder in the final chapter. For the present let us 
return to the consideration of Foucault’s notion of biopower, before examining its 
connection to his work on governmental rationality.  
One useful way of understanding Foucault’s notion of biopower is to follow 
Bryan Turner (1984 p.159), who argues that, notwithstanding his apparent 
hostility to systematic theorising, Foucault’s work implicitly embraces a particular 
causal explanation of the modern world. Turner identifies the ‘unifying theme’ of 
Foucault’s work as a dual focus on the ‘rationalisation of the body and the 
rationalisation of populations by new combinations of power and knowledge’. He 
argues that these rationalisations are the effect of increasing population densities, 
which in the nineteenth century came to threaten ‘the political order of society’. 
(Turner, 1984 p.163- emphasis added) Turner rightly emphasises the role 
population pressures played in Foucault’s analysis of the development of 
biopower, 171 pointing out that 
it is this factor which stands behind the expansion and development of 
new regimes and regimens of control - a profusion of taxonomies, tables, 
examinations, drills, dressage, chrestomathies, surveys, samples and 
censuses. The pressure of men in urban space necessitates a new 
institutional order of prisons, asylums, clinics, factories and schools in 
which accumulated bodies can be made serviceable and safe. Just as the 
space of knowledge experiences accumulations of new discourses, so the 
social space is littered with bodies and the institutions which are designed 
to control them. (Turner, 1984 p.160-1)  
If this view is developed, not only is knowledge pivotal to practices of power, 
but it is also central to the very constitution of the objects of upon which biopower 
operates, that is, to the ‘making-up’ of both people and things. Biopolitics 
therefore is inherently linked to the development and elaboration of specific forms 
of expertise. This is a theme I consider in more detail later in this chapter. For the 
present, it sufficient to emphasise that the definition and administration of 
populations simultaneously requires the constitution and management of the 
environment in which those populations exist and upon which they depend. Such a 
conclusion is implicit in Foucault’s approach although not developed. As a 
consequence Foucault does not adequately deal with the way in which the 
political and economic problematisation of populations also gave rise, at a more 
recent time, to a similar problematisation of nature and the environment. 
Notwithstanding my suggestion above that Foucault hints at continuity between 
                                                 
171 Direct confirmation that this is Foucault’s approach can be seen in Foucault (1990) p.142 and 
Foucault (1980b) p.171-2. 
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biopower and ecological risk, I develop a critique of Foucault's approach to the 
natural sciences in Chapters 7 and 8. 172 Nevertheless, it is clear from Foucault’s 
discussions of the biopolitical regulation of populations that this assumes not only 
the disciplining of individuals and populations, but also, necessarily, a concern 
with the administration of ‘all the conditions of life’ as represented by the 
environment. 
For Foucault, biopolitics as the task of administering life at the level of the 
‘species body’, comes into existence at the multiple points of application to the 
body (both individually and collectively) of disciplines such as public health, 
medicine, demography, education, social welfare, etc.  (Barret-Kriegal, 1992 
p.194) Ecology and environmental management can also be regarded as 
expressions of biopolitics, as these originate in, and operate upon, the same basic 
concerns for managing the ‘continuous and multiple relations’ between the 
population, its resources and the environment. Contemporary ecological 
discourse, in other words, is an articulation of what Foucault calls the ‘population-
riches problem’. This suggests a specifically ecological or environmental 
dimension to biopolitics, which makes more complex the way in which we 
understand the ‘body’ as the target and site of power. Not only are we forced to 
deal with the individual ‘anatomical’ body and the social body, and the relations 
between these, but we must also take into account an ecological relationship in 
which the focus is on the relationship between the social body and the biological 
species body. 173 This is not to suggest that there will not be new forms of 
discipline and normality directed at the body at the individual level (indeed these 
would appear to be a necessary component in ecological governmentality) 174. 
                                                 
172 See also Rouse (1993) p.137-62; (1987) Chapter 7; and Rutherford (1994a)  
173 The term 'social body' can be regarded as a metaphor for ‘the collective embodiment of the 
targets of power, the body as 'species', whether in the form of an entire population or a specific 
group of prisoners, school children, the insane and so forth, who are subject to specific types 
of administration and regulation.’ (Hewitt, 1983 p.71) Foucault however says that the term is 
not simply a metaphor: it refers to a materiality. The police ‘take charge of the physical 
element of the social body’; the object of the police is first and foremost the complete 
regulation or ‘whole management’ of the ‘complex and multiple materiality’ of the social 
body, the species body. The police is both an ‘institutional grouping’, that is, a specific set of 
social apparatuses and administrative structures, and a ‘modality of intervention’, [Foucault et 
al, quoted in Barret-Kriegal (1992)] that is, a generalised type of political technology, a 
‘diagram’ or ‘schema’, ‘panopticism’. For a discussion of Foucault's ‘ambiguous’ use of these 
two aspects of his notion of biopower, see Donnelly (1992) p.199-203. 
174 For a discussion of how environmental education and environmental drills are combined, in the 
case of the Canadian Green Plan, to instil new ecological disciplinary practices in the daily 
lives of individuals, see Darier (1995) and also Bowerbank (1999). An anecdotal tale from the 
author’s own experience can perhaps succinctly demonstrate such environmental disciplinary 
practices. In the early 1990s certain state government jurisdictions in Australia became 
concerned by the cancer risks of increased exposure of young school children to ultra violet 
radiation resulting from atmospheric ozone depletion in the Southern Hemisphere. The school 
authorities introduced rules requiring children to where sun hats outside during play breaks. 
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However, as with areas of social policy such as public health, the ecological is 
primarily biopolitical in nature, that is, it is manifested in specific regulatory 
controls aimed at the population, albeit from a somewhat different perspective. 
Governmental rationality 
Foucault’s work on biopolitics, especially the first volume of The History of 
Sexuality represented a development that went beyond his earlier writings on the 
relation between knowledge and power. As Mitchell Dean argues, the last chapter 
of The History of Sexuality (Vol 1) in particular foreshadowed a new concern 
with the problem of government and the role of the state that Foucault took up 
during the period 1978-84. This was the main work in which Foucault considered 
in some detail the relation between the ‘institutionalised micro-forms of work 
upon the self ... and the global strategies of the government of the state.’ (Dean, 
1994 p.175) Whereas Foucault’s earlier work had focused on power in terms of a 
local microphysics of power, this later work recasts the problem of power at a 
much broader, macro-level of analysis. This is not to suggest that Foucault 
abandoned his strong emphasis on the importance of the micro-level origin and 
application of power. Rather that the problem was reformulated in a more 
complex and sophisticated manner, in which the analysis of the state, and 
government in its broader sense, was not reliant on a juxtaposition of the micro 
and macro levels of power. 
Despite the change in focus that occurs in the writings on biopolitics, and 
more fully in those on governmental rationality, these later works nevertheless 
maintain two key concerns developed in his earlier writings. These are, first, 
continuity between the earlier concern to elaborate a microphysics of power (the 
disciplinary technologies of the body) and the sorts of biopolitical problems raised 
by the regulation of entire populations and societies. Second, there is continuity 
between both of these concerns and the practice of ethics as a form of 
‘government of the self’. (Dean, 1994 p.176) Foucault’s work on government thus 
takes as its object of analysis, to use Dean’s phrase, the ‘triple domain’ of 
government. That is, its is concerned with understanding the multiple means by 
which human conduct is governed through various practices of individual self-
                                                                                                                                     
Children who forgot their hats were restricted to areas of the school grounds where tree cover 
provided shading. Here we have a very specific (and simple) regulation of the spatial 
distribution of human individuals as biological entities based on a series of quite ‘abstract’ 
scientific knowledges and risk assessments, which included (1) radiation exposure dose 
predictions based on the chemistry of CFC derived chlorine in the stratosphere and its 
relationship to increased penetration into the lower atmosphere of several wavelengths of ultra 
violet radiation; (2) epidemiological projections of the likely rate of melanoma cancers in the 
population in 20 to 40 years later resulting from childhood exposure to sunburn; and (3) the 
unknown level of risk to specific individuals given the statistical nature of hazard probabilities 
at the population level. 
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government, the government of others, and the government of the state. 
Foucault’s characterisation of government as ‘the conduct of conduct’ (Burchell, 
1996 p.19; Foucault, 1982 p.220-1) delineates the field of government in a very 
broad sense. It is a ‘massive domain’ that extends from the minutiae of individual 
self-reflection to the depersonalised, anonymous rationalities concerned with the 
political regulation of states, populations and societies. (Dean, 1994 p.176-7) 
Foucault’s development of this notion of government was based on a 
reconstruction of the principle forms, or ‘economies’ of power in the West that 
contributed to the formation of the ‘governmental’ state. Key to this was the 
development of new political relations (at the end of the sixteenth and during the 
first half of the seventeenth centuries) that arose out of a discourse concerning the 
art, or technique, of governing. This political discourse specifically centred on the 
state as being its own end and having its own logic and nature, expressed in the 
theory of raison d’etat. According to Foucault reason of state formed out of two 
political technologies that lead to the formation of the modern nation-state. These 
were the diplomatic-military practices that developed the external capacities of 
states through the system of military alliances (leading to the Treaty of 
Westphalia), and a political technology internal to the state known as the police, 
which attended to the development of all ‘the means necessary to increase the 
forces of the state from within’. These two political technologies came together in 
the system of mercantilism or cameralism to give rise to the formation of the 
modern state. (Foucault, 1988b p.103-4) 
It was particularly in the development of the police that we see the beginnings 
of the modern political rationality that enables the formation of biopower. Gordon 
suggests that the term ‘police ‘ (‘the science of police’ or Polizeiwissenschaften) 
as used by Foucault is most closely rendered in English as policy. (Gordon, 1991 
p.10-11) It is particularly in the German and French development of the notion of 
‘the police’ (or policy science) that Foucault says we see the beginnings of the 
modern political and governmental rationalities that his notion of biopower aims 
to analyse.175 This new ‘police state’ (or policy state), unlike previous forms of 
rule, did not operate primarily on the basis of the juridical principles of 
sovereignty and territory. Until the end of the sixteenth century the juridical 
foundation of sovereignty and the state was territory and the subjects that 
inhabited it, so that, said Foucault, sovereignty was ‘not exercised on things’. 
Police theorists however replaced the emphasis on maintaining the principality 
(territory) with a concern for the science of police, or art of government. Central 
to this new perspective was a definition of government that no longer focused 
primarily on the governing of territory but rather on the governing of things. In 
Foucault’s words, for the exponents of police science 
                                                 
175 See Rabinow (1984b) p.16 and Foucault (1991c; 1988b) 
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what government has to do with is not territory but rather a complex 
composed of men and things. The things with which this sense of 
government is concerned are in fact men, but men in their relations, their 
links, their imbrications with those other things which are wealth, 
resources, means of subsistence, the territory with its specific qualities, 
climate, irrigation, fertility, etc; men in their relations to that other kind of 
things, customs, habits, ways of acting and thinking etc; lastly, men in 
their relations to that other kind of things, accidents and misfortunes such 
as famine, epidemics, death, etc. (Foucault, 1991c p.93) 
There was thus a movement away from emphasis on the negative tasks of 
politics, understood as force, as the task of resisting external opponents and 
enforcing internal law and order which was characteristic of the sovereign form of 
power. Instead the principal concern of the state increasingly became the 
productive tasks of the police, involving a continuous and remarkably specific 
series of ‘positive interventions in the behaviour of individuals’ and groups. 
(Foucault, 1991c p.93) These new police doctrines of government represented a 
radical shift from the largely negative emphasis on the ‘holding out’ of sovereign 
power within a territory, to the emphasis on the positive, detailed management of 
the entire social body, and, to ensuring the abundance and prosperity of the 
population. 
Similarly, the doctrine of reason of state, in holding that the principles of 
government were inherent to the state rather than deriving from natural or divine 
law, posed the problem of determining the needs or interests of the state and 
acquiring the knowledge and information necessary to realise those interests. The 
task of administration rested above all else on the detailed knowledge of the 
‘complex and multiple materiality’ of all those things upon which the state’s 
strength and wealth depended. Thus the task of administration, of the police, rests 
above all on the gathering of detailed information on all matters relating to the 
resources and needs of the state. The term statistics, noted Foucault, meant 
precisely ‘the science of the state’, involving detailed and precise empirical 
‘knowledge of the state in all its elements’ and particularly as these dealt with 
such things as geography, demography, natural resources, agriculture, climate etc. 
In this was to be found the main feature of the conduct of reason of state and the 
science of police, or policy. In order to efficiently arrange things in the best 
interests of the state (that is, for ‘convenient ends’), it was necessary to aspire 
towards an ever more detailed knowledge of the resources of the state, including 
all the characteristics of its population. (Foucault, 1991c p.93-6) 
What emerges most clearly in Foucault’s analysis of police science as a 
specifically modern form of governmental reason is the dependence of 
government, in all its forms (ethical and political) on a detailed, pragmatic 
knowledge of that ‘complex composed of men and things’. That is, knowledge of 
populations, resources and those factors which affect their productivity. The 
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strength of the state, in police theory, was directly linked to the well being of the 
population. The power of the state is increased inasmuch as the physical (and 
social) condition of the population is secured, made productive and improved. 
Foucault identified in his examination of the work of the French and German 
police theorists (particularly von Justi), the clearest definition of the aim of the 
modern art of government. That aim was ‘to develop those elements constitutive 
of individuals’ lives in such a way that their development also fosters that of the 
strength of the state.’ Hence, the police state’s concern to acquire the most 
exhaustively detailed knowledge of, and on the basis of that to intervene in, the 
activities of each of its citizens assumes a pastoral, even totalitarian, dimension. 
(Foucault, 1981c p. 245-8, 252) At the same time, and because of this, the police 
state is also the ‘state of prosperity’. (Gordon, 1991 p.10) This should not be seen 
as support for those, such as Habermas and Honneth, who see in such a statement 
evidence of Foucault’s alleged view of modernity as a totally administered 
society. What is missed by such an assertion is the genealogical lineage pointed to 
by Foucault’s analysis. Reason of state and police are elements that, while they 
contribute to the modern governmental rationality, do not fully define it. The 
police quest for ‘total’ knowledge was to prove unrealisable in practice. Indeed, if 
we are to fully understand Foucault’s account of how disciplinary biopower and 
modern state rationality (exemplified in reason of state and police) are brought 
into play it is also necessary to take into account the influence of liberalism. 
Liberalism  
Foucault’s analysis suggested the modern art of government is derived from 
two distinct yet related sources - first, the Cameralist/police science influence 
with its emphasis on a pragmatic knowledge of the state’s capacity and resources, 
and second, liberalism. As I have suggested, police science harboured within it an 
aspiration to a perfect or total knowledge of the workings of all the state’s 
resources and population. Such knowledge, it was thought, was necessary if the 
development of the state was to be regulated so as to maximise the realisation of 
its own ends (security, prosperity etc) in the most efficient manner. Thus police 
science, as a governmental rationality premised upon the principle of reason of 
state, always operated on the presumption of their being ‘too little government’. 
(Foucault, 1981b p.354) 
Liberalism on the other hand emerges as a critique of state reason. (Gordon, 
1991 p.15) Liberalism is frequently understood primarily as a political (and 
economic) theory or ideology concerned with the defence of individual liberty 
from encroachment by the state. However Foucault’s approach was to view 
liberalism as a specific practice of government that embodies a continuous 
reflection on not only the limits of government but also its necessity. (Foucault, 
1981b p.354-6) Where liberalism differs from reason of state is that the state is no 
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longer considered as its own end, and neither is government considered to be 
synonymous with the state. Thus Foucault argued 
Liberalism, then, is to be analysed as a principle and method of 
rationalising the exercise of government ... the liberal rationalisation finds 
its point of departure in the idea that government would not be considered 
its own end. Here, government is not to be understood as an institution 
but, rather, as an activity which consists in directing human conduct 
within the setting and with the instruments of state. ... Phrased differently, 
this latter question asked what makes it necessary for there to be a 
government and what objectives ought it to pursue with regard to society 
in order to justify its existence. (Foucault, 1981b p.354-5: emphasis 
added)  
As with police science and reason of state, the concern of liberalism was (and 
is) how to achieve maximal efficiency of rule, but of a different sort. The interests 
of the population can no longer be understood as necessarily coextensive with 
those of the state. Liberalism is still concerned with governing, that is, with how 
human conduct can be directed to appropriate ends. Where liberalism differs, as a 
mode of governmental rationality, is that it specifically considers what 
governmental tasks can be efficiently (and legitimately) conducted by the state 
and what ambitions must of necessity be regarded as outside of state competence 
in order to efficiently achieve what does lie within its power. (Foucault, 1981b 
p.356; Gordon, 1991 p.15) 
As a critique of state reason, liberalism called into question the immediate 
unity of knowledge and government assumed by police science. The liberal 
critique, developed by theorists such as Adam Smith and Adam Ferguson, pointed 
to the impossibility, in the economic sphere, of possessing knowledge of the 
interests and preferences of individuals such that government could direct and 
regulate private economic activities for the public good. Foucault noted that this 
should also to be seen as a problem posed by liberalism for government in 
general. The state, according to liberal theorists, cannot in fact posses the sorts of 
totalising knowledge upon which police science sought to base state action. The 
opacity, the unknowability, of economic processes precluded the possibility of an 
economic sovereignty assumed by reason of state. Thus the familiar liberal 
assertion that the state’s ability to act (beneficially) is restricted by the inherently 
fallible and limited scope of its knowledge. 176  
One result of the influence of liberal thought was to initiate a new relation 
between knowledge and government in which political economy assumed a 
greater autonomy and distance from pragmatic state needs than its Cameralist 
                                                 
176 For discussion of Foucault's analysis of liberalism see Burchell (1991) and Gordon (1991). 
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forms. Political economy was seen as a form of knowledge that was central to 
state functioning, but it could not deliver the sorts of detailed state planning 
envisaged by police science (or the later Leninist appropriation of this same 
dream). Political economy therefore assumed, said Foucault, ‘the role of a 
knowledge which is ‘lateral to’ or ‘in tete-a-tete with’ the art of governing: it 
cannot however, in itself constitute that art.’ (Gordon, 1991 p.16) 177 Liberalism 
did not dismiss the need for government, but rather, and this is what Foucault saw 
as distinctive about liberal governmental rationality, it dissolved the immediate 
unity between knowledge and government, and consequently the equation of 
maximising governmental effectiveness with maximising governmental 
regulation. (Burchell, 1991 p.138-9) 178 In doing so liberalism brought into being a 
new relationship between knowledge and government, involving what Colin 
Gordon has succinctly described as ‘a new mode of objectification of governed 
reality’, that resituates ‘governmental reason within a newly complicated, open 
and unstable politico-epistemic configuration.’ (Gordon, 1991 p.16) Foucault 
called this new configuration of knowledge and techniques of rule 
governmentality. He described this as the 
ensemble formed by the institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections, 
the calculations and tactics that allow the exercise of this very specific 
albeit complex form of power, which has as its target population, as its 
principal form of knowledge political economy and its essential technical 
means apparatuses of security. ... this type of power which may be termed 
government, (results) on the one hand, in the formation of a whole series 
of specific governmental apparatuses, and on the other, in the 
development of a whole complex of savoirs [knowledges]. (Foucault, 
1991c p.102-3: emphasis added) 
This relationship between particular, more or less formalised bodies of 
knowledge and specific administrative mechanisms has become a crucial feature 
of government in advanced liberal societies. Increasingly in such complex 
societies government, the conduct of conduct, necessarily relied on the role of 
professional expertise. As Donzelot has demonstrated, throughout the nineteenth 
century there was a proliferation of alliances between private and professional 
agents that led to the formation of a series of welfare programs directed at 
governing perceived problems within the social body. (Donzelot, 1993; 1979) 
Over time these welfare programs became linked with the functions and 
institutions of the state, however, the adoption of these welfare programs by the 
state did not lead to the rise of an all-powerful, interventionist state. Instead it 
resulted in the bringing together of a diverse network of arguments, projects, and 
mechanisms through which various political forces sought to pursue a multitude 
                                                 
177 Gordon cites Foucault’s lecture at College du France, 28 March, 1978. 
178 Burchell cites Foucault’s ‘Naissance de la biopolitique’, in Resumes des Course. 
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of social and political objectives. Thus welfare did not represent a coherent, state 
plan for social regulation and normalisation, but rather was composed of a series 
of networks assembled from diverse, often antagonistic elements. Modern social 
welfare did not originate as centrally directed projects of state action but was ‘a 
composition of fragile and mobile relationships’ between non-state professionals, 
intellectuals and social movements, and state agencies. (Rose and Miller, 1992 
p.192-3) Hence, the development of social welfare and subsequently the welfare 
state involved forging and maintaining alliances and networks between diverse 
experts and political forces, of which the state was only one. In a similar way the 
development of programs of environmental security can be understood as drawing 
on an equally complex, open and unstable ‘politico-epistemic configuration’. 
Such a perspective suggests that while the aspirations for an ecological ‘police 
science’ may well exist, the issues raised by the liberal critique of government 
mitigate against the success of straightforward technocratic solutions to ecological 
problems. 
The modern discourse of scientific ecology 
Consistent with Foucault’s analysis of the rise of biopolitics, the 
problematisation of the relationship between population and the environment can 
be linked to three major social developments in the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries. These were the emergence of modern biology as the science of life, the 
rapid increase in the population of Europe leading to a series of mass migrations 
to other continents, (Foucault, 1991c p.98; Worster, 1987b p.92-5) and the 
development of an international capitalist market. (Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1982 
p.135; Rabinow, 1984b p.17-8; Worster, 1987b p.92-5) Work by environmental 
historians has emphasised the importance of the interaction between European 
population growth, migration and the development of international markets in the 
same period pointed to in Foucault’s work on the emergence of biopolitics. 
Foucault was interested in ‘the deep historical link’ between the emergence of 
biopolitics and the population-resources problem, which he describes as ‘the 
process which isolates the economy as a specific sector of reality and political 
economy as the science and technique of intervention of government in that field 
of reality.’ (Foucault, 1991c p.102) The environmental historian David Worster 
has argued that the ‘two great global forces’ of population growth and world 
markets drove social changes in the nineteenth century resulting in an 
‘environmental upheaval’ that was to ‘remake nature with geological 
effectiveness.’ (Worster, 1987b p.95-7) 179 Richard Grove has argued that new 
forms of management of colonial environments in the period 1670 to the mid-
1950s, such as forestry, irrigation and soil conservation, had a more profound 
                                                 
179 See also Crosby (1986). 
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‘political’ impact than many of the other more ‘conspicuous and dramatic aspects 
of colonial rule.’ (Grove, 1990 p.17) 
Foucault saw the emergence of biopolitics in the eighteenth century as linked 
to an expanding series of population discourses focusing on health, criminality, 
education, sexuality, etc. Interestingly, at this same time we also find evidence in 
the historical scholarship of the beginnings of another new discourse that had as 
its object what today we would call the environment. Worster, for example, placed 
the first systematic documentation of concern about this new problem with the 
publication in 1864 of Man and Nature by George Perkins Marsh, a work that 
sought to demonstrate the danger to humanity and the rest of nature posed by 
rapid change in the global environment. (Worster, 1987b p.91-2) 180 Clarence 
Glacken also identified Marsh’s work as marking the arrival of a recognisably 
modern perspective on the relationship of humans to nature. The nineteenth 
century thus saw, in Glacken’s words, the advent of ‘an entirely different order, 
influenced by the theory of evolution, specialisation in the attainment of 
knowledge, (and) acceleration in the transformation of nature.’ (Glacken, 1967 
p.704-5) Anna Bramwell in her history of environmentalism similarly points to 
modern ecological concepts as deriving from ‘a set of biological, physical science 
and geographical ideas that arose separately around the mid-nineteenth century.’ 
(Bramwell, 1989 p.15) 181 Malthus’s ideas on population, published in An Essay 
on the Principle of Population at the close of the eighteenth century, along with 
Darwin’s The Origin of Species published in 1859, were seen as providing key 
themes discernible in the modern ecological analysis of environmental problems. 
(Pepper, 1984 p.91-103; Worster, 1987a) 182  
The population-resources problem, the central theme of the nineteenth century 
discourses pointed to by both Foucault and environmental historians, remains 
central to the contemporary discourses of ecological crisis. A range of works 
influential in the environmental debate of the last four decades had as their key 
focus the notion of the carrying capacity of the Earth, which was seen as a 
biological law with a profound influence for contemporary environmental and 
population-resources problems. While the emphasis and political implications 
drawn from this idea vary, most saw population growth as a fundamental factor in 
ecological crisis. Well-known examples of this approach include Hardin (1968), 
                                                 
180 In Britain the establishment of the first national environmental group was in 1865 (the 
Commons, Open Spaces and Footpaths Preservation Society). The US Sierra Club was formed 
in 1892. See Pepper (1984) p.14. There was also a proliferation of colonial geographic and 
conservation societies during this period. See Schneider (1990) and Grove (1990). 
181 See also Lowe and Goyder (1983) p.16. 
182 Worster notes that the bio-economic approach of post-World War Two systems ecology 
displays a diminished reliance on earlier Darwinian evolutionary influences. ( p.331) See also 
Grove (1992) 
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Ehlrich (1968), Meadows et al., (1972) and The Club of Rome, Goldsmith (1972)  
and The Ecologist,  and governmental reports such as that of the U.S. Council on 
Environmental Quality (1981). Other influential works on ecological crisis placed 
less emphasis on absolute population levels as the cause of environmental 
degradation. Instead these often focused on the problem of global pollution, and 
the mode and intensity of resource exploitation, which was in turn seen as related 
to population levels, and industrialism (and consumerism) as a system of 
production. Here the central concern was the impact of new forms of technology 
which have proliferated in the post-World War Two period, 183 and which are 
characterised by the extensive manufacture and use of synthetic, toxic chemicals. 
Carson (1962), Commoner (1971), and Bookchin (1962) were important examples 
of this work. 
These and numerous similar works have several important features in 
common. Each problematised the environment as the previously taken for granted 
biological basis for human life and constituted it politically as a ‘topic of social 
concern and potential conflict.’ (Cramer et al., 1989 p.96) Each sought to locate 
their claims to authority within the framework of a global ecosystems approach to 
ecology,184 whether it be Hardin’s and Ehlrich’s biological law of carrying 
capacity, Commoner’s four laws of ecology,185 or The Club of Rome’s complex 
computer modelling of the limits to growth186. Central to each was the view that 
human populations are constrained by the operation of ecological laws that were 
biological and therefore both natural and non-anthropocentric. These ecological 
laws were understood as having significant economic and political consequences, 
and were frequently expressed in the economic form of externalities impacting on 
ecologically defined public goods.187 The concern of this contemporary discourse 
was (and is) how to manage populations and resources in relation to their natural 
environments. This focus remains central to current environmental discourses; it 
is, for example, a clear theme in the Brundtland report to the United Nations 
(Brundtland, 1987) and the ongoing international debate on sustainable 
development since the publication of that report. This continues to be evident in 
the 1992 United Nations Earth Summit (Brown et al., 1990; MacNeill et al., 
                                                 
183 It is these sort of developments and their effects that Beck (1992b) focuses on as the key 
distinguishing feature of ‘risk society’. 
184 I discuss the significance of global ecosystem modelling for a biopolitics of the environment 
later in this Chapter, and also in Rutherford (1997a). 
185 Commoner's laws: 1. Everything is connected to everything else; 2. Everything must go 
somewhere; 3. Nature knows best; and, 4. There is no such thing as a free lunch. (Commoner, 
1971 p.33-46) 
186 These limits are presented as the interaction between world population, industrialisation, 
pollution, food production, and resource depletion. See Meadows et al, (1972) p.29. 
187 Public goods in this case are often defined in terms that include a broader, non-anthropocentric 
biotic community, as well as human beings. 
  
 
130
 
1991) and the establishment of the UN Sustainable Development Commission and 
the 1994 UN Population Conference.  
Expertise and governmentality 
Before looking specifically at the development of these programs of 
environmental security and governance, it is necessary to consider in more detail 
the connection between expert knowledge and governmentality. In doing this I 
draw in particular on the work by Nikolas Rose and Peter Miller on 
governmentality. This work emphasises that the exercise of political power in 
advanced liberal societies depends to a significant degree on the way in which the 
intellectual resources, technical activities and social authority of expertise are 
mobilised to govern the conduct of individuals and populations. (Rose, 1993; 
Rose and Miller, 1992) 
A major consequence of Foucault’s approach to the problem of government is 
that it calls into question the straightforward equation of political power with the 
actions of the state. Thus Foucault’s critique of sovereignty argued that political 
thinking had attached ‘excessive value’ to the role of the state in government. For 
Foucault, and later governmentality theorists such as Rose and Miller, the 
problem of government is not confined to the state. Following from Foucault's 
analysis of liberalism, ‘government’ should be understood as encompassing a 
much broader range of forces which, in a variety of ways, have sought to manage 
and regulate the behaviour of the population, both in its biopolitical ‘aggregate 
effects’ and in its disciplinary ‘depths and details’. (Foucault, 1991c p.102) 
Foucault therefore argued that it is a mistake to attribute the state with the degree 
of coherence or ‘rigorous functionality’ that Western political thinking has 
traditionally done. Rather than the state being a calculating political subject or 
centre from which power emanates, it is in fact a historical sedimentation made up 
of a multitude of techniques for governing conduct, to which the state has 
attached itself in various ways. Indeed Foucault suggests that the 
governmentalisation of the state is ... what has permitted the state to 
survive, and ... if the state is what it is today, this is so precisely thanks to 
this governmentality, which is at once internal and external to the state, 
since it is the tactics of government which make possible the continual 
definition and redefinition of what is within the competence of the state 
and what is not, the public versus the private, and so on; thus the state can 
only be understood in its survival and its limits on the basis of the general 
tactics of governmentality. (Foucault, 1991c p.103) 
In effect then, the modern state must be seen not as that which gives rise to 
government, but as one important, yet nonetheless historically contingent form 
that government has taken. Such an approach to understanding government 
emphasises the multiplicity of the practical knowledges and techniques brought to 
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bear on the general domain of the population in order to render it amenable to 
intervention and regulation. (Miller and Rose, 1993 p.77-8) According to 
Foucault, a central feature of Western modernity, from the eighteenth century 
onwards, is thus not the ‘etatisation of society’ but ‘the ‘governmentalisation’ of 
the state’. (Foucault, 1991c p.103) As indicated earlier in this chapter, this 
governmentalisation developed around biopower with its problematisation of 
human beings as living, biological beings and which Foucault saw as marking the 
point at which Western society could be said to have crossed the ‘threshold of 
modernity’. (Foucault, 1990). 
Developing his earlier notion of power/knowledge, Foucault’s work on 
governmentality emphasised the centrality of knowledge to the practice of 
government. This is a theme that has been further developed by Rose and Miller, 
who stress that governmentality has a distinctively discursive character. In 
particular they argue that language must be understood as performative, so that 
the way in which language is employed in political rationalities is not simply 
contemplative or even descriptive. Rather it is the means through which the 
specific domains of governmental concern are constituted and made amenable to 
intervention and regulation. (Miller and Rose, 1993 p.78-81; Rose, 1993 p.288-9; 
Rose and Miller, 1992 p.177) Pivotal to this is the production and mobilisation of 
systematic bodies of knowledge relating to the particular social domain in 
question. Rose argues that throughout the late nineteenth and first half of the 
twentieth centuries, the authority of social science expertise became intimately 
connected with the apparatus of formal political rule, culminating in ‘welfarism’ 
or the welfare state. The key point however, is that while this professional 
expertise provided a social means of governing behaviour, it also enabled this for 
the most part to be done in a way that was removed from detailed and 
comprehensive political direction by the state. This liberal welfarism facilitated 
both the formulation of social norms and consequently the social evaluation of 
individual conduct against these, while maintaining a considerable degree of 
separation between the normative, truth-producing activities of professional 
authorities and the exercise of the coercive capacities of the state. Keeping much 
of the knowledge producing activities of the social sciences removed from 
centralised political control thus continued what Foucault described (in relation to 
political economy) as the ‘lateral’ role played by knowledge in the liberal art of 
governance. (Gordon, 1991 p.16) As Nikolas Rose points out, for liberal 
welfarism 
The truth claims of expertise were highly significant ... through the 
powers of truth, distant events and persons could be governed ‘at arms 
length’: political rule would not itself set out the norms of individual 
conduct, but would install and empower a variety of ‘professionals’ who 
would, investing them with authority to act as experts in the devices of 
social rule. (Rose, 1993 p.285) 
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Rose goes on to argue that over the past fifty years, such welfarist ‘strategies 
of rule’ have undergone fundamental changes. This has been due in part to the 
neo-liberal critique of the supposed failures of the welfare state, but also because 
welfarism itself laid the basis for new techniques of rule, which he regards as 
fundamental to constituting advanced liberalism as a distinctive mode of 
government. 188 Advanced liberalism establishes a different relationship between 
government and expertise - unlike welfarism, the emphasis is not on social rule 
but rather it seeks to govern through ‘the regulated choices’ of the individual. At 
the same time it attempts to affect a further separation of professional expertise 
from the state through marketisation and the subsequent subjection of expert 
knowledge production to ‘the rationalities of competition, accountability and 
consumer demand.’ (Rose, 1993 p.291-2) 
Rose’s argument is directed particularly at the social sciences and economics, 
and as he suggests, the discontinuity between welfarist and advanced liberal 
strategies of rule should be understood as different problematisations of rule 
rather than as a strict periodisation. (Rose, 1993 p.285) The degree to which 
ecological governmentality can be characterised in this way is a matter that I will 
return to in the final chapter. Here I will note that the problematisation of the 
environment as an object of government would appear, at least in northern 
Europe, to give credence to the notion of an ecological version of the welfare 
state. However, it is certainly the case that since the late 1980s there has been 
considerable debate about ‘state failure’ with respect to environmental protection 
and increasing attention to the role of market-based instruments in regulating 
environmental behaviour.189 
Rose and Miller (1992 p.178-9) suggest that governmental (or political) 
rationalities characteristically possess moral, epistemological, and idiomatic 
elements. 190 It is the epistemological character that is perhaps most important in 
environmental discourse, for it is in this domain that governmental rationalities 
are articulated in terms of a specifically ecological knowledge of the objects and 
problems to be addressed. In this case the epistemology originates in scientific 
ecology: it is this that provides the authoritative accounts of the sorts of entities 
which environmental government must be concerned with managing - 
ecosystems, global climate and atmospheric processes, habitat and species 
diversity, population and carrying capacity, etc. 
                                                 
188 There is a parallel here with theorists such as Beck, who argues that ‘risk society’ comes into 
being partially as a result of the success of welfarism and economic growth. See Chapter 4 of 
this thesis. 
189 See Eckersley (1995), and also my discussion of notions of ‘ecological modernisation’ in 
Rutherford (1999a). 
190 In particular, environmental concerns have produced a vast outpouring of discourse on ethical 
and normative questions. 
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Ecology as regulatory science 
Hence, consistent with Rose and Miller’s characterisation of governmental 
rationalities, scientific expertise can be said to be fundamental to the both the 
political and epistemic definition of contemporary environmental problems.191 In 
its modern form ecology emerged in the 1940s and 1950s, based on an ‘energy-
economic model’ of the environment in which the essential feature was the flow 
of energy through ecosystems. (Jamison, 1993 p.189; Worster, 1987a p.311, 339) 
This bio-economic paradigm, or systems ecology, is a product of twentieth 
century science, a distinctly transnational enterprise drawing upon European and 
US national scientific traditions, but appearing in its contemporary form in the US 
in the period since World War Two. Despite the popularising of nature in holistic, 
and sometimes organicist terms, the bio-economic model can be said to express an 
‘agronomic attitude toward nature’ which has sought to provide the analytic tools 
needed to ‘intensively farm’ the Earth’s resources. (Jamison, 1993 p.193) 
The language of modern systems ecology reflects this, abounding with 
agronomic and economic terms such as producers, consumers, total energy 
income, yield, crop, gross and net productivity, nutrient capital, competitive 
exclusion, energy budget, efficiency, etc. Modern scientific ecology from the 
1940s came to see itself as ‘the science of natural economics’ in which nature 
became a ‘a modernised economic system, ... a corporate state, a chain of 
factories, and assembly line’. Not surprisingly conflict is often seen as having 
‘little place in such a well-regulated economy.’ (Worster, 1987a p.311-13) By the 
mid to late 1980s, this science-based model of the social relation to nature was 
increasingly incorporated into a set of governmental programs based on a political 
rationality that Albert Weale has labelled ecological modernisation. This 
perspective challenges the view of an inherent conflict between environmental 
protection and economic growth per se and instead sees the maintenance of a 
healthy environment as an essential precondition for long-term economic 
development. (Weale, 1992 p.31) 192 This view shaped the emergence of a 
complex raft of ‘sustainable development’ policies that by the early 1990s had 
gained widespread influence with national governments and international 
                                                 
191 This is particularly evident when one considers the importance of complex mathematical 
modelling of the global environment (popularised by The Limits to Growth). The current 
approach to global warming is a far more sophisticated, and more politically influential, 
response involving more complex computer modelling of global phenomena than that of The 
Limits to Growth three decades ago. See Buttel and Taylor (1992) p.218, 221-2, and 
Rutherford (1997a). 
192 The claim that economic development and environmental quality are mutually exclusive is 
associated with the counter-cultural aspects of environmentalism (eg ‘deep ecology’) – or what 
Eder describes as the purity model of nature. See Chapter 4 of this thesis. See also (Eder, 
1996) 
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institutions through the United Nations Conference on Environment and 
Development process.193 Ecology can thus be seen as developing from the 1950s 
and extending into the 1990s, as the rationale behind a new, and increasingly 
influential, form of political economy. 
The rise of the systems approach to ecology occurred in a very specific 
historical and cultural context. In a general sense systems ecology appears as the 
product of the industrialisation of science. The emergence of ‘big science’ during 
and after World War Two saw the organisation of scientific research in the US 
along large-scale, capital-intensive, corporate lines, where research output 
increasingly became an important contributor to economic growth and national 
power. Applied systems ecology in this period gained significant impetus from 
work conducted by the US Atomic Energy Commission, originating in the 
Manhattan Project, into the problems of nuclear waste and radiation ecology. 
(Kwa, 1993) Jamison points to three ways in which the post-war development of 
modern systems ecology was shaped by the US institutional and cultural context 
in which it emerged. First the industrialisation of science and the influence this 
new industrial setting had on generating the view of ecology as ‘a powerful 
technique of social engineering ... (which could potentially) ... regulate and 
control the flows of pollutants and other human interventions through large scale 
ecosystems.’ (Jamison, 1993 p.197-8) Second, the availability and popularity in 
the US of powerful computer technology that allowed the unparalleled application 
of mathematical models to natural processes. This was a direct extension of the 
conceptualisation of ecological interactions as cybernetic, ‘self-regulating, 
feedback systems’ that had emerged originally from the use of computers in the 
Manhattan Project for the development of weapons guidance systems. Third, an 
American tradition combining the influence of a utilitarian Progressive-era 
conservation philosophy with the legacy of pragmatic regional planning programs 
of the 1930s facilitated the development of an approach to ecology that lent itself 
to large-scale environmental control and management. (Jamison, 1993 p.194-8; 
Worster, 1987a p.312)  
While the industrialisation of science, including ecology, became evident in 
the US towards the end of World War Two and grew during the 1950s, 
environmental concerns throughout the 1950s and early 1960s tended to reflect 
the professional interests of scientists. (Cramer et al., 1989 p.96-7) These 
professional research interests played a significant role in the development of a 
coherent, science-based environmentalism through the International Geophysical 
Year (1957-8) and the International Biological Program (1964-74). The IBP in 
particular was a massive transnational enterprise involving research in 97 
                                                 
193 The UNCED report, Our Common Future (Brundtland, 1987) provides a particularly clear 
statement of how this new political rationality is deeply embedded in the discourse on 
sustainable development. 
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countries directed towards the understanding of the biological basis of 
productivity and human welfare. The work of the IBP emphasised areas of 
research which were ‘calculated to benefit from international collaboration, and 
were urgent because of the rapid rate of changes taking place in all environments 
throughout the world.’ The focus of the IBP was distinctively ecological in 
character, being directed towards understanding ‘organic production ... and the 
potentialities and uses of new and existing natural resources, ... (as well as) human 
adaptability to change.’ (Worthington, 1983 p.165) 194 
The sorts of extensive, transnational research programs on ecological issues 
mentioned above came throughout the 1960s and 1970s increasingly to 
characterise scientific and political discourse on the environment. From the end of 
the 1960s, through the establishment of a wide range of environmental legislation 
and enforcement agencies, the advanced industrialised countries experienced a 
rapid growth of state intervention directed at environmental regulation and 
planning. Ecological and environmental research in the 1970s thus laid the 
foundation for public policies of significant economic and political impact, 
particularly in terms of the regulatory intervention in the activities of industry. In 
financial terms alone these are significant,195 however of more general importance 
is that the period since the early 1970s has seen the significant institutionalisation 
of what could be described as forms of ecological governmentality. Two 
important aspects of this have been the growth of what has been described as 
regulatory science, and the international spread of procedures for environmental 
impact assessment (EIA). 
Sheila Jasanoff has used the notion of regulatory science to characterise the 
widespread reliance of the advanced industrial state on extensive networks of 
expert scientific advisory bodies. The increasing integration of science and policy 
making has become a central feature of environmental (and health) regulation in 
such states (Beck, 1992a; Hart and Victor, 1993; Jasanoff, 1990) as well as in 
international institutions and processes. (Hass, 1990) 196 Adapting the 
                                                 
194 For discussion of the importance of the IBP for the growth and institutionalisation of modern 
scientific ecology, see Kwa (1987); Bocking (1995); Caldwell (1991) p.261; Egerton (1983) 
p.268-71; Golley (1993) p.109-166; McIntosh (1985) p.213-41. 
195 For example, the direct cost of complying with US pollution control regulations is estimated to 
be in excess of US$100 billion per year (Jasanoff, 1992 p.195). The US commercial market for 
the transport, storage and disposal of hazardous wastes alone was $US 3,000 million per year 
in 1997, while environmental remediation and consulting services was around $US 8,000 
million in the same year. (HazNews, 1998 p.1) 
196 Hass uses the term ‘epistemic communities’ to refer to the role played by scientists in bringing 
specialised knowledge into the policy-making process on environmental issues at the 
transnational level. While Hass and his supporters are cautious about the applicability of this 
approach beyond the specific cases studied, the work of Jasanoff (1990), Jamison (1993) and 
others clearly suggests that a rigid separation between ‘science’ and ‘policy’ and the 
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‘governmentality’ approach to encompass the phenomenon of regulatory science 
focuses attention on the key political role such expert advisory groups play as loci 
of epistemological legitimation and policing. By framing the definition of 
ecological risks and by certifying what is to count as scientifically acceptable 
knowledge of the natural world, regulatory science and the extended ‘epistemic 
communities’ of policy makers with which such science is integrated, provides 
what Rose and Miller (1992) term ‘the intellectual machinery of government’. 
While attempts to define environment-society relationships in terms of systems 
ecology produce a high level of technical uncertainty and thus the potential for 
social conflict, regulatory science can be understood as an example of how liberal 
governmentality disassociates the ‘substantive authority of expertise from the 
apparatuses of political rule’. (Rose, 1993 p.285) This is a theme that also 
emerges in the work of Beck, although with somewhat less sophistication than is 
evident in that of the ‘governmentality’ approach. 
The rapid expansion of social regulation associated with the growth of 
discourse on ecological problems from the 1970s produced a largely new domain 
for the biopolitical administration of life. The population became the target for a 
new form of ecological security and welfare in which environmental agencies and 
the professional disciplines required by them set about the task of protecting the 
public from hazardous and environmentally damaging technologies. Such 
programs of government demanded ‘ever more complex predictive analyses of the 
risks and benefits of regulation.’ (Jasanoff, 1990 p.3) As Brian Wynne has noted, 
the regulatory ‘turn to science’, as an attempt to provide greater stability and 
legitimacy in environmental policy, ‘also in important respects ... defined society, 
by tacitly defining the scope and nature of social intervention in public policy risk 
decisions.’ (Wynne, 1992 p.746-8) The increasing importance of ecology as a 
regulatory science is therefore a particularly significant articulation of the 
biopolitics that Foucault saw as characteristic of modern governmental 
rationalities. The emergence of ecology as a regulatory science is clearly linked to 
the growth of ‘big science’, despite the anti-corporatist orientation of many 
environmental movements. Indeed a notable feature of regulatory science is the 
central role state agencies and industrial interests (especially transnational 
corporations) play in the normative constitution of ecological knowledge, that is, 
in the manufacture, negotiation and certification of knowledge. (Wynne, 1992 
p.754) Regulatory ecological science does not so much describe the environment 
as both actively constitute it as an object of knowledge and, through various 
modes of positive intervention, manage and police it. 
These biopolitical strategies for the regulation of the ecological life of entire 
populations could be regarded as illiberal, inasmuch as their focus is less on the 
                                                                                                                                     
‘domestic’ and ‘international’ manifestations of the science-policy interrelationship is open to 
question. 
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interests of the individual than on the population and the broader ‘ecosystem’. 
However in some regards the environment can be understood in much the same 
way as the economy; for liberal government the task would thus be how to take 
proper account of this other natural realm, particularly given the close 
interdependence between the two. Posed in this way, the problem of nature is 
subject to the same sorts of questions regarding the methods of rule as are applied 
to the economy. The ecological injunction that everything is connected to 
everything else reproduces in the environmental sphere a problem similar to that 
of the opacity of economic processes, and suggests also the impossibility of a 
comprehensive environmental sovereignty. One the one hand, environmental 
problems are subject to natural laws, and must therefore be dealt with by technical 
means based on expert knowledge. On the other hand, governmental authorities 
(both state and non-state) must also take into account the effect that these natural 
processes have on the wealth and welfare of citizens, both collectively at the level 
of the population and as individuals and hence their effect on ‘the economy’. This 
raises the problem of the legitimacy of such authorities. (Rose, 1993 p.292)  
The resort to scientific expertise, particularly in the institutional form 
provided by regulatory science, is in this respect consistent with the liberal 
response to the dilemma of too little government versus too much. As was seen in 
previous discussion of Beck, the lack of a political centre capable of subjecting 
the ‘mega’ risks generated by economic and technological development to any 
effective form of public accountability or authorisation is a chronic problem for 
ecological discourse. If as I have argued, environmental problems are yet another 
side of what Foucault called the ‘population-riches problem’, it will be impossible 
in practice to separate ecological issues from the sorts questions that arise for 
liberalism in relation to governing the economy. This is not to suggest that the 
responses will be identical, but simply that the problem of governing the 
environment will be subject to a similar set of constraints, as governing 
environmental performance means intervening in the economic activities of 
individuals and companies. 197 
Environmental assessment & modelling as technologies of 
government 
Foucault suggested that it is often in the mundane and humble procedures of 
examination and assessment at the micro-level that we can discern the operation 
of biopower. In this context the technique of environmental impact assessment 
(EIA) provides a useful illustration of one aspect of ecological governmentality. 
As noted above, a major element in the response to environmental problems from 
                                                 
197 One need only look at the burgeoning of environmental economics as a significant discipline in 
the past twenty years to appreciate this point. 
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the 1960s onwards has involved substantive legislation aimed at regulating 
particular pollutants. However, the 1969 introduction of the US National 
Environment Policy Act (NEPA) marked an important departure from this 
traditional legal-juridical path. The NEPA adopted a procedural approach to 
environment protection requiring the preparation of detailed environmental 
impact statements for major development projects that had the potential to 
significantly affect the environment. By the 1980s the US EIA process had been 
adapted and implemented in one form or another in many other industrialised 
countries. EIA sets out statutory criteria for ecological assessment requiring 
government agencies to take account of these criteria in their decision making.  
However, EIA goes beyond legislating for a science-based, ‘rational-
comprehensive’ assessment and decision-making process. While studies do point 
to the capacity of EIA to improve the effectiveness, coordination and legitimacy 
of environmental planning decisions, others suggest that these legal-formal 
mechanisms also utilise a range of what Wandesforde-Smith has described as 
‘powerful, informal incentives’ within government to ‘produce agencies that 
continuously and progressively think about environmental values.’ (Bartlett, 1990 
p.90) EIA can be understood as operating in a highly flexible, self-regulating 
manner involving continuous mediation between the internal formation of 
environmental programs and objectives within organisations (not just state 
agencies but also non-governmental organisations and private corporations), and 
the external political and economic context within which these operate. This 
suggests that EIA processes have the ability to implement environmental 
management not simply by juridical ‘command and control’ methods. Rather, 
through a set of ecological norms and administrative procedures, it is capable of 
channelling problem solving in particular directions that stimulate State agencies, 
private companies and other social actors to be both innovative and effective in 
the implementation of ecological goals. (Bartlett, 1990) 
Bartlett argues that where EIA is successful, that is, where it substantively 
influences the direction and outcome of environmental planning and economic 
activity, it does so ‘by changing, formally and informally, the premises and rules 
for arriving at legitimate decisions.’ (Bartlett, 1990 p.91) Thus he argues that EIA 
creates an ‘insidious’ mechanism for imbedding ecological modes of thought and 
environmental values into the actions of organisations and individuals. 
By establishing, continuously reaffirming and progressively legitimating 
environmental values and ecological criteria as standards by which 
individual actions are to be structured, chosen, and evaluated, EIA 
institutionalises substantive ecological rationality. ... It changes patterns 
of relationships among organisations and among individuals inside and 
outside organisations. It creates powerful incentives, formal and informal, 
that thereafter force a great deal of learning and self-regulation upon 
individual and organisational actors. And it provides opportunities for 
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individuals to develop and affirm environmental values and to press for 
innovative adaptation of structures and processes to a changing political 
world. (Bartlett, 1990 p.91-2) 
The particular strength of EIA, and that which separates it from the simple 
legislative imposition of controls (such as permissible discharge levels for 
pollutants), is that it structures the institutional and normative fields in which 
actions and governmental programs take place without specifying final outcomes. 
It establishes a governmental technology, which simultaneously guides and 
problematises actions in relation to the environment in which juridical techniques 
are subsumed under the effectivity of the norm. These sorts of techniques also 
incorporate what Foucault described as a ‘pastoral’ attitude, where government is 
understood in terms of the metaphor of ‘the shepherd and his flock’. Such a view 
sees the goal of government as the promotion of ‘the well-being of its subjects’ by 
means of an intimate and continuous regulation of behaviour, 198 and is thus more 
concerned with the welfare or security of subjects than is the liberal concern with 
autonomy. This is a basic normative perspective, which is deeply embedded in 
almost all schools of environmental thought - the notion of wise stewardship as 
fundamental to the management of all-encompassing ecological relationships. 
The EIA process (including the conduct of scientific environmental impact 
studies) is often criticised because these are generally conducted by the 
development proponents themselves, and as a consequence frequently suffer from 
‘technical flaws’, ‘incomplete presentation of information’ and therefore cannot 
be regarded as a substitute for ‘overall planning’. (Walker, 1989 p.33) Such an 
argument may miss the point, 199 for it is precisely by incorporating the developer 
and other non-environmental state agencies into the process of problem definition 
that EIA internalises and normalises ecological analysis and behaviour within 
individual and organisational actors. This of course is not to suggest that such 
techniques cannot become co-opted to immediate, short-term political 
manoeuvring by politicians and governments - clearly, they can be and are from 
time to time. 200 Nor is it to suggest that the proponents of developments do not 
pursue commercial self-interest – the question is, under what political rationality 
                                                 
198 Foucault saw the practice of police science as clear example of this pastoral attitude. See 
Foucault (1981c) and also Hindess (1996) p.118-23. 
199 See also Rutherford 1994b. 
200 It is perhaps the case that EIA ‘works’ best as a technology of government the more distant it is 
from the political interventions of executive government. This is because a development that is 
a political issue for politicians is one that has by definition already mobilised powerful 
competing interests, and these interests have brought the issues into the arena of executive 
government as part of a strategy aimed at protecting those interests. Anyone with practical 
experience in environmental regulation will know that the number of development projects that 
become political issues in this way is a relatively small proportion. In most cases, it is simply 
much easier and far quicker to do what is necessary under the EIA process. 
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are such interests pursued, and what effect does this have on the way actions are 
governed? That these questions will almost always be overlaid with other 
particular economic and political effects needs to be considered.  
Nevertheless, at the broader strategic level of political rationalities, EIA can 
be described as a means of institutionalising ecological rationality in 
governmental and social choice mechanisms. (Bartlett, 1990 p.88-9) EIA is of 
course in part a regulatory mechanism in the legal-juridical sense, but it is more 
than this. It attempts to enhance the effectiveness of government (in the 
Foucauldian sense) in regulating the complex and multiple materiality of the 
species body, both by institutionalising a scientised form of administrative 
apparatus, and more importantly perhaps, by opening up the species body 
(population) in a new way to that generalised ‘modality of intervention’ 
characterised by Foucault as panopticism. Hence, a fundamental feature of EIA is 
that it also functions as a normalising strategy, that is, it does not mandate specific 
outcomes from the centre, but sets up a framework for rationalising behaviour in 
particular ways. In other words, EIA brings into being new relations of power 
through an interpenetrating cluster of positive norms of internal self-control and 
external regulation that effect a policing of specific practices of the population, 
both at a general institutional level and through what Foucault describes as a 
‘positive intervention in the behaviour of individuals.’ (Foucault, 1988b p.159) 
Using Mitchell Dean’s (1998b) terminology, Environmental Impact Assessment 
can be described as a technology of performance, as it functions ‘to monitor, 
compare, and evaluate the performance of those whose agency is thereby 
activated.’ Such technologies of performance are ‘utilised from above, as indirect 
means of regulating agencies, at transforming professionals into “calculating 
individuals” within “calculable spaces”, subject to particular “calculative 
regimes”, to use Miller’s language (1992).’ (Dean 1998b, p.36) 
Another illustration of these relations of biopolitics in the natural sciences can 
be found by examining the role played by computer modelling in the construction 
of knowledge of global environmental change, or the ‘greenhouse effect’.201 The 
discourse on global environmental change has many of the characteristics 
previously discussed. Within the institutional context of a highly technical, 
transnational science, the extension of scientific knowledge to the world beyond 
the laboratory involves the interpretation of outputs of complex computer models 
of the global atmosphere and oceans, 202 along with the techniques of monitoring 
and standardisation in which such knowledge is embodied. As I shall discuss 
further in subsequent chapters, the extension of this type of apparently esoteric 
scientific knowledge outside the laboratory necessarily involves an adjustment of 
                                                 
201 The example used here previously appeared in Rutherford (1997a) p554-6. 
202 Known as ‘general circulation models’. 
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‘non-scientific practices and situations’ outside of the laboratory so as to make 
these ‘amenable to the employment of scientific materials and practices’. (Rouse, 
1987 p.211) Extending scientific knowledge and techniques outside of the 
laboratory brings about a strategic realignment of power relations by disciplining 
and structuring the social and physical environment in which non-scientific agents 
act. 
The specific consequences of this are illustrated by Taylor and Buttel, who 
argue that the largely uncritical acceptance by social scientists and environmental 
movements of the unproblematic ‘reality’ of the knowledge-constructs of the 
natural sciences is instrumental in the production of a complex set of hierarchical 
political and economic alignments. (Buttel and Taylor, 1992) These alignments 
are shaped by the theories, techniques, and instruments of highly formalised 
physical sciences and of systems ecology, which privilege ‘global constructions of 
ecological knowledge’ in ways that allow programs of environmental 
management to be grafted onto a set of dominant ‘geo-political institutions’. 
(Buttel and Taylor, 1992 p.226) In particular, the privileged status accorded to 
theories and models drawn from the physical sciences has facilitated the 
development of a strategic ‘coincidence of interests’ between environmental 
groups, scientists, and institutions such as the World Bank and international 
development agencies, which seek to discipline future development in the less 
developed States. (Taylor and Buttel, 1992 p.412)  
The scientific construction of knowledge of the global environmental risks 
aggregates population and resources in ways that obscure the differential impact 
of environmental problems and policies on regional and local populations and 
groups within those populations, or as Beck argues, that cut across traditional 
interest alignments. Thus, Taylor and Buttel argue that such technical knowledge 
constructions function simultaneously as a scientific concept and as an ‘ideology’ 
that helps structure sociopolitical relationships in particular ways ‘to erect a new 
global regulatory order’. (Buttel and Taylor, 1992 p.222) This regulatory order 
reflects the way in which the government of environmental risk produces ‘a 
division between active citizens (capable of managing their own risk) and targeted 
populations (disadvantaged groups, the ‘at risk’, the high-risk etc) who require 
intervention in the management of risks. (Dean, 1998b p.35) As Dean notes such a 
division involves the deployment of quite different types of governmental 
technologies, and is characteristic of neo-liberal ‘prudentialism’ which relies on 
the enhanced role of professional expertise, especially that associated with the 
prediction, quantification and prevention of risk factors. 203 Environmental Impact 
Assessment discussed above is an example of a type of governmental technology 
                                                 
203 The issue of ecological risk, as I have argued in Chapter 4, is a central concern in Beck’s work. 
Dean (1998b) provides a highly perceptive critique of Beck’s somewhat simplistic treatment of 
risk, by drawing on the work of Foucault and governmentality studies. 
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applied to active citizens – it is primarily directed at professionally educated 
engineers, business people and government officials capable of ‘regulated 
autonomy’ to use Rose and Miller’s (1992) terminology. It differs from the 
governmental technologies applied to targeted populations such as school children 
whose exposure to high levels of ultraviolet radiation in the summer months is 
regulated through the disciplining of dress codes and spatial distribution (in the 
school ground) of the ‘at risk’ population.204 
Central to global climate science is a reliance on complex computer 
modelling of the global environment that incorporates the systems approach to 
ecology referred to earlier in this chapter. Since the 1970s there have been two 
major elements in such global modelling. The first involved the use of the 
concepts of system dynamics to make predictions about the impact of future 
population growth, resource use and pollution output on the world economy and 
environment. This resulted in The Limits to Growth report which used these 
computer simulations to argue that continued population growth would lead to the 
depletion of the world’s stocks of non-renewable natural resources and precipitate 
a global economic collapse, unless coordinated policies for a no-growth, ‘steady-
state’ economy were implemented world-wide. (Meadows et al., 1972) The 
Limits to Growth was both widely criticised and defended, but regardless of the 
merits of the forecasts made in the report, it had a major influence in constructing 
the contemporary ecological representation of the world. The core of this 
representation is the concept of a single global system and the problematisation of 
the relationships between population, resources and the natural environment. The 
report thus provided a coherent, popularised articulation of the themes of systems 
ecology that was embraced by environmental movements in the industrialised 
countries, and which helped shape political support for new forms of 
environmental regulation. (Taylor and Buttel, 1992 p.409-10) 
The second element of global climate modelling, in the form of general 
circulation models of the atmosphere, came to prominence in the 1980s. These 
models were initially designed to predict the future course and impact of human 
induced changes to atmospheric chemistry, most notably increases in carbon 
dioxide levels. In the late 1980s, the modelling was further extended to develop 
scenarios of the impact of climate change on global agriculture and biodiversity, 
as well as economic and security consequences. Unlike The Limits to Growth, 
climate modelling has been able to command substantial scientific and 
institutional influence and resources, both within the national science-policy 
communities of the advanced industrial states and within international and 
transnational bodies such as the United Nations and the OECD. In particular 
climate modelling provided both the scientific rationale and technical tools for the 
                                                 
204 See note 174 above. 
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work of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change carried out under the 
auspices of the World Meteorological Organisation. It was this work which led to 
the establishment of a framework convention on climate change at the UN 
Conference on Environment and Development (the ‘Earth Summit’) in 1992. 205 
Conclusion 
Systems ecology, and the highly mathematised natural sciences (such as 
atmospheric chemistry and physics) involved in global ecosystem modelling exert 
a powerful influence across a wide range of environmental policy and social 
planning areas. The ecological sciences are fundamental to key aspects of 
contemporary biopolitics - ecological discourse both problematises numerous 
areas of life while at the same time elaborating programs of environmental 
intervention aimed at normalising the social relation to nature in specific, 
ecologically benign ways. The contemporary notion of the environment is 
constituted as inherently problematic by the development of specialised scientific 
(as well as legal and moral) discourse on ecology. This specialised discourse 
provides what Rose and Miller (1992) have described as ‘the intellectual 
machinery of government’, through which social relations with nature are 
thematised and brought into the domain of ‘conscious political calculation’ 
through the formation of programs of government. Such programs 
presuppose that the real is programmable, that it is a domain subject to 
certain determinants, rules, norms and processes that can be acted upon 
and improved by authorities. They make the objects of government 
thinkable in such a way that their ills appear susceptible to diagnosis, 
prescription and cure by calculating and normalising intervention. (Rose 
and Miller, 1992 p.182) 
Central to these activities is the production and use of knowledge by experts. 
The formation of ecological programs of government occurs to a significant 
degree within the institutional context of regulatory science, in which 
environmental experts simultaneously provide scientifically authoritative 
technical judgments and politically legitimised policies. Programs of government 
therefore embody knowledgeable accounts of what are considered legitimate 
problems, and the goals and objectives to be pursued in addressing them. 
However, programs must be capable of being deployed on the population, brought 
to bear on the ‘species body’ through a range of interventions and regulatory 
instruments. The means of making programs operable can be considered the 
technologies of government. (Rose and Miller, 1992 p.175) I have suggested that 
the technique of environmental impact assessment can be thought of as an 
                                                 
205 For a detailed historical study of the role of scientific elites in mediating between science and 
policy in the early years of climate change research see Hart and Victor (1993). 
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example of such a technology of government which expresses most clearly the 
sorts of productive relations of power Foucault calls biopolitics. In a similar vein 
Eric Darier’s (Darier, 1995) study of Canada’s Green Plan provides an 
illuminating example, in the ecological domain, of what Rose and Miller describe 
as a program of government. 206 
It is important to emphasise that what is being argued here is not that 
ecological governmentality is part of some simple, unidirectional and generalised 
extension of state domination of society, much less an expression of Adorno’s 
totally administered society. Rather, the developments described here reflect what 
Foucault referred to as ‘the ‘governmentalisation’ of the state’. (Foucault, 1991c) 
Government, understood as the attempt to implement all those more or less 
formally articulated plans, projects and practices that seek to systematically shape 
the conduct of individuals, groups and populations, is not the exclusive domain of 
the state. Indeed, the complexity of modern society appears to engender an 
increasing reliance on liberal techniques of government, which depend on 
governing at a distance, ‘seeking to create locales, entities and persons able to 
operate a regulated autonomy.’ (Rose and Miller, 1992 p.173) Thus, as suggested 
in this chapter, non-state actors, particularly professionals, academics and social 
movements contribute to the governmentalisation of life by entering into complex 
and potentially unstable relations with state agencies, other institutions and 
political forces. 
This chapter has suggested that Foucault’s work on biopolitics holds promise 
for a more sophisticated understanding of contemporary environmental concerns. 
No consideration of ecological problems can ignore the biological problem posed 
by the impact of populations on the available stock of natural resources. As I have 
shown, this is precisely the problem Foucault situates as fundamental to 
biopolitics. Thus there is an overlap, although not developed by Foucault himself, 
in which the ‘entry of life into history’ is both a biopolitical and ecological (or 
eco-political) phenomenon. Life in the modern biological sense, enters history 
precisely because the mechanisms of biological life become the objects of both 
‘reason of state’ and ‘government’ in the broader sense described by Foucault. In 
this respect, biological life becomes simultaneously an object of scientific 
knowledge, state strategic calculation, market capitalisation and ethical discourse, 
                                                 
206  Darier argues that the notion of governmentality is directly relevant to understanding the 
application of environmental policy. His study of the Canadian Green Plan emphasises that it 
is best understood as ‘a clear attempt to discipline the population by “instilling” new norms of 
environmental conduct and, thus, (it) constructs a new subjectivity based on “environmental 
citizenship”.’ Darier also notes that the Green Plan should also be seen as ‘an example of 
resistance against other prevalent kinds of subjectification – such as the “market” – and could 
constitute one of the conditions for the emergence of a subsequent green “self” with all the 
dangers that this entails.’ (Darier, 1995) 
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and in so doing, also becomes the subject of articulated, explicit governmental 
rationalities. 
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Chapter 7 
Foucault’s incomplete critique of the sovereignty 
 
Introduction 
In the preceding chapter it was suggested that because Foucault restricted his 
attention to the role of the human sciences in the development of biopower, he did 
not consider the way in which the political and economic problematisation of 
population give rise to a similar problematisation of the natural environment. 
Nevertheless, it was argued that his approach to biopolitics and governmentality 
could be extended to help understand the growth of environmental discourse and 
ecopolitical programs of government. 
The current chapter turns to a consideration of Foucault’s approach to the 
relationship between power and natural scientific knowledge. More particularly, 
this chapter examines the way in which his treatment of agency and the subject 
influenced his apparent lack of interest in the relationship between the ‘hard’ 
natural sciences and social power. This relationship is an issue on which Foucault 
was considerably more ambiguous than in his studies of the human sciences. As 
the preceding chapter has indicated, environmental discourses draw heavily on 
knowledge from the natural sciences. If the Foucauldian analysis of the relation 
between expertise, knowledge and the government of conduct is to be useful in 
those instances where knowledge is primarily drawn from the sciences of nature 
rather than of society, then it is necessary to ask whether the natural sciences are 
in any decisive sense less embroiled in relations of power than the human 
sciences? 
These are the issues examined in this and the following chapter. Here my 
focus is on the apparent inconsistency between Foucault’s approach to the natural 
and human sciences. I argue that this inconsistency can be explained by 
Foucault’s failure to break with the notion of sovereignty as fully as has been 
claimed, both by Foucault himself and by many of those commenting on his work. 
One consequence of this is that while Foucault understands the subject as the 
product of historically contingent relations of power, discipline and scientific 
objectification, he nonetheless still insists on a fundamental distinction between 
actions on human agents and actions on non-human things. 
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Foucault’s characterisation of the natural sciences 
 
One problem in attempting to determine the status of the natural sciences in 
Foucault’s work is that he does not deal with these in a comprehensive manner, 
and if anything, the attention they receive diminishes as his work developed over 
time. Thus, the most systematic consideration of the natural sciences is to be 
found in his earlier archaeological works (particularly The Archaeology of 
Knowledge and The Order of Things), in which, as Rabinow says, discourse tends 
to be ‘bracketed off from the social practices and institutions in which it is 
embedded’, (Rabinow, 1984a p.9-10) with the consequence that the non-
discursive and institutional elements of scientific practice are not dealt with in a 
substantial way.  
A second problem is that any attempt to apply the insights of Foucault’s 
analyses of the human sciences to the natural sciences must confront the apparent 
distinction he made between the two, including the way in which he allowed a 
less epistemologically problematic status to certain natural sciences (eg 
mathematics, chemistry) than the human sciences. As with his analysis of the 
emergence of the human sciences, Foucault saw the earlier development of the 
natural sciences as having their origins in techniques of discipline and social 
regulation. In particular, he suggested that the investigatory practices of Church in 
the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, and particularly The Inquisition, provided 
both an ‘operating model’ and the ‘technical matrix’ for the nascent natural 
sciences. 
It is worth recalling the connection Foucault (1979b) claimed exists here. The 
investigatory or inquisitorial practices arose in conjunction with the 
reorganisation of the Church and proliferation of the monarchical states in 
Europe. Its origin then was political, linked to the ‘birth of the states and of 
monarchical sovereignty’, but apart from serving this explicitly political-juridical 
function it also contributed, as a cluster of ‘regulated techniques’, to the formation 
of knowledge. ‘In fact’, said Foucault, ‘the investigation has been the no doubt 
crude, but fundamental element in the constitution of the empirical sciences.’ The 
‘terrible power’ of the practices of investigation enabled the proliferation of the 
‘great empirical knowledge that covered the things of the world and transcribed 
them into the ordering of an infinite discourse that observes, describes and 
establishes the ‘facts’ (at a time when the western world was beginning the 
economic and political conquest of this same world)’. Significantly however, 
Foucault claims that ‘although it is true that, in becoming a technique for the 
empirical sciences, the investigation has detached itself from the inquisitorial 
procedure, in which it was historically rooted, the examination has remained 
extremely close to the disciplinary power that shaped it.’ (Foucault, 1979b p.224-
6 emphasis added)  In other words, both the natural and human sciences share a 
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common historical origin in disciplinary technology. Whereas the natural sciences 
have somehow succeeded in detaching themselves from the inquisitorial model, 
the human sciences with their reliance on the practices of ‘the examination’, have 
remained enmeshed in disciplinary power. (Foucault, 1979b p.227) Foucault did 
not elaborate in Discipline and Punish or in subsequent writings, how and why 
this divergence should occur. 
Some explanation of this may be found in his earlier works. In The 
Archaeology of Knowledge, Foucault distinguished four ‘thresholds’ or stages in 
the emergence of discursive formations. 207 Perhaps most significant in 
considering the development of the natural sciences as largely autonomous bodies 
of knowledge removed from direct implication in disciplinary power, is what 
Foucault called the ‘threshold of scientificity’. This is when the basic 
archaeological rules governing statements within a discursive formation are 
further supplemented by more specific laws or rules governing the construction of 
propositions in accordance with the accepted norms of a scientific methodology. 
(Foucault, 1972 p.186-7; Gutting, 1989 p.252-3) This indicates that the difference 
between the thresholds of epistemologisation and scientificity is largely, perhaps 
even exclusively, one of the degree of precision, rigour and formalisation. 
(Grumley, 1989 p.252) Certainly Foucault states that it is primarily a matter of the 
extent to which the statements and propositions that constitute a discursive 
formation obey formal criteria.208 Elsewhere he suggests that in order to be 
definable as a science, an ‘epistemological configuration’ must possess the 
characteristics of ‘objectivity’ and ‘systemacity’. (Foucault, 1970 p.365) 
As pointed out in Chapter 5, Foucault’s work was not a critique of rationality 
in general. Gutting’s detailed analysis of the relation of Foucault’s archaeology to 
the history of science of Bachelard and Canguilhem, demonstrates that neither 
was it a critique of scientific rationality nor of the natural sciences per se. 
(Gutting, 1989 p.255) The focus was not on the systematic or rigorous natural 
sciences, but on the human sciences, those ‘dubious’ disciplines that have not yet 
crossed and may never cross, this threshold of scientificity to detach themselves 
from relations of power. Foucault’s critique, therefore, was primarily directed at 
specific applications of biology to human beings (via medicine, psychiatry, etc) 
and to the human sciences in general, that is, it was directed at particular historical 
applications of knowledge dealing with the ways in which human beings, as 
distinct from non-human nature, are constituted as subjects by, and of, power.  
                                                 
207 These four thresholds are those of positivity, epistemologisation, scientificity, and 
formalisation. See Foucault (1972) p.186-189. 
208  That is, when the statements of a discursive formation ‘comply not only with archaeological 
rules of formation, but also with certain laws for the construction of propositions.’ (Foucault, 
1972 p.187) 
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In one sense Foucault appeared to regard the natural sciences as less 
problematic, from the point of view of their connection to social power, because 
these have become bodies of knowledge that have crossed the threshold of 
scientificity to obey formal criteria in a way that gives rise to ‘relatively stable 
practices and objects’ in a manner somewhat similar to Kuhn’s conception of 
normal science. (Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1982 p.116). In another sense, the natural 
sciences were treated by Foucault as too problematic because the relationship 
between sciences such as theoretical physics, organic chemistry or mathematics, 
and relations of social power involve what he suggested are ‘excessively 
complicated’ questions in which the ‘threshold of possible explanations (is) 
impossibly high’. (Foucault, 1980d p.109-10) Foucault thus seemed to say that the 
interconnection between this type of scientific knowledge and the effects of power 
are extremely attenuated and not readily amenable to social analysis in a way that 
he found politically interesting or important. 209 His focus was thus on the human 
sciences, those ‘dubious’ disciplines such as medicine and psychiatry that are 
‘profoundly enmeshed in social structures’. What makes the human sciences both 
significant and interesting on this account is precisely the role these play in 
defining the historical conditions of emergence of particular modes of human 
subjectivity and the ways in which awareness of this historicity opens up 
possibilities for transforming these subjectivities. 
Could Foucault’s claim that the natural sciences were able to detach 
themselves from power relations reflect an acceptance that there is a fundamental 
difference between the objects of human and natural sciences? While Foucault’s 
approach to the natural sciences is by no means that of simple realism,210 he 
nevertheless did not adequately provide any strong arguments for accepting that 
the natural sciences, as discursive constructs, should be regarded as anything 
                                                 
209  For an interesting Foucault-influenced analysis of the ‘capitalising’ of molecular biology and 
the transformation of life into a productive force, see Yoxen (1981). While Yoxen deals with an 
area of biology which has become closely linked to medicine, he nevertheless shows how very 
clearly how ‘hard sciences’ of molecular biology (ie the genetics and biochemistry of 
recombinant DNA) have became embroiled in disciplinary practices. The relevance of Yoxen’s 
work has substantially increased in recent years with subsequent advances in the technology of 
gene manipulation, particularly gene therapy in medicine and use of patented, genetically 
modified organisms in agriculture. Yoxen’s article is also of interest in that it demonstrates the 
active competition between scientific interests (molecular biology and ecology) in the 
governmentalisation of the U.S. state. 
210  In particular see Foucault's treatment of the development of modern biology provided in The 
Order of Things. An Archaeology of the Human Sciences. (Foucault, 1970) This is definitely not a 
simple realist account, but, as Gutting demonstrates, is very much influenced by the work of 
French historians of science Bachelard and Canguilhem. Bachelard and Canguilhem introduced 
themes such as the theory dependence of observation, discontinuity and incommensurability in 
science, that 'preceded by two or three decades similar discussions by Anglo-American historians 
and philosophers of science such as Kuhn and Feyerabend' (Gutting, 1989 p.16, 33). See also 
Dreyfus and Rabinow (1982) p.116-7. 
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other than deeply implicated in the same knowledge/power matrix as the human 
sciences. Greater rigour and systemacity, or even predicability, of their own, are 
not sufficient grounds for a fundamental difference in the relationship of the 
natural sciences to power. 
Power and capacity: the subject revisited 
Foucault’s work unquestionably developed very significant critical insights 
into the ways that subjects are constituted in relations of power, but it nevertheless 
confined power to relations between active human subjects. This is most evident 
in the distinction he drew between power and ‘capacities’. Power is a mode of 
action upon the action of others, while the technical capacities of bodies and 
instruments to manipulate things do not in themselves entail relations of power. 
(Foucault, 1982 p.219-22) Thus Foucault differentiates capacity from power in 
the following terms:  
As far as this power is concerned, it is first necessary to distinguish that 
which is exerted over things and gives the ability to modify, use, 
consume, or destroy them - a power which stems from aptitudes directly 
inherent in the body or relayed by external instruments. Let us say that 
here it is a question of ‘capacity’. On the other hand, what characterises 
the power we are analysing is that it brings into play relations between 
individuals (or between groups). (Foucault, 1982 p.217 - emphasis added) 
What was Foucault suggesting here? Why insist on the difference between 
actions on things and relations of power? The obvious response is that most of 
modern Western political thought takes as fundamental the differences between 
the human and non-human, between culture and nature etc. However, given 
Foucault’s strong critique of humanism and his insistence that human beings are 
historically produced by power, that is, through processes of subjectification and 
discipline, it becomes necessary to examine this question further. More 
specifically, it is important to consider this as it relates to the way in which 
Foucault dealt with the natural sciences. As suggested in the previous chapter, 
such sciences must be seen as playing a key role in the contemporary 
problematisation of the natural environment, and in the biopolitical (or 
ecopolitical) regulation of human populations that follows from this. In sketching 
Foucault’s approach to power in Chapter 5, I pointed to his emphasis on this 
productive aspect of power, in contrast to the generally negative characterisation 
of power as domination by Habermas. It is therefore necessary to look more 
closely at the distinction Foucault made between power and domination. 
This distinction can be illuminated by contrasting it with the approach 
adopted by Charles Taylor, whose criticisms of Foucault in many respects parallel 
those raised by Habermas. Taylor maintained that not only did power and 
domination necessarily imply an imposition on the significant interests or 
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purposes of the individual, but that it also implies the potential for liberation from 
this imposition. From this perspective the concept of power is therefore 
incoherent unless it is linked to the possibility of emancipation from power. 
(Taylor, 1984 p.172-4) According to critics such as Taylor and Habermas, 
Foucault’s position does not allow this, and is thus ultimately incapable of 
providing a coherent normative basis for the critique of power. (Habermas, 1985 
p.276) In contrast to this identification of power with domination, Foucault 
characterised power as a mode of action upon the action of others, that is, a 
relationship that involves actors who are free insomuch as the field of possible 
action and response is not fully pre-determined or closed. (Foucault, 1982 p.219-
22) A state of domination exists when the relations of power are ‘firmly set and 
congealed’, instead of being variable and fluid. Hence, for Foucault domination 
was a specific outcome of power relations in which stable and relatively durable 
mechanisms of power replace the dynamic ‘agonism’ of the strategic 
manoeuvring between agents. (Foucault, 1982 p.222-26; Foucault, 1988a p.3) 
In Taylor’s approach the exercise of power, seen as imposition contrary to the 
will or interests of a pre-constituted subject, inevitably appears as a loss of 
freedom, as a diminution of the subject’s capacity for autonomy and self-
realisation. In this context, the claim that to talk of power without the correlative 
concept of emancipation from power is incoherent appears to make sense. Of 
course, such an approach confuses the issue of what sort of subject is involved. 
For Taylor (and Habermas) the subject that is imposed upon by power was the 
modern individual defined in terms of both personal autonomy and capacity for 
collective self-rule. (Taylor, 1984 p.178) For Foucault, the subject with its various 
capacities, was precisely that which must be explained in terms of the historical 
deployment of power and discourse. As a consequence, the relationship between 
power and autonomy must be understood differently. If the subject is not a pre-
constituted entity that power undermines, but rather is the result of power 
relations, then autonomy cannot be understood simply as the absence of 
imposition or repression. 
In this regard Paul Patton argues that even domination cannot be explained by 
a simple account of imposition as Taylor attempted to do. Instead domination is 
the product of a relatively stable system of extractive power resulting from an 
ongoing asymmetry of power relations. (Patton, 1989) 211 In other words, even in 
the case of domination, the relationship still relies on the ‘capture’ of the 
capacities of others,212 and is not purely an instance of direct imposition on, or 
power over, a subject. What distinguishes domination then, is the establishment of 
                                                 
211  Here Patton employs Macpherson's concept of extractive power, that is, the ability ‘to make 
use of and derive benefit from the capacities of others’.  
212 Patton is not using the term ‘capacities’ in the more narrow sense employed by Foucault in the 
earlier quoted passage, but rather more broadly as ‘capacity to act’ (upon the actions of others). 
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asymmetrical relations of power that have congealed, in which the ‘possibility of 
reversal’ no longer applies. 
Patton distinguishes between negative and positive freedom - the absence of 
imposition or power over (a subject) is freedom in the negative sense, while an 
agent’s capacity to act for its own ends constitutes power to, or positive freedom. 
Patton argues that by making such a distinction between negative and positive 
freedom, Foucault’s approach to power relations becomes clearer - power relies 
primarily upon power to, that is, power as capacity to act upon the actions of 
others. The relationship between power and freedom in Foucault also becomes 
clearer - power is exercised over free agents and freedom is a precondition for the 
exercise of power. (Foucault, 1982 p.221) Power and freedom are thus intimately 
tied together - as primary capacity (or ‘power to’) power presupposes positive 
freedom to act. Similarly a power relation proper (as distinct from a state of 
domination) is a dynamic relationship between agents in which there is always the 
potential for a reversal of the strategic position of each party. Hence freedom 
cannot be reduced to an attribute of the subject, but must be understood as an 
essential element in relations of power. (Connolly, 1985 p.371)  
Taylor’s approach to the relationship between freedom and power can 
therefore be seen to have relied on the sort of privileging of the subject 
characteristic of most modern Western political thinking, with its idealisation of 
autonomy. In contrast to this approach, Foucault’s understanding of power is 
generally understood as rejecting any ‘founding subject’ whose essential nature 
power represses or distorts. Although in this chapter I argue that Foucault’s break 
with the subject is not as complete as has often been claimed, he nonetheless did 
not conceive of power as a wholly negative force undermining the pre-constituted 
autonomous subject. Rather power was seen by him as productive, as giving rise 
to the historical relations and discursive practices through which subjects are 
formed. As with Habermas, Taylor’s criticism of Foucault can therefore said to 
have been based on a misrepresentation of Foucault’s approach to power.213 This 
rebuttal of the one dimensional conception of power attributed to Foucault by 
critics such as Habermas and Taylor, however, still leaves us with the task of 
understanding why Foucault appeared to regard the connection between power 
and knowledge in the human sciences differently from that which applied in the 
natural sciences? 
A clue to this is provided by further consideration, in the light of the 
foregoing discussion about the connection between power and freedom, of 
Foucault’s distinction between power and capacity. Patton rightly indicates that 
for Foucault what distinguished the forces or capacities that act directly on bodies 
                                                 
213 For a discussion of Habermas and Honneth misunderstanding of Foucault’ approach to power, 
see Chapter 5 of the current thesis.  
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and instruments from relations of power is that the latter treat human beings as 
acting subjects rather than merely docile bodies or things. (Patton, 1989 p.271) 
Thus Foucault could be seen at least in his later works, as having understood 
freedom (in the sense discussed above) as the ‘ontological precondition of politics 
and ethics’. In doing so he assumed a particular conception of ‘the human 
material upon which power is exercised’. In this Foucault appeared to preserve the 
modern philosophical acceptance of basic differences in the relations involving 
the instrumental manipulation of things and the actions of agents or subjects 
(although he does see these as forming ‘blocks’ which can ‘constitute regulated 
and concerted systems’ or disciplines). (Foucault, 1982 p.218-9) Patton elaborates 
on this in the following terms: 
This human material is active; it is an entity composed of forces or 
endowed with certain capacities. It is a subject of power, where this term 
is understood in its primary sense of capacity to do or become certain 
things. This conception of the human material may therefore be supposed 
to amount to a ‘thin’ conception of the subject of thought and action: 
whatever else it may be, the human subject is a being endowed with 
capacities. It is the subject of power, but this power is only realised in and 
through the diversity of human bodily capacities and forms of 
subjectivity. (Patton, 1994 p.61) 
One of Habermas’ principal criticisms of Foucault, that of ‘crypto-
normativism’, focuses on just this ‘thin’ conception of subjectivity. Habermas 
attacked Foucault for failing to acknowledge that his writings in effect locate the 
justification for resistance to power in a form of vitalism based on ‘the body’s 
experience of itself’ as subjected to the disciplinary force of biopower. 
(Habermas, 1985 p.285) Similar arguments have been made by feminist writers 
such as Judith Butler, who comments that in Foucault power becomes the focal 
point of a ‘displaced vitalism’, in which ‘power, conceived as productive, is the 
form life takes when it no longer needs to guard itself against death.’ (Butler, 
1993 p.88) While Foucault’s argument concerning the body as constructed by 
power is complex, it is also in some respects ambiguous. On the one hand he 
insisted that the body had no ontological independence outside of discourse and 
power, (Foucault, 1984a p.83, 87-8; Foucault, 1990) yet as Bulter argues, his 
Nietzschean genealogy posited the body both as a surface or site inscribed by 
power, and as a set of prediscursive subterranean ‘forces’ that are ‘repressed and 
transmuted’ by such inscription, and which provide the basis of resistance to 
power. (Butler, 1989 p.601-7) Butler claims that while Foucault criticised 
Nietzsche’s presumption of a life-affirming ‘prediscursive instinctuality’ (for 
example, in Discipline and Punish), he nevertheless fell back into employing such 
a notion in other works (as in ‘Nietzsche, Genealogy and History’), sometimes 
even expressing this as ‘the essential and transhistorical precondition of 
“history”.’ (Butler, 1989 p.606-7) Similarly, Bryan Turner argues that despite the 
apparent anti-foundationalism of Foucault’s epistemology, his work is 
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underscored by a ‘romanticism ... in which the primitive body, existing before 
signification, represents a world of innocent enjoyment.’214 (Turner, 1992 p.53-55) 
Other commentators, such as Ladelle McWhorter, deny that Foucault saw the 
body as a natural object standing in opposition to culture - rather it stood in 
opposition to the philosophical discourse ‘that gives us nature/culture dualism’ 
and its associated disputes. McWhorter also points to the influence of Nietzsche’s 
use of the term body, but insists that both Foucault and Nietzsche use this to deny 
the possibility of any ‘sure and singular source of the truth of man’, even in the 
natural body.215 (McWhorter, 1989 p.608-14) 
Patton explains the link between Foucault and Nietzsche in a slightly different 
manner. He argues that Foucault’s thin conception of the subject was developed 
into a ‘more robust conception of human being’ in later works, especially The Use 
of Pleasure. (Patton, 1994 p.69) There he points to the discussion of practices of 
self-regulation (over one’s body and sexual relations with others) as evidence of 
Foucault’s acceptance of the notion of autonomy, not only of the individual self, 
but also in terms of forms of sociality or community.216 (Patton, 1994 p.65, 67)  
Autonomy in this sense thus stands in equivalence to power as the ‘self-directed 
use and development of human capacities.’ (Patton, 1994 p.68) These capacities 
derive from a variety of sources - some are dependent on the physical properties 
of the body as a biological entity, while others are the products of social and 
institutional interactions. Patton goes further to distinguish a third, interpretative 
dimension to capacity associated with the Nietzschean notion of will to power. He 
argues that in Nietzsche the will to power is an affective state involving a 
‘feedback loop’ between the capacity for action itself and a self-conscious 
experience of successful action as power - involving what Warren describes as the 
‘self reflective goal of experiencing the self as agent’. (Patton, 1994 p.70; Warren, 
1988 p.138) 
Drawing on Nietzsche in this way, Patton directs our attention to Foucault’s 
insistence on the way in which structures of domination in contemporary society 
are characteristically accompanied by acts of resistance. Patton suggests that 
while this may provide evidence of some minimal capacity for autonomous action 
by subjects, in order for Foucault to be able to explain why individuals and groups 
actually experience particular relations of power as domination, he must extend 
his ‘thin’ conception of human being (as a subject endowed with the capacity for 
action) to presuppose a ‘fuller’ or more ‘robust’ conception of subjectivity that 
                                                 
214  See also Turner (1984) p.157-76  
215  See also Bennett (1987) 
216 Patton comments ‘there is no reason to expect that such degrees of autonomy will be developed 
by individuals acting alone rather than in the context of movements for change in certain 
aspects of social life.’ 
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encompasses a sense of agency, that is, as involving the experience of feelings of 
power/powerlessness along the lines suggested by Nietzsche. (Patton, 1994 p.70-
1) 
In drawing this connection between Foucault’s later work and the 
Nietzschean notion of will-to-power, Patton is able to respond to those such as 
Habermas and Taylor who criticise Foucault for his failure to provide a universal 
normative basis for evaluating different regimes of power, and hence his inability 
to explain why it is morally justified to resist domination. As noted previously, 
one response is the non-normative observation that such power is in fact resisted, 
that is, to say that resistance ‘follows from the nature of particular human beings.’ 
(Patton, 1994 p.69) However, Foucault’s argument went further by basing the fact 
of resistance on ontological assumptions regarding the sorts of human capacities 
that give rise to action, including resistance. Patton’s analysis demonstrates not 
only that autonomy is the ‘ontological precondition’ for power, but also that an 
important element in forming the capacity of human beings for such action is the 
self-reflexive experience of agency.  
Thus as Patton claims, effective moral values (and presumably other forms of 
normative evaluation such as what constitutes legitimate knowledge in a 
particular scientific domain) are therefore reliant on the circumstances and 
manner in which the self-experience of agency takes place, that is, ‘values are 
internal to types of individual and social being, not independent of them.’ (Patton, 
1994 p.71) It is in this context that Foucault’s references to the need for a ‘new 
economy of power relations’ and a ‘practice of freedom’ must be understood - 
that is, Foucault was proposing a form of ethics that by definition is incapable of 
providing the sort of universality demanded by critics such as Habermas. Such an 
ethic, says Patton, would nevertheless justify resistance to specific instances of 
domination precisely because the practices of liberty that it invokes would be 
‘internal’ to particular forms of subjectivity, and would therefore be dependent on 
the ways in which individuals and groups experienced agency. (Foucault, 1982; 
1988a) 
This perhaps could be regarded as a partially effective response to the 
criticisms of Habermas and Taylor, and indeed, acceptance of such an 
interpretation is necessary to fully capture the subtlety of Foucault’s later work.217 
(Foucault, 1983 p.198-201; 1988c p.13) Nevertheless it could be claimed that 
Foucault only achieved this by moving away from his earlier goal of writing a 
history of rationalities not based on the founding act of the subject. In pointing to 
the Nietzschean foundations of Foucault’s notion of agency, Patton’s work 
highlights why Foucault has been vulnerable to the charge of harbouring a 
vitalism of the primitive body and with making this the transhistorical 
                                                 
217  This is something that I have argued critics such as Habermas fail to do. See Chapter 5. 
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precondition of history. Patton’s argument implies that the conception of freedom 
employed in Foucault’s later work is fundamentally perspectival, and as such 
dependent on the ways in which different individuals experience agency and 
subjectivity. He argues that Foucault clearly saw freedom as ‘the ontological 
precondition of politics and ethics’, but goes on to stress that  
this is an historical rather than a transcendental ontology. Freedom here is 
not the transcendental condition of moral action, as it is for Kant, but 
rather the contingent historical condition for action upon the actions of 
others (politics) and action upon the self (ethics). Just as for Foucault 
political power exists only in the concrete forms of government of 
conduct, so freedom exists only in the concrete capacities to act of 
particular agents. (Patton, 1994 p.68) 
While it may be conceded the forms of subjectivity invoked by Foucault 
appeared to lack a singular transcendental quality, given that they are formed by 
historically contingent regimes of power, Patton’s argument does not fully 
extricate Foucault from the allegation of vitalism. For what lies behind 
Nietzsche’s will to power, and consequently the body as possessing a series of 
capacities for action which aim at enhancing the experience of agency, is the 
argument that language and knowledge function as useful tools for survival 
inasmuch as they allow a practical imposition of order on the chaotic flux of the 
world. 
For Nietzsche consciousness and self-consciousness, and thus the capacity to 
experience agency, have their origin in the evolutionary development of the 
human species.218 In a direct sense then Nietzsche saw agency (and the experience 
of it - ‘the feeling of power’) as linked to the vital biological interest of the human 
species in self-preservation. (Held, 1980 p.156-7; Warren, 1988 p.90-2) At the 
same time he claimed that the will-to-power is not confined to human beings, but 
is an essential quality of all life. Nor is life simply a striving for self-preservation: 
‘Nature is a struggle not to exist but to overcome, to prevail and to triumph, even 
in defeat ... Nature is ... will-to-power.’219 (Platt, 1988 p.148-9)  Nature for 
Nietzsche consists of the chaotic ‘flux and multiplicity of raw experience’ - it is 
not particularly predisposed to any anthropocentric form of secure cognitive and 
cultural representation. Nevertheless, the human species inscribes nature with its 
                                                 
218  On this see Turner (1984) p.242-4. For an attempt to link Nietzsche's view of the will-to-
power, as a general biological feature of life, to the modern ecological perspective, see 
Hallman (1991). There is an interesting parallel here to the use of Spinoza's notion of conatus 
by ‘deep ecology’ theorists such as Naess, who argues that conatus (or ‘striving to persevere in 
oneself or one's being’) is more than the urge to survive, but is a striving for an increased 
power of self-creation and self-development, and as such is an ‘urge towards higher levels of 
freedom (libertas).’ See Naess (1985) and (1977). 
219  For Nietzsche, of course, ‘man’ is the ‘crown of nature’. 
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cultural practices, and in so doing attempts more or less successfully to confer 
familiarity and continuity to the world. (Warren, 1988 p.47-8) Thus culture 
(which includes values and knowledge) as a way of constituting and disciplining 
relations with nature is always historical and perspectival. Warren points out that 
for Nietzsche ‘the conditions of possibility’ for such knowledge (and values) are 
in part ‘interests relating to human agency’, that is, as involving interests in ‘the 
material, social and cultural worlds as means to and conditions of power 
organised as subjectivity.’ Knowledge and values therefore cannot be extricated 
from the interest the self has in increasing its ‘feeling of power’. (Warren, 1988 
p.90-2) 
There are notable parallels in the role that these sorts of interests play in the 
work of Nietzsche and Habermas. Although Habermas criticises Foucault for his 
Nietzschean inspired ‘crypto-normativism’, Warren suggests that Habermas’ 
treatment of interests as a positive condition of knowledge, is a ‘contemporary 
equivalent’ of Nietzsche’s approach (‘notwithstanding Habermas’ own 
interpretation of Nietzsche’).220 (Warren, 1988 p.268, note 35) What is clear is 
that both Nietzsche and Habermas conceive of interests as having their basis in 
the natural history of the human species, and that these interests are inseparable 
from human embodiment and sensuous needs. In the early Habermas, these 
species’ interests, which give rise to knowledge, language and values (understood 
as the achievements of the transcendental subject) are tied to the vital, biological 
need for self-preservation.221 (Habermas, 1978, Appendix) A similar argument is 
developed by Turner when he claims that for Nietzsche ‘the nature and functions 
of knowledge are thus located in the evolutionary development and needs of the 
species, especially in the necessary features of social communication. Language is 
a requirement of human survival and is rooted ultimately in the physiological 
basis of human existence.’ (Turner, 1984 p.242-3) Here again, there is a parallel 
between Nietzsche and Habermas’ view of communicative action as a 
fundamental attribute of the human species. 
If as Patton cogently argues, Foucault is to be understood as basing his notion 
of agency on Nietzsche, then Foucault could be said to base not only his ‘thin’ 
conception of subjectivity, but also the later and ‘fuller’ development of this, on 
those vital capacities attached to the primitive body that forms the site of 
signification and cultural inscription. Such a view is consistent, following my 
                                                 
220  Habermas' criticisms of Nietzsche (and Horkheimer and Adorno’s appropriation of Nietzsche) 
are discussed at the end of Chapter 1 of the current thesis. See also Turner (1984) for 
discussion of Nietzsche and Foucault. 
221  See Chapter 3 of the current thesis for discussion of the ‘early’ Habermas’ approach to 
knowledge constitutive interests. Of course, Habermas insists that while human interests 
emerged from the human species' natural history, knowledge constitutive interests ‘derive both 
from nature and from the cultural break with nature.’ (Habermas, 1978 p.312) 
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suggestion in the previous chapter, with the way in which Foucault takes the body 
as the both the target of modern government and the source biopower. Turner is 
thus correct to emphasise that Foucault’s intellectual endeavour is primarily 
focused on the institutionalisation of the body through ‘the demographic (a theory 
of the population) and the physiological (a theory of the body).’ (Turner, 1984 
p.159-163) However, need the acceptance of such a reliance on the vitalism of the 
body be problematic for Foucault’s analysis? In itself, probably not, for the most 
valuable contributions of Foucault’s work are not substantially undermined by 
admitting that the processes of human objectification and subjectification must 
necessarily operate on some sort of substrate. However, it does lead us to inquire 
further into the assumptions that underpin Foucault’s later approach to power, in 
order to understand his different treatment of the human and natural sciences. 
Foucault’s incomplete critique of sovereignty 
In the context of the argument developed by Patton and as Foucault (1988a) 
suggested, the effects of domination need not always be seen as morally 
objectionable. 222 It merely suggests that individuals have a capacity for 
autonomous action, and that when this freedom to act is significantly curtailed, 
this is or at least may be, experienced as loss of autonomy, as domination. Neither 
the fact that any particular individual’s capacity to act has been reduced to a 
minimum, nor the subsequent experience of this as a loss of freedom by the 
individual in question means that domination as such is morally wrong unless a 
further step is taken in the argument to claim that, as a general principle, the 
autonomy of others should not be significantly limited. This, of course, is a key 
element in much modern political thought, with its dual emphasis on individual 
autonomy and legitimate political sovereignty. This is precisely the point made by 
Taylor when he argued that power (he uses this in the sense of power over) or 
domination involves an imposition on the significant interests or purposes of an 
individual. 
Barry Hindess has questioned some of the philosophical assumptions behind 
Foucault’s later attempts to distinguish between power, government and 
domination. (Hindess, 1996) Hindess argues that from Hobbes and Locke 
onwards, political reflection on power has been dominated by two distinct 
conceptions of power - power as simple quantitative capacity to act, and power as 
legitimate capacity or right, which is dependent on the notion of consent by the 
subjects over whom such power is exercised. Confusion between these two ideas 
has been endemic to modern political thought, even among would-be radical 
critics of power, such as Habermas and Steven Lukes, (Lukes, 1974) who argue 
                                                 
222  Foucault uses the example of the asymmetry of power relations involved in education as an 
example.  
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for the emancipation of the individual from power. (Hindess, 1996 p.1-22) Critical 
theory carries forward the ‘confusion’ between these two concepts of power, 
which are based on two substantially different models of the human subject. Thus 
despite Habermas’ criticisms of earlier critical theorists, he effectively retains 
their key underlying assumptions such as the ideal of the autonomous, rational 
individual and the possibility of some form of political community free from the 
distorting effects of power. (Hindess, 1996 p.94) In this regard suggests Hindess, 
there is a clear continuity between contemporary critical theory and Locke, in 
whose work is evident two views of the subject. One emphasises the autonomous, 
rational individual whose consent is necessary for the legitimate exercise of 
political power, while the other treats the individual as a considerably more 
malleable entity whose attitudes and hence standards of moral judgment are 
moulded by processes of social interaction. (Hindess, 1996 p.18, 58-63, 94-5) 
It is not necessary to revisit in detail the discussion in earlier chapters of 
critical theory, other than to acknowledge Hindess’ persuasive argument that 
critical theory, in its purportedly radical treatment of power, fails to break with 
the preoccupation with sovereignty and right, which Foucault identified as the 
central problem of modern political theory. Of significance for the discussion here 
is that in clarifying the shortcomings of critical theory’s critique of power, 
Hindess brings into focus Foucault’s own continuing attachment to an underlying 
vision of individual autonomy. In this context it is useful to cite Hindess’ 
summation of how this notion of autonomy underpins the entire critical theory 
project. Hindess argues that contemporary critical theorists such as Lukes, 
Marcuse and Habermas  
base a significant part of their analyses of power on: (1) a model of the 
individual as a creature of social conditions; (2) an image of the 
autonomous individual which provides an ideal against which the present 
can be measured; (3) the claim that such an ideal could be realised in a 
realm of social existence that is not structured by the illegitimate effects 
of power. This last presents us with the utopian vision of an idealised civil 
society whose inhabitants would be precisely the autonomous, rational 
persons required by the Lockean account of political power. In their 
different ways ...[these theorists] ... acknowledge the reality of 
heteronomy - the fact that the attributes and capacities of persons are 
crucially dependent on social conditions - while retaining the Lockean 
ideal of the autonomous, rational person. (Hindess, 1996 p.95) 
Hindess recognises the radical nature of Foucault’s break with the 
‘Hobbesian’ model of sovereign power in that it rejects the standard 
preoccupation with sovereignty and legitimacy. Yet at the same time, he points to 
elements in Foucault’s work that continued to cling to the ‘enduring fictions’ of 
Western political thought. In particular Hindess questions the distinction Foucault 
made in his later writings between power and domination. If power is co-
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extensive with all social relations, and therefore unavoidable, then the normative 
ideal of a general emancipation from power relations is simply untenable. Of 
course, as Hindess and Patton note, this did not mean Foucault rejected the notion 
of a limited ‘emancipation’ from specific systems of power or from the effects of 
particular techniques of power. (Hindess, 1996 p.152; Patton, 1989 p.274-6) 
In general Foucault expressed a deep distrust of notions of universal 
emancipation or ‘liberation’, an attitude linked to his rejection of humanism, and 
to his concern to understand history as the history of multiple, specific and 
therefore potentially conflicting rationalities of government. (Foucault, 1984b) 
Paradoxically, from the perspective of traditional political philosophy, the core of 
these concerns in Foucault's work was the desire not to close off the possibilities 
of human action and therefore autonomy and freedom. (Foucault, 1988c p.15) In 
his later work Foucault conceded that ‘liberation’ could be the necessary 
precondition for the practice of liberty, but he defined the applicability of these 
terms in a restricted manner. First, he suggested ‘liberation’ may be necessary 
where a state of domination exists, that is, where the relations of power have 
become fixed and ‘congealed’. Second, the ‘liberation’ must be understood as 
limited to those specific factors that have become the object of such domination. 
In other words for Foucault ‘liberation’ involved freeing up existing (or creating 
new) relationships of power, not dissolving them per se. This was the freeing up 
of the capacity of particular agents to act (power to), and hence involves the 
transformation of rigidified relations (states of domination) towards the dynamic 
‘agonism’ that exists between autonomous agents in relations of power (and 
resistance) proper.223  
Foucault rejected the sorts of universal emancipation espoused by humanists 
such as Taylor and the critical theorists, because rather than removing restrictions 
on the free play of relations of power, their view of liberation was based on a 
foundational human subject which had become suppressed or alienated. 
Liberation in this context referred to the restoration of this repressed subject to its 
genuine form. (Foucault, 1988a p.2-3) By contrast, Foucault’s critique of 
humanism was based on the argument that it was through historically contingent 
discursive and disciplinary practices that this very ‘idea or model of humanity was 
developed, and now this idea of man has become normative, self-evident and is 
supposed to be universal.’ The representation of certain modes of subjectivity as 
universal or transcendental had to be rejected precisely because it ‘presents a 
certain form of our ethics as a universal model for any kind of freedom’, and in 
doing so forecloses other possibilities for freedom. (Foucault, 1988c p.15) 
                                                 
223  ‘Liberation opens up new relationships of power, which have to be controlled by practices of 
liberty.’ (Foucault, 1988a p.4) 
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Given Foucault’s rejection of the notion of freedom as involving the 
liberation of an essential subjectivity from the distortions imposed by power, in 
what alternative sense can freedom be understood? Ian Hacking points to what he 
describes as Foucault’s ‘extreme nominalism’, which denies any pre-conceptual 
mode of being and insists that all aspects of the social, including subjectivity 
itself, must be seen as historically contingent. (Hacking, 1986a p.29, 37) 
Elsewhere he develops this further to describe how a theory of ‘dynamic 
nominalism’ relates to the notion of the individual person. Intentional action, says 
Hacking, is action ‘under a description’, that is, deliberate human action is 
dependent on the ways in which we describe those actions. Consequently, new 
modes of description create new modes of being and new possibilities for 
intentional action. Hacking suggests that each category of personhood has its own 
history, which can be understood as resulting from two ‘vectors of labelling’ - one 
from above, imposed by the discourse of scientific disciplines and dividing 
practices, the other from below, defining the autonomous behaviour of 
individuals. (Hacking, 1986b p.231-5) 
Two possibilities for freedom arise from this. Firstly, the potential for 
different types of subjectivity is in a basic ontological sense indeterminate and 
open, although actual forms will be the product of historically derived relations of 
power relations that are open to change. Secondly, while the power relations and 
‘regimes of truth’ will tend, through various objectifying processes, towards 
normalisation of the individual, the thrust from below of what Foucault called 
anonymous, subjugated knowledge provides a resistance to normalisation and 
disciplinary practices. (Foucault, 1980e p.81-84) As Patton comments, this 
‘spectrum of existing forms of individuality’ defines the possibilities for 
subjectivity at any particular historical juncture. Thus Foucault’s genealogical 
method inevitably finds itself in a certain dynamic tension. A tension that on the 
one hand presents a form of historical a priori of what is possible within a 
particular historical space, while at the same time opening up games of truth to 
radical questioning, exposing received forms of subjectivity as historically 
contingent ‘straightjackets of identity’ that are not immutable or inevitable, but 
imposed and arbitrary. (Patton, 1989) It is this tension that Foucault is referring to 
in his later work when he talks of the ethos of the ‘care of the self’ as a practice of 
liberty and directs his attention to ‘the problem of the relationships between 
subject and games of truth’. In so doing he drew a contrast with his earlier work 
on power,224 and acknowledged this involved a shift of emphasis from a concern 
with the relationship between knowledge and these coercive or objectifying 
practices towards the ‘practices of self-formation of the subject’. (Foucault, 1988a 
p.2) In Hacking’s terms this could be seen as a shift between the ‘two vectors of 
                                                 
224  Where the emphasis was on ‘coercive practices’ such as psychiatry and the penal system, and 
‘theoretical or scientific games’, such as ‘the analysis of language and of the living being’ 
(Foucault, 1988a p.2) 
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labelling’ to an emphasis on the one ‘from below’ which is concerned with 
reflexively defining the autonomous behaviour of the individual. 
The difficulty Hindess points to in this shift is that Foucault appeared to 
suggest ‘not simply that domination will in fact be resisted, but also that it should 
be kept to a minimum’ (Hindess, 1996 p.154). In other words, Foucault appeared 
to shift from the recognition of resistance as an effect of certain types of power 
relations, to advancing what appeared to be a universalised normative injunction. 
Thus while at a methodological level Foucault seemed to reject notions of 
generalised emancipation and universal ethical standards, Hindess suggests that in 
his later remarks on both the critical function of philosophy and on the nature of 
freedom, he could be regarded as resurrecting some of the central concerns of 
critical theory, particularly the idealisation of autonomy. Hindess illustrates this 
by contrasting Foucault’s earlier (1971) Nietzschean account of history as ‘the 
endlessly repeated play of dominations (in which) humanity installs each of its 
violences in a system of rules and thus proceeds from domination to domination’, 
(Foucault, 1984a p.85) with the view put forward in his last interview in 1984, 
where the critical function of philosophy is identified as ‘the challenging of all 
phenomena of domination at whatever level or under whatever form they present 
themselves’. (Foucault, 1988a) 
Foucault linked this critical role for philosophy to the ‘Socratic imperative’ 
for the individual to ‘ground yourself in liberty, through the mastery of the self.’ 
(Foucault, 1988a p.20) This is so because it is free individuals who are engaged in 
relations of power (or ‘strategic games of liberty’) with each other, which 
Foucault contrasts with states of domination (‘which are what we ordinarily call 
power’) and political power (‘understood of course, as a state of domination’). 
(Foucault, 1988a p.19-20) Thus less than six months before his death, Foucault 
outlined his project in terms that very clearly placed the notion of the freedom and 
autonomy of the subject at the centre of his work: 
I do not think that the only point of possible resistance to political power - 
understood of course, as a state of domination - lies in the relationship of 
self to self. I say that governmentality implies the relationship of self to 
self, which means exactly that, in the idea of governmentality, I am 
aiming at the totality of practices, by which one can constitute, define, 
organise, instrumentalise the strategies which individuals in their liberty 
can have in regard to each other. It is free individuals who try to control, 
to determine, to delimit the liberty of others and, in order to do that, they 
dispose of certain instruments to govern others. That rests indeed on 
freedom, on the relationship of self to self and the relationship to the 
other. (Foucault, 1988a p.20) 
This move, which allows Foucault to distinguish between domination and 
‘strategic games of power between liberties’, is seen by Hindess as invoking an 
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idealised conception of community in which domination is kept to a minimum, 
and thus as promoting yet another ‘version of the utopian critique of power’ that 
Foucault’s own work in other respects had served to undermine. (Hindess, 1996 
p.156) Hindess suggests that if we accept Foucault’s view (and he clearly thinks 
we should) that the human subject is constituted by the effects of power, then 
there are no grounds for a normative condemnation of domination in general. 
How can we accept the productivity of power in the formation of human 
capacities and at the same time condemn the role subjectification and domination 
play in this process? In particular Hindess draws on the argument developed by 
Nietzsche concerning the source of ‘responsibility’ or autonomy in the modern 
individual. Nietzsche examined how the ‘sovereign individual’ (‘the man who has 
his own independence, protracted will and the right to make promises’) comes 
into being historically. (Nietzsche, 1989) What Nietzsche deals with is precisely 
the genealogy of the modern subject of power, the ‘free individual’ that Foucault 
invokes as engaging in practices of liberty.225 
Nietzsche’s claim was that the very condition of autonomy, expressed through 
the capacity to take sovereign responsibility for one’s actions (‘the right to make 
promises’) is the result of a long history of moral discipline and social 
regimentation in which human beings are made ‘to a certain degree necessary, 
uniform, like among like, regular, and consequently calculable’ (Nietzsche, 1989 
p.58-9) - the very point Foucault himself made time and again. Thus, as a crucial 
component of the historical processes responsible for the formation of modern 
subjectivity, domination must be understood as ‘an indispensable condition of 
liberty - or at least the kinds of liberty that both we and Nietzsche have learned to 
desire. (Hindess, 1996 p.155)  
Hindess suggests that to be consistent, Foucault’s analysis of the productivity 
of power relations must also recognise that some degree of domination and 
subjectification are necessary for the existence of organised social structures and 
institutions. Consequently, as both Nietzsche and Hobbes argued, these are also 
necessary for the forms of liberty made possible by ‘organised social existence’. 
(Hindess, 1996 p.157) A consistent application of Foucault’s own analysis would 
therefore require that while it would be a sociological fact that particular instances 
of domination would be resisted, there could be no transcendental normative 
grounds on which to condemn domination in general. That Foucault in his later 
works appeared to repeatedly to do just this indicates he neglected his own 
methodological prescription that criticism should not be practiced as a ‘search for 
formal structures with universal value’, but rather as specific historical 
                                                 
225  In rebuffing Habermas’ utopian notion of power free communication, Foucault suggested that 
it was necessary to ‘ground oneself in liberty’, that is, ‘to give one's self the rules of law, the 
techniques of management, ... and the ethos, the practice of self that would allow ... games of 
power to be played with a minimum of domination.’ (Foucault, 1988a p.8) 
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investigations into the events and processes responsible for producing the modern 
subject in its various forms. This demanded that philosophical analysis must 
eschew ‘all projects that claim to be global or radical’. (Foucault, 1991e p.45-6) 
According to Hindess, the basis of Foucault’s apparent inconsistency on this 
question lies in his incomplete critique of sovereignty. He failed to fully 
disengage his analysis from that pervasive ‘modern obsession with the idea of the 
person as autonomous agent, and consequently, with the idea that a community of 
such persons can, and should, be governed by consent of its members.’ (Hindess, 
1996 p.157) This was implicit in Foucault’s treatment of domination as something 
that should be avoided or minimised as far as possible because it undermines the 
liberty of the individual and leads to ‘congealed’ or rigid relations of power. Here 
Foucault returned to a theme familiar in modern political philosophy when he 
expressed a concern not only for the repressive effect on the liberty of those 
subjected to domination, but also the view that domination in some way corrupts 
those exercising power (domination). This is made clear when he suggested that 
‘if you care for yourself correctly ... then you cannot abuse your power over 
others.’ (Foucault, 1988a p.18) 
While Foucault (and others) have focused on elaborating the genealogy of the 
modern individual, much less has been done to understand the ways in which 
power and domination constitute the community within which such individuals 
are formed. (Hindess, 1996 p.158) Thus while the differentiation of domination 
from power can serve useful analytical or descriptive purposes, Foucault’s reasons 
for privileging the freedom associated with power relations proper must be called 
into question if his own arguments about the productive nature of the disciplinary 
processes are to be taken seriously. In his analysis Hindess concludes that 
Foucault’s criticism of political sovereignty did not go far enough. Not only do 
we need, as Foucault insisted, a political philosophy that is not built around the 
problem of sovereignty, we also need to free ourselves from that other constitutive 
fiction of modern political thought - that of political community. A full 
consideration of this problem is beyond the scope of the present thesis. 
Nevertheless, Hindess’ analysis does suggest an answer to the question of why 
Foucault made a distinction between capacities exerted over things and relations 
of power among acting human subjects, and why the natural sciences, which take 
as their object the study of non-human things, were seen by him as capable of 
detaching themselves from relations of power.  
My argument here is that Foucault’s ‘privileging’ of the natural sciences 
should be seen as linked directly to his underlying philosophical concern with 
autonomy as a fundamental feature of human nature. As suggested earlier in this 
chapter, Foucault’s analysis appears to have rested on a vitalism of human bodily 
capacities (what Patton terms a thin conception of the subject of thought and 
action), but more significantly it ontologically characterised human nature as the 
capacity for agency, a move which was tied to a particular idealisation of 
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individual autonomy. Thomas Wartenberg has argued that Foucault ‘attributes to 
power the structure of human agency - that is, the capability of performing actions 
with strategic intent’ and that this amounts to posing power ‘as a quasi-subject’, a 
move which obscures the actual processes involved in power relationships. 
According to Wartenberg, despite his insights into the mechanisms of social 
domination, Foucault thus effectively relied on a metaphysical positing of a 
‘supra-human subject ... as necessary for explaining the nature of human social 
development.’ (Wartenberg, 1990 p.137-9) While Wartenberg over-states the 
degree to which Foucault was guilty of hypostasising power, there was clearly in 
Foucault's later work an underlying Nietzschean notion of human nature that lent 
itself to an idealisation or affirmation of individual autonomy. 
Rouse: the critique of epistemic sovereignty 
The argument that Foucault’s critique of sovereignty does not go far enough 
has been raised in a different way by Joseph Rouse. 226 His analysis is important in 
the context of the present chapter because he is one of the few scholars to 
specifically consider how Foucault’s work applies to the natural sciences. 227 
Rouse (1987; 1991; 1993; 1994) claims that a critique of sovereignty analogous to 
that put forward by Foucault in relation to political theory can be developed in 
epistemology and philosophy of the natural sciences.  
A key element of Foucault’s criticism of the concept of political sovereignty 
was that it obscured the ways in which power actually operates in modern 
societies. Theories of sovereignty rely one-sidedly on the politico-juridical model 
of power as repressive and prohibitive, and neglect the dispersed sources of power 
(its ‘microphysics’) and its deployment outside the frameworks of the state.228 In 
this regard Rouse points to Foucault’s claim that the principle of sovereignty in 
political theory was increasingly separated from ‘any real political location’ and 
instead was turned into an ‘analytic’ or ‘theoretical’ construct against which 
political practice is assessed. (Rouse, 1993 p.145; 1994 p.101) Foucault’s concern 
then was that political criticism based on the concepts of sovereignty and right 
misrepresented how power operates, but also that it ‘dangerously misunderstands 
its own positioning’ by failing to recognise the fictitious nature of the rational 
consent that purportedly formed the ultimate foundation of political sovereignty. 
That is, the modern institutions and practices of sovereignty are not the source of 
power but rather were constituted by the sorts of disciplinary practices that lay 
                                                 
226  A version of this section of the Chapter was previously published in Rutherford (1994a). 
227  Other major works to consider this include Kusch (1991) and Gutting (1989). 
228  See Chapters 5 and 6 respectively of the current thesis for detailed discussion of these points. 
Foucault most clearly develops his critique of sovereignty in his lectures published in the Colin 
Gordon (1980b) collection and Foucault (1990) 
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outside of the political realm of law and right. In rejecting political criticism based 
on rights, Foucault was objecting to any attempt to endow historically specific 
political positions (and in particular, French intellectual Marxism) with the 
standpoint of a generalised or transcendental epistemic sovereignty. 229 (Rouse, 
1993 p.144-9; 1994 p.101-4) While Foucault does not use this term, Rouse argues 
that it is not difficult to discern a fairly clear parallel within epistemology to the 
concern with sovereignty evident in political thought. 
All of the central issues of political sovereignty are reproduced in 
epistemology: the constitution of a unitary regime, based upon legitimacy 
through law, established from an impartial standpoint above particular 
conflicts, and enforced through discontinuous interventions that aim to 
suppress illegitimacy. The problematic of epistemic sovereignty is 
fundamentally located in the standard contrast between knowledge and 
belief or assertion. ... Knowledge is a unified (or constitently unifiable) 
network of statements that can be extracted from the welter of confused 
and conflicting contenders and legitimated in accord with rules of rational 
method, the epistemic surrogate of law. Here is where the figure of the 
epistemic sovereign is theoretically important. Sovereignty need not be 
located in any actual sovereign knower, any more than political 
sovereignty requires a monarch. But just as the sovereign power must be 
one that could consistently be embodied in a single will, sovereign 
knowledge must be consistently representable in a single coherent 
propositional system. (Rouse, 1993 p.147) 
The objections Foucault raised with political sovereignty can be seen to apply 
to epistemic sovereignty as a view of knowledge that tends to ignore the local and 
multiple ‘micropractices’ that produce knowledge and its objects. Foucault’s work 
makes it clear that relations of power and knowledge constitute both the ‘knowing 
subject and the truths known’. (Rouse, 1994 p.103) Just as Foucault’s critique of 
sovereignty sought to overcome the theoretical privileging of sovereignty and law 
in the analysis of power, his genealogical investigations were an ‘attempt to 
emancipate historical knowledges (from) the coercion of a theoretical, unitary, 
formal, and scientific discourse’ which ‘aims to inscribe knowledges in the 
hierarchical order of power associated with science’. (Foucault, 1980e p.85) Given 
this, it is reasonable to suggest that while Foucault did not develop a critique of 
the natural sciences in the same way as he did for the human sciences, it is 
nevertheless possible to find a strong parallel between the ways in which natural 
scientific knowledge is produced and the sorts of disciplinary practices Foucault 
identified in the production of power/knowledge in the human sciences. 
                                                 
229  On Foucault's criticism of Marxism, see Foucault (1980e) p.84-8. 
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Rouse argues that despite Foucault’s own apparent reluctance to apply his 
approach to the established natural sciences, his genealogies, by problematising 
the notion of an essential human subjectivity, also challenge the traditional 
concepts of representation and action that ground the distinction between the 
natural and human sciences. (Rouse, 1993 p.138-9) Rouse aptly points out that 
any 
strong epistemic or political distinction between nature and society would 
clearly be subject to the central motivating question of Foucault’s work: 
‘in what is given to us as universal, necessary, obligatory, what place is 
occupied by whatever is singular, contingent, and the product of arbitrary 
constraints?’ (Rouse, 1993 p.138-9)  
He therefore suggests the need to broaden Foucault’s notion of power beyond 
interaction conceived simply as relations between human agents, to one that 
encompasses the ways in which the configuration of technical practices and 
material technologies help structure specific alignments of power. (Rouse, 1991 
p.660) As with the human sciences, scientific knowledge of new phenomena in 
the natural world (including ecological processes and entities such as global 
warming) alters the strategic alignments of power relations within society. Both 
the natural and human sciences rely on developing historically new practices of 
surveillance which serve to describe, partition, measure, classify and refine the 
behaviour and properties of their objects of study. New domains of scientific 
expertise come into existence through postulating new objects of knowledge and 
by developing new techniques for measuring, manipulating and monitoring these 
new entities. The extension of knowledge and its associated material technologies 
acts to discipline and control the action-environment of social agents. On this 
account natural scientific knowledge cannot be separated from power, for 
knowledge is embodied in the skills, techniques and machines which are integral 
to scientific activity. (Rouse, 1987; 1991)  Conceptual skills and material 
techniques, which arise from specific alignments of capacities and power at the 
local or micro-level of the laboratory and within particular technical discourses 
(such as computer models) are extended outside the laboratory and mediate the 
way in which the world is produced, reproduced and structured. That is, ‘power 
relations require not only keeping other human agents in line, but also a reliable 
alignment of the physical environment.’ (Rouse, 1991 p.659)  Foucault suggested 
something similar when he discussed the ‘paradox’ of relations of capacity and 
power. In that context he said that ‘control over things is mediated by relations 
with others’ but he maintained the importance of analytically separating three 
axes or ‘practical systems’ of critique: those of knowledge, power and ethics. 
(Foucault, 1984b p.48-9) 
Some of the key features that Foucault identified with power relations in the 
social field can be found in the exercise of capacities over things. In particular the 
notion of surveillance with its practices of examination, recording and 
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normalising classification was central to Foucault’s understanding of biopower 
(both as anatomo-politics and as biopolitics), and this finds an obvious parallel in 
the objectifying practices of the natural sciences. Indeed, as mentioned above, 
Foucault points to the common origin of the human and natural sciences in the 
‘terrible power’ of the investigatory technique. (Foucault, 1979b p.224-6) In 
Foucault’s work this disciplinary impetus, in which people are treated as docile 
bodies, was supplemented with an emphasis on the productive character of power. 
This productive dimension was connected by Foucault, via the technique of the 
confession, to the self-constituting activities of speaking subjects compelled ‘to 
speak the truth’ of the self. (Foucault, 1982 p.208) 230 The production of the truth 
of the self depends on the ‘decipherment of what is said’ by the expert as 
confessor. Confession is primarily a procedure in which particular sorts of signs 
are elicited from the subject and interpreted by experts, and it is only through such 
a process of interpretation that truth is ‘scientifically validated’. 
In his discussion of the formation of modern sexuality Foucault thus pointed 
to the interdependence between procedures of confession and ‘scientific 
discursivity’, and argued that in making the truths of the human sciences 
(particularly those of sexuality) into signs dependent on the ‘hermeneutic 
function’ of the expert, it became possible for the procedures of confession to 
become part of ‘the regular formation of scientific discourse.’ (Foucault, 1990 
p.64-7) Here Foucault restricted his comments to the human sciences. Rouse 
however argues that it is not just the speaking human subject that is ‘constrained 
to produce signs’. The natural sciences too abound with countless ways in which 
things are also forced to speak, that is, emit signs - as in the human sciences, the 
objects of investigation in natural sciences do not remain silent and docile. 
(Rouse, 1987 p.220) Indeed, most if not all of the entities of the natural sciences 
are only accessible through signs produced by various techniques, equipment, 
methods and models, the ‘disclosures’ of which are taken as genuine or real only 
within the ‘authoritative interpretative constraints that distinguish data from 
artefacts or noise.’ (Rouse, 1993 p.141) 231 What Rouse has argued then is that the 
signs extracted from things may be as important in producing political effects as 
those elicited from speaking subjects. (Rouse, 1987 p.220)  
                                                 
230  See also Rouse (1987) p.218 and (1993) p.140. 
231  Rouse cites as examples of techniques used to incite the production of signs such procedures 
as 'radioactive labelling, cloud and bubble chambers, x-ray crystallography, and various forms 
of chromatography, spectroscopy, microscopy, and telescopy'. To this could be added the 
techniques of the environmental sciences, such as general circulation models of the global 
atmosphere, and even concepts such as 'ecosystem' and 'biodiversity' as these are dependent on 
forces and entities such as trophic levels and genes which are themselves only accessible 
through the signs emitted by similar sorts of instruments and techniques referred to by Rouse. I 
have elaborated on this elsewhere. See Rutherford, (1994a; 1997a). 
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When this argument is considered in the context of the production of 
scientific truths in ecological discourse its strength is readily apparent. For 
example, some parallels can be drawn here with Beck’s analysis of the role of 
contemporary science in the systemic production of ecological ‘mega-hazards’. 
As discussed in Chapter 4, Beck demonstrates that what constitutes an ecological 
risk, and the way in which the consequent environmental and health hazards are 
distributed, are discursively defined. The sorts of global ecological hazards Beck 
is concerned with, such as radiation contamination and depletion of the 
stratospheric ozone layer, are not readily visible or perceptible in unmediated 
every-day experience. Rather, ecological risks only come into existence through 
the objectifying medium of expert judgment, that is, these sorts of hazards are not 
things of simple experience but require the interpretation of scientific theories and 
intervention of measuring instruments ‘in order to become visible or interpretable 
as hazards at all.’ (Beck, 1992b p.27) 232 Beck suggests that contemporary 
ecological and technological hazards are characterised by their invisibility to non-
expert experience. Such risks  
are based on causal interpretations, and thus initially only exist in terms 
of the knowledge about them. They can thus be changed, magnified, 
dramatised or minimised within knowledge, and to that extent they are 
particularly open to social definition and construction. (Beck, 1992b 
p.22-3) 
One consequence of this is that the victims of technologically produced hazards 
are rendered ‘incompetent in matters of their own affliction’, with the power to 
define hazards and judge exposure to risks increasingly restricted to expert 
‘external knowledge producers’. (Beck, 1992a p.97-123; 1992b p.53-5) 
Rouse argues that while knowledge, in this case that produced by the natural 
sciences, is not equivalent to power, nevertheless it cannot be considered in 
isolation from the social field in which it exists. Knowledge includes not only 
propositional statements (in Foucault’s usage connaissances) but also objects, 
instruments, skills, and various social networks. In themselves none of these 
constitute the discursive field of knowledge (what Foucault termed savior). 
Scientific statements only count as knowledge by virtue of their actual use, that is, 
in terms of their practical deployment or alignment with other heterogeneous 
elements; to conceive of scientific knowledge as a stable and ‘distinct object 
domain’ overlooks the dynamic interconnection between knowledge and other 
social and material resources. (Rouse, 1994 p.110-1) 233 This of course is 
                                                 
232  There is a clear parallel here with Habermas’ treatment of ‘objective nature’ as that which can 
only be made available as an object of possible knowledge through the objectifying processes 
of modern science. See Chapter 3 of present thesis for discussion of Habermas on this. 
233  Hence Rouse takes ‘the “field” within which scientific claims acquire significance and 
justification to include more than a web of belief: skills and techniques, instruments and 
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consistent with Foucault’s approach to knowledge in the human sciences. 
(Foucault, 1990 p.93-4) As with Foucault’s view of the human sciences, a crucial 
element of Rouse’s analysis of natural science is his emphasis on the diverse 
sources of these localised, heterogeneous elements. In line with Rouse’s argument 
against the possibility of epistemic sovereignty, scientific knowledge production 
must be understood as a series of historical practices the subtlety and detail of 
which cannot be captured by generalisations about ‘scientific reason’. Nor can 
this be captured by generalisations about the degree of formalisation, as Foucault 
tended to suggest in his early archaeological work. (Foucault, 1972) 
Similarly, the sorts of authoritative interpretation referred to by Foucault as 
central to the human sciences is also exercised in the natural sciences. As with the 
human sciences, this also occurs in quite specific socio-historical circumstances 
with numerous, highly localised origins - what Rouse terms laboratory 
‘microworlds’. Accordingly, scientific concepts and theories, such as genes, 
retroviruses and global climate change ‘only become possible objects of 
knowledge or discourse within ... a complex practical field, shaped by the 
availability of equipment, and subtle technical and theoretical skills.’ (Rouse, 
1991 p.660) In other words, science depends as much on creating and mobilising 
technical capacities, associated with instruments, machines, tests, protocols etc, as 
it does on theory construction.234 Indeed, this approach implies that the 
investigatory practices carried out in the laboratory (and its analogues in field 
studies) are far more crucial than is generally suggested by philosophical studies 
of science, which treat science primarily as a theoretical-discursive activity.  
This is a criticism that can also be said to apply to Foucault’s treatment of the 
natural sciences. 235 Drawing on the work of Bruno Latour236, Rouse emphasises 
that a key feature of natural science is the ability to construct new phenomena 
within the laboratory or other experimental situation. 237 What makes science 
                                                                                                                                     
material systems (including networks of manufacture and supply), resource availability (money 
and facilities, but also staff, information, an audience, etc), institutional structures, relevance to 
other social practices and political concerns and much more.’ (Rouse, 1991 p.662-3) 
234  Rose and Miller (1992) develop a substantially similar approach. However their focus is on 
the role of the expertise of the social sciences. See Chapter 6 in the current thesis for a more 
detailed discussion of this. 
235  At least in works such as Foucault (1970; 1972). 
236  The work of Latour is discussed in the next chapter. Rose and Miller also draw on Latour, 
particularly for the notion of ‘action at a distance’ which they employ to explain the modes of 
liberal and neo-liberal governmentality which rely heavily on various forms of professional 
expertise for the shaping of conduct outside of the formal institutions of state rule. See Rose 
and Miller (1992); Rose (1993). 
237  Here Rouse draws on Ian Hacking’s definition of phenomenon: ‘By ‘phenomenon’ Hacking 
means a manifest regularity in the natural world. It is not a private sensation but a public event 
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powerful is precisely its capacity to structure the world outside the laboratory. Yet 
this capacity is not simply the ability to transfer the phenomena from the 
constructed world of the laboratory to the outside world. More fundamentally it is 
the ability to transfer the laboratory conditions themselves into the outside world, 
a task which characteristically necessitates extending the materials and techniques 
that ‘made possible the disclosure and tracking of laboratory phenomena’ in the 
first place. (Rouse, 1987 p.101; 1993 p.139-43)  
The principal achievement of science is its capacity to create new phenomena. 
Science is more than simply a theoretical-discursive activity, but it is also more 
than the simple discovery of facts through empirical observation. Rouse points to 
the inherent opportunism of the natural sciences - science is a highly practical 
activity in which the direction of research (and hence the type of knowledge 
produced) is to a considerable degree shaped by the techniques and 
instrumentation available. The capacity of scientists to manipulate instruments 
and experimental apparatus is as much a practical art as theoretical 
representation. Thus experimentation involves much more than the testing of the 
adequacy of prior theorising against observed facts. Rather it 
opens new domains for investigation, refines them to make them suitable 
for theoretical reflection and provides a practical grasp of that domain as 
a resource. The creation of new phenomena, and scientists’ practical 
understanding of the instrumental context of the laboratory within which 
this creation occurs, cannot be easily subordinated to a theory-dominant 
picture of how science develops. (Rouse, 1987 p. 100-1) 238 
This approach brings into focus the importance of the non-discursive 
practices as well as those discursive-theoretical elements that are generally taken 
to characterise the natural sciences. It forces us to pay attention to the ways in 
                                                                                                                                     
that commands our attention. What distinguishes a phenomenon are its clarity and reliability. 
Phenomena are clearly discernible, and the circumstances of their occurrence (although not 
always their causes or their most adequate description) must be well understood. The clarity of 
phenomena is to be contrasted to the complexity, the confused muddle, of most events in the 
world. In the language of information theory, phenomena have a high signal-to-noise ratio. But 
in this sense of the word there are comparatively few phenomena in nature. Hacking cites the 
pre-eminence of astronomy as a source of manifest regularity... A few chemical reactions and 
changes of state might also be cited ... But generally nature presents us with a blooming, 
buzzing confusion ... An empirical science dependent upon evident regularities in nature will 
very quickly encounter irreducible local idiosyncrasies. The objects of such a science would be 
far too complex for any systematic investigation stemming from observation, however careful. 
We tend to say too many factors are involved for any of them to be clearly seen, although, as 
Hacking notes, this can be said only in retrospect, when those ‘factors’ have been 
distinguished, isolated and analysed. Before that there is just complexity, and the ‘factors’ 
from which it supposedly results do not exist.' (Rouse, 1987 p.99; Hacking, 1983) 
238 For more detailed illustrations of this see Rouse (1987) p.69-126; also Mulkay (1979) p.63-95 
and Woolgar and Latour (1979). 
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which technical resources (instruments and techniques) are employed in the 
construction of phenomena in the experimental settings (laboratory microworlds). 
It also requires that we further consider the ways in which these phenomena are 
mobilised and deployed beyond their initial local settings and transferred into the 
wider society. Central to this approach is the understanding that laboratory 
microworlds are analogues in the natural sciences of the disciplinary and 
normalising locales (prisons, clinics, etc) dealt with in Foucault’s consideration of 
the human sciences. 
Conclusion 
The arguments for regarding the natural sciences in this way are considered 
further in the next chapter, where I discuss the work of Bruno Latour and actor 
network theory. However, it can be seen that it is possible to develop a detailed 
and highly plausible application of Foucault’s approach to understand how the 
natural sciences are enmeshed in strategies of power and knowledge. (Rouse, 
1987 p.209-47) The claim that Foucault’s critique of political sovereignty can be 
broadened out in a theoretically consistent manner to a critique of epistemic 
sovereignty in general and the natural sciences in particular, amounts to an 
immanent critique of Foucault on this count. If it were simply a case of 
acknowledging Foucault did not develop his ideas in relation to the natural 
sciences because his primary intellectual (and political) interests lay elsewhere, 
then the sorts of comments made here could be seen as an extension of Foucault’s 
work rather than as a critique. However, when these arguments regarding 
epistemic sovereignty are taken against the background of Hindess’ comments 
regarding Foucault’s incomplete critique of political sovereignty, their broader 
critical nature becomes apparent. 
To reiterate, Foucault’s preparedness to treat the natural sciences in a manner 
different from the human sciences - by maintaining that the former are able to 
detach or distance themselves from relations of social power - accepts that there 
are basic differences between the objects of these different sciences. Hence his 
distinction between capacities over things and relations of power between active 
subjects. As I have argued, this distinction, which is perfectly consistent with the 
main currents of Western philosophical thinking, can be traced to a philosophical 
commitment to autonomy and the capacity for agency as the defining 
characteristic of the human subject. 
Rouse’s approach to this issue draws on the work of the French sociologist of 
science Bruno Latour in significant ways.239 Latour’s criticism of the ‘modern 
                                                 
239 I have already noted in Chapter 6 that Rose and Miller’s work on neo-liberal modes of 
governmentality draws on Latour’s notion of ‘action at a distance’. See Rose and Miller 
(1992). 
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constitution’ of political philosophy and sociology argues that these critical 
enterprises are based on the failed attempt to rigidly separate nature and society. 
Latour is also critical of Foucault, particularly of his acceptance of the ‘the 
solidity of the natural sciences’. The argument that the sources of power cut 
across the subject/nature divide is taken up in more detail the next chapter. 
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Chapter 8 
Latour and actor network theory.  
 
Introduction 
The preceding chapter examined the connection between Foucault’s 
willingness to see the natural sciences as able to detach themselves from relations 
of power and knowledge, something that he regarded as impossible in the human 
sciences. This attitude was considered in the context of what I described as 
Foucault’s incomplete critique of sovereignty. That chapter concluded by 
suggesting that to be consistent with the tasks he set for his own project, 
Foucault’s criticism of political sovereignty needed to be carried further into a 
rejection of all forms of epistemic sovereignty. 
The argument that Foucault’s notion of power can be developed to deal with 
the natural sciences is pursued further in current chapter. In doing this I draw on 
the work of the French sociologist of science, Bruno Latour. In particular, I 
consider how the distinction between the ‘social’ and the ‘natural’ is called into 
question by a broader critique of epistemic sovereignty. Building on this, I 
explore the compatibility of the work of Latour and actor network theory with that 
of Foucault. I suggest that the actor network theory approach can provide an 
understanding of power and representation in the natural sciences that in key 
respects is not inconsistent with Foucault’s general approach to such questions. 
Foucault’s approach to the separation of power in the social and natural 
sciences is problematic and open to challenge. As I noted in the previous chapter, 
Rouse’s work draws on that of Bruno Latour, and it is to the work of Latour, 
Michel Callon and others associated with ‘actor network theory’ that I now turn. 
As suggested in the preceding discussion, if power is to be considered as a 
relationship (or set of relationships) which is not purely a property of the human 
subject or agent, then the importance of non-human material entities, including 
technical resources in understanding power in modern society must be considered 
in a different light. Actor network theory, and in particular the work of Latour and 
Callon, promises to help in providing the conceptual approach to overcome the 
sorts of difficulties identified in the preceding chapter. Indeed, several 
commentators have alluded to areas of similarity between the general approach to 
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power adopted by Foucault and that found in actor network theory.240 In the first 
part of this chapter I set out some of the key elements of actor network theory, 
noting in the process the points of similarity with Foucault, before considering in 
the subsequent parts the points of divergence between the two. 
Actor network theory 
Actor network theory originated in attempts by sociologists of science to 
explain, contrary to the prevailing approaches in philosophy of science, how 
science was ‘really done’, and to understand how science and technology 
interacted to impact on society outside the narrow confines of the laboratory. It 
thus emerged as a critique of other theories or models of science, and in dialogue 
with other sociologically informed approaches to the relationship between 
scientific work and the broader society. 241 As such, its early development appears 
to have occurred largely separate from the central philosophical and sociological 
debates on power and social theory in which, in recent decades, the work of 
Foucault has been enmeshed. 242 This is not to suggest that the predominantly 
European members of the actor network theory ‘school’ were unaware of the 
potential intersection of their work with the problems and approaches found in 
Foucault’s work. 243 In fact there is evidence that this link is recognised, albeit 
often only as a background commentary in the footnotes. 
An interesting footnote to an article by Latour (1986) provides a clear 
example of this is. In that article, Latour criticises sociological theory for the 
reifying use of notions such as ‘society’ and ‘power’ to explain the apparent 
stability of social relationships. He argues instead for an approach that 
understands the ‘stability’ of macro-social structures in terms of the performative 
nature of micro-relations of power. His analysis parallels that of Foucault in 
emphasising that macro social structures are the product of the sorts of constant 
‘agonistic’ relations of power at the micro or local level that Foucault discussed in 
works such as The Subject and Power and Power/Knowledge.244 
                                                 
240  See for example Law (1991a) p.169 and (1997) p.3; Kusch (1991) p.190-191; Ward (1994) 
p.91; Dean (1998a) p.191, 197 
241 Most notably the Edinburgh School of science studies represented in the work of such 
researchers as Barry Barnes and David Bloor. 
242  While this development was separate from these debates, it was not in ignorance of them - in 
particular see Barry Barnes (1988) substantial work on power. 
243  Bruno Latour and Michel Callon, arguably the most influential actor network theorists, are of 
course both French. 
244  See in particular Foucault, (1982), (1980d) and (1980e). 
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Latour however added a significant dimension to his analysis that was not 
adequately dealt with by Foucault, by arguing that stable social institutions245 
always necessarily involve the mobilisation of heterogeneous ‘extrasomatic 
resources’ in order to impose and enforce the definitions of particular actors. 
Furthermore says Latour, the only way to understand such social stability is 
through examining how power is exerted locally, but that this must also include 
understanding how non-human and technological resources have been mobilised 
by actors at the micro-level in conjunction with social elements. (Latour, 1986 
p.277) Latour’s reference to Foucault occurs against the background of his 
explanation of this argument, as the final footnote to his paper. It reads in full: 
This is in effect the same result obtained by Michel Foucault 246 when he 
dissolved the notion of power held by the powerful in favour of 
micropowers diffused through the many technologies to discipline and 
keep in line. It is simply an expansion of Foucault’s notion to the many 
techniques employed in machines and the hard sciences. (Latour, 1986 
p.279 emphasis added) 
Considered in the context of my discussion of Rouse in the previous chapter there 
are good reasons to accept Latour’s claim that his approach is a logical 
development of Foucault’s analysis. However, before evaluating the similarities 
and differences between Foucault and actor network theory in more detail, it is 
first necessary to examine the key propositions that underpin actor network 
theory.  
According to Callon’s explanation of the ‘translation model’ of science 
adopted by actor network theory, the prime objective of science is to produce 
statements, which he qualifies by stressing the importance of both the process by 
which such statements are made, and the role of non-propositional elements in 
their production. Statements in turn make up translation chains in that all 
scientific statements refer to other statements, objects and other ‘time spaces’, 
which are condensed and thus made available. Translation chains ‘combine 
heterogeneous elements of which the most important are statements, technical 
devices and tacit skills that can rightly be called embodied skills.’ (Callon, 1995 
p.50) Relationships between these heterogeneous elements are built through what 
Latour called inscriptions - written traces produced in reports, laboratory notes, 
graphic displays, data tables etc. The important point here is that contrary to those 
models of science which assume a fundamental division between experimental 
instruments and observational statements, the translation model sees simply a 
                                                 
245  Foucault argued that such stable institutions, resulted from what he called states of domination 
‘when stable mechanisms replace the free play of antagonistic reactions’. (Foucault, 1982 
p.225-6). 
246  The reference here is to Discipline and Punish. 
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range of inscriptions which vary in their degree of sophistication and organising 
capacity.247  
Callon explicitly draws a parallel between the approach of Foucault and 
Latour, this time when he argues that ‘Writing devices are important in all 
scientific fields and beyond. For example, Foucault ... analyses the hospital as a 
device that places the individual in a “network of writing”.’ (Callon, 1995 p.51) 
Developing this analysis further, Callon emphasises that, for actor network 
theory: 
Science is a vast enterprise of writing, but to move from an inscription to 
a statement, and from one statement to another, requires embodied skills 
and/or technical devices ... it is the constant interaction between 
inscriptions, technical devices, and embodied skills that leads to the 
development of statements. (Callon, 1995 p.51) 
Nevertheless, scientific activity does not simply produce statements; often it seeks 
to move statements out of the laboratory. Here Latour’s approach can be seen as a 
challenge to the conventional distinction drawn by much philosophy of science 
between the content of knowledge and the context of its production - a key point 
also raised by Rouse in his argument regarding the problems of epistemic 
sovereignty. Callon suggests that Latour’s notion of inscription, contrary to 
conventional rationalist approaches to science, allows us to understand how the 
content and context of knowledge ‘are simultaneously reconfigured’. Translation 
thus leads to the ‘identification and shaping of allies and seeking their support.’ 
This involves establishing some form of coincidence of interest between the 
statements (and devices) produced in the laboratory (or in field studies in ecology) 
and other, external non-scientific actors, to establish translation networks 
concerned with the development and extension of the translations of a particular 
set of statements or research results. 248 
Callon identifies two basic forms of these translation networks. First there are 
those which principally circulate their products within the specialised 
communities and spaces of science - as statements within the scientific literature 
and instruments within the laboratory. Second, there are those which ‘stabilise 
some of these entities’ (ie statements and instruments) ‘and mobilise them to 
multiply connections with non-specialists’ outside the laboratory. In each of these 
cases however, it is the scientific activity that establishes the translation network. 
                                                 
247 The similarity between Rouse’s approach and that of Latour and Callon on these points is 
clear. See also Latour (1987), especially Chapter 6. 
248 Callon says that the notion of a translation network ‘refers to a compound reality in which 
inscriptions (and in particular, statements), technical devices, and human actors (including 
researchers, technicians, industrialists, firms, charitable organisations, and politicians) are 
brought together and interact with each other.’ (Callon, 1995 p.52) 
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Callon argues that when networks of the second type are established they extend 
and grow because scientists, by virtue of the defining role they play in the 
manufacture of statements and instruments, are able to speak ‘on behalf of’ the 
scientific entities produced (eg DNA, electrons, and I would argue, entities such 
endangered species, environmental hazards etc). 249 
However, what is important about this second type of translation is that in 
extending the network beyond the scientific journals and laboratories, scientists 
translate scientific entities for non-scientific interests (companies, governments, 
interests groups). In doing so they thus are also potentially in a position to speak 
on behalf of substantial numbers of other actors external to science who have 
developed an interest in a particular scientific entity or who may see these as of 
benefit to their own interests in some way.250 Scientists play a unique role here in 
that they are engaged in a double translation or representation. This occurs, first 
in translating the statements that manufacture the content of scientific knowledge 
(producing the entities to which their statements refer), and second, in shaping the 
context in which such knowledge (and entities) are relevant to, and interact with, 
other interests and networks. This is of particular significance because 
representation in science cannot be separated into statements and the objects to 
which these refer or correspond in some external ‘real’ world. The entire process 
is rather a chain of translations in which any single statement can be understood 
as a series of translations, which refer to a multitude of other inscriptions, 
embodied skills and technical devices. 
Callon further suggests two important consequences of such an approach. 
First, because statements do not refer to an ‘outside reality’ but are simply 
‘location points’ in a teeming network of such statements etc, it is not possible to 
speak of a single ‘reference’ but only of ‘an entanglement of micro references’. 
What we take as a reference to the ‘out-thereness’ of entities in the world is only a 
focus on the ‘final’ statement in a chain of translations.251 Hence, reference is 
much like power for Foucault, ‘nothing more than an effect of a translation chain’ 
the robustness of which ‘depends entirely upon the latter.’ (Callon, 1995 p.53) 
The second consequence of the translation network approach is that it explains 
that particular strength of science which allows the scientist to ‘re-present’ in their 
translation of statements and techniques the interests of other actors attracted to 
that particular area of scientific work. They are able, that is, to ‘re-present’ 
                                                 
249 Callon describes a third type of translation network - which is in effect a more dynamic version 
of the second type - in which networks are ‘active on both fronts and enter into a dynamic 
expansion, where each translation within the laboratory leads the network outside to be 
lengthened.’ (Callon, 1995 p.52) 
250  See Callon (1986) and Latour (1983) for detailed case studies of how this occurs. 
251  There is a parallel here with Hacking’s notion of ‘phenomena’ as used by Rouse. See Chapter 
6 of this thesis. 
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themselves as the ‘spokesperson of both nature and society.’ (Callon, 1995 p.53) 
252  
A key claim of actor network theory, therefore, is that the ‘facts’ of the 
natural sciences are, like those of the social sciences, constructed. They are 
established through the production of strong associational networks - the stronger 
and more extensive a network becomes, the more solid the scientific facts 
become.  
The scientist, by successfully recruiting allies, both human and non-
human, appealing to authority, referring to former texts and procedures, 
compiling data, creating computer files, utilising laboratories and 
equipment, etc, is able to create an encompassing network, the 
sponsorship of a sustaining audience, and ultimately a community of 
truth. It is through this network-building that the scientist is able to go 
from soft rhetoric to hard knowledge ... What becomes a scientific fact 
and an accepted truth is a direct outcome of the strength of the ties, or in 
[Latour’s] words ‘metrological chains’, 253 which a scientist or group of 
scientists is able to construct and enforce. If the scientist has been 
successful, reality has been defined. (Ward, 1994 p.83)  
This approach goes directly to the problem of the relationship between the highly 
formalised natural sciences and relations of power in society, which as we saw in 
an earlier chapter, is precisely the issue Foucault dismissed as an ‘excessively 
complicated’ question in which the ‘threshold of explanation is impossibly high’. 
(Foucault, 1980d p.109-110) However the general approach of actor network 
theory to knowledge and power is similar to that adopted by Foucault. It is also 
able demonstrate that the difference between the ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ of the 
laboratory is in effect the same sort of relationship Foucault pointed to in his 
analyses of the social sciences which pointed to the continuity between the 
‘micro’ and ‘macro’ levels of social structure. 
At the same time actor network theory allows us to explain the special 
character attributed to natural science - which Foucault regarded as connected to 
‘the centralising powers’ and functions of institutionalised scientific discourse in 
Western societies. 254 The actor network approach argues that in modern societies 
                                                 
252 In fact this is, as I argue below, one way of accounting for the particular effects, repeatedly 
commented on in Foucault’s works, of the ‘power which the West since Medieval times has 
attributed to science and has reserved for those engaged in scientific discourse.’ (Foucault, 
1980e p.85) 
253  A metrological chain is another term used by Latour for a translation chain. See Latour (1987) 
p.179. 
254  Foucault refers to the ‘effects of the centralising powers which are linked to the institution and 
functioning of an organised scientific discourse with a society such as ours’ and which are 
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the most dynamic and important sources of power come from science, and ‘not 
from the classical political process’. 255 Indeed Latour suggests that the very 
techno-scientific processes that political science and sociology have ‘deemed 
uninteresting or too technical to be analysed’ 256 are in fact more influential than 
many social processes. (Latour, 1983 p.168)  
As indicated in my discussion of Rouse in Chapter 7, what makes science so 
important (and indeed, ‘special’) is its ability to shape the world outside of the 
laboratory by translating the disciplinary conditions of the laboratory into broader 
social, economic and technological arenas. Latour explains that this performative 
characteristic of science resides in its ability to enrol and enlist the interests of 
‘outside’ actors in its translation networks. He uses the example of Pasteur’s 
research into anthrax to illustrate this argument. What was crucial in making the 
science of microbiology a powerful force in both agriculture and medicine (with 
profound social and economic consequences), was the work of Pasteur’s team in 
convincing agricultural interests that the anthrax disease could be controlled 
through the scientific knowledge developed in his laboratory. This was only 
possible however if farm practices were reorganised in ways which translated into 
the field those laboratory conditions and practices which allowed the anthrax 
bacillus to be manipulated and rendered docile. 
What made this possible was the scientific success in manipulating 
translations of scale. The artificial, highly disciplined micro environments of the 
laboratory allowed manipulations of the bacillus in ways that were just not 
possible on the pre-scientific farm. The laboratory application of the techniques of 
sterility, isolation, vaccine testing, etc provided a regime of simplification and 
discipline needed to study how the anthrax disease worked. That is, it enabled a 
disciplining of the entire anthrax disease, which the unruly ‘outside’ world of the 
farm would not. There are two elements to Latour’s argument here. First, the 
laboratory techniques which permit the systematic analysis of the disease 
behaviour must be perfected in the highly artificial, constructed environments of 
the laboratory. However, and this is Latour’s crucial second point, for the 
knowledge and techniques accumulated on the micro scale to be successfully 
translated into the macro world of the farm and commercial agriculture, a very 
important precondition must be present. That is, in order to extend the success rate 
                                                                                                                                     
endowed with a special ability to invest particular discourses ‘and those who uphold them with 
the effects of a power which the West since Medieval times has attributed to science and has 
reserved for those engaged in scientific discourse.’ (Foucault, 1980e p.84-5). 
255  The similarity of this to Beck’s analysis of science and technology in risk society should be 
noted although there are important differences. See Chapter 3; I consider this further in the 
Conclusion of this thesis. See also Rutherford (1999a). 
256 These, of course, are the two reasons I suggested in the previous chapter for Foucault’s relative 
lack attention to the natural sciences. 
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of the vaccine in the laboratory to the farm, it is also necessary to extend the 
disciplinary regime of the laboratory onto the farm. Pasteur’s vaccine will only 
work on the condition that the farmer ‘respect a limited set of laboratory practices 
- disinfection, cleanliness, inoculation, timing and recording’ etc. The key to this 
extension of scientific discipline from laboratory to the ‘outside world’, Latour 
points out, is the ability of the scientists to extend their ‘translation network to 
enlists the actors outside the laboratory - the farmers, government officials, etc. 
For this to happen, the non-scientists first had to accept the scientists’ expertise, 
that is, to follow the prescribed techniques and accept their scientific statements 
as having the authority of ‘truth’. (Latour, 1983 p.150-52) 
One of the key criticisms levelled by Latour at the sociology of science is that 
it fails to recognise laboratories as one of the few ‘fresh sources of politics’ in 
contemporary society. Much sociology of science accepts that the inside/outside 
dichotomy does not hold true. However, rather than understanding the scientific 
space (the laboratory) as a dynamic source of power, such sociology sees the 
laboratory as a fundamentally ordinary place. Latour agrees the substantial 
number of anthropological studies of laboratories over recent decades have 
dissipated many of the arguments about the special epistemological status of the 
natural sciences - that, indeed there is nothing special or unique in the cognitive 
and social practices of science. The problem raised by Latour however is that this 
fails to account for the importance of science and technology in contemporary 
society. His response is to concede that scientific fact is the ‘product of average, 
ordinary people and settings, linked to one another by no special norms or 
communication forms.’ What makes the natural sciences powerful is in fact 
something very simple - the use of inscription devices. (Latour, 1983 p.157- 62)  
Hence, the influence of science in society can be explained by bringing 
together the three threads of Latour’s approach to actor network theory. First, is 
the dissolution of the inside/outside boundary between ‘science’ in the laboratory 
and ‘society’ outside. Modern science is very much applied science, or what 
Latour and others have called ‘techno-science’. (Latour, 1987) In order to 
flourish, such science must be concerned with capturing the interests of others, 
that is, it must be able to translate scientific statements in such a way that these 
are discursively framed in terms which problematise the development and 
application of economic and social interests.257 Second, is the inversion of the 
scale of micro/macro levels through the expertise obtained by partitioning and 
disciplining micro-phenomena in the laboratory and through mathematical or 
computer modelling. This simplification and ‘scaling down’ produces a change of 
scale which makes possible a reversal of the actor’s strengths so that what is 
overwhelming in ‘the field’ can be made manageable and open to manipulation in 
                                                 
257  Latour (1983) p.145-6. 
  
 
182
 
the scientific space. (Latour, 1983 p.145-7; 1987 p.233-7) When successful, such 
inversion of scale makes the scientist (and their ‘outside’ allies) powerful where 
previously they were weak.258 Third, is the processes of inscription and the 
formation of ‘centres of calculation’. Irrespective of the objects or phenomena of 
scientific study, the only way they can be rendered manipulable is through the 
process of inscribing vast quantities of information and data into a form that can 
be measured and compared. That is, information is reduced to a written trace that 
not only makes the ‘perceptive judgment of the others simpler’, but it also limits 
the modalities (and hence counter-arguments) that a reader can add to the 
statements involved. (Latour, 1983 p.161)  
When combined with the change of scale referred to above, the laboratory is 
at the centre of a series of long chains through which information is gathered and 
inscriptions generated, combined, condensed and then re-dispersed and inserted in 
the practices of the world beyond the laboratory. In this process the laboratory 
becomes a centre of calculation that draws on resources scattered across numerous 
networks. Inscription devices and the traces they produce (especially numbers and 
statistics) allow the operation of centres that are capable of acting at distance ‘on 
unfamiliar events, places and people.’ 259 The use of cartography as a tool of 
European colonial ‘exploration’ is used by Latour to illustrate the operation of 
such centres of calculation in ‘bringing back’ and disciplining the unfamiliar and 
distant. 260  
In this way, Latour argues that it is largely meaningless to attempt to 
distinguish between the social context of science and the content of science as 
produced in the laboratory. There is no clear cut separation between the 
laboratory and the ‘outside’ world - rather the laboratory, that which in most 
respects is a rather ‘ordinary place’, is powerful precisely because it is a 
technological device capable of inverting ‘the hierarchy of forces’ in society 
(Latour, 1983 p.159, 164): 
                                                 
258  ‘The change of scale makes possible a reversal of the actors’ strengths; ‘outside’ animals, 
farmers, and veterinarians were weaker than the invisible anthrax bacillus; inside Pasteur’s lab, 
man becomes stronger than the bacillus, and as a corollary, the scientists in his lab gets the 
edge over the local, devoted, experienced veterinarian.’ (Latour, 1983 p.147) 
259  This is achieved by ‘inventing means that (a) render them mobile so that they can be brought 
back (ie to the centre); (b) keep them stable so that they can be moved back and forth without 
additional distortion, corruption, or decay; and (c) are combinable so that whatever stuff they 
are made of, they can be cumulated, aggregated, or shuffled like a pack of cards.’ (Latour, 
1987  p.233) 
260  A somewhat parallel notion can be found in Foucault when he deals with spatial issues: ‘Once 
knowledge can be analysed in terms of region, domain, implantation, displacement, 
transposition, one is able to capture the process by which knowledge functions as a form of 
power and disseminates the effects of power.’ (Foucault, 1980c p.69) 
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The specificity of science is not to be found in cognitive, social or 
psychological qualities, but in the special construction of laboratories in a 
manner which reverses the scale of phenomena so as to make things 
readable, and then accelerates the frequency of trials, allowing many 
mistakes to be made and registered. (Latour, 1983 p.165) 
What makes such an otherwise ordinary technological device socially powerful is 
that in order to achieve a similar degree of predictive reliability (and success) in 
the application of scientific knowledge outside the microworld of the laboratory, 
it is essential to first extend to the outside the highly contrived conditions 
responsible for production and verification of statements which exist in the 
laboratory. In other words, in order to allow the scientific ‘facts’ to circulate 
beyond the laboratory it is necessary to greatly extend those ‘costly networks 
inside which they can maintain their fragile efficacy’, and this ‘means 
transforming society into a vast laboratory’. (Latour, 1983 p.166) 
Here Latour’s argument is similar to that employed by Beck (in the latter’s 
analysis of ‘risk society’) when he points out that in modern technological 
societies it is science, and not ‘the classical political process’ which is the source 
of power. It is the unseen, autonomous, but nonetheless ordinary, everyday 
practice of science that shapes so much of politics and social change. These 
laboratory forces, argues Latour, ‘can displace society and recompose it by the 
very content of what is done inside them, which seemed at first irrelevant or too 
technical.’ Indeed, in a rebuff to the argument put by Foucault, Latour insists that 
the careful scrutiny of the natural sciences cannot be ignored for the political ‘gets 
all its really efficient sources of power from the very laboratories that have just 
been deemed uninteresting or too technical to be analysed.’ (Latour, 1983 p.168) 
Elsewhere Latour directly addresses the very point raised by Foucault when 
he sought to separate the ‘dubious’ human sciences from the ‘highly formalised’ 
natural sciences. It is worth quoting Latour’s comments on this at length, as they 
clearly draw the connection between the highly formalised character of the so-
called ‘hard’ sciences and his notion that the strength of these sciences is built up 
through centres of calculation operating as a generalised apparatus of power: 
When people wonder how ‘abstract’ geometry or mathematics may have 
some bearing on ‘reality’, they are really admiring the strategic position 
taken by those who work inside the centres on forms of forms. They 
should be the weakest since they are the most remote (as it is often said) 
from any ‘application’. On the contrary, they may become the strongest 
by the same token as the centres end up controlling time and space: they 
design networks that are tied together in a few obligatory passage points. 
Once every trace has been not only written on paper, but rewritten in 
geometrical form, and re-written in equation form, then it is no wonder 
that those who control geometry and mathematics will be able to 
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intervene almost anywhere. The more ‘abstract’ their theory is, the better 
it will be able to occupy centres inside the centres. ... The more 
heterogeneous and dominating the centres, the more formalism they will 
require simply to stay together and maintain their imperium. Formalism 
and mathematics are attracted by the centres, if I dare make this 
metaphor, like rats and insects to granaries.’ (Latour, 1987 p.245)  
Thus the very formalism and abstractness that Foucault took as signalling the 
detachment of the natural sciences from power relations is shown by Latour to be 
precisely mechanism by which science and technology are able to profoundly 
shape such power relations. 
Latour and Foucault: affinities and differences 
The literature on actor network theory is scattered throughout with largely 
positive references to Foucault. This suggests an intellectual affinity between the 
two that nonetheless remains largely in the background.261 The reason that this is 
‘in the background’ is undoubtedly related to the fact that actor network theory is 
concerned with the power of the natural sciences (‘technoscience’) and Foucault 
was not. However, in an interview published in 1993 Latour commented on 
Foucault’s work in more detail. (Crawford, 1993) Here Latour admits that he has 
used and read Foucault quite ‘a lot’, in particular Discipline and Punish, which he 
regards as ‘a fascinating field study on the dissemination of power.’ He singles 
out Foucault’s notion of the ‘regime of statements and how they spread’, 
suggesting that this approach lends itself very effectively for use as a network 
argument. The importance of Discipline and Punish, according to Latour, was that 
it demonstrated not simply that knowledge is necessary to the exercise of power, 
but more importantly, showed for the first time that a specific apparatus of power, 
a dispositif, is necessary to establish and maintain both society and knowledge. 
(Crawford, 1993 p.251) Latour expresses particular interest in Foucault’s work on 
the panopticon, which he sees as an example of the same general form of 
‘intellectual technological dispositif’ that he has pointed to in the scientific 
laboratory. In fact says Latour, 
In that sense, the dissemination of laboratories, their ability to reverse 
scale, to completely reverse micro and macro order, is very much a 
confirmation of Foucault’s tradition. But of course, there are many more 
dispositifs than the panopticon. (Crawford, 1993 p.253 - emphasis added) 
Likewise, Latour’s comment on centres of calculation quoted above suggests 
a parallel with Foucault’s notions of panopticism and the dispositif, although such 
                                                 
261  See for example the following references to Foucault: Callon (1995) p.51, 62 and (1986) 
p.224; Latour (1986) p.279 and (1991) p.13; Law (1991a) p.169-170, 173, 187, (1997) p.3 and 
(1994). 
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an analogy also throws differences into relief. 262 Kusch points to Foucault’s 
differentiation between micro-relations of power at the level of the individual (or 
small groups), and macro-level mechanisms of power as embodied in systems of 
institutional coercive. (Kusch, 1991 p.143) While Foucault undoubtedly saw these 
two levels of power relations as interconnected, they are nevertheless different 
and distinguishable. In particular Foucault drew attention to the often unforeseen 
and unintended effects of the emergence of macro-relations of power, in the 
course of which ‘micro-mechanisms’ of power were ‘invested, colonised, utilised, 
involuted, transformed, displaced, extended, etc by ever more general 
mechanisms and by forces of global domination.’ (Foucault, 1980e p.99) 263 These 
more general apparatuses of power, the dispositifs, were of course embedded in 
the institutions of the prison, the clinic, the asylum etc which Foucault saw as 
intimately intertwined with the rise of the theories and practices of the human 
sciences. While Foucault examined the emergence of modern biology, especially 
in his earlier archaeological works, his studies of dispositifs and the systems these 
formed focused on institutions of social coercion - or more accurately, on 
disciplinary institutions and systems of subjectification. His concern was not, as I 
have said previously, with the institutions of natural science. 
Kusch argues that although Foucault never gave a detailed account in his 
writings, he nevertheless appeared to suggest a ‘two-fold explanation’ of the 
existence of dispositifs, which relied upon both a description of ‘the structure, 
profile or composition’ of institutions and an explanation of the ‘conditions of its 
possibility’. (Kusch, 1991 p.145) According to Kusch, understanding the 
composition involves studying how micro-relations of power are ‘colonised’ by 
institutions and systems. This is a dual task involving the study of the dispositif 
‘both as social laboratories, and as the results of this laboratory work.’264, 
Understanding the second element, its conditions of possibility, requires in itself a 
double task. The first is the identification of what Foucault (1980e p.101) called 
‘the immediate social entourage’. Kusch describes this as those groups of social 
actors who see the dispositif as in some way having the potential to influence the 
scope or efficiency of a given network of power in their favour. (Kusch, 1991 
p.147) The second task involves studying processes of subjectification, that is, 
                                                 
262 Latour explicitly makes this connection between panopticism and centres of calculation - see 
my discussion later in this chapter and Crawford (1993). 
263  See also Foucault (1980a) p.199-200. 
264  Hence, Kusch interprets the dispositif as ‘spaces where experimentation with small, closed 
power networks, or social ‘microworlds’ is possible, spaces where new technologies of more 
efficient, more extensive, more diverse forms of control, manipulation, authority, coercion, 
punishment and deterrence are developed.’ (Kusch, 1991 p.146)  Kusch’s somewhat negative 
interpretation would be better qualified by recognising the role of normalising and self-
formative processes of subjectification that could also be a product of such a system - not to 
mention the inherent propensity for such institutions to spawn resistance to their schemes. 
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how some actors are constituted as ‘inmates and victims’, while others are 
constituted as functionaries and officials, or what Foucault called 
‘hierarchisation’. 
Foucault cast his notion of power in terms of networks and chains. (Kusch, 
1991 p.138) Where he specifically addressed the nature of power, he always 
insisted on it being treated as a relationship rather than an attribute. Hence, all 
power relations ‘are rooted in the system of social networks’ and power is 
‘coextensive with every social relationship.’ (Foucault, 1982 p.224 – emphasis 
added) Similarly he argued that power ‘must be analysed as something which 
circulates, or rather as something which only functions in the form of a chain ... 
Power is employed and exercised through a net-like organisation.’ (Foucault, 
1980e p.98 – emphasis added) 265 Indeed in many of the works of his genealogical 
period 266 Foucault suggests that the individual actor or subject exists within 
networks of power and that these are constitutive of the identity of the subject. 267 
This reading suggests that the parallels between the approaches of Foucault 
and Latour are substantial. For example, Latour’s emphasis on the importance of 
problematisation and capturing others’ interests (what Callon calls interessement 
268) is reminiscent of Foucault’s admonishment that understanding how 
mechanisms of power function requires historical investigation ‘beginning at the 
lowest level’ to identify the actors responsible for such mechanisms and the ways 
in which these became ‘economically and politically useful’ at a ‘precise 
conjuncture’ in representing particular interests. (Foucault, 1980e p.101) 
Foucault’s studies of the human sciences repeatedly pointed to this process of 
problematisation (for example insanity, crime, sexuality) and the ways in which 
                                                 
265  Dean (1998b) acknowledges the substantial elements common to both Foucault’s notion of 
‘regimes of practices’ or dispositifs and the actor network theory notions of socio-technical 
networks and ‘technological systems’. He also argues that while Foucault shared with Callon 
and Latour a ‘constructivist’ understanding of knowledge as being formed within ‘particular 
regimes of truth and rationality, then within regimes of practices, and finally in relation to what 
might be called “regimes of identity”, his methodology and, more importantly, his purposes, 
depart dramatically’ from what Dean sees as the underlying ‘realism’ of actor network theory. I 
disagree that actor network theory can be said to embrace realism, at least of a kind that could 
be associated with a correspondence theory of truth. See my discussion of translation networks 
earlier in this chapter. 
266  Darier suggests Foucault’s work can be roughly grouped into an archaeological, genealogical 
and ‘final’ periods. See Darier (1999c). McNay (1994) suggests a similar approach.  
267  Following Hindess, in the previous Chapter I suggested that in his later works, Foucault 
moved away from the view that the actor was largely, if not fully, defined by these relations 
and adopted a view which that was perhaps closer to the view of subjectivity traditionally 
advanced by critical theory. 
268  Callon defines interessement as ‘the group of actions by which an entity ... attempts to impose 
and stabilise the identity of the other actors it defines through its problematisation.’ See Callon 
(1986) p.207. 
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expertise is instrumental in the formation of specific modes of subjectivity - a 
process which thereby defines both the identity and interests of social actors. 269 
Similarly, it is possible to discern a clear equivalence between Latour’s rejection 
of the inside (laboratory) / outside (society) distinction and Foucault’s emphasis 
on the ‘two-way borrowing’ of mechanisms of power (and knowledge) between 
disciplinary institutions and the wider social environment. Kusch is surely correct 
therefore in concluding that: 
In Foucault, the Latourian laboratory is replaced by coercive institutions, 
but otherwise the line of thinking is similar: coercive institutions are the 
social laboratories for new forms of control and discipline ... and the 
results of these social experiments are extended to ever new social 
domains. (Kusch, 1991 p.190-91) 
Actants and agency 
The preceding discussion has avoided consideration of the most significant 
difference between Latour and Foucault - that for actor network theory the 
distinction between society and nature is blurred to the point where agency cannot 
be regarded as a property exclusive to the human subject, as it remained for 
Foucault. In this section I therefore turn to a closer examination of the way in 
which actor network theory deals with the question of agency. This is a 
particularly important issue as, on the surface at least, it is this which radically 
undermines the traditional approach to political philosophy, centrally concerned 
as it is with the problem of the sovereignty of the human subject. A position, as I 
have argued in the preceding chapter, which was not fully relinquished by 
Foucault’s attempt at ‘beheading’ the sovereign in political philosophy. 
The consequence of the actor network theory claim that a clear ontological 
distinction between nature and society cannot be sustained is something that will 
be considered further in the Conclusion. Here I examine some specific criticisms 
levelled at Foucault by Latour, before turning to consider the way in which Latour 
problematises agency. This is useful both because it highlights my contention that 
Latour’s approach is in fact not inconsistent with the general intellectual 
orientation of Foucault’s work on genealogy and governmentality, and because it 
provides some valuable insights into how a biopolitics of the environment 270 
might be understood and studied further. 
In the interview cited earlier in this chapter in which Latour commented on 
the influence of Foucault's work on his own, he also outlines some substantial 
                                                 
269  There is also evident a strong emphasis on this in post-Foucault governmentality studies - see 
in particular the importance placed on this by Rose and Miller (1992). 
270  Earlier I referred to this in terms of ‘ecological governmentality’. See also Rutherford (1999b) 
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criticisms of Foucault. In doing so he places Foucault within the epistemological 
tradition of Canguilhem and Bachelard, ‘a tradition that shows how science 
should escape by a succession of breaks from its past and its social condition.’ 
(Crawford, 1993 p.251) 271 This characterisation is consistent with the argument 
Foucault used to explain the distinction between social science and the science of 
nature and how the latter was able to separate itself from the disciplinary 
technique of the human sciences, especially the examination. 272  
Latour sees Foucault as part of a ‘peculiarly French’ tradition in the history of 
science, which permits the natural sciences (‘the hard sciences’) to escape serious 
criticism.273 Indeed, from a critical perspective, the natural sciences are 
‘unstudiable from first principles’ in France because of this, and this is reflected 
in the position taken by intellectuals such as Lyotard, Baudrillard etc, whom 
Latour regards as ‘completely scientistic as far as science is concerned’. Hence 
Latour cautions that it is necessary to bear in mind the extent to which the natural 
sciences escape serious criticisms in ‘the French tradition’, a tradition of which 
‘Foucault is very much part’. (Crawford, 1993 p.251-2) It is against this 
background that Latour criticises Foucault’s work for being unbalanced 
(‘asymmetrical’), in that it largely ignored these very sciences. By doing so 
Foucault ‘shunned the hard cases’ and as a result says Latour, it is difficult to 
fully evaluate the usefulness of his approach for analysing the natural sciences. 
While Foucault redefined the relationship between knowledge and power in the 
social sciences, he did not do the necessary work in relation to the ‘hard sciences’. 
Latour questions whether Foucault’s vocabulary and concepts could usefully be 
transferred to such an analysis, arguing that the real test of the Foucauldian 
redefinition of power would be to see whether or not it could be extended to those 
sciences concerned with non-human entities. He concludes, while acknowledging 
the influence of Foucault’s work on his own, 274 with the ‘suspicion’ that 
                                                 
271 For a detailed study of Foucault’s relationship to French history of science, and especially 
Canguilhem and Bachelard, see Gutting (1989). 
272  This is discussed in an earlier chapter. Interestingly, Foucault did concede that the ‘forms of 
inquiry and examination’ could interact  ‘and as a consequence the sciences of nature and man 
also overlapped in terms of their concepts, methods and results. I think that one could find in 
geography a good example of a discipline which systematically uses measure, inquiry and 
examination.’ (Foucault, 1980c p.74-5). This suggestion that geography involves an 
‘intersection’ of the human and natural science is particularly interesting given the important 
contribution of geography in the nineteenth century to the development of a specifically 
environmental discourse. It is perhaps not accidental that contemporary universities still 
frequently locate environmental studies within their geography programs. 
273 This is hardly a peculiarly French phenomenon, although it is perhaps stronger in French 
intellectual culture than some others. 
274  Latour says ‘I have used Foucault and read him a lot, so he might be absorbed in my thinking 
probably much more than I recognise.’ Crawford (1993) p.252. 
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‘Foucault retained the typically French attitude - a complete belief in the solidity 
of the hard sciences.’ (Crawford, 1993 p.252) 
Latour’s criticism of Foucault’s ‘asymmetry’ towards the natural sciences 
should not be understood simply as the complaint that he paid too little attention 
to the natural sciences. Rather it reflects a methodological concern central to actor 
network theory and its particular reinterpretation of agency. Both Callon (1986) 
and Latour (1994) propose the adoption of what they describe as a ‘generalised 
principle of symmetry’. This is an extension of the principle of symmetry put 
forward by David Bloor for the ‘strong program’ in the sociology of science. 
Bloor argues that both truth and falsity, and rational and irrational behaviour, 
should be analysed in the same terms rather than segregating these into two 
incompatible spheres. In his studies of the human sciences Foucault clearly 
adopted a position that consistent with this methodological principle. However 
Latour and Callon extend this principle further to encompass the study of human 
and non-human behaviour - that is, in studying both ‘nature’ and ‘society’ they 
insist we should not switch analytical frameworks when moving from the social to 
the technical aspects of a problem. Latour sees this as not only consistent with, 
but as a logical development of, Bloor’s approach. The difference is that instead 
of explaining society and nature in social terms as does Bloor, Latour argues that 
both sorts of phenomena should be analysed in terms that are neither social nor 
technical but rather socio-technical or collective. (Crawford, 1993 p.255-6; 
Latour, 1993 p.4-5) By collective Latour means the tangling together or 
‘hybridisation’ of society and the ‘objective world (things-in-themselves)’. 
(Latour, 1994 p.793) Such an approach, Latour readily admits, blurs the 
boundaries between subject and object, and as a result is frequently accused of 
either anthropomorphism (Schaffer, 1991) or the mechanisation of subjectivity. 
(Collins and Yearley, 1992) 
For actor network theory, an agent or actant is a semiotic definition. An 
actant is something that acts, without any necessary implication of its being 
human; it can, says Latour  ‘literally be anything’ provided it is the source of an 
action. (Latour, 1997) 275 Hence, within actor network theory the notion of agency 
does not provide, nor is it intended to provide, a model of human subjectivity or 
                                                 
275  Elsewhere Latour and Callon comment on their notion of an actor in the following terms:  ‘To 
replace the usual divisions (micro/macro, human/animal, social/technical), which we have 
shown to be unprofitable, we need terms in keeping with (our new) methodological principles. 
What is an ‘actor’?  Any element which bends space around itself, makes other elements 
dependent upon itself and translates their will into a language of its own. An actor makes 
changes in the set of elements and concepts habitually used to describe the social and natural 
worlds ... [A]n actor can make ... asymmetries last, can lay down a temporality and a space that 
is imposed on others ...Weak, reversible interactions are replaced by strong interactions. ... 
Instead of swarms of possibilities, we find lines of force, obligatory passage points, directions 
and deductions.’ (Callon and Latour, 1981 p.286) 
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even a catalogue of basic human competences. Indeed, the most fundamental 
argument of actor network theory is that every entity, whether the self, society or 
nature is the product of semiotic work - each involves the building of the actant 
through ‘attributing, imputing (and) distributing action, competences, 
performances and relations’. The claim that actors are ‘infinitely pliable’ and 
heterogeneous is not meant to describe any ‘real observed actor’, but is the 
semiotically ‘necessary condition for the observation and recording of actors to be 
possible.’ (Latour, 1997 p.6) This semiotic work is performed through the 
heterogeneous processes of translation and problematisation within networks, and 
importantly this leads to what Latour describes as an ontological claim about the 
network-like character of the actants themselves. Actor network theory therefore 
shares with Foucault the view that the actor is defined by relations of power and 
the accompanying capacity for action within those relationships. However, actor 
network theory carries the assumptions about the types of historical and discursive 
(semiotic) work needed to build an entity beyond those bearing on human 
subjectivity, and extends this methodological approach to all actants.276 
One key consequence of this application of Latour and Callon’s generalised 
principle of symmetry is that the opposition between society and nature, and the 
distinction of passive ‘things’ from active human ‘subjects’ is of very limited 
heuristic value. Rather than separate branches of an unbridgeable dichotomy, 
these previously ‘fundamental’ categories are best seen as the reified extremes of 
a continuum established by translation networks. As Callon suggests, if there is 
still a need to speak of nature and society, it is preferable to see this in terms of a 
‘socio-nature’ woven by translation networks, as an ‘in-between that is inhabited 
by actants whose competences and identities vary along within the translations 
transforming them.’ To be sure, both ‘passive beings and genuine actors’ populate 
socio-nature, but an ontologically unambiguous ‘dividing line’ cannot be laid 
down. (Callon, 1995 p.58) 
Against the background of the preceding discussion, the actor network theory 
approach to agency can be summarised. Following John Law (1991a p.173, 187), 
an agent can be defined as a structured set of relations stable enough to generate 
a durable series of power effects. This definition encompasses Foucault’s 
characterisation of power as action on the actions of others (ie active human 
subjects), however, it also covers the broader range of network building and 
translation activities discussed by Latour and Callon. It therefore should be taken 
as including what Foucault referred to as relationships of communication and 
objective or technical capacities. This is consistent with Foucault’s approach 
                                                 
276  This sort of approach is implicit to the argument I have put forward regarding the extension of 
Foucault’s concept of biopolitics to environmental issues. See Chapters 6 and 7 of this thesis. 
See also Rutherford (1999b) and Tully (1997). 
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when he suggested that blocks of ‘capacity-communication-power’ could come to 
‘constitute regulated and concerted systems’. (Foucault, 1982 p.218) 
Further, agents are at the same time both sets of relations and ‘nodes in sets 
of relations’. This recalls something very much like Deleuze’s notion of 
assemblage (‘agencement’) which combines the idea of arrangement or 
organisation with the suggestion of agency. Hence, an assemblage is neither a 
unity nor a totality, but a multiplicity, in which what is crucial is not the 
constituent elements but the relations between the elements. (Cooper, 1997 p.3-4) 
In Latour’s words, ‘a network is not a thing but the recorded movement of a 
thing’. The network cannot exist independently of the act of constituting it 
(‘tracing’) - the ‘nodes’ are actors whose definition of the world simultaneously 
delineates the network, while they themselves are shaped by the networks of 
relations within which they exist. (Latour, 1997 p.9) 
In addition, entities other than people may be agents. This runs counter to the 
general direction of Foucault’s work, for while arguably he accepted that social 
groups and even institutions could exhibit agency, he would not extend this to 
non-social entities. Non-human entities may be drawn upon as technical capacities 
to support power relations in the formation of disciplinary blocks, but power 
relations proper for him were inseparable from the ‘person who acts’. Hence for 
Foucault agency is strictly anthropocentric - agency (‘the exercise of power’) is 
‘always a way of acting upon an acting subject or acting subjects by virtue of their 
acting or being capable of action.’ (Foucault, 1982 p.220)  
Finally, the relations which constitute agents are rarely, if ever, purely social 
relations. Rather, as Law puts it: 
they are heterogeneous, partly social, partly technical, partly textual, and 
partly to do with naturally occurring events, objects and processes - and 
most usually combine elements of all of these; this, of course, means that 
actors are similarly heterogeneous; and it means that there is almost never 
any such thing as a purely social actor. (Law, 1991a p.173) 
Such an approach differs from that of Foucault. As noted above, he distinguishes 
power relations from those of communication and technical capacities. Yet he also 
notes that these three types of relationship ‘in fact always overlap’ and support 
each other in a reciprocal manner. (Foucault, 1982 p.218 - emphasis added) 277  
Again, while this is perhaps a question of emphasis, the overall conclusion is 
inescapable that for Foucault power relations and agents are exclusively social. 
The consequences of actor network theory’s redefinition of agency are potentially 
significant, although not fundamentally at odds with the general concerns that 
                                                 
277  See also Foucault (1984b) p.48. 
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underlay Foucault’s work on genealogy and governmentality, as suggested at the 
start of the current chapter. The issue here is whether or not there is a strong basis 
for maintaining different models of representation for human and non-human 
entities? 
Representation and the modern constitution 
In Chapter 7 I discussed what Hindess (1996) referred to as Foucault’s 
incomplete critique of sovereignty. I also noted his comment that aside from 
sovereignty, the other constitutive fiction of modern political thought is that of 
political community. In the concluding section of is chapter I wish to explore how 
actor network theory may contribute to a consideration of these issues within the 
general philosophical perspective developed by Foucault. 
Consistent with his argument regarding the collective or hybrid nature of 
‘socio-nature’, Latour provides a critique of the modern notions of representation. 
He defines ‘modern’ to be ‘when the political constitution of truth creates … two 
separate parliaments’ – or modes of representation – ‘one hidden for things, the 
other in the open for citizens.’ (Latour, 1991 p.15; 1993 p.10-11) His discussion 
of this draws on the work of Shapin and Schaffer (1985) which examines the 
debate between the founder of the Royal Society, physicist Robert Boyle, and 
political theorist Thomas Hobbes, on the relationship between politics and 
science. Shapin and Schaffer detail the ways in which during the eighteenth 
century these key progenitors of modern science and politics struggled to establish 
the now familiar demarcation between the politics and science. Shapin and 
Schaffer’s historical research showed how the ‘experimental community’ 
established by Boyle energetically elaborated and deployed a set of ‘boundary-
conventions’, which defined the inside/outside of science and were able to 
‘transport politics outside of science’. (Shapin and Schaffer, 1985 p.342) In this 
regard, their work can be regarded as falling within the mainstream of the 
Edinburgh School of science studies with its focus on explaining science in its 
social context. 
Latour’s interpretation and use of this work goes beyond that intended by the 
authors and they certainly do not share Latour’s conclusions. Nevertheless, Latour 
argues that if the logic of Shapin and Schaffer’s detailed historical work is 
pursued, 278 the debate in question can be seen to be about far more than Hobbes 
                                                 
278  That is, if Shapin and Schaffer did not apply an ‘asymmetrical’ approach to their study by 
privileging the ‘social’ context. They take great care says Latour, to understand scientific facts 
as a historical and political invention, but ‘they take no such precautions where political 
language itself is concerned. They use the words ‘power’, ‘interest’, and ‘politics’ in all 
innocence. … criticising science but swallowing politics as the only valid source of 
explanation’ … (as does Hobbes) … with his construction of a monist macro-structure in 
which knowledge has a place only in support of the social order.’ (Latour, 1993 p.15-27) 
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and Boyle defining separate discourses about the proper conduct of science and 
politics. In fact, between them Hobbes and Boyle played a central role in the 
‘invention’ of the modern world - a world ‘in which the representation of things 
through the intermediary of the laboratory is forever dissociated from the 
representation of citizens through the intermediary of the social contract.’ 
(Latour, 1993 p.27) Both of these modes of representation - the state 
(Commonwealth) and the laboratory experiment - can clearly be demonstrated to 
be inventions, ‘artificial constructs’. Indeed argues Latour, Boyle and Hobbes 
were the eighteenth century drafters of the ‘modern constitution’; they invented 
and articulated the modern dichotomy between the political representation of 
sovereign subjects and the scientific representation of non-human objects. 
(Latour, 1991 p.13)  
This dichotomy only appears tenable if the two sides are thought of as strictly 
separate. Political representation for Hobbes was the product of sovereign, 
rational citizens with interests whose common consent constitutes the Leviathan. 
This is an inherently paradoxical entity, for it is at one and the same time a 
creature composed of the wills of the individual citizens and the sovereign who 
personifies the common will. Yet despite this, the political state is nothing other 
than relations between sovereign human subjects, that is, social relations and 
these alone. Parallel to this political representation, Boyle defines the 
representation of nature through the equally artificial apparatus of the laboratory 
and scientific method. In the laboratory, through the application of machines and 
instruments, facts are extracted from nature, but to ensure the recognition of facts 
(as distinct from mere impressions), Boyle’s science set strict limits on who was 
to be authorised to interpret the meaning of data obtained through experiment. 
Boyle establishes, through the Royal Society, the community of scientists, 
disinterested witnesses who meticulously represent the facts, that is, he invents 
the modern notion of the expert. But asks Latour, who is speaking when the 
scientist speaks? In itself nature is mute. Notwithstanding, Boyle and those who 
follow him claim that the facts speak for themselves, because through the 
discipline of the scientific method, nature can be seen to behave meaningfully 
(although not intentionally). Thus nature, which would otherwise remain mute, is 
‘capable of speaking, writing, signifying’ within the artificial realm of the 
laboratory and through the scientific community who translate the behaviour of 
objects. (Latour, 1993 p.29) 
Latour describes these boundary-defining activities in terms borrowed 
directly from Foucault. What Hobbes and Boyle (and their intellectual successors) 
were engaged in was the drafting of ‘a political constitution of truth’, or what 
Foucault called the political economy of truth. (Latour, 1993 p.29) Through the 
work of Shapin and Schaffer it can be seen that the debate between Hobbes and 
Boyle was not simply two competing views of representation, in which Hobbes 
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was the social theorist and Boyle the theorist of nature.279 Rather argues Latour, as 
Shapin and Schaffer’s historical study demonstrates, both Hobbes and Boyle were 
rationalists and mechanists resolutely opposed to the ‘pre-scientific past’. Both 
advanced theories of science and politics in their struggle with the other, yet as 
Latour comments 
Hobbes is a scientist whose science has been completely eliminated from 
later accounts. He is taken seriously only as a political philosopher, while 
Boyle had a political philosophy, which has been completely eliminated 
from later accounts. He is taken seriously only as a physicist. (Latour, 
1991 p.12) 
As with the construction of any ‘regime of truth’, the detail of why and how 
particular outcomes occur are very much matters for historical or genealogical 
investigation. The point is however that the two modes of representation, which 
together are at the centre of modern thinking, are both historical constructs, not 
necessary or transcendental truths. They are the product of a particular history 
(albeit forgotten or subjugated) and like all such historical products subject to the 
possibility of further change. Indeed, once the historicity of not only political 
representation, but also the scientific representation of nature is recognised, both 
must be seen as subject to the central critical question posed by Foucault: in that 
which appears universal and necessary, what in fact is the product of arbitrary or 
at least historically contingent constraints? (Foucault, 1984b p.45) 
Latour's criticism of political philosophy and its attitude to representation then 
is similar to Foucault’s critique of political sovereignty. However, his focus goes 
beyond political representation to the attitude of ‘well-meaning social theorists’ 
who accept the asymmetrical view that the representation of nature is largely non-
political and unproblematic. 280 However Latour's criticisms extend further, for in 
accepting this dichotomous model of representation, political and social theory 
ignores not only the ‘family resemblance’ and interconnection between the natural 
and social sciences, they also perpetuate the false separation between ‘society’ 
and ‘nature’. By maintaining such modernist divisions political philosophy denies 
the collective, hybrid character of entities, and remains incapable of 
understanding that all human interaction is socio-technical, and indeed that ‘the 
very shape of humans, our very body, is already made in large part of socio-
technical negotiations and artefacts.’ (Latour, 1994 p.806) Social theory and 
political philosophy therefore remain bound to a mode of thought that is incapable 
                                                 
279  Latour claims that the great contribution of Shapin and Schaffer’s work was that it ‘unearthed’ 
Hobbes’ scientific works so neglected by political science and rescued ‘from oblivion’ Boyle’s 
political theories which had been equally neglected in the history of science. Latour (1993) 
p.16-17. 
280  That is, ‘They accept as a given the result of a political constitution of truth that has first 
dispatched speech, deafness, and dumbness.’ (Latour, 1991 p.14) 
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(and increasingly more so) of understanding and explaining the mechanisms of 
societal production and action within the very ‘society’ for which it purports to 
provide a social science. 
In fact, Latour argues the modernity that is supposedly built on the division of 
representation, the achievement of which more than any other marks the modern 
from the pre-modern, does not now and never has really existed. This is not to 
deny the obvious power and achievements of what we call modern politics, 
science and technology, but rather to challenge the assumption that a radical 
separation of society and nature has ever been effected. In reality suggests Latour, 
the power and achievements of ‘modern’ society have been possible precisely 
because it has increasingly afforded more efficient means and opportunities for 
the production of socio-technical hybrids and collectives. At the same time, 
Latour’s analysis shows why the problems that arise from this blindness to the 
realities of socio-nature are, paradoxically, both the most intractable for, and at 
the same time the clearest illustration of the failure of, the modern mode of 
representation. He points to global environmental problems such as the 
greenhouse effect, stratospheric ozone depletion, radiation exposure, etc. Here 
perhaps more than any other area the tangling together of the scientific, the 
political and the technological-economic illustrates the pervasiveness of socio-
technical crossovers involving the exchange of properties between social and non-
social entities. (Latour, 1991 p.4, 16-18; 1994 p.795-97) 
The term ‘modern’ as used by Latour thus refers to two quite different sets of 
practices, which the modern attitude seeks to separate, but which in contemporary 
society are increasingly blended together. The first of these are the practices of 
translation discussed earlier in this chapter, which constantly give rise to socio-
technical networks and hybrids. The second Latour designates as practices of 
‘purification’, aimed at the creation of the ‘distinct ontological zones’ of the 
human and non-human. This second set of practices corresponds to the modern 
critical stance. Latour uses an environmental example to suggest how the 
practices of translation would ‘link in one continuous chain the chemistry of the 
upper atmosphere, scientific and industrial strategies, the preoccupations of heads 
of state, the anxieties of ecologists’. The practices of purification, on the other 
hand, establish the separation between an objective nature, and the historicity of 
society, replete with ‘predictable’ human interests. (Latour, 1993 p.12) What 
characterises modern thought is the separation of these two sets of practices; once 
we become aware that both sets of practices have historically proceeded side by 
side, we can start to abandon the modern attitude, or at least question it. It is clear 
that modernity is framed in terms of humanism – either through the attempt to 
define the unique characteristics of the human subject or by declaring the death of 
the subject. As we have seen Foucault, at least to a degree, tends to fall on the 
latter side of this ‘divide’. However, as I have argued, Foucault’s work also 
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retains elements of the belief that at its core, subjectivity must be defined in terms 
that are bound up with notions of the sovereignty of the human agent.  
The work of both Latour and Rouse point to this incomplete critique of 
sovereignty as being closely connected to a failure to break with a belief in the 
epistemic ‘solidity’ of the knowledge produced by the natural sciences. Latour 
and actor network theory’s critique of agency, by undermining the ‘double 
separation’ that modernist thought has constructed,281 calls into question what 
Barry Hindess describes as the other modern ‘constitutive fiction’ – political 
community. Actor network theory’s recasting of agency in terms of ‘collectives’ 
and socio-technical hybrids challenges this pillar of the modern political thought. 
For no matter how the critique of the subject proceeds, as long as it continues to 
locate the historical formation of the subject in social processes, it reinforces the 
modern critical stance. In this perspective agency is always and necessarily a 
property attributable to human beings. Inasmuch as such human subjects are 
understood as exercising agency within some form of sociality, the twin concepts 
of political sovereignty and political community are also necessarily defined in 
terms of the capacity for human agency and autonomy. The approach of actor 
network theory, and Latour in particular, thus immediately complicates any 
analysis of agency and hence relations of power between agents. 
Latour's criticism of modernism, of the project of purification, urges us to 
recognise that we have never been modern because the separateness upon which 
this is premised cannot be achieved. His approach calls not for an anti-modern or 
even post-modern attitude, but rather what he describes as a ‘non-modern’ one. 
(Latour, 1991 p.17) Such a non-modern attitude recognises that ‘there are not two 
problems of representation, just one.’ (Latour, 1993 p.143) It takes seriously the 
double ambiguity of modernity towards representation, where there is a constant 
suspicion that political representation (and hence sovereignty) can be corrupted 
and turned into domination on behalf of particular interests, and similarly that the 
scientific representation of nature can be corrupted by the interests of those 
claiming to speak on behalf of the facts. Such fears are themselves premised on 
the belief in the possibility of purification, of separating two modes of 
representation. 
Latour claims that actor network theory is not a revolutionary call for change, 
but rather it simply requires that we ‘publicly’ ratify what we have always done, 
given that power (ie politics and science) have always involved the shaping and 
mobilisation of socio-natures. Thus, the pretence of double representation must be 
                                                 
281  ‘The double separation is what we have to reconstruct: the separation between humans and 
nonhumans on the one hand, and between what happens ‘above’ and what happens ‘below’ on 
the other.’ (Latour, 1993 p.13) 
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replaced by the explicit admission that there is in fact a single ‘parliament of 
things’ within which 
the continuity of the collective is reconfigured. There are no more naked 
truths, but there are no more naked citizens, either. … Let one of the 
representatives talk, for instance, about the ozone hole, another represent 
the Monsanto chemical industry, a third the workers of the same chemical 
industry, another the voters of New Hampshire, a fifth the meteorology of 
the polar regions; let still another speak in the name of the State; what 
does it matter, so long as they are all talking about the same thing, about a 
quasi-object they have all created, the object-discourse-nature-society 
whose new properties astound us all and whose network extends from my 
refrigerator to the Antarctic by way of chemistry, law, the State, the 
economy, and satellites. The imbroglios and networks that had no place 
[in modernist representations] now have the whole place to themselves. 
They are the ones that have to be represented; it is around them that the 
parliament of Things gathers henceforth. (Latour, 1993 p.144) 
Such an approach radically challenges modern notions of the limits of 
political community, despite Latour's claim that it amounts to little more than 
openly acknowledging that modernity already constantly (if ‘unofficially’) 
produces a proliferation of socio-technical hybrids and quasi-objects.282 Latour 
suggests that we can see the beginning of a public acknowledgment of this monist 
notion of representation in events such as the 1992 UN-sponsored Earth Summit, 
in which humans and non-humans are brought together ‘under the same 
continuous protection.’ (Latour, 1991 p.18)  
Conclusion 
Despite Latour's tendency at times to sound like a radical environmentalist 
moralistically affirming the right of nature, actor network theory does offer 
theoretical insights that complement the work of Foucault and his successors on 
biopolitics and governmentality. Indeed, as I have suggested, 283 Foucault’s 
analysis of biopolitics provides a potentially useful approach to understanding 
environmental discourse and problematisations. In particular, Latour's work 
explains why the problem of nature should not be understood in terms of the 
modernist opposition between different modes of representation. Of the social 
theorists discussed in this thesis, the work of Habermas reflects the pursuit of 
what Latour calls ‘the project of purification’ at its most sophisticated. However 
                                                 
282  There is a clear parallel here with Beck’s argument regarding the ‘sub-politics’ of science and 
technology in risk society. See Beck (1992b). I discuss Beck in Chapter 4 of the current thesis, 
and return to this issue in the Conclusion (Chapter 9). 
283 See Rutherford (1999b; 1999a; 1997a) 
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as I have argued, the modern critical perspective, which is premised on this 
philosophical separation of the representation of the human subject from the 
representation of nature, is continued in the work of Foucault and most scholars 
influenced by his approach. 
One need not accept that there is an ‘absolute equivalence’ between the 
regulatory practices which operate on human and non-human entities to 
appreciate the significant capacity of actor network theory to provide both a more 
genealogical understanding of environmental problems and a critical 
appropriation of Foucault's work for this task. 284 Indeed, one of the strengths of 
Latour’s work is that it allows us to frame the problem of nature in a way that is 
open to the sort of detailed study of governmental practices which have been 
characteristic of works on governmentality in other areas. The approach drawn 
here from the work of Foucault and Latour enables environmental problems to be 
studied as ‘organised forms of practice’ that bring together the four dimensions of 
government referred to in the introduction to this thesis. 
Through its critique of the asymmetrical approach of both political 
philosophy and science studies to agency and its epistemic representation, actor 
network theory permits the ‘Foucauldian’ study of the complex matrix of 
government. It does this in a way that more fully takes account of what Tully 
describes as the third dimension of government, that is ‘the practical rationalities 
in accordance with which human aptitudes are exercised on nature through 
various (material) technologies.’ (Tully, 1997 p.6) 285 By being alert to the hybrid 
character of agency, such an analysis is able to recognise the importance of 
material technologies and the capacities of non-human entities and processes to 
the existence of structured relations that are stable enough to generate a durable 
series of power effects. The role of science and technology in shaping power 
relations must be seen as central to understanding the ecological dimension of 
biopolitics, rather than as ancillary and external to the actions of agents as human 
subjects. The perspective suggested here rejects both sociological and 
technological determinism in favour of a genealogical approach that takes 
seriously the claim that the relations which constitute both agents and the 
governmental rationalities, and which shape their conduct, are almost never either 
purely ‘social’ or wholly ‘technical’ or ‘natural’. The implications of such an 
approach for social and political theory are significant, and are considered further 
in the Conclusion. 
                                                 
284 In his comments (personal communication) to me on a previously published article 
(Rutherford, 1994a) that discussed Foucault’s approach to the natural sciences, Rose indicated 
his reluctance to follow Callon and Latour to the extent of asserting an ‘absolute equivalence’ 
between regulatory practices operating on non-human and human entities. 
285 And it should be added, the ways in which various material technologies shape human 
aptitudes. 
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Chapter 9 
Conclusion: ecological modernisation or 
governmentality ?  
 
Introduction 
Two substantially different ways of approaching the problem of nature 
emerge from the examination of social theory in this thesis, although there is also 
a common emphasis in each on the importance of processes of rationalisation. A 
major difference is evident in the way in which Foucault and those influenced by 
his perspective (I include Latour and actor network theory here) are inclined to 
see ‘rationalisation’ much more in terms of a diverse multiplicity of rationalities 
and governmental technologies. Those influenced by the critical theory tradition 
on the other hand see rationalisation in more generalised social systemic terms 
and linked to a view of global processes of modernisation. The latter approach 
tends to see modernisation as progressing towards some emancipatory form of an 
idealised democracy, whereas the former is more inclined to an analysis of the 
ways in which relations of power are shaped by political rationalities which have 
local, and quite specific concerns. 
This difference can be expressed another way by saying that the problem of 
nature can be analysed within two distinct conceptual frameworks. The first is that 
of ecological modernisation, 286 an approach that is seen most clearly in the work 
                                                 
286 I have argued elsewhere that the notion ecological modernisation is a potentially fruitful way of 
connecting the macro-sociological perspectives developed by theorists such as Beck and Eder, 
with the recent institutionalisation of specific regulatory practices and policies. See Rutherford 
(1999a). However, it is necessary to make a distinction between ecological modernisation as a 
governmental rationality and the term as used here. Here I am referring to ecological 
modernisation as a social theoretical approach that specifically places the problem of nature at 
the centre of contemporary processes of modernisation in advanced industrial society. The use I 
have made elsewhere of the term ecological modernisation reflects what is in effect a technical 
or governmental program in the sense discussed by Miller and Rose (1992). In that context I 
use ecological modernisation to describe specific changes which have occurred in the 
formulation and implementation of enviornmental policies in the 1980s in Western Europe. 
These changes were a response by environmental agencies to perceptions about the limits of 
state regulation in achieving improved environmental management. As such this governmental 
program involved a whole range of policy approaches and instruments aimed at the integration 
of ‘clean production’ into economic activities. The institutional transformations that arose from 
this program resulted in significant changes to investment patterns and production techniques 
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of Eder and Beck and which draws on a critical theoretical tradition going back to 
Weber. The second is that of ecological governmentality, an approach which I 
have argued can be drawn from Foucault’s work on biopolitics and subsequent 
works on governmentality, and which is capable of being significantly enriched 
by the insights of actor network theory.  
In this chapter, I summarise the key themes and arguments considered in the 
thesis. I conclude that by bringing together the work of governmentality studies 
and actor network theory in a way that extends Foucault’s genealogies of power to 
the natural sciences and associated material technologies, a significant advance 
over the ways either of these bodies of work are currently employed is possible. 
Based on this approach, I suggest some directions for future research. 
Reflecting these two tasks, this chapter is divided into two main parts. The 
first reviews the key themes and arguments presented in the earlier chapters of the 
thesis. The second discusses some of the theoretical implications to emerge for 
social theory and political philosophy from my discussion of the problem of 
nature and its relationship to the notions of agency and power. My conclusions are 
couched in terms of their relevance to the analysis of contemporary ecological 
problems, but are likely to have a wider applicability to all those areas where 
science and material technologies play a significant role in the way in which 
social behaviour is configured. 
Key themes 
(1) The problem of nature for critical theory 
Chapter 2 of this thesis considered how the early Frankfurt School identified 
what I described as the ‘negative dialectic of progress’, which pointed to 
contradictory elements inherent in the growth of reason. Horkheimer and 
Adorno’s critique of the dialectic of enlightenment drew an indivisible link 
between the domination of the outer natural world by science and technology, and 
the repression of inner human nature by social institutions and practices. The 
defining characteristics of modern society were thus cast in terms of the radical 
separation between subjectivity and nature. This is a theme central to later 
ecological critique of modern industrial society both in Green theory and, as 
emphasised in my discussion in Chapter 4, in the recent work of Eder and Beck. 
This early critical theory posited a dialectical relationship of the subject to 
nature, while also rejecting the identity of inner and outer nature. The notion of 
historicised nature played a central role in the critique of the present, with the 
                                                                                                                                     
(particularly in the manufacturing and energy sectors) and in the relationship between the state, 
industrial interests and environmental groups. See Weale (1992); Christoff (1996)  
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concepts of history and nature functioning as cognitive tools for such critique - 
each being employed to destabilise the ontological primacy of the other. As 
indicated by Habermas, the problem for Horkheimer and Adorno was how the 
notion of emancipatory reason could resist the generalised critique of modernity, 
given that the totalising force of reason they saw as inherent to conceptual 
thinking and language per se, and as such inseparable from the domination of the 
natural and human worlds. The solution to this problem for the early Frankfurt 
School, not unlike that of the romantic radicalism of some environmentalist 
movements, was to seek a refuge for emancipatory reason in an aesthetic notion of 
reconciliation of the two natures. 
Habermas rejected Horkheimer and Adorno’s rendition of the dialectic of 
enlightenment and the notion of reconciliation with nature. Despite this, as I have 
demonstrated in Chapter 3 the problem of nature continues to play a pivotal, 
although somewhat subterranean role in Habermas’ attempt to reconstruct social 
theory. The core aim of this reconstruction of social theory was to ‘rescue’ a 
rational grounding for universal standards of validity and truth, and to avoid their 
conflation with power in Nietzschean-inspired perspectivalism. As I have argued, 
while Habermas’ theoretical approach changed over time, he nevertheless 
maintained that it was necessary to distinguish between the logic of instrumental 
action as applied to our relations with nature, and that of communicative action 
involved in relations between human agents. Based on this ‘differentiation of 
reason’, Habermas argued contrary to Horkheimer and Adorno, that in itself 
science was not part of the ‘dark-side’ of modernity but one of its greatest 
achievements. For him the problem of the social relation to nature (and the 
environmental problems arising from this) are not caused by the functioning of 
science as a technological force. To the extent that there is an ‘ecological crisis’, 
and Habermas is ambiguous on this, it is caused by the failure of the social system 
to restrict technical reason to its proper domain (science and relations with nature) 
and prevent its intrusion into the domain of politics (ie moral-practical reason). 
It is therefore clear from my discussion of Habermas’ approach to the 
problem of nature (Chapter 3) that while he argues all knowledge is historically 
situated, he also retains a conception of science as producing an ‘objective’ 
knowledge of the natural world. 287 His criticisms of scientism are directed at 
attempts to use the model of natural science as an ideological tool of positivist 
social sciences to justify social domination. This stance is reflected in his 
rejection of the Frankfurt School’s critique of instrumental reason, which he 
                                                 
287 Of course as I have noted, for Habermas the objectivity of science is not absolute. Interests 
condition it, but these are primarily the interest in survival of the human species, that is, of the 
‘quasi-transcendental subject’. While this does allow objectivity to be understood as having an 
historical genesis, he still nevertheless interprets it as a more or less unitary evolution of the 
human capacity. 
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similarly sees as undermining the possibility of both ‘objective’ knowledge and 
social emancipation. By stressing the differentiation of reason Habermas seeks to 
emphasise the pragmatic utility of the natural sciences on the one hand, while 
wanting to quarantine politics and ethics from the objectifying logic of those 
sciences. In this context, I have argued that Habermas’ shift to the theory of 
communicative action meant that his approach became even more 
anthropocentric. For Habermas, communicative reason is the defining 
characteristic of human nature precisely because it is intrinsic to the evolution of 
the species as language user. 
Despite the shift from cognitive interests to communicative action, Habermas’ 
argument was not substantially different from that he had previously advanced 
against the early Frankfurt School and his more recent critics who suggested that 
his theory was too anthropocentric and hence incapable of usefully responding to 
contemporary environmental issues. Whereas the Frankfurt School saw modern 
science and technology as central to the domination and suppression of both ‘first’ 
and ‘second’ nature, in the hands of Habermas this is transformed into the 
relatively unproblematic issues of ‘system maintenance’ and the aesthetic 
‘grammar of life’. Chapter 3 therefore concluded that in the end Habermas’ 
characterisation of modern science and technology tends to seriously gloss over 
the impact these have on the natural environment, and as a consequence, ignores 
the significance of ecological problems, which are marginalised both for politics 
and for social theory. 
(2) The centrality of ecological problems in Eder and Beck 
As I discussed in Chapter 4, both Eder and Beck recognise a ‘dark’ side to 
modernisation and in particular the role of scientific knowledge and technology in 
producing the self-destructive, negative side effects of progress. Unlike 
Habermas, they see the problem of nature as absolutely central to contemporary 
social relations and the discourse on modernisation. Both view the social relation 
to nature as far more problematic than does Habermas, identifying ecological 
problems as the basis for new social divisions and conflicts. 
Each of these two authors argue that social theory must shift its focus from 
traditional concerns – the political and economic reproduction of society – to 
include the problems of ecological reproduction (Eder) or the distribution of 
ecological risk (Beck), which amounts to much the same thing. Key to both Eder 
and Beck is their understanding of an ecological modernisation that is constitutive 
of a new type of society, based on forms of social conflict which differ 
substantially from those which dominated social development in earlier phases of 
modernity. These new fields of ecological conflict increasingly shape the 
development of society. For Eder this is centred on competition between different 
cultural models of the social relation to nature, while for Beck it reflects the 
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emergence of a sub-politics produced by the systemic shift from problems of 
wealth distribution to those of the distribution of technically induced ecological 
risks. 
I have argued that the work of Eder and Beck provides a more satisfactory 
social theoretical approach to the problem of nature than does that of Habermas. 
Perhaps most importantly the work of Eder and Beck allows us to link social 
systemic processes with political struggles (particularly environmental ones) that 
have little place in Habermas’ analysis. In particular both theorists provide ways 
of understanding the roles played by ecological movements, citizens groups and 
scientific expertise in the emergence of these new fields of ecological conflict. 
This is one area where the generality and theoretical abstractness of both 
Habermas and the Frankfurt School is particularly unhelpful. 
Eder’s work is particularly useful because it provides a subtle and nuanced 
reading of the role of ecological movements in contemporary environmental 
discourse and governmental practices, demonstrating that these movements have a 
deep rooted cultural history embodying both the utilitarian and purity cultural 
models of the social relation to nature. (see Chapter 4) These movements are often 
taken as reflecting an anti-modernism, which Habermas identifies with the 
counter-cultural perspective of the radical new social movements. However, this 
purity model is never very far from, and constantly interacts with, the 
utilitarianism and rationalism of modern scientific ecology, as Eder and historians 
such as Worster (1987a; 1993b) and Grove (1995) have shown. 288 Ecological 
conflicts, as both Eder and Beck suggest, take on the form of doctrinal or cultural 
struggles over the appropriate path to modernity, rather than being ‘anti-
modernist’ as such. They reflect, that is, discourses centred on different 
rationalities for governing the social relation to nature.  
Similarly, a particular strength of Beck’s work is that it points to the way in 
which both the production and definition of technological risks, and the 
mobilisation of ecological movements and ‘counter expertise’, takes place outside 
the formal political framework. Modern ecological hazards and risks arise as the 
result of private economic decisions regarding the use of science and technology 
                                                 
288 Grove’s detailed historical study of the roots of modern global environmental consciousness 
warrants closer attention than it has received in this thesis. He traces the interaction between 
the emerging environmental sciences (eg hydrology, climatology, forestry etc) and the 
practical administration of environmental management in the colonies of the European powers 
between 1660 and 1860. Of particular importance to the present context is Grove’s 
identification of the interaction between the scientific elites in the colonies and the local ‘non-
European epistemologies of nature’. New environmental knowledge emerged in these colonial 
situations and embodied a complex interaction of environmental romanticism and State 
interests, which often brought together notions of ‘moral economy’ and ‘utilitarian ideals about 
the desirability of new state structures or roles.’  
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in the market. Yet while these risks are defined and socially evaluated post facto 
(by experts, the courts, social movements and the media etc) prior decisions are 
rarely taken at the formal political level about whether or not such risks are 
acceptable. This is really the central point of Beck’s analysis as discussed in 
Chapter 4 - the formal political system in the West is premised on the strict 
differentiation of parliamentary politics from the sub-politics of the techno-
economic pursuit of interests. Ecological risks (and their associated social 
consequences) appear as the autonomised, latent side effects of scientific and 
technological decisions that are not subject to institutionalised political 
authorisation and legitimation. Beck’s point that these decisions are often taken 
outside of the representative institutions of the State suggests a clear parallel with 
the sorts of arguments, referred to in Chapter 6, of governmentality theorists Rose 
and Miller in their analysis of advanced liberal modes of rule. 
As Beck is able to demonstrate, these processes lead to three highly 
significant changes in the character of politics in risk society. First, the established 
cultural consensus that there is an inherent link between technical-economic 
development and social progress begins to weaken. Second, the scientifically 
generated awareness of ecological risks and the hazards of technology gives rise 
to increasing demands within society for political control and accountability of 
processes that are to a substantial degree outside the public sphere. Third, there is 
a breakdown of the notion of the State as a political centre capable of controlling 
the processes of technological development. Somewhat paradoxically, there is 
also at the same time (as a result of the heightened awareness and political 
problematisation of ecological risks) an extension of efforts by the State and 
others (such as social movements) to monitor and regulate risks. Thus again, as 
the general approach taken in the work of Rose and Miller would suggest, 
ecological risks problematise specific forms of ‘dangerous’ conduct amongst the 
population, which in turn spurs further attempts (often unsuccessful) to govern 
these risks. 
These processes are analysed by Beck as generating the sub-politics of risk 
society. There are two sides to sub-politics. The first, which I have just referred 
to, is concerned with the way in which ‘non political’ decisions made outside of 
the formal political institutions have profound political influence on the direction 
of social change and the choices available to citizens regarding acceptable levels 
of ecological risk. The other aspect of sub-politics is the emergence of ecological 
and environmental movements and citizen action groups that represent centres of 
counter-expertise. It is these groups which articulate the demand for greater 
political accountability and control over the generation of risks. Beck’s analysis 
therefore throws considerable light on the nature of contemporary ecological 
politics.  
Beck’s approach it is not incompatible with that of Eder. Indeed, Eder’s 
suggestion that within the environmental movement we can identify both cultural 
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movements which question the moral-aesthetic relation to nature, and social 
movements which seek a more ecologically sustainable management of nature, 
permits a further refinement of the sub-political dynamics of contemporary 
society. Cultural movements that embody the purity model of the social relation to 
nature (as found in the Deep Ecology movements for example) are far more likely 
to question the authority of science, to reject the equation of technical and social 
progress and to favour life style changes and direct action on environmental 
issues. Social movements based on the justice model are more likely to be 
concerned with greater State regulation of economic-technological development 
in order to ensure a more scientifically based management of the social relation to 
nature. Such movements are far more likely to accept ‘good’ ecological science 
and to engage with the formal political system via lobbying, participation on 
science-based policy consultative and advisory bodies. 289 Indeed, these latter 
types of movements and citizens groups often participate in what I describe in 
Chapter 6 as ‘regulatory science’. 
I therefore concluded in Chapter 4 that the sort of approach adopted by Eder 
and Beck is far more theoretically useful than that of Habermas in understanding 
the relationship between ecological problems and modernisation. It recognises 
that environmental movements represent a variety of cultural discourses (or 
political rationalities, to use Foucault’s terminology) about the problem of nature 
and the future direction of societal rationalisation. Such a perspective helps 
overcome Habermas’ inability to satisfactorily link the material reproduction of 
society at the system level with the actions of ecological movements in a way that 
does not relegate such movements to the status of irrational, ‘anti-modernist’ 
reactions to social complexity. 
(3) Biopolitics and the problem of nature in Foucault  
Chapter 6 developed the central argument that Foucault’s work on biopolitics 
is very much linked to the problem of nature, or as Foucault himself argued, 
biopolitics has its origins in the problematisation of the relationship between 
populations and resources. The element of nature that interested Foucault was that 
of ‘second nature’, that is the processes whereby relations of power form modern 
human subjects. While recognising this, I have argued that there is no compelling 
reason not to extend Foucault’s analysis of biopolitics to the issues of ‘first 
nature’ and the way in which this is shaped by, and itself influences, the social 
relation to nature as represented in the natural environment. 
Foucault suggested that the need for the administration of populations and 
their biological conditions lead to the growth of the human sciences. In Chapter 6, 
                                                 
289 See Luke (1999) for an analysis of ecological politics in the United States which draws on the 
governmentality approach. 
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I argued that this also gave rise to the problematisation of the natural 
environment, including the development of the practices that constituted ‘the 
environment’ as an object of management and control, and in time, as an object of 
scientific study in all its (ecological) relations. Indeed, a key theme of this thesis 
has been that the disciplining of individuals and populations was not possible 
without the inception of measures concerned with the disposition and regulation 
of the ‘external’ conditions of life of the population. I have therefore argued that 
the more recent development of the science of ecology and the subsequent growth 
of technical and political interest in the idea of managing the environment should 
be regarded as an expression or articulation of biopolitics along the lines explored 
by Foucault. When Foucault talked of the ‘entry of life into history’ this was 
precisely because the biological conditions of life and the relationship of these to 
welfare at the level of the population had become the object of expert knowledges 
and hence political calculation. This is a process that is clearly extended by 
contemporary practices for the management of the human relationship to the 
natural environment. 
Foucault and his successors have demonstrated that the emergence of 
liberalism lead to a re-conceptualisation of the relationship between expert 
knowledge and government. 290 In a similar manner, I have argued (in Chapter 6) 
that the role of expert knowledge of the science of ecology has been central to the 
way in which environments are constituted and managed as dynamic systems. 
Indeed, the programs of government that have been built around environmental 
problems in the past 40 years, illustrate the centrality of such ecological expertise 
in the contemporary attempts at the administration of life. I have suggested that 
scientific ecology should thus be regarded as providing the basis for the 
emergence and subsequent institutionalisation of an ecological governmentality. 
A key proposition of this thesis is therefore that a contemporary analysis of 
biopolitics must also encompass the forms of ecological governmentality as 
presented through programs of government that draw on systems ecology and 
associated sciences of global modelling. The science of ecology and other 
environmental discourses problematise the social relation to nature and at the 
same time elaborate programs of environmental intervention and management. 
Through the sub-politics of natural sciences such as ecology, and the counter 
expertise and cultural models of ecological movements, ‘the environment’ has 
been brought increasingly into the domain of conscious political calculation and 
made a domain of life which is ‘susceptible to diagnosis, prescription and cure by 
calculating and normalising intervention.’ (Rose and Miller, 1992 p.182) 
                                                 
290 The work of Rose and Miller (1992); Burchell (1996); and Dean (1994;1998b) is particularly 
significant in this regard. 
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(4) Foucault: the incomplete critique of sovereignty 
Despite my claims that there are good historical and methodological reasons 
for arguing that the analysis of biopolitics and governmentality should be 
extended to the study of the environmental discourse, Foucault himself did not 
explore this possibility. There is in fact a paucity of Foucauldian analysis of the 
role of natural sciences, including the ecological sciences.291 Nevertheless, I 
sought to demonstrate in Chapter 7 that Foucault’s lack of interest reflected 
important, although largely unexamined theoretical difficulties in his work. One 
such problem is that Foucault appears to have taken the view that, in contrast to 
the human sciences, ‘the sciences of nature’ where somehow able to detach 
themselves from the social relations of power. This is a view for which he did not 
provide a satisfactory explanation, other than to suggest it is a function of the 
degree of formalisation and ‘objectivity’ such sciences have acquired over long 
periods of development in the West. 
In my consideration of the debate between Foucault and Habermas on power 
and rationality (see Chapter 5), I argued that contrary to the view suggested by 
critics such as Habermas and Honneth, Foucault’s work was not a general critique 
of rationality. Rather it was directed at specific social applications of biology (eg 
medicine) and the human sciences. Nevertheless, I have also presented arguments, 
in Chapters 7 and 8, that Foucault’s philosophical position was not as radical as is 
sometimes suggested. The most important manifestation of this was the 
distinction he made between social relations of power and instrumental capacities 
to ‘modify, use, consume, or destroy’ things. Power, Foucault insisted, applies to 
relations between human agents. In this case, then, power cannot apply to the 
relations between people and non-human things. In his later studies of the 
processes by which power disciplines and actively forms modern subjects, power 
and freedom are intimately connected - power in this positive sense presupposes 
the ability to act on others. Power relations are always dynamic relationships 
between agents and consequently freedom (as the capacity of agents to act) is an 
essential feature of such relations. 
As I have shown, the difference between power and capacity for Foucault was 
that ‘forces’ and ‘capacities’ act directly on bodies and things, they do not involve 
mutual adjustments of, and influence on, the actions of other agents. Power 
involves acting subjects, and this human freedom to act is regarded by Foucault as 
the ‘ontological precondition’ of politics and ethics. There is clearly implied in 
this a basic difference between those actions involving the instrumental 
manipulation of things, and those of agents or subjects. Implicit also is a further 
                                                 
291  For the most substantial attempt to date to apply the insights of Foucault’s work to 
environmental issues, see Darier (1999a). 
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distinction that assumes there is a fundamental difference between relationships 
between people and between people and nature. Drawing on the work of Patton I 
argued that the view of the subject in Foucault’s later work was an essentially 
Nietzschean one, which attributed an underlying potential for autonomy in the 
subject. One aspect of this autonomy derives from the power for ‘self-directed’ 
use of the biological capacities of the human body. Another key element is tied to 
the Nietzschean notion of the will to power, in which the bodily capacity for 
action is accompanied by the self-reflexive experience of agency. It is this 
positive, self-conscious feeling of successful action that is experienced as 
autonomy. For Nietzsche such self-consciousness, and therefore the capacity to 
experience agency, is linked to a vital biological interest of the human species in 
self-preservation – a position that, as I have noted, has parallels with Habermas’ 
cognitive interest theory. 
Foucault’s later work drew strongly on this underlying conception of 
subjectivity as the capacity for autonomy. Following Hindess, I argued that the 
difficulty with this was not the suggestion that domination would be resisted 
because of the active nature of the subject. Rather, it was that Foucault went 
further and suggested that the critical role of philosophy was to argue that 
domination should be kept to a minimum. There was thus a shift from the 
recognition of resistance as one effect of power, to Foucault appearing to set 
down a universal (or at least potentially universalisable) normative injunction. 
While Foucault had always at the methodological level rejected notions of 
generalised emancipation and universal ethical standards, in his last works his 
comments both on the function of philosophy and on the nature of freedom 
appeared to resurrect some of the central concerns of critical theory. 
For the reasons detailed in Chapter 7, Hindess criticises this as another 
version of ‘the utopian critique of power’. To be consistent with his own analysis 
of the productivity of power, Foucault must also recognise that some degree of 
domination and subjectification is necessary for the existence of organised social 
structures and institutions. I thus argued that Hindess is correct to see Foucault’s 
inconsistency on this question as stemming from an incomplete critique of 
sovereignty. Foucault fails to fully disengage from the ‘modern obsession with the 
idea of the person as autonomous agent, and consequently, with the idea that a 
community of such persons can, and should, be governed by consent of its 
members.’ (Hindess, 1996 p.157) Foucault’s critique of political sovereignty 
therefore does not go far enough. Hindess suggests that what is needed is not only 
a political philosophy that is not built around the problem of sovereignty but also 
one that frees itself from that other political fiction – ‘political community’. My 
discussion of actor network theory and Latour's criticisms of Foucault in Chapter 
8 sought to provide the basis for such a break from the notions of political 
sovereignty and community. 
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Further support for the claim that Foucault failed to consistently carry through 
his critique of sovereignty is provided by my discussion of the work of Rouse. 
This demonstrates that despite Foucault’s reticence to apply his critique to the 
established natural sciences, there is a strong argument that do so would be both 
possible and consistent with his general analysis of the relations between power 
and knowledge. In fact, Foucault’s general genealogical approach not only 
problematises any notions of an essential human subjectivity, at the same time it 
also challenges traditional concepts of representation and action. Hence Foucault 
can legitimately be taken to task and asked why any assertion of a strong 
epistemic or political distinction between nature and society should not be subject 
to the key critical question underpinning his work in general. 292 
It is therefore reasonable to suggest, as Rouse has done, that Foucault’s 
critique of political sovereignty should both logically and methodologically be 
part of a wider critique of epistemic sovereignty. The sorts of objections Foucault 
raised against political sovereignty also apply to questions of epistemic 
sovereignty, in that both ignore the multiple and local micropractices of power 
that produce both organised scientific discourse and define their objects of study. 
A key conclusion of this thesis therefore is that Foucault’s incomplete critique of 
sovereignty explains why he made a distinction between capacities exerted over 
non-human things and relations of power among acting human subjects. It also 
helps explain why the natural sciences which take as their object the study of non-
human nature, were seen by him as capable of detaching themselves from 
relations of power. 
(5) Latour: the critique of modern representation 
In Chapter 8, I argued that the approach of Latour and actor network theory to 
agency provides a crucial insight into how the natural sciences can be analysed in 
a way that is generally consistent with Foucault’s approach to biopolitics and the 
recent work of others on governmentality. One of Latour’s major criticisms of 
both contemporary science and technology studies, and social theory in general is 
their failure to recognise that in modern societies many of the most efficient 
sources of power come from the sciences and not from the traditional political 
process. To the extent that Foucault treats natural science as able to free itself 
from relations of power, Latour's criticism can also be directed at Foucault. 
I demonstrated in Chapter 8, that it is possible to draw on Latour’s work to 
explain how the natural sciences are able to exercise what Foucault described as 
the ‘the centralising powers which are linked to the institution and functioning of 
                                                 
292 That is, ‘in what is given to us as universal, necessary, obligatory, what place is occupied by 
whatever is singular, contingent, and the product of arbitrary constraints’? See Rouse (1993) 
p.138-9. 
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an organised science in a society such as ours.’ (Foucault, 1980e p.84) Latour’s 
analysis points to three main factors that are responsible for these ‘centralising 
powers’ of the natural sciences. First, the practices of modern science render any 
inside/outside boundary between ‘science’ in the laboratory and the ‘society’ 
outside arbitrary and deceptive. Modern science, which by its very nature is 
applied techno-science, systematically dissolves this distinction. In order to 
function, science must capture the interests of allies, that is, must be able to 
‘translate’ scientific statements so that these are framed in terms which 
problematise their development and application for economic and social interests 
beyond the laboratory (eg companies, interest groups, government agencies, etc). 
Second, by partitioning and disciplining micro-phenomena in the laboratory, 
science is able to invert the micro/macro levels of social theory. Simplification 
and scaling down in the laboratory produce a change of scale which makes 
possible a reversal of the actor’s strengths so that what was formerly 
overwhelming in ‘the field’ can be made manageable and manipulable. Third, 
through the processes of inscription, science is able to build powerful centres of 
calculation. Only through inscribing vast quantities of information and data in a 
form that can be measured and compared, can the objects and phenomena of 
science (ie ‘nature’) be rendered manipulable. When combined with the change of 
scale referred to above, the laboratory is at the centre of a network through which 
information is gathered and inscriptions generated, combined and condensed. 
Those inscriptions are then re-dispersed and inserted in the practices of the world 
‘outside’ the laboratory, but only to the extent that the wider society itself is first 
reconfigured and disciplined in ways which permit the reproduction of the 
contrived conditions of the laboratory. In this process science builds centres of 
calculation that mobilise resources scattered across numerous and diverse 
networks, and becomes capable of acting at distance on hitherto unfamiliar events, 
locales and actors. 
Foucault regarded the natural sciences as too problematic, involving questions 
about the link between scientific knowledge and power that were ‘excessively 
complicated’ and in which the ‘threshold of possible explanation (is) impossibly 
high.’ (Foucault, 1980d p.109-10) As I have shown in Chapter 8, what Latour 
calls centres of calculation can be seen as extensions of Foucault’s notion of the 
dispositif. However, in extending Foucault’s approach to the ‘hard’ natural 
sciences, Latour’s work directly undermines the very reasons put forward by 
Foucault for not studying the connection between these ‘highly formalised’ 
natural sciences and power relations. 
I argued in Chapter 7 that one reason Foucault was not able (or willing) to 
advance beyond the view of the natural science as ‘detached’ from power was that 
despite his anti-humanism, he remained tied to the ideal of human autonomy. His 
focus on the critique of the human sciences reflected his underlying view that it 
was these and the disciplinary practices they imposed upon human agent, which 
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potentially most threatened that autonomy. Latour and his colleagues however are 
able to show that those scientific activities that sociology and social theory 
(including Foucault’s) have deemed ‘irrelevant or too technical’ are in fact one of 
the most efficient, new sources of power in modern societies, precisely because 
they appear so technical and remote from ‘politics’. Latour’s work makes it clear 
that it is science’s abstract and complex networks of translation that allows it to 
become so powerful. This is because the ‘abstract’, formalised sciences are able to 
occupy strategic positions within extended translation networks, by establishing 
‘obligatory passage points’ that successfully tie social and technical resources 
together. Thus the ability, noted by Foucault, of the natural sciences to invest 
particular discourses (and those who engage in them) with a special power and 
authority rests on the way in which scientific spaces (eg laboratories) occupy 
these strategic centres. It is from these spaces or centres that scientists (perhaps 
quite unwittingly) engage in practices that ‘can displace society and recompose it 
by the very content of what is done inside them.’ (Latour, 1983 p.168) 
In Chapter 8, I also discussed Latour’s specific criticisms of Foucault. The 
most significant of these is related to Latour and Callon’s methodological 
principle of general symmetry, which cautions against assuming agency is 
necessarily a uniquely human characteristic. This approach is intended to 
problematise the representation of subject and object as ontologically distinct 
classes of being. It recasts agency as a property of hybrid entities composed of 
social and technical elements, thereby undermining any implication that this is 
necessarily or exclusively a human characteristic. 
As I have emphasised, a key result of this is that the notion of agency does 
not provide, nor should it be intended to provide, a model of human subjectivity 
or even a description of minimal human competences. Rather actants are seen 
both as possessing the ontological characteristics of a network, and as the product 
of the semiotic work of heterogeneous processes of translation, attribution, and 
problematisation within networks. Actor network theory therefore shares with 
Foucault the view that relations of power and the capacities for action 
accompanying those relations define the actor. However, it carries the 
assumptions about the types of historical and discursive work needed to constitute 
an entity beyond those bearing on human subjectivity and agency, and extends 
this approach to anything capable of being the source of an action. One key 
consequence of the application of the principle of generalised symmetry is thus 
that the distinction made by Foucault between passive things and active human 
subjects is highly problematic. Thus rather than a separate nature and society, it is 
preferable to see these as constituting a ‘socio-nature’ composed of the hybrid 
entities produced by translation networks. 
The principle of generalised symmetry can be applied to the analysis of the 
notion of modernity itself. As Latour argues, what we understand as ‘modern’ is 
based on the philosophical division of representation. Latour however shows that 
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what we call ‘modern’ consists of two different sets of practices - the processes of 
translation which gives rise to socio-technical networks and hybrids, and the 
practices of ‘purification’ that create and enforce the ontological separation of 
human from non-human. This second set of practices corresponds to what Latour 
describes as the ‘modern critical stance’. As my examination of Habermas in 
Chapter 3 demonstrated, maintaining this philosophical division of representation 
is fundamental to his defence of modernity. It is also in these practices of 
purification that we see the grounding of Foucault’s position on the difference 
between the human and natural sciences. As I argued in Chapter 7, Foucault’s 
failure to extend his critique of political sovereignty to a broader critique of 
epistemic sovereignty is closely connected to his apparent belief in the solidity of 
the natural sciences and their ability to detach themselves from power. It is also 
connected to his identification of the human subject’s capacity for autonomy as 
fundamental to power and agency. 
The actor network theory critique of the modern dichotomy of representation 
also calls into question the ideal of political community, which Hindess identifies 
as the other key modern constitutive fiction. Such a radical critique of the 
modernist notions of representation and agency, if accepted, clearly would have 
far reaching implications for how we understand politics and power. In the final 
part of this chapter, I therefore consider the implications of the conclusions of this 
thesis for our understanding of the problem of nature and ecological politics. 
Ecological modernisation or ecological governmentality? 
What can be said about the implications of the theories examined in this thesis 
for our understanding of the problem of nature? Habermas’ critical theory seeks to 
impose a far too artificial and rigid separation between modes of rationality and 
action. Beck, while working in an idiom that is far from alien to that of critical 
theory, is in many respects highly critical of Habermas. Nevertheless, as useful 
and thought provoking as Beck’s analysis of risk society undoubtedly is, in the 
end he does not venture significantly beyond the task Habermas had set for 
himself. Habermas’ objections to Horkheimer and Adorno’s critique of 
instrumental reason and the dialectic of enlightenment are at their core directed at 
completing the ‘unfinished project of modernity’. This is a project that for 
Habermas means carrying the processes of rationalisation forward so that all 
realms of social action are subjected to the rule of reason. 
Beck’s critique of risk society is far more attuned to dealing with the problem 
of nature than is Habermas’. Beck seeks an ‘ecological enlightenment’ based on 
the understanding that the simple modernity defended by Habermas is in the 
process of being transformed into a qualitatively new reflexive modernity, in 
which the relation to nature has become central to both further modernisation and 
to social theory. However Beck appears more radical in his diagnosis of the 
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symptoms of the problem than in his proposals for dealing with this. His analysis 
of science and technology does not significantly go beyond that given by 
Habermas several decades earlier. In particular, this is evident in the way Beck is 
critical of the role of science and technology because it leads to unseen, 
autonomised social changes. He is critical of this precisely because it imposes 
social change that is not legitimated by political discourse and democratic 
decision-making.  
Risk society is for Beck based on a ‘category error’ in which the 
technological verification of hazards simultaneously excludes proper recognition 
of the social genesis of those hazards. (Beck, 1995b p. 110) Of course Beck sees 
in reflexive modernisation an immanent basis for the overcoming of this problem. 
Yet his solution is not one that goes beyond the Habermasian concern for the 
revitalisation of the public sphere and the rejection of scientism and technocratic 
consciousness, which Habermas argues, transforms science and technology from a 
progressive force into ideology and an obstacle to emancipation. (Habermas, 
1971) Thus Beck insists 
Only by breaking the law of unseen side effects, by elevating decision 
making on technologies to public and political processes before and 
during the genesis of hazards, can we return the fate of the hazard 
civilisation to the realm of action and decision making. We must reverse 
the prevailing practice of developing and financing new technologies 
first, and then investigating the effects and hazards, and finally publicly 
discussing them under the guillotine of manufactured objective 
constraints. (Beck, 1995b p.110) 
He thus argues for institutional responses that will bring this autonomised 
technological change into the realm of a democratic and discursive decision 
making. He suggests that we need a public, deliberative forum – ‘perhaps a kind 
of ‘Upper House’ or ‘Technology Court’ that would guarantee the division of 
power between technology development and technology implementation.’ Such 
processes, while not abolishing conflict and guaranteeing consensus, he hopes 
could at least ‘practice and integrate ambivalences, as well as revealing winners 
and losers, making them public and thereby improving the preconditions for 
political action.’ (Beck, 1995b p.29-31 – emphasis added) In other words, what 
Beck is concerned with is precisely the revitalisation and extension of the political 
sovereignty of those affected by technological change. 
It will also be noted that Beck is effectively calling for the ‘proper’ separation 
of technical rationality from political decision making about the applications of 
science. As I indicated earlier, he also dismisses the notion of a new ethical 
relationship to nature. He is therefore not that far from Habermas when it comes 
to his views on how to deal with the problem of nature. The issue for Beck, just as 
it is for Habermas, is not an excess of rationality as suggested by Horkheimer and 
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Adorno. Indeed, Beck claims that the problems of risk society can be cured ‘not 
by a retreat but only by a radicalisation of rationality, which will absorb the 
repressed uncertainty.’ (Beck, 1995b p.33) It is important however to recognise 
that Beck is not simply talking of the creation of formal institutions which would 
give form to the reflexive re-invention of politics. Risk society gives rise to a 
‘life-and-death politics’ that permeates everything from the most global ecological 
problems to the inner most depths of private life. (Beck, 1995b p.44-7) 293 Indeed, 
Beck argues that the ‘ecological culture’ of risk society undermines the apolitical 
character of the private sphere. Hence while we can see clear parallels with 
Habermas, we can also see others which reflect elements of Foucault’s diagnosis 
of biopolitics. 
Beck points to the collapse of the traditional ideals of scientific rationality, in 
which there is a distinction between ‘basic’ or ‘pure’ research, and ‘applied’ 
science and technology. A ‘new type of manufacturing tinker-science’ has 
replaced this traditional model of science, according to Beck. He argues that in 
this sort of science, the spatio-temporal relationship between experiment and 
application has been reversed, so that experimentation is exported beyond the 
laboratory and ‘society is made into a laboratory’.294  
This may superficially appear to echo the view put forward by Latour, 
however it reveals a key problem in Beck’s approach. Rather than advancing a 
view consistent with Latour, Beck is in fact making one of the mistakes Latour 
cautions against; that is, Beck’s analysis assumes the ‘inside/outside’ distinction 
between laboratory and society. Hence, Beck is mistaken to see this ‘reversal’ of 
experiment and application as a fundamental feature of a new type of science. 
Rather, as Latour and Callon demonstrate, this has always been an essential 
feature of modern science (‘techno-science’). What is probably true is that the 
problematisation of the ecological and bio-technical consequences of this type of 
science has increasingly rendered the myth of the separation between laboratory 
and society untenable. Beck is of course correct when he suggests that the 
undermining of the ‘ideal’ of traditional science ‘opens the door to public 
disputes, fears, and viewpoints’ which call into question the objectivity of science. 
(Beck, 1995b p.105) 
As I have suggested, Beck’s work in key respects suffers from the same 
underlying totalising approach to rationalisation, as does that of critical theorists 
such as Horkheimer, Adorno and Habermas. In Beck’s analysis of reflexive 
                                                 
293 See also Beck’s (1992b, Part II) detailed treatment of how risk society individualises gender, 
family and labour relations. 
294 For example, he argues that ‘Nuclear reactors must be built, artificial biotechnical creatures 
must be released into the environment, and chemical products must be put into circulation for 
their properties, safety, and long term effects to be studied.’ (Beck, 1995b p.104) 
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modernisation this leads to an overly generalised view of risk, and a tendency to 
portray risk as operating fairly much in the same way across contemporary 
technological society regardless of the specific sectoral or national context. His 
analysis of the emergence of a new stage of modernisation is premised on the 
assertion that the advent of ecological ‘mega-risks’ makes risk incalculable, and 
consequently, all attempts to calculate and manage the costs of these become 
technocratic obsfucation. 
However, as Dean (1998b) has very clearly demonstrated, the problem of the 
calculability of technological risk is far more usefully approached within the 
conceptual framework of governmentality. Thus, he emphasises the importance of 
directing our attention to analysis of ‘the specific form of risk rationalities’ rather 
than engaging in ‘a global narrative of risk society.’ He suggests four dimensions 
to the government of risk, and indeed, I would argue that it these questions which 
should form the starting point for any future research which seeks to understand 
the ways in which environmental risks are linked to the formation and articulation 
of ecological governmentality. Dean frames the key questions that should be 
asked of ‘risk’ as follows: 
First, how we come to know about and act upon different conceptions of 
risk, ie the specific forms of risk rationality. Second, how such 
conceptions are linked to particular practices and technologies. Third, 
how such practices and technologies give rise to new forms of social and 
political identity. Fourth, how such rationalities, technologies and 
identities become latched onto different political programs and social 
imageries that invest them with specific ethos. (Dean, 1998b p.32) 
In contrast to Beck, Latour’s approach has the considerable merit of 
extending the sorts of critical genealogical questions posed by Foucault to our 
attempts to understand the interaction between the human world and non-human 
nature. Latour’s call for the abandonment of the ontological bifurcation of the 
‘modern constitution’ appears to open up the possibilities of some form of 
political representation for nature. It is thus possible to see Latour as providing a 
strong social theoretical perspective that has generally been lacking in Green 
political thinking. However, neither Green theory nor Latour overcome the 
problem of humans speaking on behalf of the non-human. If determining who can 
legitimately speak for whom is a problem in human societies, it is doubly 
problematic for non-human entities who can only ‘speak’ through the inscription 
media of a human constituted natural science. It is perhaps unfair to expect Latour 
to respond to this problem, despite his rhetoric about the ‘Parliament of Things’, 
for in reality it probably makes little sense to speak of a political community that 
includes nature. Of more significance is Latour’s emphasis on a broader 
‘collective’ or ‘hybrid’ view of agency. By calling into question any simple 
correspondence between speaking human subjects and agency Latour’s work 
opens the way for a view of power which is far more nuanced and thus receptive 
  
 
217
 
to extending the sorts of analysis developed by Foucault to those areas, including 
the environmental, in which science and technology play a central role. 
It seems to me that nothing is lost and much may be gained by adopting the 
perspective of actor network theory, and saying that in many instances it is not 
particularly helpful to assume that it is only people who act or exert power. This 
theme is implicit in my critique of Foucault, for while his characterisation of 
government as the ‘conduct of conduct’ is undoubtedly a powerful analytical turn, 
it is nevertheless arbitrarily self-limiting if we always take this to refer to only the 
actions of persons on others. I have been critical of Foucault (and by implication, 
of those who have taken up aspects of his work) for not paying sufficient attention 
to the role of the natural sciences in shaping power relations. I have attempted to 
argue that this is not so much an ontological question about the objects of study of 
the human versus the natural sciences. Instead it is a question of the extent to 
which particular forms of knowledge (and associated governmental practices) 
bear upon the realm of positivity – which today is shaped by ecology, molecular 
biology and atmospheric physics as much by the human sciences. 295 
The substantial merit of taking the actor network theory approach seriously, 
and hence adopting Callon’s methodological principal of generalised symmetry in 
the study of the problem of nature, is that this allows us to reflect critically on a 
particular form of relation to nature rather than being compelled to unreflectively 
work within the limits set by a view of nature taken from the natural sciences. It 
seems clear that if the social relation to nature is understood along the lines 
suggested here, then we must also take seriously the proposition that not only are 
we, as Tully (1997) says, ‘partly constituted as subjects acting on nature in (the) 
complex practices of knowledge, power, ethics and technologies’, but also that 
such practices constitute the nature we act upon. This in turn requires that we give 
appropriate weight to the ways in which the non-human world (both nature and 
material technologies) is a repository of capacities that are significant resources 
for the translation networks and centres of calculation that are integral to the 
power of modern science. 
One consequence of extending this sort of analysis to the natural sciences is 
that the processes of thematisation, discipline and normalisation must be seen to 
be as much a part of our knowledge of, and relation to, nature as they are in the 
human sciences. The natural environment has increasingly become the subject of 
political rationalities, which have not only altered the ways in which its ‘reality’ is 
conceptualised, but also generated a complex array of moral and political 
justifications for the proper disposition of authority and government. Such a view 
is not inconsistent with Foucault’s project of understanding power and its 
                                                 
295 I am indebted to Nikolas Rose for articulating this distinction in his comments to me on an 
earlier published work (Rutherford, 1994a). 
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production of truth, even when extended to the natural science. In arguing thus I 
have draw on the work of Nikolas Rose and Peter Miller on governmentality. 
Governing conduct is linked to political rationalities, which make the domain to 
be governed intelligible and susceptible to strategic (including moral) action. 296 
Such rationalities are brought to bear on conduct through governmental 
technologies. Rose suggests that such technologies should be regarded as ‘an 
assemblage’ of a range of forms of practical knowledge, practices of calculation, 
human capacities and non-human objects and devices, including inscription 
devices. (Rose, 1999 p.52 – emphasis added) 
Rose views such technologies of government as ‘human’ technologies, and 
argues counter to the Frankfurt School, that it is meaningless to counterpose 
human freedom to technology simply because ‘freedom is the mobile outcome of 
a multitude of human technologies’. Yet despite this, Rose appears reluctant take 
the broader view of power suggested by authors including Latour, Callon and 
Rouse. His view of the inventiveness of science appears to remain overly tied to 
the experimental methodology of scientists within the laboratory to the neglect of 
how this is only ever of lasting significance to the extent that is able translated 
outside the laboratory. Rose and Miller draw on Latour and Callon’s notions of 
inscription devices and translation networks (and the role of these in enabling 
‘action at a distance’) as central to neo-liberal modes of rule. Given this, and 
Rose’s (1999) recognition that even material technologies involve ‘a certain 
shaping of conduct’, it must be said that Rose has not presented a clear argument 
as to why the actor network theory position on agency should be unacceptable. 297 
If it is accepted that a rigid separation cannot be made between those elements of 
governmental technologies that rely on non-human capacities, objects, and 
devices, and those whose elements are social, then it is difficult to see why agency 
cannot be attributed to ‘hybrid’ actants as suggested by Latour. 
At a general level, despite his reluctance to develop conceptually his fairly 
scattered comments on the natural sciences, Foucault could clearly be said to 
regard discipline and biopolitics as mechanisms by which otherness was 
thematised, problematised and brought into the realm of normalising calculation. 
Indeed, Foucault cautioned that 
We must not imagine that the world turns towards us a legible face which 
we would have only to decipher; the world is not the accomplice of our 
knowledge; there is no prediscursive providence which disposes the 
world in our favour. (Foucault, 1981d p.229) 
                                                 
296 See Rose (1999) p.15-60 for a detailed exposition of ‘governing’. 
297 I have posed a similar question in a review of Hindess’ recent work. See Rutherford (1997b). 
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It is in comments such as this that we see the common threads between Foucault’s 
work and that of Horkheimer and Adorno, who argued that in Enlightenment 
thinking the ‘mere idea of outsideness is the very source of fear’. (Adorno and 
Horkheimer, 1986) It is here that we can understand the link between 
rationalisation, discipline and normalisation. Foucault (1990 p.142) argued that 
the emergence of biopolitics coincided with the modern scientific thematisation of 
life, making for the first time in history what was formerly the ‘inaccessible 
substrate’ of human life an object of power. Scientific objectification, whether of 
the human body or non-human nature problematises that otherness which 
threatens to escape governmentalisation and normalisation. Foucault often 
emphasised that problematisation and discipline were the products of specific 
rationalities. There is in Foucault recognition of what could be described as the 
dark side of the thematising project and of reason more generally. 298 However, 
the problem is not the same one identified by critical theory (and Green theorists) 
299 as that of excessive instrumental rationality. As Jane Bennett has pointed out, it 
is ‘misleading to reduce the problem to instrumental rationality (as) each and 
every categorical organisation, however expressive or anti-instrumental, will be 
exclusionary in some way.’ (Bennett, 1987 p.145) Such a view is not that far from 
Horkheimer and Adorno’s treatment of ‘identity thinking’ in Dialectic of 
Enlightenment. 300 
The effect of the scientific thematisation of nature is taken up by Beck. He 
claims that the further differentiation of industrial modernity in risk society means 
that nature no longer retains its ‘pre-ordained character’ and has become part of 
the ‘inner nature’ of post-industrial society. He argues that the meanings of 
‘nature’ and ‘society’ are re-thematised and integrated into a ‘social-nature’. In 
the process nature is appropriated to political functions: 
‘Nature’ becomes a social project, a utopia that is to be reconstructed, 
shaped and transformed … and (this) makes the production of matters and 
bodies of fact possible (and) … produces a world of living creatures 
which can conceal the manufacturing character it creates and represents. 
(Beck, 1994 p.27) 
Ecological problems and environmental movements are therefore as much 
involved in the thematisation of nature, as are the economic and technical forces 
                                                 
298 It is this side of Foucault’s work that Habermas and Honneth seized on when attributing to him 
a view of a disciplined society, similar to Horkheimer and Adorno’s ‘totally administered 
society’. 
299 See Eckersley (1992) and Chapter 2 of this thesis. 
300 See Rutherford (1993) and Luke (1988) for discussion of how expressivist forms of 
environmentalism, especially ‘deep ecology’, seek a new subjectivity modelled on an uncritical 
acceptance of ecological constructs.. 
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of advanced industrialism. As Beck emphasises, such movements and 
problematisations, while they appear to call for the ‘salvation of nature’ in fact 
‘accelerate and perfect’ the consumption (of nature)’. (Beck, 1994 p.27) The 
problem is that Beck is unable to explain how this is brought about. 
Latour’s critique of the modern bifurcation of nature and society points in 
deliberately Foucauldian terms to the need for a new ‘political constitution of 
truth’ which would recognise the hitherto denied and subterranean production of 
socio-natural ‘collectives’ and ‘hybrids’. What this involves is not simply the 
recognition that the realm of positivity is in fact a tangle of the human and non-
human. Rather Latour sees this as also very much a continuation of the democratic 
spirit of the Enlightenment, and specifically asks, ‘Is it not worth the effort to 
pursue the Enlightenment into the dark tangles of science and society mixtures?’ 
(Latour, 1991 p.18) For him this is a question of creating, along the lines 
suggested by Foucault, a new regime of truth and a new anthropology appropriate 
to the task – a task involving the intellectual disciplines of political philosophy 
and science studies. 301 He insists that this does not require a ‘revolution’, only the 
public ratification of what has always in fact happened in practice but has been 
denied by modern epistemology. 
However, this claim that all that is needed mere ‘ratification’ is not as simple 
as Latour’s presentation of it suggests. Even if his argument for the hybridisation 
of social and natural entities were accepted, the call to bring Enlightenment to 
bear on the entities of socio-nature would carry the process of thematisation and 
objectification to a new level of intensity. Latour’s ‘Parliament of Things’, the 
recognition that power and agency inhere in networks composed of human actions 
and material capacities of things, requires on his account a further extension of the 
                                                 
301 Dean argues that despite the commonalities between actor network theory and Foucault, the 
two part company because authors such as Callon and Latour adhere to a particular variant of 
realism which focuses on the way in which socio-technical reality is constructed, whereas 
Foucault adopts a far more nominalist approach which refrains from pronouncing on the nature 
of social reality. Foucault’s methods, argues Dean ‘arise once we examine the full 
consequences of what we might call “the social construction of knowledge” while abstaining 
from providing an alternative account of reality (the reality of subjects, of society, of 
humanity).’ Hence, what is at issue is in fact ‘the realm of effectivity of the construction of 
truth.’ Nevertheless, Dean argues that there is a limit to Foucault’s nominalism, that he ‘refrains 
from the inference that everything is thereby a construction. Yet at the same time the real 
‘remains too indecipherable ever to be able to be summed up into a formula (a theory of the 
subject, of power, of a constructed object, a realm of facts, a network, a social reality). … This 
is Foucault's irrealism, his agnosticism. (Dean, 1998a p.193-5)  
Space does not permit an excersus into the philosophical debates on realism and constructivism. 
However, I am not convinced by Dean’s argument on this issue. I think that he overlooks the 
degree to which actor network theory is compatible with the sort of nominalism attributed to 
Foucault. In any case, I do not see the approach taken by Callon and Latour as a realist one. I 
am more comfortable with Rouse’s position, which is “against realism and anti-realism”. On 
this see Rouse (1987). 
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dividing practices and scientific classification that Foucault’s work pointed to as 
central to modern power/knowledge. Thus, Latour says that we need 
The meticulous sorting of quasi-objects to become possible – no longer 
unofficially and under the table, but officially and in broad daylight. In 
this desire to bring to light, to incorporate into language, to make public, 
we continue to identify with the intuition of the Enlightenment. But this 
intuition never had the anthropology it deserved. (Latour, 1993 p.142) 
As Foucault and others have shown, the other side of such thematisation is 
problematisation, programs of government, normalisation and discipline. The way 
in which such programs of ecological governmentality would play themselves out 
is not something to which Latour pays much attention. His approach does 
however suggest something of a celebratory proliferation of hybrid diversity. 
There is no doubt that the processes of translation and relations of power analysed 
by actor network theory would not be abolished by abandoning the modern 
constitution. Indeed, there is in what Latour says no suggestion of the abolition of 
power. However, his rhetoric regarding a ‘Parliament of Things’ confuses, 
perhaps deliberately, different meanings of representation so that recognition of 
the actor-network qualities of agency is not disentangled from notions of political 
sovereignty. The value of Latour’s critique of the modern constitution is that it 
undermines any arbitrary division of representation between human and non-
human entities. This critical genealogical approach makes ‘no a priori distinction 
between the size of actors, between the real and the unreal, between what is 
necessary and what is contingent, between the technical and the social.’ (Callon 
and Latour, 1981 p.292) This is particularly important when the realm of 
positivity in question is the ecological. In such circumstances it focuses attention 
on the ways in which capacities and power are aggregated, through centres of 
calculation, to act across complex assemblages of political (both institutional and 
sub-political), scientific, economic, ethical, and technological practices at both the 
local and global level. 
All of the theoretical approaches considered in this thesis lead us to consider 
the ways in which modern scientific knowledge and expertise shapes the 
distribution of power and the social relation to nature. Foucault’s insistence that 
we understand particular institutions and accompanying relations of power as the 
result of historically specific political rationalities, rather than as the result of 
some generalised (and totalising) process of societal rationalisation is an 
important corrective to that tendency in theorists such as Habermas and Beck. 
Foucault’s notion of biopolitics can, as I have argued, be linked to the emergence 
of contemporary scientific ecology as a mode of regulatory science. This is not to 
suggest that contemporary environmental discourse is a unity, much less that it 
reflects the triumph of technical or instrumental rationality in general. Instead, the 
more limited suggestion has been made that the ecological sciences (such as 
systems ecology) and projects such as the International Biological Program can be 
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understood as a form of political or governmental rationality. Systems ecology is 
one such rationality among a plurality of rationalities, even within the domain of 
environmental discourse. 
If this governmentality approach is applied to Eder’s work, for example, it 
suggests that what he calls the ‘purity’ or romantic model of nature has been very 
much a marginalised rationality in Western culture and politics. Nonetheless, 
historically it has interacted with and influenced the expression of the dominant 
rationality, the utilitarian or ‘justice’ model of nature. Something similar can be 
found in Beck’s notion of sub-politics, in which he argues that risk society 
produces discourses about the generation and distribution risk that increase 
opportunities for social movements and counter-experts to help shape 
contemporary society ‘from below’. Latour and Callon also show that socio-
technical action at the local level (in the laboratory, the factory or on the farm) 
and at the macro-level of the ‘social system’ is not fundamentally different. In 
each case it is rather a question of local actors making themselves ‘bigger’ and 
more powerful by extending the reach of translation chains and enrolling the 
resources of allies, and by occupying obligatory passage points or centres which 
channel translations and resources to enhance their strength. As Rose points out, 
what is at stake in all of these sorts of struggles are not contestations ‘between 
power and its others, but between diverse programs, logics, dreams and ideals, 
codified, organised and rationalised to a greater or lesser extent.’ (Rose, 1999 
p.279)  
The similarity with Foucault here is obvious. Foucault argued that a power 
relation is ‘an agonism’, a ‘permanent provocation’. Power relationships are 
dynamic and therefore always potentially unstable. Consequently, under particular 
circumstances, even long-established states of domination may be subject to 
reversal. Thus Eder’s purity model and aspects of Beck’s sub-polity can be seen 
as resistance to the dominant, scientised understandings of nature, or what 
Foucault described as an ‘insurrection of subjugated knowledges’, those ‘naïve’, 
‘disqualified’, localised, non-scientific discourses which oppose the ‘tyranny’ of 
particular globalising scientific disciplines. (Foucault, 1980e p.81-5) However, 
the point in making such a contrast is not to counterpose, in the style of 
Habermas, modern, rationalised knowledge to anti-modern, irrational forms of 
belief, which are thereby devalued and excluded. Indeed, perhaps Foucault’s 
comments on ‘resistance’ betray a lingering valorisation of the autonomy and 
sovereignty from which I have argued he failed to fully break. Perhaps, as Rose 
suggests, there is no need for a notion of resistance. Rather we may need to think 
simply in terms of the dynamic ‘ways in which creativity arises out of the 
situation of human beings 302engaged in particular relations of force and meaning, 
                                                 
302 Or indeed, of any ‘actant’, not only human ones. 
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and what is made out of the possibilities of that location.’ (Rose, 1999 p.279) 
Foucault of course saw identification with the resistance of ‘disqualified’ 
discourses as a practical genealogical task aimed at establishing ‘a historical 
knowledge of struggles’ which could be made use of tactically in contemporary 
political and social contests. (Foucault, 1980e p.83) No doubt there are many 
disqualified and subjugated knowledges where this is appropriate, yet it is also 
relevant to recall Hindess’ comment that organised social existence (and the 
freedoms that this provides) is not possible without some degree of domination. It 
is arguable that in environmental matters, some forms of domination may be 
particularly important if both humans and other species are to enjoy certain basic 
ecological ‘rights to life’. This however touches on the issue of an environmental 
ethics – a task beyond this thesis. 303 
The focus of this thesis suggests that a research agenda into ecological 
problems is likely to have much to gain from drawing on the work of both 
governmentality studies and actor network theory. While I have commented 
above on the role of environmental movements, the study of environmental 
discourse cannot be concerned solely, or perhaps even principally, with the 
struggle between scientific and non-scientific rationalities. It would also need to 
examine the competition and manoeuvring within scientific ecology itself (ie 
between systems ecology and population ecology, community ecology, etc), and 
to consider how these apparently esoteric, technical debates influence the 
historical formation of the regulatory sciences and ecological programs of 
government.304 This thesis has argued that the development of scientific ecology, 
particularly systems ecology, provided both a guiding political rationality and the 
technical apparatus of calculation and assessment that by the late 1960s began to 
make possible a form of regulatory science that was capable of governmentalising 
society-environment relations.  
A need exists for substantial further research into the ways in which the 
ecological research institutions (particularly in the United States, but also in other 
countries) developed as centres of calculation able to translate their emerging 
research interests into key elements of the new rationalities of ecological 
government. Such historical research would seek to explain how scientists were 
able to make the technical agendas of ecology the cornerstone of powerful 
alliances with conservation groups, political executives, legislatures and State 
agencies to create new regulatory regimes focused on the problematisation of the 
environment and the social relation to nature. The role of the USA has been 
                                                 
303 For some recent and very interesting attempts to consider what an environmental ethic 
informed by a Foucauldian perspective might involve (and not involve) see Darier (1999b) and 
Tully (1997). 
304 For some excellent historical studies of the conflicts within scientific ecology in the post-
World War 2 period see Mitman (1988); Palliadino (1991) and Taylor (1988). 
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significant, inasmuch as it was the first place that saw the emergence of 
contemporary industrialised ‘big science’. This was initially very much influenced 
by national characteristics. However, given the transnational character of 
scientific research agendas (eg the International Geophysical Year and the 
International Biological Program), and the hegemony of US science in much of 
the post-World War Two period, there is evidence of a widespread (but by no 
means universal) internationalisation of ecological techniques (eg Environmental 
Impact Assessment) and ecological theories originating in the USA. 305 How these 
‘laboratory’ developments were translated both nationally and internationally, and 
were aligned with economic and social interests requires further investigation. 
While the focus of many governmentality studies has been the practices of 
government within the context of particular nation-states, actor network theory 
provides useful conceptual tools to look at scientific networks that extend beyond 
such boundaries. It is important not to over-emphasise the nation-state and 
national cultures at the expense of analysing the problematics of government in a 
way that gives appropriate weight to the global (or at least transnational) 
assemblages of forces and networks of authoritative scientific-policy judgement 
that can have a significant influence on shaping contemporary social relations. 
Included in this would be consideration of the role of international organisations, 
and the link between science and international environmental policy (eg ozone 
depletion, climate change etc.). 
Dean has argued the Foucauldian concern with the ‘problematic of 
government is not so much a solution to the paradoxical nature of the state but a 
research agenda into the contingent trajectories by which the state assumes its 
present and changing form’. (Dean, 1994 p.181) As ecological problems 
demonstrate, that form is increasingly one in which national structures are 
overlaid by international patterns of governance which embody processes of both 
marketisation and regulation, and which rely on expertise and knowledge that is to 
a significant degree denationalised (if not globalised). In the context of ecological 
problems, it is therefore important to try to unravel the relations between such 
denationalised scientific expertise on the one hand, and on the other, the political 
rationalities and various governmental programs for ecological management 
conceived in terms of a global, systemic interdependence between society and 
nature. 
The many apparently contradictory elements of environmental discourse 
(scientific, economic, ethical, cultural, etc) can be understood in terms of the 
                                                 
305 For detailed discussions of the influence of US science on the growth of contemporary 
ecological theories, see Golley (1993); Jamison (1993) and McIntosh (1985). For detailed 
consideration of the political institutionalisation of environment protection in the USA, see 
Harris and Milkis (1989); Jasanoff (1990); (1992) and Marcus (1991). 
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notion of governmentality. The significant work of Rose and Miller (1992) on this 
has identified three key characteristics of governmental rationalities. If the 
discourse on the problem of nature is considered in the light of these three 
elements, we can move beyond the general assertion that both ecological 
modernisation and counter-cultural resistance are immanent in modernity, and 
instead begin to consider how and why these elements fit together in 
contemporary practices for governing the environment. 
According to Rose and Miller (1992 p.178-82) governmental rationalities are 
characteristically moral, epistemological and idiomatic. They are expressed in 
moral terms that elaborate the ideals and principles with which government 
should properly be concerned. Ecological governmentality is particularly 
concerned with questions of justice and equity – questions such as inter-
generational equity, the relation between development and environmental 
protection, and the relations between the needs of human society and the biotic 
rights of non-human nature. Thus a significant element in the environmental 
debate is the concern to develop an appropriate environmental ethics. 
Governmental rationalities also have an epistemological character. They are 
articulated in terms of a specific knowledge of the objects and problems to be 
addressed. This epistemology is in large part derived from scientific ecology, 
which as I argue in Chapter 6, represents an essentially economic model of 
nature.306 It is scientific ecology (and related sciences of global environmental 
modelling) that provides the authoritative accounts of the sorts of entities and 
processes which must be managed – ecosystems, global climatic and atmospheric 
processes, habitat and species diversity, population and carrying capacity, and so 
forth. Finally, all governmental rationalities are expressed in a distinctive idiom, 
which functions as an intellectual means for making reality ‘thinkable in such a 
way that it is amenable to political deliberations.’ (Rose and Miller, 1992 p.179) 
Hence the relationship of society to the natural environment is conceived in terms 
of the language of security and risk (or ecological crisis). Ecological hazards and 
insecurity are characteristically posed as problems that must be addressed through 
governmental technologies that minimise dangerous behaviours and the risks to 
which they give rise. The idiom of ecological rationality is paradigmatically 
represented by ‘the precautionary principle’, 307 which reverses the onus of 
scientific proof to insist that practices and actions cannot be deemed safe simply 
because there is not scientific certainty of the potential for environmental harm. 
Government, as the conduct of conduct is inherently a problematising activity 
in which the ‘articulation of government has been bound to the constant 
                                                 
306 On this see Worster (1987a) and (1993a). 
307  This is was clearly enunciated as the key principle of sustainable development in the famous 
“Brundtland Report” (Brundtland, 1987). 
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identification of the difficulties and failures of government.’ (Rose and Miller, 
1992 p.181-83) Ecological governmentality is a problematising political 
rationality, which continuously seeks to improve the techniques for managing the 
environment and those social activities that impact upon ecological processes. 
Ecological governmentality therefore continually problematises the social relation 
to nature at a basic ontological (and moral) level. In many respects, ecological 
thought articulates the fundamental philosophical dilemma of the dialectic of 
enlightenment, in which modernity, with its dependence on instrumental, 
scientific knowledge, embodies a self-destructive social relation to nature. 
However, as Klaus Eder (1996) has argued, differing and sometimes even 
incommensurable validity claims mean that the conflict over the social relation to 
nature cannot be resolved by reference to the ‘implicit validity claims’ of critical 
theory. 
It is however possible to develop a historically grounded theoretical 
framework for the analysis of these sort of ecological discourses, conflicts and 
practices by drawing on the work of Foucault, recent governmentality studies, and 
Latour and actor network theory. Such an approach, while cognisant of the macro-
sociological dimensions of biopolitics, is also able to relate this to specific, 
localised governmental programs and technologies involved in governing the 
social relation to nature. The work of Rose and Miller in particular draws on 
Latour and Callon. In doing so it emphasises that programs of government emerge 
as a means of establishing ‘translatability between the moralities, epistemologies 
and idioms of political power, and the government of a specific problem space, 
(which) establishes a mutuality between what is desirable and what can be made 
possible through the calculated activities of political forces.’ (Rose and Miller, 
1992 p.178-82) 
An important research agenda for scholars who seek to understand the 
relations of power and knowledge in contemporary ecological discourse is the 
application of the insights derived from governmentality and actor network 
studies to an environmental ‘history of the present’. Such research would involve 
the meticulous, empirical study of the three dimensions of governmental 
rationalities, and the ways in which these are shaped by the dynamic interactions 
of scientific knowledge and expertise, material technologies, ecological 
movements, state-based regulatory regimes, and the influence of global forces of 
marketisation. 
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